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Abstract 
 
The question of how affective state effects decision making has, in recent years, come to 
prominence in the field of decision research. The relationship between numeracy and 
choice, reasoning and judgement has also started to receive an increasing amount of 
attention. The series of studies reported here investigate the effect of numeracy and affect 
on the violation of rational choice principles. Preference reversal and violations of 
(transparent) dominance in decisions under risk are investigated in Study 1, using a lottery 
choice paradigm, while Study 2 examines the relationship between numeracy and these 
violations of rationality. Study 3 concerns the development and reliability and validity 
testing of a numeracy scale designed for use in decision research. Study 4 investigates the 
extent to which more and less numerate individuals attend to probabilistic and outcome 
value information, using a think aloud methodology. In Studies 5 and 6 the effect of 
endogenous and exogenous affect on choice and response time is examined, with Study 6 
also investigating whether the effect of affect on dominance violation is mediated by 
numeracy or propensity to engage in cognitive reflection. Key contributions to theory 
made by this programme of research included the findings that: 1) probability neglect is a 
widespread phenomenon that can lead to violations of transparent dominance; 2) those 
lower in numeracy are more prone to probability neglect than those who are more 
numerate; 3) endogenous happiness promotes the utilisation of cognitively effortful System 
2 processes and thus a reduced rate of probability neglect, while exogenous happiness does 
not; and 4) the relationship between endogenous happiness and process is not mediated by 
numeracy, thus indicating that those lower in numeracy can be motivated to expend greater 
cognitive effort on probabilistic tasks. Two key contributions to methodology are also 
made: 1) a numeracy scale; and 2) a procedure for eliciting task-endogenous changes in 
affective state. 
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
 
As the title indicates, the overarching goal of this programme of research was to 
investigate the relationship between numeracy, affect and the violation of certain rational 
choice principles in decisions under risk. The rational choice principles in question are 
transitivity and dominance, both of which should be adhered to if a decision maker is 
making choices in accordance with the normative model set out in subjective expected 
utility theory (axiomised by von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944 and Savage, 1954). The 
axiom of transitivity states that when A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C then A 
should invariably be preferred to C. The principle of dominance states that when an 
alternative is superior to others on at least one attribute and equal in all other respects, this 
alternative should be selected. Both of these axioms would appear to be intuitively 
obvious. One would – barring indifference or a change in circumstance – anticipate 
preference to remain transitive and stable. One would also expect people to select superior 
alternatives over inferior alternatives.  Of these two principles dominance is, of course, the 
most fundamental. To violate transitivity is to demonstrate inconsistency of preference. To 
violate dominance on the other hand is to fail to act in accordance with preference. 
However, violations of both principles have been recorded.  Intransitivities have been 
observed in various choice scenarios (e.g. Starmer, 1999; Tversky, 1969 amongst many 
others), while Tversky and Kahneman (1981, 1986) observed that dominance may be 
violated when the existence of a dominant alternative is rendered non-transparent (i.e. in 
multi-stage gambles and scenarios where alternatives feature a large number of potential 
outcomes). Nonetheless, when these principles of rational choice are violated one is 
prompted to ask why this might occur. This is especially true for violations of dominance. 
Indeed, in scenarios where dominance is systematically violated despite the fact that the 
existence of a dominant alternative should be transparent, the question of why this should 
happen has both theoretical and practical importance.  
 
In the series of studies reported here, the question of why a large number of 
participants should violate dominance when presented with choices in which the existence 
of a dominant alternative should be transparent forms the central focus of investigation. 
While this may at first seem a somewhat narrow focus, the wider implications for theory of 
the findings obtained are not. In Studies 2, 4 and 6 a clear link between numeracy, 
probability neglect and dominance violation is established. In Studies 5 and 6 endogenous 
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happiness is found to have a very different relationship with rate of dominance 
violation/adherence (and thus mode of thought) than exogenous happiness. These findings 
indicate that, even amongst relatively well educated populations, probabilistic information 
is often inconsistently attended to. 
 
The relationship between numeracy and choice is one that has, during the last five 
years, received an increasing amount of interest. In the modern world numeric choice 
information is ubiquitous. However, there is increasing awareness that many adults are 
lacking in basic mathematical ability. In the UK, the 2003 Skills for Life survey 
demonstrated that 47% of British adults lacked the skill required to obtain a bare pass 
(Grade G) in GCSE mathematics, with 75% failing to reach the equivalent of a good pass 
(Grade C or above). Similar findings have been obtained in the USA; with many well 
educated individuals lacking adequate understanding of numeric risk information (see 
Reyna, Nelson, Han & Dieckmann. 2009 for further summary and discussion). Hence, the 
question of how more and less numerate individuals may differ in manner in which they 
process and utilise numeric choice information has great theoretical and practical 
importance. Peters, Vastfjall, Slovic, Mertz, Mazzocco and Dickert (2006) found that those 
lower in numeracy tended to be more prone to certain violations of rationality (i.e. 
denominator neglect and certain framing effects) than those higher in numeracy. These 
findings were attributed by Peters et al. to less numerate individuals being more susceptible 
to the influence of objectively irrelevant but affectively salient attributes. Subsequent 
research has lent further support to this postulation (see for instance Peters & Levin, 2008; 
Peters, Dieckmann, Vastfjall, Mertz, Slovic & Hibbard, 2009), while the findings of 
Dieckmann, Slovic and Peters (2009) indicate that more and less numerate individuals 
differ in manner in which they use qualitative and quantitative information. In the present 
programme of research, the relationship between numeracy and probability usage and 
neglect is examined, with several key conclusions being drawn as to nature of this 
relationship. 
 
In addition to examining the relationship between numeracy, probability neglect 
and the violation of rational choice principles, the effect of endogenous and exogenous 
affect on choice process is investigated in the last two studies in this series. As 
Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee and Welch (2001) point out, emotion has traditionally been 
seen as a barrier to rational choice. However, over the last decade and a half a rather more 
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nuanced picture has emerged. Evidence has emerged to indicate that affect is a necessary 
component of choice (see for instance Bechara, Damasio, Tranel & Damasio, 1997; 
Bechara, Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 1996; Damasio 1994) and that it acts in itself as a 
source of information (see Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic & Johnson 2000; Slovic, Finucane, 
Peters & MacGregor, 2004). With respect to choice, judgement and reasoning processes 
(and mode of thought more generally), it has also been posited that positive affective states 
facilitate reliance on intuitive, associative top down processes, while ‗sad‘ affective states 
promote utilisation of deliberative, bottom up processes (see for example Bless, Clore, 
Schwarz, Golisano, Rabe & Wolk, 1996; Bless & Schwarz, 1999; de Vries Holland & 
Witteman, 2008a, 2008b). Hence, the exact nature of the relationship between emotion and 
the processing of choice information is of some interest in the field of decision research. In 
one recent paper Zeelenberg, Nelissen, Breugelmans and Pieters (2008) postulate that 
emotion serves to motivate goal directed behaviour and, as such, the effects of endogenous 
and exogenous emotional states on judgement and decision making may differ in some 
instances. In Studies 5 and 6 the effect of endogenous and exogenous affect on adherence 
to the dominance principle (along with other markers of task performance) is thus 
investigated.  The results of these two studies indicate that task induced happiness does 
indeed appear to have a different relationship with task performance (and thus choice 
process) than incidental happiness.  
 
What follows will be a systematic report of the studies that comprise this 
programme of research, the theoretical basis for undertaking them and the key conclusions 
that can be drawn from their findings. In the literature review (Chapter 2), the theoretical 
background to the present programme of research is fully detailed. Studies 1 and 2 
(Chapters 3 and 4) investigate violations of transitivity and dominance in a simple lottery 
choice task, with Study 2 examining the relationship between numeracy and these 
violations of rationality. Numeracy is also the central focus of Studies 3 and 4 (Chapters 5 
and 6). In Study 3 the reliability and validity of a numeracy scale designed for use in this 
programme of research is tested, while Study 4 utilises a think aloud method to examine 
the rate at which more and less numerate individuals reference probabilistic choice 
information. In Studies 5 and 6 (Chapters 7 and 8), the last two studies of the series, the 
relationship between endogenous and exogenous affect, dominance violation and choice 
process is examined. Study 6 also examines whether the relationship between affect and 
task performance is mediated by numeracy. Finally, key findings, conclusions and 
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implications are outlined in the general discussion, along with possible directions for future 
research.  
  
5 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
As outlined in the general introduction to this thesis, the primary aim of this 
programme of research is to investigate the impact of numeracy and affective state on 
choice process and the violation of certain rational choice principles. What follows will be 
a discussion of theoretical context within which the series of investigations reported in this 
thesis takes place. The dominance principle and its centrality to the notion of ‗rational 
choice‘ will be outlined in the first section of this literature review, along with the role that 
dominance violation/adherence and preference reversal play in various structural models of 
choice. While the focus of this thesis is on cognitive process rather than the mathematical 
modelling of rationality and behaviour, it is felt that such an overview is necessary in order 
to put the findings of the studies reported here in context. This summary will then be 
followed by a discussion of cognitive models of choice, with emphasis placed on dual-
process models, which are central to the series of investigations reported here. This, in 
turn, will be followed by overviews of research in the fields of numeracy and choice and 
emotion and choice, upon which the investigations reported here in this thesis aim to build.  
 
2.1. The Dominance Principle: Predictions of Normative and ‘As-If’ Models of Choice 
 
 The axioms of subjective expected utility theory. 
 
The dominance principle holds that when one alternative is equal to all other 
alternatives in all ways apart from one, in which it is superior, this dominant alternative 
should be chosen. It is one of the four principles of rational choice set out in Savage‘s 
(1954) axiomisation of subjective expected utility theory.  
 
Subjective expected utility theory (henceforth referred to as SEU) is a model of 
rational choice. That is to say, a model of how an ‗ideal‘ and wholly rational individual 
would make decisions under risk. In this thesis reference will be made to three kinds of 
choice model: normative, predictive and descriptive. Reference to the ‗normative model‘ 
is, unless otherwise specified, a reference to SEU and the manner in which SEU‘s ideal, 
rational decision maker would make choices. Reference to normativity will also be made, 
where appropriate, with regard to reasoning rather than choice. In these cases ‗normative‘ 
performance should be taken to be that which is logically (and mathematically) correct. 
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The term predictive model will be used here to describe models that endeavour to predict 
choice. Such models, whilst aiming to accurately predict the choices that decision makers 
will make, given a particular set of inputs, do not necessarily aim to describe the cognitive 
or neurological processes involved in choice. Examples include cumulative prospect theory 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) and Birnbaum‘s Configural Weighting Models (e.g. 
Birnbaum & Macintosh, 1996; Birnbaum & Chavez, 1997). These are sometime dubbed 
‗as-if‘ models (e.g. Johnson, Schulte-Mecklenbeck & Willemsen, 2008). The term 
‗descriptive model‘, as one might imagine, will be used to refer to models that endeavour 
to describe and identify the processes underlying choice. Hence, a model can be both 
descriptive and predictive or merely predictive (a model that was descriptive without 
having any predictive component would be insupportable as such would be impossible to 
test). 
 
The normative model set out in SEU is central to this particular program of 
research, in that it provides a point of comparison. That is to say, individuals‘ actual 
choices can be compared to those that would be made by the idealised, rational decision 
maker using the utility maximisation process set out in SEU. 
 
The first formulation of SEU was proposed in the 17
th
 century by mathematician 
Bernoulli and later expounded upon and axiomised by von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944) and Savage (1954). It holds that the rational decision maker should make choices 
by calculating the subjective expected utility of each available alternative and selecting that 
alternative with the greatest subjective expected value. An alternative‘s subjective 
expected utility is calculated by multiplying the (subjective) value of each possible 
outcome by the corresponding (perceived) probability of said outcome occurring. Unlike 
expected value, which is derived by multiplying objective linear valuations by objective 
probabilities, subjective expected utility is based upon subjective valuations (i.e. subjective 
utility). Observing that people tended to be risk averse (in the domain of gains at least), 
Bernoulli proposed that the utility function was concaved, with a certain gain of x usually 
being preferred of a .5 probability of winning 2x. However, despite the subjectivity of 
utility/disutility valuations (i.e. how ‗good‘ or ‗bad‘ a potential outcome would be), the 
SEU model frames decision making as an essentially rational activity, in which 
(subjective) utility is maximised. 
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In Savage‘s (1954) axiomisation of SEU, four central axioms of rational choice 
were established: dominance, invariance, transitivity and independence.  
 
 Dominance: As detailed above, the principle of dominance holds that when an 
alternative is superior to all others in at least one respect and equal in all others, it 
should be chosen. 
 
 Invariance: The principle of invariance essentially holds that the manner in which 
a choice is framed or presented should have no impact upon the decision made as 
long all choice attributes (i.e. outcome values and probabilities) remain objectively 
constant. 
 
 Transitivity: The notion that order of preference should remain consistence. 
Essentially, that if alternative A is preferred to alternative B and alternative B is 
preferred to alternative C, then alternative A should logically be preferred to 
alternative C. 
 
 Independence: That if an outcome (or potential outcome) is common to all 
available alternatives then it should not influence choice. 
 
Needless to say, violations of each of these axioms have been observed in various 
choice scenarios. The Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes demonstrate that the majority of 
people demonstrate preference patterns inconsistent with the axiom of independence when 
presented with certain problems (see Baron, 2008, for an outline of the Allais and Ellsberg 
paradoxes). Systematic violations of transitivity have been observed and reported (e.g. 
Starmer, 1999; Tversky 1969) as have violations of invariance; with the Asian Disease 
problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) being perhaps the most famous example of the 
latter.  
 
Of the four rational choice principles detailed above dominance is the most 
fundamental. That a superior alternative should be chosen over an inferior alternative, 
when all choice information is available, would seem to be self-evident. Independence, 
transitivity and invariance are matters of preference consistency. Dominance however 
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would appear to be a matter of adhering to one‘s preference. Yet once again, in their 
seminal body of research on the subject of rational choice principles and the adherence 
to/violation thereof, Tversky and Kahneman (1981, 1986) found that many individuals 
violate the dominance principle when the existence of a dominant alternative (or set of 
alternatives) is rendered intransparent by: a) the fact a choice task has been broken down 
into multiple stages; or b) alternatives having a large number of difficult to compare 
outcomes.  
 
 Prospect theory, cumulative prospect theory and configural weighting models. 
 
Tversky and Kahneman attributed the above mentioned violations of dominance to 
a tendency to underweigh larger probabilities comparative to smaller probabilities. This 
tendency is predicted by prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), the model that 
Tversky and Kahneman devised to a) predict actual choice; and b) explain why the axioms 
of rational choice set out by Savage (1954) are not universally adhered to. In its original 
formulation prospect theory, like SEU, holds that decisions are a product of subjective 
valuations of outcomes weighted by an assessment of their corresponding probability of 
occurring. Unlike SEU however, Prospect Theory was formulated to be a predictive rather 
than normative model. While SEU holds that the rational decision maker should multiply 
the (subjective) valuations of outcomes by their corresponding (perceived or objectively 
determined) probability of occurring, prospect theory holds that choice is the result of 
subjective valuations of outcomes being weighted by decision weights. Decision weights 
are functions of probability rather than probabilities themselves. While probabilities are 
linear (e.g. a .15 chance of a particular event occurring being exactly half that of a .3 
chance of a particular event occurring), according to prospect theory decision weights are 
not, following instead the curvilinear trend depicted in Figure 2.1.1 below. 
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Figure 2.1.1: Example of a weighting function. 
    
 
As one can see, the gradient of the curve is far steeper with regard to very small 
probabilities than it is with regard to moderate probabilities. For instance, the difference in 
‗weight‘ between .01 and .02 is far greater than the difference in weight between .46 and 
.47, despite the fact that the difference is .01 in each instance. In addition to postulating 
that probabilities are transformed into decision weights, prospect theory also holds that the 
value function is concaved in the domain of gains and convex in the domain of losses. This 
means that – as is the case with SEU – linear increments in value (usually defined in 
monetary terms) are not matched by linear increments in utility and disutility. As Figure 
2.1.2 below illustrates the value function is steeper for losses than for gains, reflecting an 
apparent tendency for losses to loom larger than equivalent (in value) gains. This, it is 
asserted, predicts higher loss aversion than gain seeking. The concave value function for 
gains and convex value function for losses also predicts risk seeking in the domain of 
losses and risk aversion the domain of gains. Diminishing marginal sensitivity to 
increments in value as they move away for the status quo reference point (in either a gain 
or loss direction) means that a gain of 2x does not have twice the subjective value (or 
utility) of x. Hence, risk aversion is predicted, with higher probabilities of obtaining 
smaller gains favoured over smaller probabilities of obtaining larger gains. Similarly, 
according to the valuation function a loss of 2x is not going to be perceived as twice as 
‗bad‘ as a loss of x. This predicts risk seeking for losses, with alternatives featuring a 
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smaller chance of losing a higher amount (and thus a larger chance of losing nothing) 
being favoured over a higher chance of losing a smaller amount.  
 
 
Figure 2.1.2: Example of a value function. 
 
The original formulation of prospect theory conceptualises choice as a two stage 
process consisting of an editing phase and an evaluation phase. In the editing phase the 
decision information is restructured in order to simplify the choice task (thus making the 
evaluation phase less cognitively taxing). The evaluation phase, as the name suggests, 
refers to the phase in which subjective outcome valuations are weighted by their 
corresponding decision weights. Tversky and Kahneman do not, of course, propose that 
people actually make choices by consciously transforming outcome values and 
probabilities into subjective utilities and decision weights and then multiply the former by 
the latter in order to derive the worth of each alternative. Such a procedure would, as 
Simon (1957, 1983) points out, be cognitively implausible in most choice scenarios. Rather 
they propose that the evaluation equation set out in the model serves to predict choice 
behaviour. The non-linear nature of the valuation and decision weighting functions are, of 
course, thought to reflect actual diminishing sensitivity to linear increments in value and 
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probability, but the evaluation phase of prospect theory is not theorised to reflect the actual 
cognitive process(es) by which these measures are utilised in choice. 
 
Of course, while the evaluation phase is not put forward as a descriptive model of 
process, the editing phase is. Thus, prospect theory in its original form is part descriptive 
cognitive theory and part predictive utility model. It was proposed by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) that the editing phase involves the application of simple heuristics such as 
rounding, cancellation (i.e. of outcomes common to all alternatives), combination (i.e. of 
identical outcomes within an alternative) and the dismissal of potential outcomes that 
possess a very low chance of occurring. It is also posited that dominance detection occurs 
in this phase of the choice process; with the choice process ending should a dominant 
alternative become evident. 
 
Within the model set out in original prospect theory, divergences from ‗normatively 
correct‘ choice (i.e. that which SEU would dictate) are explained variously in terms of the 
valuation function, the weighting function and the application of the editing heuristics. In 
the example given above for instance, the systematic violation of the dominance principle 
observed by Tversky and Kahneman (1986) is explained by the weighting function. As 
Camerer (2000) points out, this formulation of prospect theory can account for various 
‗real world‘ choice phenomena.  For instance, the disposition effect, a phenomenon 
formally identified and named by Shefrin and Statman (1985), holds that decision makers 
will tend to hold on to losing prospects (e.g. stocks that are decreasing in value relative to 
their purchase price) rather than accept a certain loss, and sell winning prospects (e.g. 
stocks that are increasing in value relative to their purchase price) early in order to ensure a 
certain gain. The effect has, as Camerer (2000) points out, been observed in various 
experimental (Weber & Camerer, 1998) and real world (Odean, 1997, 1998) contexts. 
Original prospect theory predicts the existence disposition effect due to the fact that the 
model holds that people will be risk seeking in the loss domain (i.e. eager to avoid a certain 
loss) and risk averse in the gains domain (i.e. eager to ensure a certain gain).  
 
As Stevenson, Busmeyer and Naylor (1991) point out, and Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) acknowledge, one problem with original prospect theory‘s conceptualisation of the 
editing function is that it the manner in which it operates is vague and unspecified (and 
therefore very difficult to falsify). As original prospect theory does not specify the 
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procedure (or order) by which the editing heuristics are applied means that many choice 
phenomena could be explained post-hoc by suggesting some combination of editing 
heuristics, whether said heuristics were actually being employed or not. Despite the 
obvious problems with the conceptualisation of the editing phase however, the existence of 
some kind of dominance detection function would seem plausible if one is to presuppose 
the existence of an evaluation phase. As stated above, Tversky and Kahneman do not hold 
that people actually multiply subjective valuations by decision weights. However, in order 
for probabilities and outcome values to jointly influence choice some kind of evaluation 
must take place. It would seem plausible therefore that if the existence of a dominant 
alternative was rendered salient then the dominant alternative should be selected without 
any further evaluation of outcome values and probabilities. Indeed, a study conducted by 
Starmer (1999) supports both the existence of a dominance detection process and a 
probability weighting function consistent with that suggested by original prospect theory. 
As will be reported following chapter, the first investigation in the series reported in this 
thesis was prompted by findings of Starmer‘s (1999) study.  
 
Prospect theory in its original form predicts that a particular pattern of intransitivity 
will occur as a result of the model‘s weighting function. This is to say that in a situation in 
which participants are presented with the three lotteries depicted in Figure 2.1.3 below in 
pairs of A versus B, B versus C and A versus C and asked to select from each pair the 
lottery they would prefer to play, many individuals will display the intransitive pattern of 
preference A > B, B > C, C > A.  
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Lottery A 
 
        20         80 
Lottery B 
0                          30           31                                                             100 
 
        £8:00 
 
                          0 
 30    70 
Lottery C 
0       15                    16 30 31                                                             100 
£8:00 £7:75 
                                  
                            0 
     15         15    70  
 
Figure 2.1.3: Illustration of the three lotteries used by Starmer (1999).  
 
 
If one prefers A to B then one should logically, in accordance with SEU, prefer A 
to C. Alternative B dominates alternative C due to the fact that, while both offer the same 
probability (30%) of incurring a win, one of C‘s potential win amounts is lower than that 
offered by B. Original prospect theory however predicts that the pattern of intransitivity 
described above will result from the overweighting of the two 15% chance of obtaining a 
win offered by C comparative to the single 30% chance of winning a potentially slightly 
greater amount offered by B. The overweighting of .5y comparative to y (where y is a 
moderate probability) predicted by original prospect theory‘s weighting function, means 
that the difference in decision weight between the probabilities of obtaining a non-zero 
outcome in C and B may be enough to offset the small difference in outcome value 
between C and B. Of course, the dominance detection process that original prospect theory 
holds will occur prior to evaluation means that people should not select C over B when the 
two alternatives are presented jointly. However, it does predict that the preference reversal 
A > B, C  > A will occur amongst individuals whose preference for the higher risk 
alternative A over the lower risk alternative B is marginal.  
0             20                    21                                                                        100 
 
   £14:00 
 
                                0 
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Starmer (1999) obtained evidence supporting the existence of the predicted 
preference reversal. On presenting a sample of over 200 participants with the lotteries 
depicted above in pairs of A versus B, B versus C and A versus C, Starmer found that few 
participants violated the dominance principle when required to choose between B and C. A 
large number of participants did however demonstrate the preference reversal A > B, C > 
A. Had this reversal of preference been the result of indifference between alternatives, then 
one would expect the counter reversal B > A, A > C to occur with equal frequency. This 
was not found to be the case. The number of participants demonstrating the reversal of 
preference predicted by original prospect theory was found to be significantly greater than 
the number of participants demonstrating the counter reversal. Hence, Starmer‘s findings 
appear to suggest that while the presence of a saliently dominant alternative in joint 
evaluation is enough to offset the ‗subadditive‘ nature of any probability weighting 
function, such a subadditive weighting function does appear to influence choice in 
scenarios where no dominant alternative exists. As the first investigation in the series 
reported in this thesis will reveal, Starmer‘s findings vis-a-vis adherence to dominance 
have not been universally replicated. However, at the very least, the study indicates a clear 
effect of ‗number of potential outcomes‘ on choice. 
 
Cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) abolished the editing 
phase of the original model. As previously stated, the original formulation of prospect 
theory combined a descriptive editing phase and a predictive ‗as-if‘ evaluation phase. 
Cumulative prospect theory by contrast is entirely predictive (though it should be noted 
that the probability weighting and outcome valuation functions with their diminishing 
marginal sensitivity are posited to reflect actual cognitive/perceptual processes). The 
editing phase of original prospect theory was, as noted above, open to criticism on the 
grounds that it had limited predictive power due to the fact that the manner (and order) in 
which editing heuristics were applied was not clearly specified (e.g. Stevenson, Busmeyer 
& Naylor, 1991). Without the editing phase and its associated dominance detection 
function however original prospect theory would, amongst other things, seem to predict 
systematic violations of (apparently salient) dominance in instances such as Starmer‘s 
(1999) lottery choice task. Ergo cumulative prospect theory dispensed with the editing 
phase and the manner in which (subjective) outcome valuations and decision weights were 
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combined was re-formulated in such a manner as to avoid predicting the dominance 
violation described. 
 
In original prospect theory an overall valuation of an alternative (or ‗prospect‘) is 
derived by multiplying the subjective value of each potential gain and loss (i.e. how ‗good‘ 
or ‗bad‘ said outcome is perceived to be) by its corresponding decision weight and 
summing the resultant values. In cumulative prospect theory subjective valuations of 
outcomes are also weighed by decision weights. However, in this version of prospect 
theory the manner in which this is done is markedly different. In this model gain outcomes 
and loss outcomes are first segregated. They are then evaluated in terms of their ranked 
order with regard to other gains or losses, with each outcome‘s place in the rankings 
determined by its perceived value. While original prospect theory was formulated so that 
each individual outcome valuation was multiplied by a decision weight assigned 
independently to the outcome‘s probability, in cumulative prospect theory outcome values 
are weighed by cumulative decision weights. This is to say that the subjective value 
assigned to the probability of a particular gain outcome occurring, equals the cumulative 
decision weights for all gains equal or inferior to outcome in question. For losses this is 
reversed, with the subjective value assigned to the probability of an individual loss 
outcome equalling the cumulative decision weights for all losses equal or worse than the 
outcome in question. The way in which these weightings are derived ensures that 
dominance cannot be violated in a single stage gamble in which one alternative 
transparently dominates all others. Although, cumulative prospect theory does of course 
allow for the occurrence of dominance violation in multi-stage gambles, where the 
existence of a dominant alternative would only be revealed were the various stages to be 
integrated. A set of studies by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) along with a series of 
experiments conducted by Fennema and Wakker (1997) indicated that this new 
formulation of prospect theory was better at predicting choice than was the original 
version‘s evaluation phase. However, as Starmer (1999) points out, the cumulative 
weighing function is structured in such a manner as to predict that the particular violation 
of transitivity observed in Starmer‘s own study will not occur.  
 
Birnbaum and colleagues‘ configural weighting models represent another variant of 
predictive model that allows for the occurrence of dominance violation and preference 
reversal (e.g. Birnbaum & Macintosh, 1996; Birnbaum & Chavez, 1997). While Birnbaum 
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has proposed two configural weighting models: the rank applicative multiple weighting 
model (RAM) and the transfer of attention model (TAX), they each hold that individual 
probabilities are weighted based on the number of possible outcomes an alternative option 
has. In these models individual outcomes are represented as ranked ‗branches‘, with weight 
(in terms of probability value) being passed from lower branch outcomes to higher branch 
outcomes. Additionally, if multiple outcomes have identical outcome values then they are 
not, according to the configural weighting models, amalgamated (e.g. if an alternative 
offers a 20% chance of winning £100 and a 10% chance of winning £100 then these 
outcomes are not combined into a single 30% chance of winning £100). Instead, they are 
weighted as separate branches. Hence, as is the case with the original form of prospect 
theory when the dominance detection editing function is removed, the configural weighting 
models allow for violations of dominance in instances where an asymmetric number of 
outcomes exist. In a series of experiments conducted by Birnbaum (2008) the configural 
weightings models were found to outperform cumulative prospect theory in terms of 
predicting choice. It should be noted however that Starmer‘s (1999) findings did not 
coincide with the predictions of either TAX or RAM (see Chapter 3). 
 
With the exception of SEU, all of the models outlined above hold that the principle 
of dominance can, under certain conditions be violated. However, when the dominance 
principle is persistently and systematically violated in a task where the existence of a 
dominant, ‗objectively superior‘ alternative would seem to be transparent, the decision 
researcher is prompted to question why this should occur. Such a finding, detailed in 
Chapter 3, was the impetus for the series of investigations reported here. After observing, 
during a replication and expansion of Starmer‘s (1999) study that a surprisingly high 
number of participants violated the dominance principle when presented with B versus C, 
it was felt that further investigation should take place. Therefore, while not the only 
phenomenon examined in this series of studies, the dominance principle and the violation 
thereof is a central focus of investigation. Aside from the purely theoretical interest such an 
observation inspires, the finding that systematic violations of dominance occur in situations 
where dominance would appear to be transparent has certain practical implications with 
respect to the presentation of risk information in ‗real world‘ choice and judgement 
scenarios.  
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2.2. Information Processing and Dual-Process Models of Choice and Judgement 
 
 Information processing accounts. 
 
In the preceding sub-section dominance was discussed within the context of 
predictive ‗as-if‘ models of decision making. In this sub-section focus will be shifted to 
cognitive considerations and information processing accounts of choice; with emphasis 
placed upon dual-process conceptualisations of thought. 
 
With regard to what might be termed the cognitive psychology of decision making, 
numerous theories, frameworks and models have been proposed with the aim of 
describing, explaining and predicting a multitude of decision phenomena in terms of 
cognitive process. As such, a fully comprehensive account of the area is beyond the scope 
of this literature review. However, it is intended that this sub-section will provide a clear 
summary of the theories and frameworks most central to the investigations reported in 
subsequent chapters. 
 
One of the earlier critiques of the use of utility maximisation as a descriptive or 
predictive model of choice came from Simon (1957), who pointed out that the consistent 
application of expected utility calculations to all decision making scenarios would be a) 
completely unfeasible given the limits of human cognition; and b) extremely wasteful with 
regard to both time and cognitive resources. Simon therefore proposed that in most 
everyday decision scenarios simpler processes such as satisficing or merely acting in 
accordance with habit are relied upon by decision makers. Since then the notion that choice 
is not a matter of applying a unitary, utility maximisation process has been largely 
accepted amongst those researchers studying the psychology of decision making.  
 
In their adaptive decision maker framework Payne, Bettman and Johnson (1993) set 
out the case for choice being a contingent process; with a number of task and context 
factors influencing the choice strategy or heuristic utilised. These factors include, amongst 
numerous others: number of alternatives, number of outcomes, mode of response, manner 
of presentation, time pressure, decision importance, attribute range, direction of attribute 
correlation and frame. Within the adaptive decision maker framework it is held that 
decision making involves a speed/accuracy tradeoff. This is to say that quicker and less 
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cognitively demanding heuristics are more likely to lead to certain biases and violations of 
rational choice principles, while more time consuming and cognitively demanding 
processes are more likely to lead to unbiased and normatively correct responding. Of 
course, while the latter are more likely to yield normatively correct choices that adhere to 
rational choice principles, and may thus at first glance appear universally superior, there 
are many situations in which the benefit of such a process is far outweighed by the cost in 
terms of time and effort. The application of a utility maximisation calculation to all choices 
would, as Simon (1957) states, be both impossible and grossly inefficient.  
 
In The Adaptive Decision Maker, Payne, Bettman and Johnson (1993) classify 
choice processes in terms of whether they are attribute versus alternative based,  and 
compensatory versus non-compensatory in nature. Attribute based processes are those in 
which comparisons are made across attributes while alternative based processes are those 
in which whole alternatives are compared. Compensatory processes are classified as those 
in which tradeoffs are made amongst choice attributes, while non-compensatory processes 
are those in which tradeoffs are not made. For example the weighted additive difference 
rule (henceforth known as WADD) is alternative-based and compensatory. As a utility 
maximising process for multiattribute choices featuring sure outcomes, WADD requires 
that the overall worth of an alternative be calculated by multiplying the value of each 
choice attribute by a weight (i.e. a measure of the attribute‘s importance) and summing 
together the resultant values. Hence, comparisons are made between what might be termed 
‗holistic‘ valuations of alternatives, with utility weighting being used to tradeoff a good 
value on one attribute against a poor value on another. An example of an attribute 
based/non-compensatory process would be the Lexicographic heuristic (LEX). LEX, as 
identified by Tversky (1969), is a process by which a single attribute (usually the most 
important) is selected and the alternative that possesses the highest value on this attribute 
chosen. If two or more alternatives have the same value then another attribute is chosen 
(usually the second most important) and so on, until an attribute is found upon which one 
alternative has a higher value than the others. With LEX comparisons between alternatives 
are not ‗holistic‘ but based upon single attributes (hence attribute based); while the fact that 
comparisons are made attribute by attribute mean that no tradeoffs are required. Payne, 
Bettman and Johnson identify several other dimensions on which choice processes can be 
classified; such as the degree to which the choice process is qualitative versus quantitative, 
whether whole evaluations of alternatives are made, whether amount of information 
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processed is consistent across alternatives and the overall amount of processing required. 
In the present work, the attribute versus alternative classification dimension along with the 
notion that various choice heuristics and strategies require varying amounts of information 
processing are raised as key points with regard to the investigations reported.    
 
In addition to identifying and classifying several choice processes on the 
dimensions listed above, Payne, Bettman and Johnson (1993) proposed that different 
decision contexts and contingencies serve to influence the type of decision process utilised.  
Task complexity for instance, is proposed to be a main determinant of the choice process. 
Payne, Bettman and Johnson cite a number of studies conducted in the 1970s and 1980s 
(see Payne, Bettman and Johnson, 1993, pp34-37) as evidence for the (quite logical) 
position that increasing or decreasing the number of attributes and/or alternatives (and thus 
increasing task complexity) amongst a decision set leads to a change in processing. For 
example, there is evidence to suggest that increasing the number of alternatives in a set 
reduces the use of compensatory strategies (e.g. Biggs, Bedard, Gaber, & Linsmeier, 1985; 
Payne, 1976; Payne and Braunstein, 1978; Shields, 1980). Factors such as time pressure 
and cognitive ability (to be discussed in further detail below) are also cited as variable 
likely to influence choice process, as is manner in which information is presented. As one 
might expect, there is ample evidence to suggest that reducing the amount of time an 
individual has to spend on a decision affects how that decision is made (see for example 
Ben Zur & Breznitz, 1981; Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005; Huber & Kunz, 2007; Rieskamp 
& Hoffrage, 2008; Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1988, amongst numerous others). There is 
also a body of research to support the notion that the manner in which information is 
presented influences the choice process. Jarvenpaa (1990) for instance obtained findings to 
suggest that, for graphical information presentation formats, visual salience is a main 
determinant of information acquisition. Similarly, Stone, Yates and Parker (1994) and 
Chua Yates and Shah (2004) found that presenting relative risk reduction information in 
graphical format increased the amount of money participants stated they would be willing 
to pay for risk reduction measures. With regard to sequential versus simultaneous 
presentation, Ward and Jenkins (1965) found evidence to suggest that presenting 
information sequentially (rather than simultaneously) reduced participants‘ ability to 
accurately identify the degree to which events covaried. More recently the evaluability 
hypothesis has been proposed (Hsee, 1996; Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount & Bazerman, 1999) 
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to account for certain observed reversals of preference in joint and separate evaluation 
conditions.  
 
It is felt, in the context of the present research, that the method(s) of classifying 
choice processes outlined above provide a useful framework in which to identify the kind 
of processes that may lead to the preference reversals and violations of dominance 
investigated. Also pertinent to the present programme of research is Payne, Bettman and 
Johnson‘s (1993) suggestion that choice processes can broken down into a series of EIPs 
(elementary information processes). These EIPs, it is proposed, take the form of simple 
cognitive operations such as weighting one value by another, comparing two alternatives 
on a single attribute and adding attribute values in working memory (see Payne, Bettman 
and Johnson, 1993, pp77). This conceptualisation is rooted in the work of Newell & Simon 
(1972) and Huber (1980, 1989), all of whom have identified such elementary processes or 
‗operators‘ with regard to problem solving (Newell & Simon, 1972) and decision making 
(Huber, 1980). Especially relevant to the current research is Huber‘s (1982, though see 
Huber 1989 for a summary in English) observation that these operators may be combined 
in ways that lead to violation of the dominance principle. For instance, Huber (1989) 
reports a think aloud study in which one participant‘s verbalisations indicated that part of 
his choice strategy involved summing outcome values for each alternative, with no 
consideration given to outcome probabilities.  
 
In a similar vein to the adaptive decision maker framework (Payne, Bettman and 
Johnson, 1993), Gigerenzer and colleagues (see for example Gigerenzer, 2001; Gigerenzer 
& Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Selten 2001) 
propose that human decision makers make use of an adaptive toolbox. The adaptive 
toolbox can be roughly defined as a set of processes and heuristics which can be applied to 
choice scenarios. It is argued that these heuristics and processes are the result of 
environmental adaptation, in which certain ‗fast and frugal‘ (i.e. quick to implement and 
cognitively untaxing to utilise) choice processes have conferred an evolutionary advantage. 
Therefore, though these processes may lead to violations of expected utility and rational 
choice principles, they are not ‗irrational‘ but boundedly rational. That is to say that they 
function efficiently and beneficially within the environmental context in which they 
emerged. Gigerenzer argues that utility maximisation (or indeed any form of optimisation 
in general) should not be held up as the ‗gold standard‘ of decision making (see 
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Gigerenzer, 2001). This is due to the fact that for most choice scenarios encountered by 
humans the available alternatives, their potential outcomes and the probabilities of each 
outcome occurring are not clearly defined, and often need to be generated by the decision 
maker. Hence, rather than comparing the choice made in a given situation against an 
‗optimal‘ or ‗maximised‘ choice, it is suggested that bounded rather than absolute 
rationality would more useful focus. In essence, that rather comparing seemingly non-
rational choice behaviour to a rational ideal, focus could – according to this framework – 
be directed to the manner in which the choice behaviour (and the processes underlying the 
choice behaviour) may be adaptive in the environment in which humans evolved. 
 
This position with regard to maximisation and optimisation is certainly a 
compelling one when it comes to ill-defined decision problems. The cognitive resources 
required to a) determine an optimal outcome (or set of outcomes); b) identify possible 
alternative course of action that might lead to said outcomes; and c) apply a complex utility 
weighting procedure to maximise one‘s chances of obtaining them in all decision situations 
would be immense (see Gigerenzer‘s, 2001, discussion on the problem of infinite regress 
in deciding how to decide in Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001). However, it is felt that within the 
case of the present research the concepts of normativity and rationality are useful. It is true 
that the environment in which humans evolved probably contained relatively few situations 
in which all available alternatives and their corresponding outcomes could be neatly 
mapped out. In the modern world however a great deal of choice information is presented 
in a clearly defined format. Though the information in question may not be exhaustive in 
terms of possible alternatives and outcomes, in domains such health decision making and 
financial decision making information is frequently presented in what might be termed ‗a 
well defined manner‘. That is to say that a set of alternatives may be presented in a format 
similar to that traditionally used in many decision making experiments; with each 
alternative having clearly stated outcomes and corresponding outcome probabilities (or at 
least some form of corresponding likelihood estimate). In situations where alternatives and 
their outcomes/potential outcomes must be generated by the decision maker, the notion of 
using utility maximisation as a gold standard would appear to be somewhat dubious. 
However, in cases where well defined (or at least quasi well defined) choice information 
exists, it is felt that the rational choice principles set out in SEUT provide a useful point of 
comparison. One may question why, for instance, a seemingly small alteration in task 
variables might induce intransitivity, violations of invariance and other preference 
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reversals. Similarly, when the dominance principle is violated in a scenario where the 
existence of a dominant alternative would seem to be salient (i.e. in a situation where there 
are a limited number of well defined alternatives featuring well defined outcome values 
and probabilities are presented together) it would seem important to ask why. The question 
of what constitutes a ‗good decision‘ is not one that can be easily answered, given that – as 
Simon (1957, 1983), Gigerenzer (2001) and numerous others have pointed out – utility 
maximisation in every decision situation would be a) impossible and b) an ineffective use 
of cognitive resources. However, it is felt that adherence to the principle of dominance in 
instances where dominance is seemingly transparent would seem to be a perquisite for 
good decision making. 
 
Dual-process models. 
 
As stated above, dual-process conceptualisations of choice, judgement and 
reasoning are central to the program of research reported in this thesis. The notion that 
humans possess two models of thought: the intuitive and the analytic (dubbed System 1 
and System 2 by Stanovich, 1999) has attained some prominence in the field of decision 
research (and the related field of reasoning research) during the last fifteen years (see 
Epstein, 1994; Evans, 2006; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Sloman, 1996 and Stanovich 
and West, 2000 amongst others).  Though elements of proposed theories may differ, all 
dual-process models in this vein hold that human‘s have two modes of thought. System 1 
(also known as the ‗intuitive‘, ‗affective‘, ‗experiential‘ or ‗heuristic‘ system) processes 
are generally characterised as being intuitive, affect-driven, largely unconscious, fast, 
cognitively undemanding and prone to certain biases. System 2 (also known as the 
‗analytic‘, ‗cognitive‘ or ‗deliberative‘ system) processes by contrast are characterised as 
deliberative, conscious, slow, cognitively taxing and driven by the task information at 
hand. An effort/accuracy tradeoff is, of course, implied by this conceptualisation. System 
1, while apt to cue appropriate responses in many situations, is characterised more prone to 
cuing ‗biased‘ and normatively incorrect responses in others. System 2, on the other hand, 
is held to be cognitively demanding yet more likely to provide normatively correct 
responses in choice, judgement and reasoning scenarios where ‗biased‘ responding is 
frequently observed. 
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In his 1994 paper, Epstein made the case for the postulation that humans possess 
two systems of thought: the cognitive (or ‗rational‘) and the experiential, each possessing 
the characteristics outlined above. Though the notion that human‘s separate two such 
modes of thought had been proposed prior to this (see Epstein 1994 for a summary), 
Epstein was one of the first researchers to explicitly relate this conceptualisation of thought 
to heuristics and biases in decision making. Holding that (evolutionarily ancient) 
experiential and (evolutionary more recent) cognitive modes of thought constitute separate 
and parallel (though not disconnected) processes, Epstein posited that the workings of the 
experiential system could account for phenomena such as the ratio bias effect and the 
conjunction fallacy.  
 
The ratio bias effect, identified by Miller, Turnbull and McFarland (1989), refers to 
a tendency to judge an event as less likely if the probability of its occurrence is presented 
as a smaller ratio (e.g. 1 in 10) than an objectively identical larger ratio (e.g. 10 in 100). 
Denes-Raj & Epstein (1994) posited the ratio bias effect was the result of concrete absolute 
values having greater affective impact via the experiential mode of thought than more 
abstract ratios. Observing that if this postulation was true then it should possible to 
engineer a situation in which dominance is violated as a result of the dominant alternative 
being presented as a smaller ratio than the dominated alternative, Denes-Raj & Epstein 
presented participants with the now famous ‗jelly beans task‘. The task involved 
participants being given a series of choices in which they asked to choose between 
alternative 1: a 1 in 10 chance of a win or loss outcome occurring and alternative 2: a 5 in 
100 to 9 in 100 chance of a win or loss outcome occurring (these draws were presented in 
the form of jelly beans in a bowl in which red beans corresponded with a win/loss and a 
white bean with a null outcome). It was found that most participants (82%) made at least 
one sub-optimal choice (i.e. they chose the dominated alternative), with a greater 
proportion of sub-optimal choices being made in the gains domain than the losses domain. 
When asked to explain their choices after taking part in the experiment, many of the 
participants in Denes-Raj & Epstein‘s study who had selected one or more non-optimal 
choices, stated that they knew that the ‗1 in 10‘ chance bowl represented a higher chance 
of a non-zero outcome, but that they ‗felt‘ better disposed towards the (dominated) larger 
ratio win and/or less well disposed towards the (dominant) larger ratio loss. Some 
participants who responded in a normatively correct manner (i.e. chose the dominant 
alternatives) also stated that they had struggled to suppress the urge to select the 
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objectively inferior alternative. Denes-Raj & Epstein concluded that this was evidence of 
an affect-driven, experiential mode of thought overriding a rational, cognitive mode of 
thought that operated in parallel. Of course, as will be discussed further in the next sub-
section of this introduction, Denes-Raj & Epstein took no measure of participants‘ level of 
numeracy, a factor that may have had a strong influence on whether participants 
demonstrated the ratio bias effect (also known in this context as ‗denominator neglect‘) or 
not. 
 
Though none of the studies reported here seek to specifically replicate the ratio bias 
effect, the pattern of dominance violation observed can, as will become clear, be related 
back to Denes-Raj & Epstein‘s findings. 
 
Of course, while the notion that humans possess two modes of reasoning – one 
slow and effortful and one fast yet prone to certain biases – could explain many violations 
of rational choice principles, the mere existence of choice, judgement and reasoning biases 
does not in itself constitute proof of such a split. However, a body of evidence does exist to 
support the dual-process conceptualisation of choice, judgement and reasoning. It is to be 
hypothesised that if humans do possess two modes of thought and one is fast and bias 
prone and the other cognitively demanding and more likely to produce normatively correct 
responses, then reliance on the former will be increased when the availability of cognitive 
resources is decreased. If System 2 processes require deliberation and access to working 
memory resources, then one would predict that reducing the time available for deliberation 
would increase reliance on System 1 processes. Hence, in tasks where reliance on System 1 
processes is thought to lead to biased responding (and the utilisation of System 2 processes 
to increase the likelihood of a normatively correct response) one would expect imposing a 
strict time limit on the task to increase biased responding. Similarly, one would also predict 
that burdening working memory with a concurrent task would reduce an individual‘s 
capacity for conscious, effortful System 2 thought and increase reliance on System1 
processes.  
 
With regard to the former prediction: that time pressure will increase biased 
responding in certain tasks as a consequence of individuals not having enough time to 
generate a System 2 response, Evans & Curtis-Holmes (2005) found evidence to suggest 
that this was the case. Introducing time pressure to a belief-bias syllogism task, they found 
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that participants placed under time pressure were more likely to accept invalid but 
believable statements as true and reject valid but unbelievable statements as false, than 
were those in a control group. No difference in response accuracy was found between the 
two groups when it came to statements that were valid and true and statements that were 
invalid and false. As the belief-bias effect has been linked to reliance on automatic, 
associative processes, this finding supports the existence of two modes of reasoning. 
 
On a similar note, De Neys (2006) found that the response times of participants 
who committed the conjunction fallacy when presented with variations on the Linda 
problem had faster response times than participants who provided the normatively correct 
response. De Neys also found that burdening the executive function of participants‘ 
working memories with concurrent tasks increased the rate at which the conjunction 
fallacy and matching bias were demonstrated on variations on the Linda Problem and the 
Wason Card Selection task respectively.  
 
In addition to the studies of time-pressure and cognitive load, cognitive ability has 
been identified as a factor that may influence whether a System 1 or System 2 response to 
a problem is given. This issue will be discussed in more detail in the next section of this 
introduction; however, it should be mentioned here that a link between the two has been 
established by Stanovich & West (1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 2000). If the utilisation of 
conscious, effortful System 2 thought is contingent on there being enough cognitive 
capacity available for a System 2 response to be provided, then it would seem reasonable 
to posit that those with higher cognitive ability (and therefore higher cognitive capacity) 
will be more apt to utilise it. Stanovich & West (see Stanovich & West, 2000 for summary) 
found that those higher in general intelligence (as inferred from SAT scores) were more 
likely to provide normatively correct responses to a number of choice and reasoning 
problems in which non-normative responses have been previously associated with reliance 
on intuitive System 1 processes (e.g. matching versus maximising, belief bias in syllogistic 
reasoning, etc.). More recently Stanovich & West (2008) present evidence to suggest that 
lower cognitive ability does not correspond with all thought biases. This, as will be 
discussed in more detail below, is posited by Stanovich & West to be the result of said 
biases being the result of a failure to detect that the System 1 response should be 
overridden rather than a lack of cognitive capacity per se. 
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As stated above, some differences exist between different dual-process accounts of 
choice, reasoning and judgement. Epstein (1994) conceptualises the two modes of thought 
as experiential and cognitive and suggests that the two modes of thought operate in 
parallel. Sloman (1996, 2002) also posited the existence of two parallel systems of 
reasoning: the ‗associative‘ and the ‗rule-based‘. In this account the associative system 
operates as a connectionist network in which similarity associations cue response, while 
the rule-based system involves the application of symbolically represented (and context 
independent) rules. Unlike Epstein‘s account however, Sloman‘s does not specify a role for 
affect.  
 
 More recently Evans (2006) and Stanovich & West (2008) have posited that the 
two modes of thought do not compete in parallel, but rather operate in what Evans (2006, 
2007) terms a ―default-interventionist‖ manner. As one might deduce from the name, 
default-interventionist accounts hold that System 1 constitutes a default response and 
System 2 acts to monitor System 1 output and intervene if and when an ‗error‘ is detected. 
Stanovich & West (2008) have presented what is, to date, perhaps the most highly 
specified ―default-interventionist‖ model of how System 1 and System 2 may operate. The 
model holds that in reasoning and judgement scenarios an intuitive, System 1 response is 
automatically generated, but that said response may be overridden by System 2 if a need to 
override is detected. Within this model failure to override a ‗biased‘ or situationally 
inappropriate System 1 response can result from one of three things: a lack of knowledge 
as to how to generate a normatively correct response (dubbed a ‗mindware gap‘ by 
Stanovich & West, 2008), failure to detect that an override is necessary or failure to sustain 
inhibition of the prepotent response.  
 
It should be noted that dual-process conceptualisations of thought have been 
criticised on the basis that the two modes of thought are too vaguely defined and thus 
susceptible to being to use to “...account post-hoc for almost anything” (Gigerenzer & 
Hoffrage, 2007, p.264, see also Gigerenzer and Regier, 1996). However, in terms of the 
present series of studies this conceptualisation does appear to be consistent with various 
findings (to be discussed in the chapters that follow).  
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2.3. Cognitive Ability 
 
While the relationship between general cognitive ability and choice is not in itself a 
central focus of this series of investigations, it does have direct relevance; with respect to 
both dual-process models of thought generally and the findings of Study 6 specifically. 
Hence a brief discussion of certain key pieces of research in this area will be presented 
here. 
 
As noted in the previous subsection, Stanovich and West (1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 
2000, 2008) have presented a sizable body of evidence to support the existence of a link 
between higher cognitive ability and the avoidance of certain choice, reasoning and 
judgement biases. The biases in question are, it is argued, indicative of reliance on intuitive 
(non-normative) System 1 responses. On conducting a series of studies examining the 
relationship between cognitive ability (as measured by SAT score) and propensity to 
commit certain well documented thought biases, Stanovich and West (2008) found that 
higher cognitive ability corresponded with superior (i.e. normatively correct) performance 
on some tasks but not others. Cognitive ability was found to associate with denominator 
neglect, matching versus maximising, performance on syllogistic and modus ponens 
reasoning problems, performance on the argument evaluation test and matching bias on the 
four card selection task. Cognitive ability was not however found to associate with certain 
well known biases (i.e. base rate neglect, framing, the conjunction fallacy, outcome bias 
and anchoring) when the problems known to elicit said biases were presented in a between 
participants fashion. By ‗between participants‘ what is meant is that participants were 
presented with just a single scenario for each problem rather than the standard repeated 
measures versions. For instance, when presented with a version of Linda problem (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1983), a task that frequently elicits the conjunction fallacy, participants were 
not asked to rank the likelihood of Linda being a being a feminist, Linda being a bank 
teller and Linda being a feminist bank teller. Instead they were presented with just a single 
statement (i.e. ‗Linda is a bank teller‘ or ‗Linda is a feminist bank teller‘) and asked to rate 
the probability of the statement being true. Stanovich and West (2008) found that when 
more and less cognitively able participants were presented with the between participants 
version of the tasks those higher in cognitive ability performed no more normatively than 
those lower in cognitive ability. For example, more cognitively able participants in the 
‗Linda is a feminist bank teller‘ condition gave their statement a higher likelihood rating 
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than high SAT score participants in the ‗Linda is a bank teller‘ condition. This stands in 
contrast to Stanovich and West‘s (1998b) earlier finding that those committing the 
conjunction fallacy on the standard (i.e. repeated measures) version of the Linda problem 
had a significantly lower average SAT score than those who did not. 
 
Based upon these findings Stanovich and West (2008) postulated that those higher 
in cognitive ability possess greater cognitive capacity and are thus more able to sustain the 
inhibition of erroneous System 1 responses when the need to override is detected. As 
mentioned in the previous sub-section, Stanovich and West propose that in order for an 
erroneous System 1 response to be overridden by a normative System 2 response a person 
must: 1) have the ‗mindware‘ to produce the normatively correct response; 2) detect the 
need to override; and 3) have the capacity to sustain inhibition of the erroneous intuitive 
response until the normatively correct System 2 response can be produced. It is the third of 
these that Stanovich & West suggest is influenced by cognitive ability/capacity. It is 
posited that as the between participants version of the Linda problem (along with the other 
between participants tasks listed above) did not contain any explicit cue that the automatic, 
prepotent response was non-normative (e.g. that the likelihood of Linda being a feminist 
bank teller must be lower than that of Linda being a bank teller) the need to override it was 
not detected. Hence, participants did not detect the need to engage in sustained inhibition 
and those higher in cognitive ability performed no better than those lower in cognitive 
ability. By contrast, problems such as the jelly beans task (see Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994) 
and the standard form of the Linda Problem (see Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), do contain 
cues to prompt ‗override detection‘. 
 
While this thesis is concerned with decisions involving risk and not reasoning in a 
general sense, the hypothesis that inhibition of non-normative intuitive responses is largely 
contingent on the presence of a ‗cue‘ to signal a need to override is directly relevant to 
Studies 1 & 2. The notion that cognitive ability/capacity and the related but distinct ability 
of numeracy facilitate ‗rational‘ choice only when some salient cue exists as to the non-
normativity of a particular choice is also of great interest. 
 
While of some relevance to the series of investigations reported here general, 
cognitive ability is not, as previously stated, a central focus on this thesis in itself. 
However, one facet of cognitive ability that is a focus of investigation in the final study of 
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the series (see Chapter 8) is that of cognitive reflection. Cognitive reflection is defined by 
Frederick (2005) as: “–the ability or disposition to resist reporting the response that first 
comes to mind” (p 35). Frederick proposes that cognitive reflection constitutes a distinct 
sub-component of cognitive ability; a postulation that is supported by the fact that score on 
the three item cognitive reflection test has a moderately strong correlation with various 
measures of general intelligence and mathematical ability without being collinear with any 
of them. 
 
The three questions that comprise the cognitive reflection task are listed below. The 
correct answers to the three questions are 5 cents, 5 minutes and 47 days respectively. 
However, the answers that spring intuitively to mind for most respondents are 10 cents, 
100 minutes and 24 days. Indeed, these are the responses most commonly given. It seems 
that these incorrect responses are associatively cued by content of the questions and that in 
order to provide the correct answer many respondents have to inhibit the first. 
 
 A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball 
cost?  
_____ cents 
 
 If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 
100 widgets?  
_____ minutes  
 
 In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the 
patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake?  
_____ days  
 
The cognitive reflection test: reproduced from Frederick (2005) pp 27. 
  
As noted above, Frederick (2005) found that score on the cognitive reflection test 
(CRT) correlated with measures of general cognitive and mathematical ability. However, 
as the correlation between score on the CRT and mark for the mathematical component of 
the SAT was .46 it would seem that the CRT is not solely a measure of mathematical 
ability. The same paper also reports the finding that those scoring full marks on the CRT 
tended to be less prone to temporal discounting that those scoring zero on the test. As 
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might be imagined, Frederick draws an association between performance on the CRT and 
the utilisation of deliberative ‗System 2‘ processes, suggesting that those scoring higher on 
the task are more prone to utilising deliberative System 2. Thus, in instances where cues 
exist to signal that one‘s intuitive response is erroneous, one would anticipate those scoring 
higher on the CRT to demonstrate fewer System 1 linked thought biases than those scoring 
lower on the CRT. Additionally, if performance on the CRT is not solely determined by 
numeracy, then one would predict that CRT score will continue to associate with 
performance on task known to induce such thought biases when a general measure of 
numeracy is controlled for. 
 
In Study 6 such an investigation is made and relationship between CRT score, score 
on a numeracy scale expanded from that of Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer (2001) and 
propensity to violate the principle of dominance is examined (see Chapter 8). The results 
of this study reveal that while numeracy score and CRT score correlate both positively 
with one another and negatively with rate of dominance violation they do not appear to 
measure identical abilities. 
 
2.4. Numeracy 
 
While cognitive ability per se is not central to this programme of research, 
numeracy is one of its central foci. Numeracy, which is defined by Reyna et al. (2009) as 
‗quantitative literacy‘, is an individual differences factor that has, in recent years, started to 
receive some attention in the field of decision research. It is an area that is of both great 
theoretical and great practical interest. On a theoretical level, any individual difference 
factor that influences the manner in which numeric (especially probabilistic) information is 
understood and utilised by decision makers is of considerable importance to the 
formulation of information processing theories of decision making under risk. With respect 
to practical considerations, much of the choice information with which people are 
presented in day to day life is quantitative, proportional and probabilistic in nature. This is 
especially true in domains such health and personal finance/insurance where choices made 
can have considerable impact on the lives of decision makers. However, despite the fact 
that a great deal of information is presented using frequencies, percentages and 
standardised probabilities, there is evidence to show that even highly educated individuals 
often fail to interpret even simple representations of probability and proportion accurately 
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and consistently. Base rate neglect has been observed amongst physicians presented with 
Bayesian reasoning problems (e.g. Hoffrage & Gigerenzer, 1998), as have deviations from 
normative probabilistic reasoning with regard to much simpler problems. Slovic, Monahan 
and MacGregor (2000), for example, found that even qualified psychiatrists tended to rate 
a psychiatric patient described as having a 20 in 100 chance of committing a violent 
offence as more dangerous than an a patient described as having a 20% chance of doing so.  
 
Interest in how humans interpret and utilise probabilistic information is not, of 
course, a new theme in judgement and decision research. Prospect theory‘s weighting 
function is, after all, posited to reflect actual psychophysical properties of probability 
perception (Tversky & Kahneman, 1979). In the 1990s meanwhile, Gigerenzer and 
Hoffrage (see; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Hoffrage & Gigerenzer, 1998) proposed that 
the widespread poor performance traditionally observed when educated participants are 
presented with Bayesian reasoning problems, is a result of said problems being delivered in 
percentage or standard probability formats. Arguing that humans evolved in an 
environment in which quantitative information takes the form of experienced natural 
frequencies, Gigerenzer and Hoffrage along with Cosmides and Tooby (1996) postulate 
that humans are more easily able to reason with frequency information. Indeed, Gigerenzer 
and Hoffrage found that the performance of participants was more likely to be consistent 
with Bayes‘ theorem when problems were presented in frequency format than standard 
probability/percentage format. This position has been critiqued by Barby and Sloman 
(2007), who posit that presenting problems in frequency format serves to render the 
underlying set structure of the problem transparent. Nonetheless, one commonality 
between the theories of probabilistic understanding postulated by all of these researchers is 
that they implicitly assume that people both understand and are capable of utilising simple 
frequency based probabilities. As shall now be discussed however, there is a growing body 
of research to indicate that this is not always the case. What proceeds will be a summary 
and discussion of some of the key pieces of research featuring in the growing body of 
literature on the subject of numeracy and choice. This will be followed by an outline of this 
programme of research‘s goals with regard to numeracy.  
 
On comparing the performance of more numerate and less numerate participants on 
a series of choice and judgement tasks, Peters et al. (2006) found a marked difference in 
performance between the two groups; a difference that could not be attributed to general 
32 
 
intelligence (for which SAT score was used as a proxy).  In this series of studies, numeracy 
was measured using an eleven item scale devised by Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer (2001). A 
median split was then performed to divide the sample into more and less numerate 
participants. More numerate participants were found to be: 1) less susceptible to simple 
positive/negative framing effects (e.g. tended to be more consistent in their ratings of a 
piece of work described as 74% correct or 26% incorrect); 2) more consistent across 
probability representations when asked to judge the danger posed by a psychiatric patient 
(i.e. 1 in 10 chance of committing a violent offence versus a 10% chance of committing an 
offence); and 3) less prone to denominator neglect on the jelly beans task. With regard to 
the jelly beans task, Peters et al. also found that, when asked to rate the clarity of their 
feelings towards the two alternatives, as a group less numerate participants tended to report 
less precise feelings (i.e. rated their feelings as being more ‗unclear‘) towards the 
dominated alternative than more numerate participants. Peters et al. concluded that those 
higher in numeracy tend to have more precise affective feelings towards quantitative 
information than those lower in numeracy. It was also concluded that less numerate 
participants were more likely to be influenced by irrelevant – but affectively salient – 
information, such as frame and numerator divorced from denominator.  
 
With respect to Peters et al. (2006) findings regarding numeracy and denominator 
neglect, it also is worth noting that at least one other study has replicated the relationship. 
Garcia-Retamaro and Galesic (2009) found that less numerate participants tended to 
overestimate the risk of death from a hypothetical cholesterol treatment when ‗deaths 
amongst those treated‘ were represented using a higher denominator than ‗deaths amongst 
those not treated‘ more than did more numerate participants. Conversely, when ‗deaths 
amongst those treated‘ was represented using a lower denominator, less numerate 
participants demonstrated greater underestimation of the risk associated with treatment. 
The study in question also found that presenting the information in pictorial format 
lessened denominator neglect amongst those lower in numeracy. 
 
Interestingly, in addition to observing that more numerate participants tended to 
perform in a more normative fashion on the tasks described above, Peters et al. (2006) also 
found that they were less likely to demonstrate a normative pattern of judgement in one 
particular task. In this task half of the sample was asked to rate a gamble offering a 7/26 
chance to win $9 and a 19/26 chance of winning nothing. The other half of the sample was 
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asked to rate a gamble offering a 7/26 chance to win $9 and a 19/26 chance of losing 5 
cents. The two lotteries are very similar, but the latter is dominated by the former as the 
latter features a very small potential loss. It was found, however, that more numerate 
participants who were presented with the lottery featuring the small loss gave it a higher 
rating than those more numerate participants who were presented with the lottery featuring 
no loss. Those lower in numeracy on the other hand gave the lotteries a similar rating. 
Peters et al. suggest that this is evidence that more numerate participants tended to draw 
greater affective meaning from the magnitude of difference between win amount and loss 
amount than from the absolute value of the win.  
 
In terms of the dual-process accounts of choice and judgement discussed in the 
previous section, the findings of Peters et al. (2006) are of great interest. The conclusion 
that more numerate participants seem to derive greater affective meaning from numeric 
information, could suggest that the affect driven, System 1 responses of more numerate 
individuals may – in certain tasks – be consistent with the normatively correct response. 
For instance, in the case of the jelly beans task, it would seem plausible that if more 
numerate individuals are better able to draw precise affective meaning from probabilities 
then they will be less likely to have a more positive affective reaction to the high 
numerator alternative. Alternatively, it may be the case that those higher in numeracy are 
better at detecting and/or inhibiting erroneous intuitive responses when presented with task 
of a numeric nature.  The fact Peters et al. did find a modest correlation between numeracy 
and SAT score would seem to indicate that those who were more numerate tended to have 
greater general intelligence than those were less numerate. With respect to Stanovich and 
West‘s (2008) model of intuitive response inhibition, cognitive ability is posited to be 
related to capacity to sustain inhibition of erroneous intuitive responses. However, as noted 
above, Peters et al. found that despite the correlation between score on the numeracy scale 
and SAT score, the relationship between numeracy and task performance was separable 
from that of SAT score and task performance. It is also worth noting that the position that 
numeracy and general cognitive ability are distinct constructs is supported by the findings 
of Brooks and Pui (2010). On examining the correlation between score on the Wonderlic 
Personnel Test and  score on the numeracy scale devised by Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer 
(2001), Brooks and Pui concluded that the size of the correlation indicated that the two 
scales measured related but separable constructs. 
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Further evidence to support the postulation that less numerate individuals are more 
likely to be influenced by irrelevant but affectively salient information and less likely to 
utilise quantitative data comes from various subsequent studies. Peters et al. (2009) found 
that when provided with quantitative information about a hypothetical hospital and asked 
rate the hospital‘s quality, less numerate participants reporting that they were in a good 
mood tended to give the hospital a better rating than those reporting that they were in a bad 
mood. On a similar note, Peters and Levin (2008) found that while both more and less 
numerate participants were susceptible to framing effects on the Asian Disease Problem, 
the choices of numerate participants were more consistent with their ratings of the 
alternatives in separate evaluation. This, Peters & Levin posit, is an indication that the 
choices and judgements of more numerate participants tended to be based on the numeric 
information provided. By contrast, the lack of consistency between separate evaluation and 
choice on the part of less numerate participants is postulated to be the result of these 
participants processing the numeric data in a more superficial manner and being more 
influenced by frame and the existence a ‗sure thing‘ alternative.  With respect to the usage 
of quantitative versus qualitative information, Dieckmann, Slovic and Peters (2009) found 
evidence of a difference between more and less numerate participants. When presented 
with both narrative and probabilistic evidence, less numerate individuals tend make more 
use of the former and more numerate individuals the latter.  
 
Differences in performance between more and less numerate individuals have also 
been observed in various other recently published choice and judgement studies. These 
include findings that numeracy corresponds with physicians‘ comprehension of Medicare 
plans (Hanoch, Miron-Shatz, Cole, Himmelstein & Federman 2010); the comprehension of 
probabilistic information of the kind presented following genetic testing by both women 
who had and had not undergone such testing (Hanoch, Miron-Shatz & Himmelstein, 2010); 
and uptake of colorectal cancer screening (Ciampa, Osborn, Peterson & Rothman., 2010). 
 
With regard to the cognitive processes and structures underlying the relationship 
between numeracy and choice and judgement, there would seem to have emerged two 
different – but not irreconcilable – positions on the matter. These could be defined as the 
theory that numeracy facilitates precise number perceptions and the theory that numeracy 
is related to the ability to form accurate gist representations. The former, the theory that 
more numerate individuals perceive numbers more precisely and are thus more able to 
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draw more precise affective meaning from numeric information, is set out by Peters et al. 
(2006) and Peters, Slovic, Västfjäll & Mertz (2008). As discussed above, Peters et al. 
(2006) found that more numerate participants were less susceptible to certain framing 
effects and rated themselves as having clearer feelings towards the dominated alternative in 
the jelly bean task than less numerate participants. This consistency and clarity, it was 
posited, is indicative of those higher in numeracy being more able to draw precise affective 
meaning from the probabilistic information presented. In another study, Peters et al. (2008) 
obtained evidence to suggest that more numerate individuals tend to have more precise 
intuitive representations of the mental number line than less numerate individuals. Intuitive 
representations of the mental number line are defined by Peters et al. (2008) as: 
“...nonverbal representations of numerosity that are spontaneously activated in the 
presence of numeric information regardless of format.” (p 619). This intuitive mental 
number line is proposed to operate in accordance with Weber‘s Law; with linear 
increments in magnitude producing ever diminishing increments in perception, and ease of 
discriminability being determined by ratio rather than absolute difference (see Dehaene, 
1989, Link, 1990; Parkman, 1971 amongst others for evidence to support the existence this 
phenomenon in the domain of numerosity).  
 
Peters et al. (2008) presented more and less numerate participants with a series of 
pairs of numbers and asked them to indicate which of each pair was higher. Response 
times were plotted for number pairs that were closer together versus further apart (distance 
effect slopes). It was found that the distance effect slopes of less numerate individuals 
tended to be steeper than those of more numerate individuals, with response times for pairs 
closer in value being substantially higher than pairs more distant in value. This would seem 
to indicate that more numerate individuals are better able to discriminate between numbers 
that are closer in value than less numerate individual. Peters et al. thus posit that this is 
evidence for the postulation those higher in numeracy possess more precise intuitive 
representations of number and ratio. 
 
In contrast to the argument that more numerate individuals are able to form more 
precise intuitive mental representations of numeric information, Reyna and colleagues (see 
Reyna & Brainerd, 2008; Reyna, 2008; and Reyna et al., 2009) propose that those who are 
more numerate are in fact more likely to form meaningful gist representations of numeric 
information. Humans, it is postulated, possess two modes of mental representation: 
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verbatim and gist. Verbatim representations constitute precise but superficial 
representations of the information presented, while gist representations represent the 
meaning of said information at the simplest level available (i.e. categorical followed by 
ordinal and then interval). For instance, one might encode the essential gist meaning of 
‗alternative A offers 10% chance of winning a prize and alternative B offers a 5% chance 
of winning a prize‘ as ‗more chance of winning with alternative A‘. Though Reyna et al. 
(2009) define this as a dual-process model, it stands in contrast to traditional dual-process 
models of the sort discussed in the previous section, in that the ‗gist‘ representation of 
information is held to be more a more ‗advanced‘ process than precise ‗verbatim‘ 
representations. In contrast to Denes-Raj & Epstein (1994), who hold that denominator 
neglect in the jelly beans task is the result of reliance on an affect driven, experiential 
mode of thought, Reyna & Brainerd (2008) posit that it is the result of an erroneous ‗gist‘ 
being formed. This model does not however account for certain findings that have been 
cited in support of traditional ‗System 1, System 2‘ dual-process models, such as the links 
between thought biases and time pressure (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005), response time 
(De Neys, 2006), secondary task interference (De Neys, 2006) and performance on the 
cognitive reflection test (Fredericks, 2005). Although it should be mentioned that Reyna & 
Brainerd (2008) explicitly state that this model concerns mental representation not 
inhibition, which is held to be a separate process. Nonetheless, the question of whether 
numeracy is related to precision or gist is a compelling one. Peters et al.‘s (2008) findings 
regarding the number lines of those higher in numeracy would seem to suggest the former. 
However, Reyna (e.g. Reyna, 2005; but see also Reyna, 2008) has obtained evidence to 
indicate that recall for verbatim information is separate from that of gist (i.e. essential 
meaning). These two points of view are not however necessarily incompatible. It is 
possible that a greater ability to make precise distinctions between numeric values and 
ratios may facilitate the extrapolation and encoding of essential gist meaning. With respect 
to the lottery choice task developed for use in this programme of research, the question of 
whether more numerate individuals are more or less likely than less numerate individuals 
to make quantitative or qualitative references to numeric information when asked to think 
aloud, is one of the matters investigated in Study 4 (see Chapter 6).  
 
The body of research reported in this thesis concerns both the measurement of 
numeracy and the relationship between numeracy, probability neglect and dominance 
violation. In Study 3 (see Chapter 5) the reliability of an expanded numeracy scale 
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incorporating items from Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer‘s (2001) scale is tested. In Studies 2, 4 
and 6 (see Chapters 4, 6 and 8 respectively) the possible relationship between numeracy 
and dominance violation is examined in detail. 
 
With regard to measurement, there are three methods of gauging numeracy: 
objective, subjective and proxy. Each of these has its attendant advantages and 
disadvantages. Objective measures are those that involve the administration of a numeracy 
test to participants. The numeracy scale devised by Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer (2001) is to 
date that most commonly used objective measure in decision research; though Peters, 
Dieckmann, Dixon, Hibbard & Mertz (2007) and Dieckmann, Weller, Tusler & Peters 
(2009) have incorporated items from Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer‘s scale into an expanded 
scale and an abbreviated scale respectively. The primary benefit of using an objective 
measure of numeracy is that one obtains a standardised measure of ability. The primary 
disadvantage is that potential participants may be discouraged from taking part in an 
investigation if they are aware that it will involve the completion of a mathematical test. 
Subjective measures are those that involve asking participants to rate their own confidence 
and competence with regard to various quantitative tasks. As Reyna et al. (2009) – drawing 
on the findings of Sheridan, Pignone, and Lewis (2003) – point out, the main problem with 
subjective measures of numeracy are that people are not always accurate judges of their 
own abilities. However, Fagerlin, Zikmund-Fisher, Ubel, Jankovic, Derry & Smith (2007) 
report that score on the recently devised Subjective Numeracy Scale correlates strongly 
(.63 – .68) with performance on Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer‘s objective numeracy scale. 
Proxy methods of gauging numeracy are those in which scores/grades on standard 
educational tests of mathematical ability (e.g. GCSE mathematics grade, A level 
mathematics grade, score on SAT mathematics component, etc.) are obtained from 
participants and used as proxy‘s for numeracy. The obvious benefit of this method is that 
such data is easy and fast to collect. The disadvantages of utilising the aforementioned 
educational test scores however are threefold: 1) participants may not provide a truthful 
response or indeed be able to recall their test score; 2) the content of such tests and the 
manner in which they are graded is likely to vary over time, meaning that the measure is 
not consistent; and 3) the participant‘s level of numeracy may have changed since they 
took the test. 
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One of the goals of the present program of research was to develop and test the 
reliability of an objective numeracy scale, featuring a range of frequency and percentage-
based items. The scale constitutes an extension of Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer‘s (2001) scale, 
with all eleven items from the original test being incorporated into the expanded scale, 
along with eight new frequency-based items. The scale devised by Lipkus, Samsa and 
Rimer (2001) contains only 3 items that are solely frequency-based (the rest featuring 
frequency to percentage/standardised probability conversions or vice versa). As previously 
discussed, it has been postulated that humans process frequency-based information 
differently to other representations of probability (e.g. Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; 
Hoffrage & Gigerenzer, 1998; Cosmides & Tooby, 1996). Hence, it was felt that adding 
new frequency items would a) make the scale more suitable for use in conjunction with the 
lottery choice task utilised in this series of studies (in which probabilities are represented in 
a frequency-based manner); and b) allow one to examine – when submitted to principle 
components analysis – whether frequency items load onto a different underlying construct 
than items featuring percentage/standardised probability elements. The findings of this 
analysis are reported in Chapter 5. 
 
The phenomenon of probability neglect is, as previously noted, a key area of 
interest in this thesis. In Study 1 (see Chapter 3), probability neglect is identified as a 
possible cause of dominance violation. This possibility is examined in more detail in 
subsequent studies; with the relationship between numeracy and probability neglect 
forming a central focus of investigation in Studies 2, 4 and 6 (see Chapters 4, 6 and 8). The 
matter of whether less numerate individuals utilise probabilistic information less is 
investigated. The interaction between numeracy and stimulus complexity is also examined; 
as is the possibility that the effect of affect on choice is mediated by numeracy. Findings 
regarding numeracy and choice are discussed with reference to the literature discussed 
above in both their respect chapters and the general discussion (Chapter 9). 
 
2.5. Choice, Judgement and the Effect of Affect  
 
The relationship between emotion and choice has, in recent years, become a key 
area of interest in decision research. The notion that decision making has an affective 
component is present – albeit often implicitly – in vast majority of models and theories 
pertaining to choice. Even normative, utility models such as SEU (see von Neumann and 
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Morgenstern, 1944; Savage, 1954) and predictive mathematical models such as prospect 
theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1979, 1992) hold that people attach some form of affective 
value to decision outcomes. If they did not then it would seem inevitable that a state of 
indifference would prevail. Nonetheless, despite accepting that people will find certain 
outcomes pleasant and others unpleasant, such probability/outcome valuation models do 
not incorporate an emotional component to choice other than as part of the more general 
concept of utility or subjective outcome valuation. Recognising that certain emotions might 
constitute outcomes in and of themselves, some theorists proposed models in which 
anticipated positive and negative states are acknowledged to influence choice. Regret 
theory (Loomes & Sugden, 1982) and disappointment theory (Bell, 1985), for instance, are 
essentially utility models of choice in which aversive states (regret and disappointment 
respectively) constitute disutilities in themselves. Isen and colleagues mood maintenance 
hypothesis meanwhile holds that those in positive mood states will seek to maintain them 
by avoiding (or minimising the chance of) potential outcomes that may diminish their 
positive mood state (see Isen, Ashby and Nygren, 1988). More recently however, focus has 
shifted from emotion as a perceived potential outcome only, to the possible role that that 
emotion/affect plays in the choice process itself. In the domain of neuropsychology 
Bechara, Damasio, Damasio and colleagues (e.g. Bechara, Damasio, Damasio & 
Anderson, 1994;  Bechara, Damsio, Tranel, Damasio, 1997; Bechara, Tranel, Damasio & 
Damasio, 1996; Damasio, 1994) have presented compelling evidence to suggest that affect 
is integral to the choice process. In the field of cognition, the affect heuristic (Finucane et 
al, 2000; Slovic et al., 2002) and the Risk as Feeling model (Loewenstein et al, 2001) seek 
to elucidate upon the process(es) by which affect influences choice and judgement. 
 
Of the six studies reported in this thesis, two focus upon incidental versus task 
induced emotion/affect and their relationship with performance on the lottery choice task. 
In Study 5 (see Chapter 7) the relationships between incidental and task-induced affective 
states and task performance are assessed. In Study 6 (see Chapter 8), these relationships are 
further examined and the possible mediating effects of numeracy and cognitive reflection 
explored. In order to place these studies and the rationale behind them into a clear 
theoretical context, it is necessary to outline and discuss certain key pieces of prior 
research pertaining to affect, rationality and mode of thought.  
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As Loewenstein et al. (2001) point out, emotions influencing and experienced 
during the choice process itself have in many quarters traditionally been viewed as 
intrusions upon cognition/rationality. However, evidence has emerged from several 
sources to suggest that emotion may in fact be an integral component of the choice process. 
Of the theories that take such a position, the most well known and influential is perhaps the 
somatic marker hypothesis (see for example Bechara, Damasio, Damasio & Anderson, 
1994;  Bechara, Damsio, Tranel & Damasio, 1997; Bechara, Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 
1996; Damasio, 1994). The somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) holds that as objects, 
images, actions, events etc. are experienced in the environment they become tagged with 
positive and negatively valenced somatic markers. These somatic markers are – as the 
name suggests – caused by changes in the body‘s somatic state. When stimuli to which 
somatic markers have been attached are encountered again, said somatic markers cause the 
individual to experience a positive or negative affective response, depending on whether 
the net valence of the markers is positive or negative. The implications of the SMH for 
decision making are clear: that the net valence of one‘s somatic markers with regard to a 
particular alternative may determine, or at least influence, one‘s choices. This would seem 
congruent with the existence of the affect heuristic: a process by which decisions are made 
on the basis of one‘s affective feelings towards the available alternatives (see Finucane et 
al, 2000; Slovic et al. 2002).  
 
Much of the evidence cited in support of the SMH comes from the Iowa Gambling 
Task (IGT). The IGT is an implicit learning task in which participants are presented with 
four decks of cards. Each of the cards features either a gain amount or a loss amount and, 
of the decks four presented, two are advantageous (low wins but lower losses) and two 
disadvantageous (high wins but higher losses). After being instructed that their goal is to 
obtain as a high a balance as possible by turning over gains (and avoiding losses), 
participants are asked to start sampling cards from the four decks. Typically, participants 
will start sampling primarily from the advantageous decks prior to being able to verbally 
detail why these decks are advantageous. However, on presenting the task to both a group 
of patients with lesions to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and a group of 
neurologically intact controls, Bechara et al. (1994) found that while the controls began to 
select primarily from the advantageous decks with relative quickness, the VMPFC 
participants failed to develop a strong preference for the advantageous decks. In a 
subsequent investigation Bechara et al. (1996) measured the skin conductance responses of 
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neurologically intact controls and individuals with damage to the VMPFC whilst they were 
performing the task. It was found that all participants demonstrated skin conductance 
responses when turning over a gain or a loss card. However, it was also found that, once 
they had been performing the task for a while, neurologically intact participants began to 
demonstrate anticipatory skin conductance responses prior to selecting a card from a 
disadvantageous deck. These anticipatory skin conductance responses were absent in those 
participants with lesions to the VMPFC. It was thus argued that the somatic states 
experienced during a positive or negative event (such a incurring a gain or loss) are stored 
in the mind as ‗somatic markers‘. These stimuli are then activated when stimuli related to 
the event are encountered again. Hence, anticipatory skin conductance responses are 
observed prior to cards from the ‗disadvantageous‘ deck being drawn, though the 
individual drawing the cards is not able to consciously report why the deck is 
disadvantageous. 
 
As stated above, those with lesions to the VMPFC did not demonstrate these 
anticipatory skin conductance responses and were impaired relative to neurologically intact 
controls on the Iowa Gambling task. It was thus postulated that there exist structures in the 
brain that act as: “...a repository of dispositionally recorded linkages between factual 
information and bioregulatory states” (Bechara, Damasio & Damasio, 2000, p296), and 
that the VMPFC is linked with the retrieval and possibly the encoding of said states. 
Damage to the VMPFC is linked with pronounced impairments in decision making and 
enacting appropriate behaviours and indifference to future consequences; though not with 
impairments of formal logic or memory. Hence, Bechara et al. concluded that access to 
affective information (triggered by the activation of somatic markers) is in fact necessary 
in order for advantageous decision making to occur.  
 
In terms of dual-process models of choice, judgement and reasoning, the 
associative nature of the linkage between somatic states and cognitive input would seem to 
correspond with the operation of associative, affect driven System 1. Indeed, Bechara, 
Damasio and Damasio (2000) reported a dissociation between the performance on the IGT 
and a working memory test between those with damage to the VMPFC and those with 
damage to the dorsal-lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Those with lesions to the VMPFC, 
which did not extend posteriorly, were not found to be impaired on the working memory 
task. Those with damage to the right dorsal-lateral prefrontal cortex by contrast were found 
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to be impaired on the working memory task, but not the IGT. In dual process models of 
thought, working memory is associated with the effective employment of conscious, 
deliberative System 2 reasoning; with factors such as secondary task inference (De Neys, 
2006) reducing working memory capacity and leading to an increase in certain (System 1 
linked) thought biases. The findings of Bechara et al. would seem to further support the 
existence of two modes of reasoning: one associative and affective and one deliberative 
and dependent on working memory capacity. However, it should be noted that the SMH 
would seem to imply that even deliberative, System 2 processes are influenced by an 
affective component; with anticipatory emotional responses informing consideration of 
potential outcomes. 
 
As previously noted, the idea that affect itself may act as information in choice 
processes is central to both the affect heuristic (Finucane et al., 2000; Slovic et al., 2002) 
and Loewenstein et al‘s. (2001) risk as feeling framework. The affect heuristic is, as the 
name would suggest, a heuristic whereby choices are made based on the decision maker‘s 
affective reaction to the available alternatives. Like Bechara, Damasio and Damasio 
(2000), Finducane, Slovic et al. postulate that images of objects, events, situations etc. 
stored in the mind become tagged with positive and negative markers as a result of either 
direct experience or association. The net valence of these markers then acts to influence 
perceptions of benefits, costs and risks. Though an instantaneous ‗affect heuristic‘ may not 
be applied in every decision scenario, it is held that these affect influenced appraisals of 
cost, benefit and risk will have an impact on more deliberative modes of thinking, which 
are traditionally framed as being purely ‗cognitive‘ in nature. 
 
On a complementary note, Loewenstein et al.‘s (2001) risk as feeling framework 
holds that emotions are both anticipated and anticipatory with respect to choice. That is to 
say that emotional state serves as both anticipated outcome and anticipatory information. 
Anticipated emotion is the happiness, sadness, disappointment, regret, relief etc. one 
expects to experience should one select a particular alternative or experience a particular 
outcome. Anticipatory emotions are those feelings one experiences during the choice 
process. As the title of the risk as feeling framework implies, Lowenstein et al. suggest that 
one‘s cognitive appraisal of risk is influenced by one‘s feelings (which are in turn 
influenced by one‘s cognitive appraisal). Drawing upon research from outside the sphere 
of decision research, such as Clore and Schwarz's affect-as-information hypothesis (Clore, 
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Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Schwarz and Clore, 1983), Loewenstein et al. propose that 
both incidental emotions and emotions generated by the choice act as information in the 
decision making process. In support of the postulation that emotions can affect the choice 
and judgement process in a manner unrelated to outcome appraisal, Loewenstein et al. cite 
evidence which suggest that a) emotional states induced by one source may be 
misattributed to another (Schwarz and Clore, 1983) and; b) emotions induced by being 
forced to make a trade-off can influence choice process (e.g. Luce, Bettman and Payne, 
1997). Loewenstein et al. also posit that factors unrelated to perceived probability and 
outcome value; such as vividness, immediacy and prior exposure to outcomes, can 
influence feelings during the course of a decision. These feelings may then in turn 
influence cognitive evaluation and thus the choice process itself.  
 
The notion of affect acting as information is, as was discussed in the preceding sub-
section, especially pertinent to the study of numeracy and choice. As previously detailed, 
Peters et al. (2009) obtained evidence to suggest that when asked to rate the quality of a 
hypothetical hospital based upon difficult to evaluate numeric information, incidental 
mood state influenced the judgements of less numerate (but not more numerate) 
participants. 
 
Of course, if one assumes that humans do possess two modes of thought: one 
intuitive and cognitively un-taxing and one deliberative and cognitively demanding, 
questions are raised as to how emotions and mood states may influence which of these 
modes are relied upon during the decision making process. It has been suggested by Bless 
and colleagues that ‗happier‘ mood states can lead to reliance on more associative, top 
down processes while ‗sadder‘ mood states induce greater reliance on deliberative, bottom 
up processes driven by the task information at hand (see for example Bless et al. 1996; 
Bless and Schwarz, 1999).  Support for this position comes from findings that suggest that 
those in positive mood states appeared to rely more on ‗general knowledge structures‘ (i.e. 
schemas and information already stored in the mind). Bless et al. (1996) report a study in 
which participants were asked to recall a story about ‗going out to dinner‘. It was found 
that the recollections of those participants in whom positive affect had been induced 
contained more intrusion errors (i.e. recollections that were congruent with the restaurant 
script but were not actually present in the story) than those in whom negative affect had 
been induced. This, Bless et al. posited was the result of the happier individuals being more 
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prone to utilising associative, top-down, schema-reliant processes than sad individuals. 
Bless et al. then went on to propose that the reason for these findings could be that a 
positive affective state serves to signal that one‘s environment is as it should be; and that it 
is thus safe to rely upon associative ‗general knowledge structures‘. Negative affect, by 
contrast, may serve as an indication that one‘s current situation is problematic and thus 
relying on pre-stored schemas may not be safe.  
 
Consistent with this postulation, de Vries, Holland and Witteman (2008a) found 
that individuals who reported themselves to be in a ‗happy‘ mood state performed better on 
the Iowa Gambling Task than those reporting themselves to be in a ‗sad‘ mood state. As 
discussed above, performance on the Iowa Gambling task would seem to be contingent on 
associative, affect-driven ‗System 1‘ processing (to, at least, the point where participants 
possess an explicit understanding of which decks are ‗good‘ and which are bad). Having 
reviewed both Bechara et al.‘s research concerning the IGT and Bless et al.‘s postulations 
regarding affect and mode of thought, de Vries, Holland and Witteman hypothesised that 
mood state would affect performance on the IGT. In the early stages of the IGT (i.e. prior 
to participants explicitly and consciously recognising that some decks are better than 
others), it is postulated that that good performance is the result of positive and negative 
‗markers‘ becoming attached to certain decks and thus unconsciously guiding choice. This, 
as previously noted, would seem to be consistent with the notion of humans possessing an 
intuitive, associative unconscious ‗System 1‘ mode of thought, driven by affective 
associations. Hence, if Bless et al.‘s suggestion that positive affect induces associative top-
down processes and negative affect bottom-up processes is correct, one might anticipate 
happier people to do better on the IGT. This is indeed what de Vries, Holland and 
Witteman found. Those participants reporting higher incidental levels of happiness at the 
outset of the study performed better than others on the task. The same pattern of 
performance was found when increases in positive and negative affect were induced by 
getting participants to watch funny or sad movie clips. Thus, the notion that positive affect 
corresponds with greater reliance on ‗System 1‘ is supported.  
 
The existence of a ‗fit‘ between intuitive processes and positive affect and 
deliberative processes and negative affect is further supported by de Vries, Holland and 
Witteman‘s (2008b) findings that participants‘ subjective valuations of rewards that they 
had chosen were higher when their decision strategy ‗fit‘ their mood state.  This is to say 
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that those reporting a positive mood state rated the reward they had chosen themselves 
more highly when they were asked to make an intuitive choice. By contrast, those 
reporting a negative mood state rated their chosen reward more highly when they were 
asked to deliberate on their choice. 
 
One interesting prediction that one might make based upon the postulation that 
positive affect is congruent with reliance on intuitive processes and negative affect 
congruent with deliberative processes, is that the effect of affective state on choice task 
performance will be contingent on whether System 1 or System 2 thought is required. 
Should an implicit learning task like the IGT – which can be linked to associative, affect 
driven System 1 – be presented then one might predict that happier individuals would 
perform better than sad (or at least less happy) individuals. If, by contrast, a task requiring 
deliberation and rule-based reasoning was presented, one might predict that sad (or at least 
less happy) individuals would perform better than their happier counterparts. Hence, with 
respect to an activity such as the lottery choice task utilised in this programme of research, 
it would be anticipated that sad participants would be less prone to certain violations of 
rationality such as probability neglect.  
 
Though much of the research discussed here frames emotional state in terms of 
valence (i.e. whether a state is ‗good‘ or ‗bad‘, ‗positive‘ or ‗negative‘), it should be noted 
that some theorists argue that emotions cannot be reduced solely to valence. For example, 
Zeelenberg and colleagues (Zeelenberg et al. 2008) propose a ‗Feeling is For Doing‘ 
conceptualisation of emotion and choice. It is a framework that stands somewhat in 
contrast to Loewenstein et al.‘s (2001) Risk as Feeling model, due to its emphasis on 
feelings being motivational as well as informational. While both the affect heuristic and the 
risk as feeling framework conceptualise feelings as having an informational role in choice, 
Zeelenberg et al. hold that feelings serve to motivate goal directed behaviour and that 
acting as information is only one role that they serve with respect to choice (an behaviour 
more generally). Indeed, Zeelenberg et al. (2008) maintain that emotion is “...the primary 
motivation system for goal directed behaviour” (p 21). Within this framework each 
emotion is posited to serve a distinct motivational function that cannot be reduced to 
positive or negative valence alone. The notion that ‗feelings‘ can act as information is not 
disputed by Zeelenberg et al., nor is existence of an affect heuristic questioned. However, 
the emphasis of this particular framework is on the motivational properties of emotion and 
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how they relate to choice. To illustrate this idea of emotions serving a motivational 
function that cannot be neatly mapped onto a scale of ‗positive‘ versus ‗negative‘, 
Zeelenberg et al. (2008) point to the differential effects on behaviour of anger and fear, two 
emotions that have negative connotations but ostensibly different effects on behaviour. 
Anger, it is argued, serves to motivate action upon the object of anger. Fear, by contrast, 
serves to motivate avoidance. With respect to mode of thought, the notion that all ‗negative 
emotional states‘ have the same effect on processes utilised is certainly unsupported by the 
evidence gathered to date. Bless and colleagues (e.g. Bless et al., 1996; Bless & Schwarz, 
1999) posit that sadness tends to induce less reliance on ‗general knowledge structures‘ 
and internal associations. However, with respect to anger, Bodenhausen, Sheppard and 
Kramer (1994) found evidence to suggest that this emotion increases reliance on 
stereotypes and heuristic cues. 
 
Zeelenberg et al. (2008) also hold that emotional states can be classified as either 
endogenous (i.e. generated by the task/situation and related to the goal state) or exogenous 
(i.e. incidental to the task/situation and unrelated to the goal state). This factor, it is 
suggest, will determine their influence on choice (and behaviour more generally); with 
their impact contingent on how relevant they are perceived to be to one‘s current goal state.  
Evidence cited in support of this position comes from de Hooge, Breugelmans and 
Zeelenberg‘s (2008) findings, that task endogenous and task exogenous shame appear to 
have different effects on willingness to engage in pro-social behaviour. Exogenous shame 
(generated by an event separate from the target task) was not found to influence 
willingness to engage in pro-social behaviour. Endogenous shame (generated by the task 
itself), on the other hand, was. This, it is claimed, is the result of exogenous shame not 
carrying over into the target task due to the motivational purpose of shame being situation 
specific (i.e. to avoid enacting the specific behaviour that caused shame in the first place). 
Of course, as Loewenstein et al. (2001) point out, prior research has indicated that task-
external ‗exogenous‘ and ‗irrelevant‘ affective states do appear to, at least in some 
instances, carry over into other choice and judgement scenarios as a result of misattribution 
(e.g. Schwarz and Clore, 1983). Zeelenberg et al. (2008) acknowledge that some task-
exogenous emotional states may have the same (or at least similar) effects on choice and 
behaviour as task-endogenous emotional states, as a consequence of either misattribution 
or some kind of carry over effect. However, it is maintained that the exact impact of 
various endogenous and exogenous emotional states is a subject worthy of study.   
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In the last two studies of this programme of research, the relationship between task-
induced (i.e. endogenous) happiness and sadness and various measures of performance on 
the lottery choice task is investigated. The findings of Bless et al. (1996) and de Vries, 
Holland and Witteman (2008a, 2008b) suggest a link between positive affective states and 
reliance on associative, affect driven System 1 processes. However, in both studies 
affective state was either incidental or induced by sources external to the target tasks that 
participants were asked to perform (i.e. getting participants to watch funny/sad video clips 
or asking them to recall happy/sad memories). In Studies 5 and 6 in the present programme 
of research however, the affect induction procedure is – as detailed in Chapters 7 and 8 – 
endogenous to the task itself. 
 
Another affective component to the choice process examined in Study 6 is ‗type of 
reward‘. Though Studies 1, 2, 4 and 5 utilise monetary outcomes, in Study 6 participants 
are presented with gambles in which tokens for either utilitarian or hedonic items can be 
won or lost. Utilitarian goods are those that can be described as useful, practical and 
affectively pallid, while hedonic goods are those that can be described as fun, enjoyable 
and affectively appealing. Dhar & Wertenbroch (2000) observed that when given an 
acquisition choice between a utilitarian and hedonic item most participants selected the 
utilitarian alternative. However, when faced with a forfeiture choice between the same 
hedonic and utilitarian items, most participants opted to retain the hedonic item. Dhar & 
Wertenbroch suggest that this is evidence that people are more ‗loss averse‘ with regard to 
hedonic items than utilitarian items: a phenomenon that is attributed to prospective hedonic 
losses being more affectively salient than equivocal utilitarian losses. Hence, one of the 
goals of Study 6 was to assess whether the affective salience of the type of reward (i.e. 
hedonic versus utilitarian) influenced response and response time.  
 
2.6. In Summary 
 
 Detailed above are the models, theories, frameworks and investigations that form 
the theoretical background to this programme of research. In the first section, the central 
axioms of SEU were outlined (Savage, 1954), along with the predictions that original 
prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1979, 1981), cumulative prospect theory (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1992) and the configural weighting models (e.g. Birnbaum & Macintosh, 
48 
 
1996; Birnbaum & Chavez, 1997) make with respect to dominance violation/adherence 
and the weighting of probabilities. Although these predictive ‗as-if‘ models of choice are 
not a central focus of this programme of research they are of some relevance. As shall be 
discussed in the final chapter of this thesis, the findings of the studies reported here do 
have implications for such models. In the second section, several information processing 
accounts of choice and judgement were detailed, with emphasis placed on dual-process 
models. The case for the existence of an intuitive/deliberative split was outlined (see also 
Epstein, 1994; Evans, 2006; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Sloman, 1996 and Stanovich 
and West, 2000, 2008), as was the criticism that the conceptualisation is too vaguely 
defined (e.g. Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 2007). In the third and fourth sections of this review 
the relationship between choice process, cognitive ability and numeracy was discussed. 
Evidence indicating that numeracy is distinct from more general conceptions of cognitive 
ability was outlined (Brooks & Pui, 2010; Peters et al., 2006), along with findings of prior 
research that suggest that those lower in numeracy are: a) less likely to accurately 
comprehend numeric choice information (e.g. Hanoch et al., 2010; Hanoch, Miron-Shatz & 
Himmelstein, 2010; see also Reyna et al.,2009); b) less likely to draw affective meaning 
from numeric information (Peters et al., 2006); and c) more prone to certain thought biases 
(e.g. Garcia-Retamaro & Galesic, 2009; Peters & Levin, 2008; Peters et al., 2006), than 
those higher in numeracy. The hypothesised link between cognitive ability and mode of 
thought was also explored, with reference to both Stanovich and West‘s (2008) model of 
intuitive response inhibition and Frederick‘s (2005) suggestion that ‗cognitive reflection‘ 
represents a distinct sub-component of cognitive ability. As will be further discussed in the 
coming chapters, these prior findings regarding numeracy, cognitive reflection and mode 
of thought were the basis of many of the hypotheses tested in this programme of research. 
The fifth section of this review focussed on the effect of affect on choice, reasoning and 
judgement. Evidence suggesting a link between positive affect reliance on intuitive, top-
down System 1 processes was reviewed here (e.g. Bless et al., 1996, de Vries, Holland & 
Witteman, 2008a, 2008b), as was the postulation that endogenous and exogenous emotion 
states do not always have the same influence on behaviour (de Hooge, Breugelmans & 
Zeelenberg, 2008; Zeelenberg et al. 2008). As shall be reported in Chapters 7 and 8, the 
relationship between endogenous and exogenous affect and performance on the lottery 
choice task was examined in Studies 5 and 6, with surprising and interesting results. 
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Chapter 3: Study 1 
 
Subjective expected utility theory (henceforth known as SEU) holds that the 
rational decision maker should adhere to the principles of dominance, invariance, 
transitivity and independence (see chapter 2 for a description of each). Proposed by the 18
th
 
century philosopher Bernoulli and axiomised by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) 
and Savage (1954), SEU provides a normative model of how a wholly rational utility 
maximiser would make decisions. As numerous studies have shown however, humans do 
not always make choices that adhere to these four principles (see for example Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1986). Various models and theories have therefore been proposed to predict 
and describe decision behaviour. Some of these models and theories are cognitively 
descriptive, others behaviourist (and thus solely predictive) in nature and yet others, such 
as original prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), part cognitively descriptive and 
part mathematically predictive.  The present investigation centres on the rational choice 
principles of dominance and transitivity: specifically, a set of lottery choice scenarios for 
which the original form of prospect theory predicts a systematic violation of the principle 
of transitivity and adherence to the principle of dominance. 
 
Transitivity, the notion that if A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C, then A 
should be preferred to C, is both predicted and – due to its status as a normative model – 
prescribed by SEU. Indeed, it would seem intuitively logical that preference should remain 
consistent unless some change in the task or external environment was to occur. However, 
various instances of intransitivity (and preference reversal more generally) have been 
observed in decision research. For instance, in one classic study Tversky (1969) found that 
for the alternatives a, b, c, d and e - where each consecutive alternative offers a probability 
of winning that is 1/24 larger than that of the preceding alternative and a potential gain that 
is 25 cents lower - the intransitivity a > b, b > c, c > d, d > e, e > a was frequently 
demonstrated. This phenomenon was attributed by Tversky to use of a lexicographic semi-
order rule (or a similar additive difference strategy): whereby the small difference in 
probability between adjacent alternatives did not exceed the threshold needed for a 
decision to be made on this attribute, but the rather larger (4/24) difference in probability 
between alternative e and alternative a did. Preference, it would seem, is not a fixed state. 
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Dominance is the notion that if an alternative is superior to all other alternatives on 
at least one attribute and equal on all others then this alternative should be selected. The 
dominance principle is perhaps the most fundamental of all of the principles of rational 
choice set out in SEU. It is perhaps easy to see how intransitivities and other preference 
reversals might result from changes in attribute differences, response modes and other task 
variables. Violations of dominance on the other hand would appear to denote not so much 
a reversal of preference as a failure to select an alternative that is better in every sense over 
an alternative that is worse in every sense. To violate dominance, it would seem (on the 
surface at least), is to violate ‗common sense‘ as well as rationality. Systematic violations 
of the dominance principle have however been recorded and reported by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1986). In one investigation, a number of participants were observed to violate 
dominance when presented with a choice between alternatives featuring a large number of 
(difficult to directly compare) potential outcomes. In another investigation, Tversky and 
Kahneman found that dominance is frequently violated in two-stage gambles, in which the 
stages in question would have to be integrated for the existence of a dominated alternative 
to be rendered salient. Nonetheless, in both of these examples the existence of a dominant 
and dominated alternative is clearly obscured by the structure of the task. Should 
dominance to be violated in a task where the existence of a dominant alternative is thought 
to be rendered transparent this would be far more surprising. 
 
Prospect Theory and the Prediction of Systematic Intransitivity 
 
The present study concerns both the principle of transitivity and the principle of 
dominance. As discussed in Chapter 2, prospect theory holds that risky choice can be 
modelled as a two stage process (or set of processes) featuring an editing phase and an 
evaluation phase (see Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 1986). In the editing phase the choice 
is restructured using editing heuristics. Potential outcomes are coded as ‗gains‘ or ‗losses‘ 
comparative to an arbitrary reference point, operations are performed to restructure the 
choice into a form that is easier to evaluate and transparently dominated alternatives are 
discarded. In the evaluation phase subjective valuations of outcomes are weighted by non-
linear functions of probability known as decision weights. As noted above, this model is 
partly cognitively descriptive (the editing phase) and partly mathematically predictive (the 
evaluation phase). This has led Yates (1990) to dub it a ‗hybrid model‘ of choice.  As such 
prospect theory does not hold that people literally mentally multiply outcome valuations by 
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decision weights and sum the resultant values for each alternative, only that the evaluation 
process corresponds with this formula. As the probability weighting function is steeper for 
smaller than moderate values, the overweighting of smaller probabilities comparative to 
moderate probabilities is predicted. This is to say that two 15% chances of winning a prize 
would be given more weight that a single 30% chance of winnings the same prize. Hence, 
for a potential gain of the value x the alternative (x, .15; x, .15; 0, .7) would be preferred to 
the alternative (x, .3; 0, .7), despite the alternatives two being objectively identical. By 
contrast, for a potential loss of the value x the alternative (-x, .3; 0, .7) would be preferred 
to the alternative (-x, .15; -x, .15; 0, .7).  
 
The formulation of the weighting function proposed in the original form of prospect 
theory not only predicts that (x, .15; x, .15; 0, .7) will be preferred to the fundamentally 
identical (x, .3; 0, .7), but implies that the marginally inferior potential gain (x, .15; .97x, 
.15; 0, .7) may be preferred to the marginally superior potential gain (x, .3; 0, .7). This is to 
say that the overweighting of two 15% probabilities comparative to a single 30% 
probability may in some instances offset a small difference in outcome value and render a 
dominated alternative more desirable (or in the domain of losses ‗less undesirable‘) than a 
dominant alternative. Of course, the original form of prospect theory holds that 
recognisably dominated alternatives should be discarded during the editing phase. 
Therefore the overweighting of smaller probabilities comparative to larger ones should not 
lead violations of dominance in instances where decision makers are asked to make a direct 
choice between (x, .15; .97x, .15; 0, .7) and (x, .3; 0, .7). However, Starmer (1999) 
predicted that it could lead to a particular intransitivity when the three lotteries depicted in 
Figure 3.1.1 below are presented in pairs of A versus B, B versus C & A versus C. 
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Lottery A 
 
        20         80 
Lottery B 
0                          30           31                                                             100 
 
        £8:00 
 
                          0 
 30    70 
Lottery C 
0       15                    16 30 31                                                             100 
£8:00 £7:75 
                                  
                            0 
     15         15    70  
 
Figure 3.1.1: Illustration of the three lotteries used by Starmer (1999). The values in each 
segment of each alternative refer to the outcome values corresponding with the ticket 
numbers above.  
 
As one can see, Lottery B dominates Lottery C. Hence, according to both SEU and 
prospect theory, B should always be chosen over C when the two are presented together. 
SEU also predicts that if one prefers A to B then one should also prefer A to C, as C is 
dominated by B. Starmer (1999) however postulated that the overweighting of smaller 
probabilities comparative to moderate probabilities predicted by prospect theory‘s 
weighting function would lead to individuals who possess a weak preference for A over B 
demonstrating a reversal of preference when presented with the pair A versus C. According 
to prospect theory, more ‗weight‘ would be given to two 15% chances of winning a prize 
than a single 30% chance of winning the same prize. Therefore this difference in weight 
might be enough to offset the difference in outcome value between C and B and induce 
participants who have only a mild preference for the higher risk A over the lower risk B to 
chose C over A; thus demonstrating the intransitivity A > B, B > C, C > A.  
 
0             20                    21                                                                        100 
 
   £14:00 
 
                                0 
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Starmer (1999) predicted that, should participants make their choices in a manner 
consistent with original prospect theory, more individuals would demonstrate the 
intransitive preference reversal A > B, B > C, C > A than the transitive counter reversal B 
> A. B > C, A > C. If, on the other hand, the counter reversal occurred more frequently 
than the predicted reversal then this would indicate a weak but transitive pattern of 
preference. Indifference meanwhile would be denoted by the predicted and counter 
reversals occurring at about the same rate. Starmer found that the predicted reversal of 
preference did in fact occur significantly more frequently than the counter reversal, thus 
corresponding with the configuration of the weighting function set out in original prospect 
theory.  
 
Had the same three alternatives utilised in Starmer‘s (1999) study been presented as 
losses rather than gains (e.g. a 30/100 chance of losing £8 rather than a 30/100 chance of 
winning £8) then the opposite pattern would have been expected (i.e. one would 
anticipated the reversal B > A, A > C to occur more frequently than the counter reversal A 
> B, C > A). However, as only alternatives featuring gain amounts were used in Starmer‘s 
(1999) study, this prediction was not investigated. 
 
Cumulative Prospect Theory 
 
As Starmer (1999) points out, the existence of this intransitive reversal of 
preference is inconsistent with the formulation of the weighting function employed 
cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). As discussed in Chapter 2, one 
criticism of original prospect theory was that the proposed editing phase was – as the 
model stood – too loosely defined to be falsifiable (Stevenson, Busemeyer & Naylor, 
1991). That is to say that as the model offered few clear predictions as to how, when and in 
what order editing heuristics might be applied, they could be combined in multiple ways to 
provide post hoc explanations of a number of choice phenomena (whether they were 
responsible for said phenomena or not). Of course, without the editing phase original 
prospect theory predicts that dominance will be violated in instances where a dominant 
alternative is transparently present (as is the case in the B versus C pair depicted above).  
Cumulative prospect theory, which is a predictive rather than cognitively descriptive 
model, both dispenses with the editing phase and restructures the evaluation phase to – 
amongst other things – preclude such violations of dominance. Rather than assigning a 
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single decision weight to a single potential outcome, cumulative prospect theory states that 
probability is transformed in a cumulative and rank dependent manner for gains and 
cumulative and rank dependently manner for losses. For gains the final probability weight 
assigned to an outcome (x) equals the cumulative weight of the probabilities of all gains 
greater than or equal to x, minus the cumulative weight of the probabilities of all gains 
greater than x. For losses this is reversed, with the loss outcome (x)‘s final decision weight 
being the cumulative weight of the probabilities of all losses greater than or equal to x, 
minus the cumulative weight of the probabilities of all losses greater than x. The rank 
dependent nature of this formulation means that neither dominance violation nor the 
violation of transitivity observed by Starmer (1999) should occur. Yet Starmer did observe 
the pattern of intransitivity in question. 
 
Configural Weighting Models: Transitivity and Dominance 
 
One set of mathematically predictive models of choice that do predict dominance 
violation in certain single-stage decision making tasks are the configural weighting models. 
Birnabum and colleagues have proposed two configural weighting models: the transfer of 
attention exchange model (TAX) (e.g. Birnbaum & Chavez, 1997) and the rank-affected 
multiplicative weighting model (RAM) (e.g. Birnbaum & McIntosh, 1996). Though the 
models have certain structural differences they both hold that the outcomes within an 
alternative should be conceptualised as independent branches, which are ranked according 
to their value and their probabilities weighted according to said ranking. As separate 
outcomes with identical outcome values retain ‗branch independence‘ and are not 
combined into a single amalgamated outcome (i.e. the outcomes (x, .15) and (x, .2) would 
not be amalgamated into (x, .35)), certain intransitivies and violations of dominance are 
predicted in cases where identical and near-identical outcomes are split. 
 
While Starmer (1999) did not include a discussion of configural weighting models 
in his report of the study, the results of a simulation conducted by the researcher using the 
RAM and TAX calculators that have been made available online Birnbaum and Bailey 
(1998) (see references for URLs), suggest a mixed picture (see Appendix A for details of 
this simulation). Both the RAM and TAX variations accorded Lottery A the highest 
valuation. However, while RAM accords Lottery B a higher value than Lottery C, TAX 
55 
 
accorded C a higher valuation than B. Hence, for the three lotteries depicted in Figure 3.1.1 
RAM would predict a preference order of A > B > C and TAX A > C > B.  
 
The fact that the RAM model assigns greater weight to B than C means that the 
model does not, when default parameters are utilised, predict that the preference reversal 
(A > B, C > A)  will be observed more frequently than the counter reversal (B > A, A > C). 
According to RAM (A > B, A > C) should occur more frequently than (B > A, A > C), 
which in turn should occur more frequently than (A > B, C > A). The TAX model on the 
other hand assigns greater weight to C than B. Thus this model would appear to predict 
that the preference reversal (A > B, C > A) will occur more frequently than the counter 
reversal (B > A, A > C). Although, once again, the preference pattern (A > B, A > C) 
would be expected to predominate. Interestingly, the fact that TAX assigns more weight to 
C than B means that the model would seem to predict a high rate of dominance violation 
when the pair B versus C is presented. 
 
With respect to Starmer‘s (1999) study, it can be concluded that RAM does not 
successfully predict its findings. TAX on the other hand does appear to be at least partially 
consistent with the results of the investigation.   
 
With respect to the replication and expansion of Starmer‘s (1999) study to be 
undertaken in the present investigation, the predictions made by original prospect theory, 
cumulative prospect theory and the configural weighting models with respect to the cycles 
of A versus B, B versus C and A versus C can be clearly stated. As previously discussed, 
original prospect theory predicts that in the domain of gains more participants will 
demonstrate the (A > B, C > A) preference reversal more frequently than the counter 
reversal (B > A, A > C). In the domain of losses the reverse is to be expected.  Original 
prospect theory also holds that dominance should not be violated when B and C are 
presented together, as the existence of a dominated alternative should be detected during 
the editing phase. Cumulative prospect theory predicts that preferences should a) adhere to 
dominance; and b) be transitive unless the decision maker is truly indifferent to the 
alternatives presented. Hence, the preference reversal predicted by the original formulation 
of prospect theory would not be expected to occur more frequently than the counter 
reversal. In the domain of gains the RAM configural weighting model predicts (when 
default parameters are utilised) that the (A > B, C > A) reversal predicted by prospect 
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theory should occur less frequently than the counter reversal. The TAX model meanwhile 
predicts that (in the gains domain) the preference reversal predicted by original prospect 
theory will occur more frequently than the counter reversal. TAX also predicts that the 
principle of dominance will be frequently violated when B and C are presented together 
(see appendix A for a summary of the results of the TAX and RAM calculations). Both 
TAX and RAM predict that, in the domain of gains, the higher risk alternative (A) will be 
predominantly preferred to both B and C. 
 
It should be noted that cumulative prospect theory, configural weighting models 
and the evaluation phase of original prospect theory serve primarily as behaviourist models 
of choice; mathematical functions that predict choices when certain inputs and weightings 
are entered. They do not directly specify the cognitive processes that produce the choice 
phenomena that they predict and account for. Of course, cognitive and neurological 
evidence supporting such models do exist. For instance, the diminishing sensitivity to 
increases in outcome values predicted by prospect theory‘s valuation function is consistent 
with Weber‘s Law and therefore the psychophysics of perception. In the domain of 
neuropsychology meanwhile Trepel, Fox and Poldrack (2005) have identified, based on 
lesion studies and other neuro-physiological measures, the neurological systems and 
regions of the brain that would seem likely to mediate the choice phenomena associated 
with prospect theory. Nonetheless, the fact that prospect theory‘s probability weighting 
function predicts the violation of transitivity observed by Starmer (1999) does not in and of 
itself offer a cognitively descriptive explanation of the phenomenon. 
 
Process Accounts of Preference Reversal 
 
In terms of cognition and process based accounts of choice, Starmer‘s (1999) 
findings are interesting in that they are inconsistent with findings of Ranyard (1995), which 
suggest that when faced with multiple outcome decisions under risk decision makers tend 
to combine very similar outcomes. Verbal process data collected by Ranyard in this 
investigation indicated that decision makers routinely amalgamate very similar within-
alternatives outcomes when presented with choices between monetary gambles. However, 
the reversal of preference evident in Starmer‘s research would seem to indicate that a 
relatively large proportion of participants did not employ such an amalgamation heuristic. 
Of course, it is entirely possible that many participants in Starmer‘s study did mentally 
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amalgamate the two non-zero outcomes offered by Lottery C and thus demonstrated either 
consistent risk seeking/risk aversion or indifference. More participants in Starmer‘s study 
did, after all, demonstrate preference consistency than preference reversal. This does not 
however answer the question of why such a sizable portion of the sample did not. 
 
One possible explanation can be drawn from Payne, Bettman and Johnson‘s (1993) 
adaptive decision maker framework, which holds that decision making is both adaptive and 
context dependent. As noted in Chapter 2, few researchers in the field of the psychology of 
decision making today would argue that all decisions are the result of the application of a 
unitary choice process. However, the manner in which Payne, Bettman and Johnson 
classify choice processes would seem to have special relevance here. In the adaptive 
decision maker framework choice strategies and heuristics are classified as alternative-
based versus attribute-based. Attribute-based strategies/heuristics are those such as the 
lexicographic and lexicographic semi-order heuristic (Tversky, 1969) and elimination by 
aspects (Tversky, 1972), in which comparisons between alternatives are made on an 
attribute by attribute basis. Alternative-based strategies on the other hand are those in 
which multiple attributes belonging to a single alternative are considered together, before 
the next alternative in the set is similarly judged. Comparisons are then made between 
these holistic judgements of alternatives. Payne, Bettman and Johnson cite evidence to 
suggest that attribute-based processes are a) less cognitively demanding than alternative-
based processes (Russo & Dosher, 1983); b) more likely to be utilised than alternative-
based processes as the number of alternatives increases (Payne & Braunstein, 1978); and c) 
more likely to occur when information is presented numerically than when it is presented 
as text (Stone & Schkade, 1991). In addition to this Jarvenpaa (1990) found that organising 
information by attribute increased attribute-based information processing, while organising 
information by alternative increased alternative-based information processing. 
 
If participants are making attribute-based comparisons between alternatives 
featuring an asymmetric number of outcomes, then amalgamation of similar outcomes 
would seem likely to facilitate attribute comparison across alternatives. On the other hand, 
if participants are making a holistic assessment of each alternative, amalgamation may be 
less likely to occur. 
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Method of Presentation 
 
Looking at the manner in which the information was presented in Starmer‘s (1999) 
study (i.e. a graphical matrix), one may be struck by the fact that while A and B are very 
easy to compare on an attribute by attribute basis (i.e. a single outcome value comparison 
or a single probability comparison), A and C are perhaps somewhat less so owing to the 
asymmetry of the number of outcomes. It might therefore be posited that as A and B are 
easier to compare across attributes than A and C, some decision makers may switch from 
attribute-based processing in the former case to alternative-based processing in the latter. A 
switch in process between the two lottery-choice scenarios could account for the reversal 
in preference observed in Starmer‘s study. It seems possible, after all, that the ease with 
which A and B can be compared on the outcome-value attribute may induce in many a 
preference for A. On the other hand, the fact that A and C are less easy to compare on an 
outcome by outcome basis, may induce some to make more holistic judgements of C and A 
and therefore utilise alternative-based choice processes/strategies.  
 
If this is indeed the case then one might expect that presenting choice information 
in a manner likely to facilitate alternative rather than attribute-based processing will 
increase the rate of preference reversal in the direction predicted original prospect theory 
and observed in Starmer‘s (1999) study. Presenting choice information in text format 
would, according to the findings of Stone and Schkade (1991), seem likely to increase the 
utilisation of alternative-based processes/strategies. Of course, if this is the case then it is 
likely that presenting choice information in text format will increase rate of alternative-
based processing in single-outcome lottery pairs (e.g. the A and B pair) as well as 
asymmetric-outcome lottery pairs (e.g. the A and C pair). However, for the single non-zero 
outcome pairs it is to be predicted that the text presentation format will render probability 
information less salient than in the matrix condition, where it is represented graphically; 
thus increasing reliance on outcome-value information. This prediction is supported by the 
research of Chua, Yates and Shah (2006) and Stone, Yates and Parker (1997), whose 
findings suggest that displaying risk/probabilistic information graphically (rather than in 
text form) can increase risk aversion. In the case of the asymmetric-outcome A versus C 
pairs however, the fact that an alternative-based consideration of C will require the 
integration (or at least the processing) of two gain outcomes would seem likely to increase 
59 
 
preference for C, even if the salience of probabilistic information itself is diminished (i.e. 
that the number of potential gain outcomes becomes a salient characteristic in and of itself 
even though the probabilities of said outcomes are themselves rendered less salient). 
Indeed, should a text presentation format sufficiently facilitate alternative-based processing 
(and diminish comparisons of attributes between alternatives), one might even expect 
violations of the dominance principle to occur when B and C are presented together. 
 
Another presentation manipulation that may serve to increase alternative-based 
processing and thus preference reversal (and possibly dominance violation) would be to 
change the mode of presentation from simultaneous (i.e. both alternatives appearing 
simultaneously) to sequential (i.e. one alternative appearing before the other). Being 
presented with one alternative before the other would seem likely to facilitate alternative-
based processing. Such a prediction would not be without theoretical precedence. Research 
conducted by Hsee et al. (1999) has, for example, indicated that judgements of alternatives 
presented separately tend to differ that judgements of alternatives presented jointly.  
 
It should of course be noted that the processes and models described above assume 
that probabilistic information is always attended to. However, it is also worth keeping in 
mind that the neglect of probabilistic information could also lead to preference reversal. If 
an individual does not utilise probabilistic information, then they would be expected to 
prefer A to B, due to A‘s higher outcome value. With respect to A and C however, the fact 
that C offers two potential gain outcomes while A offers only one, could lead to C being 
preferred to A. Of course, such probability neglect would also seem likely to lead to 
violations of dominance when B and C are presented together, something that was not 
observed in Starmer‘s (1999) study. 
 
Aims and Hypotheses 
 
Taking all of the above into account, it would therefore seem reasonable to both 
further investigate the intransitivity observed in Starmer‘s (1999) research and examine 
whether manipulations of presentation format and presentation mode will influence rate of 
preference reversal. The aims of the present study are thus threefold: 1) to ascertain 
whether Starmer‘s (1999) findings can be replicated; 2) to examine whether the reversal of 
preference observed by Starmer extends to the loss domain; and 3) to investigate whether 
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manipulating the presentation format (text versus matrix) and presentation mode 
(sequential versus simultaneous) in which choice information is presented will increase the 
rate of preference reversal and/or dominance violation. 
 
As previously stated, original prospect theory, cumulative prospect theory, TAX 
and RAM all offer testable predictions with respect to the cycles of A versus B, B versus C 
and A versus C to be presented in this investigation. Although it should however be noted 
that the predictions of the TAX and RAM configural weighting models are limited to those 
cycles in the domain of gains. 
 
Original prospect theory predicts that smaller probabilities will be overweighted 
comparative to larger probabilities. The model also holds that transparently dominated 
alternatives will be rejected during a preliminary editing phase of choice. Hence, if choices 
between lottery pairs are made in a manner consistent with the original form of prospect 
theory then one would expect to observe the following. 
 
1. That in the domain of gains the preference reversal (A > B, C > A) will occur more 
frequently than the counter reversal (B > A, A > C). 
 
2. That in the domain of losses the preference reversal (B > A, A > C) will occur more 
frequently than the counter reversal (A > B, C > A). 
 
3. That the principle of dominance will be adhered to for all B versus C pairs. 
 
Due to the manner in which its weighting function differs from that of original prospect 
theory, cumulative prospect theory on the other hand predicts that: 
 
1. The preference reversal (A > B, C > A) and the preference reversal (B > A, A > C) 
will occur with about equal frequency in both the domain of gains and the domain 
of losses. 
 
2. That the principle of dominance will be adhered to for all B versus C pairs. 
 
61 
 
When default parameters are utilised, the RAM configural weighting model assigns A 
greater weight than B and B greater weight than C (see Appendix A). Hence, this model 
predicts the following with respect to both the high-win and low-win cycles. 
 
1. That most participants will demonstrate a consistent preference for the higher risk 
alternative (A). 
 
2. That the preference reversal (B > A, A > C) will occur more frequently than the 
reversal (A > B, C > A). 
 
3. That the principle of dominance will be adhered to for all B versus C pairs. 
 
Like RAM the TAX configural weighting model assigns alternative A the most weight 
for both the high-win and low-win cycles. Unlike RAM however, TAX assigns greater 
weight to C than to B. Hence, when default parameters are utilised TAX predicts that: 
 
1. That most participants will demonstrate a consistent preference for the higher risk 
alternative (A). 
 
2. That the preference reversal (A > B, B > C) will occur more frequently than the 
counter reversal (B > A, A > C). 
 
3. That the principle of dominance will be frequently violated for B versus C pairs. 
 
As previously noted, the original formulation of prospect theory is the only one of the 
aforementioned models that is fully consistent the findings of Starmer‘s (1999) 
investigation. For this reason it is anticipated that the findings of this expansion and 
replication of the study will also conform to the predictions of original prospect theory 
when a similar format and mode of presentation (i.e. matrix-simultaneous) is utilised. 
However, the present study will serve as a test of the predictions of all four models. 
 
Of course, with the exception of original prospect theory‘s editing phase these models 
are behaviourist rather than cognitive in nature, and it is the aim of the present study to 
investigate possible process explanations for the preference reversal observed by Starmer 
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(1999). Hence, drawing upon Payne, Bettman and Johnson‘s (1993) classification of 
choice processes as being either alternative-based or attribute-based, it was posited that 
alternative-based processing is more likely to lead to preference reversal and dominance 
violation than attribute-based processing. As prior research suggests that presenting 
information in a text-based manner a) facilitates alternative-based processing (e.g. Stone & 
Schkade, 1991); and b) diminishes the salience of probabilistic information (e.g. Chua, 
Yates & Shah, 2006; Stone, Yates & Parker, 1997), it might therefore be predicted that 
presenting lottery information in text-format will: 
 
1. Result in a higher rate of preference reversal. 
 
2. Result in a higher rate of dominance violation. 
 
3. Result in higher response times, due to alternative-based processes demanding 
greater cognitive effort (Russo & Dosher, 1983, as cited by Payne, Bettman and 
Johnson, 1993). 
 
4. Result in a higher rate of risk seeking. 
 
Similarly, it is anticipated that presenting lottery information in a sequential rather than 
simultaneous manner will lead to more alternative-based processing. It might therefore be 
predicted that presenting lottery information in matrix-format will: 
 
1. Result in a higher rate of preference reversal. 
 
2. Result in a higher rate of dominance violation. 
 
3. Result in higher response times. 
 
Consistent with the predictions outlined above, this study will proceed with the 
following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: For cycles in the domain of gains the preference reversal (A > B, C > A) 
will be observed more frequently than the counter reversal (B > A, A > C). 
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Hypothesis 2: For cycles in the domain of losses the preference reversal (B > A, A > C) 
will be observed more frequently than the counter reversal (A > B, C > A). 
 
Hypothesis 3a: A higher rate of preference reversal in the predicted direction will be 
observed amongst those in the text-format condition than those in the matrix-format 
condition. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: A higher rate of Dominance violation for B versus C pairs will be 
observed amongst those frequently in the text-format condition than those the matrix-
format condition. 
 
Hypothesis 4a: A higher rate of preference reversal in the predicted direction will be 
observed amongst those in the sequential-mode condition than those in the simultaneous-
mode condition. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: A higher rate of Dominance violation for B versus C pairs will be 
observed amongst those frequently in the sequential-mode condition than those the 
simultaneous-mode condition. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Response times will be higher for those in the text-format condition than 
the matrix-format condition. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Response times will be higher for those in the sequential-mode condition 
than the simultaneous-mode condition. 
 
Hypothesis 7: That rate of risk seeking will be higher amongst those in the text-format 
condition than those in the matrix-format condition. 
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3.2. Method 
 
Participants 
 
The sample was comprised of 72 students and members of staff from the University 
of Bolton (54 female and 18 male). Participants‘ ages ranged from 18 and 52, with a mean 
of 27.6. Participants were recruited by two methods: direct approach in various public 
spaces on-campus and via an on-campus poster advertising the experiment. All participants 
were paid a fee £5 for their participation in the study. 
 
Design 
 
A mixed 2x2x2x2 factorial design with two between groups‘ factors and two 
repeated measures factors was employed in this study. Between groups‘ factors were 
Presentation Format (matrix versus text) and Presentation Mode (simultaneous versus 
sequential). Repeated measures factors were Outcome Domain (gains versus losses) and 
Outcome Value (high versus low).  
 
Dependent variables were risk preference, rate of dominance violation and response 
time. 
 
Stimuli 
 
Two sets of stimuli were created: one for the text presentation format condition (see 
Figure 3.2.1 below for an example of a lottery pair presented in text format) and one for 
the matrix presentation format condition (see Figure 3.2.2 below for an example of a 
lottery pair presented in matrix format). The content of the lottery pairs was of course 
identical in both sets. While the matrix presentation format condition was intended to 
approximate the format used by Starmer (1999), the stimuli used in the present study had 
20 rather than 100 as a denominator. This was due to the fact that the experiment was 
presented as part of a battery of experiments in which all stimuli were presented thusly. 
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Figure 3.2.1: An example of a lottery pair presented in text format. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2.2: An example of a lottery pair presented in matrix format. 
 
 
The stimuli sets were comprised of 12 targets and 12 fillers. The targets were those 
stimuli that comprised cycles of A versus B, B versus C & C versus A (as described in the 
introduction). The fillers were six gain pairs and six loss pairs (each gain pair having a 
corresponding loss pair). As one can see there were, in total, four cycles of A versus B, B 
versus C & C versus A. These were dubbed: Low Win, Low Loss, High Win and High 
Loss. Their compositions are illustrated in matrix format in Figure 3.2.3 to Figure 3.2.6 
below. As one can see, the Low Win condition constitutes a near-replication of Starmer‘s 
(1999) stimuli. Note that when the pairs were presented to participants alternatives were 
always dubbed A and B. 
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A  
B  
C  
Figure 3.2.3: Alternatives presented in Low Win condition 
 
A  
B  
C  
Figure 3.2.4: Alternatives presented in the Low Loss condition 
 
A  
B  
C  
Figure 3.2.5: Alternatives presented in the High Win condition. 
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A  
B  
C  
Figure 3.2.6: Alternatives presented in the High Loss condition 
 
It is worth noting here that of the 12 filler, two contained a dominant alternative 
(see figure 3.2.7 below).  As the difference in outcome value between dominant and 
dominated alternatives in these pairs was vast, it was posited that dominance would only 
be violated for these pairs as a result of a) error; b) task misunderstanding; or c) 
inattention. Hence, should violations of dominance observed for the B versus C pairs 
illustrated above, a comparison of rate of dominance violation for those pairs and rate of 
dominance violation for the fillers illustrated below should indicate whether the former 
were caused by simple error/inattention or something more theoretically interesting. 
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Figure 3.2.7: The two filler pairs featuring a dominant and dominated alternative (as 
presented in matrix format). 
 
Equipment 
 
The experiment was created using the E-Studio facility of E-Prime 1.1 and run 
using the E-Run function of the package (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA, 
USA). Responses were recorded using a Response Box with buttons labelled ‗A‘, ‗B‘ & 
‗Z‘. 
 
Procedure 
 
Prior to the start of the experiment participants were randomly allocated to either 
the matrix-simultaneous, matrix-sequential, text-simultaneous or text-sequential condition. 
They were then seated at a computer terminal running the appropriate version of the 
experiment. As this study was one of two experiments that each participant completed 
during the same session it was presented either before or after another similar but unrelated 
experiment. 
 
Once seated, participants were presented with a set of onscreen instructions. These 
instructions informed them that they were about to be presented with a series of lottery 
pairs, and that from each pair they were required to select the alternative that they would 
prefer to play. They were also instructed that at the end of the study one participant, one 
lottery pair and one ticket would be selected at random by the computer. The chosen 
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participant would then receive £30 plus or minus the amount that the ticket corresponded 
with for the alternative they had chosen from the selected lottery pair. Once participants 
had finished reading the instructions they were instructed, via an onscreen prompt, to press 
the button labelled ‗Z‘ to move to the next part of the experiment (throughout the 
experiment the ‗Z‘ key was used to navigate from stage to stage, while the ‗A‘ and ‗B‘ 
keys were used to make choices between alternatives). The instructions were then followed 
by a demonstration of how the lottery choice games were to proceed. The demonstration 
took the same form as the trials that comprised the main body of the experiment, but 
contained various onscreen annotations that further elaborated further on how to play the 
choice games. 
 
For those in the matrix-simultaneous and text-simultaneous condition the 
demonstration pair took the form of two alternatives simultaneously presented one under 
the other in the same manner as those depicted in Figures 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. They were asked 
to make their choice by pressing the button (‗A‘ or ‗B‘) that corresponded with the 
alternative they wished to select. Those in the matrix-sequential and text-sequential 
conditions were presented first with alternative A in isolation. An onscreen prompt 
instructed them to study this alternative and then press ‗Z‘ when they were ready to see 
alternative B. Alternative B then appeared under alternative A. Participants were instructed 
to make their choice by pressing the button that corresponded with the alternative that they 
wished to select. Once participants had made their selection, a ticket number was generated 
at random by the program. A screen then appeared detailing what the randomly selected 
ticket number was and the outcome that said ticket number corresponded with for their 
chosen lottery.  
 
It should here be noted that the sequential presentation mode utilised in the present 
study was not fully sequential in the traditional sense (i.e. in the manner defined as 
‗separate‘ by Hsee et al., 1999). The presentation of alternative A in isolation was not 
followed by the presentation of alternative B in isolation, but rather a joint presentation of 
alternative A and alternative B. This partially sequential mode of presentation was used in 
lieu of one that was fully sequential because it was anticipated that a fully sequential 
presentation condition would lead to many participants selecting alternative B as a result of 
recency effects. It was however anticipated that this partially sequential mode of 
presentation would induce the hypothesised effects. 
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After completing the demonstration, participants were presented with four 
consecutive practice games (two featuring wins and two featuring losses). This stage of the 
experiment was included in order to further familiarise participants with the experimental 
procedure. The stimuli were presented and played in the same manner as the demonstration 
game, though this time there were no explanatory annotations onscreen. Once all four 
selections had been made, one practice game and once ticket number were generated at 
random by the program. A screen then appeared informing participants which ticket 
number and lottery pair had been selected. They were also informed whether their balance 
would have increased, decreased or remained unchanged had they been playing ‗for real‘. 
This information was, of course, dependent on the outcome that the ticket number 
corresponded with in their chosen lottery for the pair. 
 
After completing the practice, participants were then presented with the twenty four 
games that made up the main body of the experiment. The program was configured to 
alternate the games between randomly selected target and randomly selected filler. Once 
all twenty-four choices had been made, one game and one ‗ticket number‘ were selected at 
random by the computer. A screen then appeared detailing which lottery pair and ticket 
number had been selected, and what their final balance was. Again, this last piece of 
information was dependent on the outcome that the ticket number corresponded with in 
their chosen lottery for the pair. 
 
Participants were then asked to fill in a demographic details form. Once they had 
done this they were paid £5:00 for taking part in the experiment and thanked for their time. 
After the data collection phase of the study was complete one participant was selected at 
random to receive their final balance. 
 
3.3. Results 
 
73 data sets were collected during the investigation. However, two sets were 
removed prior to analysis. In one instance this was because it was discovered that the same 
participant had taken part in the experiment twice (in this instance the participant‘s first 
dataset was retained). In the other instance it was because the participant‘s mean response 
time was found to be less than one second, indicating that they had probably responded in 
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a quasi-random fashion. Consequently, N = 18 for the matrix-sequential condition, N = 18 
for the matrix-simultaneous condition, N = 17 for the text-sequential condition and N = 18 
for the text-simultaneous condition. 
 
As stated at the outset, the primary objectives of this study were to examine a) 
whether Starmer‘s (1999) findings regarding intransitivity/preference reversal could be 
replicated and generalised to the domain of losses; and b) whether the format and mode of 
information presentation would have an effect on preference reversal, adherence to the 
principle of dominance, response time and risk seeking. Hence the following analyses will 
be divided into four main subsections: preference patterns and reversals, dominance 
violation and adherence, response time and risk preference. 
 
Patterns of Preference 
 
At the outset it was predicted that the preference reversal (A > B, C > A) would be 
demonstrated more frequently than the counter reversal (B > A, A > C) in the domain of 
gains (Hypothesis 1). The reverse was predicted to occur in the domain of losses 
(Hypothesis 2). In addition to this, it was hypothesised that the predicted preference 
reversal would occur more frequently amongst those in the text-format (Hypothesis 3a) and 
the sequential-mode (Hypothesis 4a) conditions than those in matrix-format and 
simultaneous-mode conditions. For the B versus C pairs, dominance was expected to be 
violated more frequently by those in the in the text-format (Hypothesis 3b) and sequential-
mode (Hypothesis 4b) conditions than those in matrix-format and simultaneous-mode 
conditions. 
 
For each of the four target cycles of A versus B, B versus C & A versus C, eight 
possible permutations of preference existed. The frequency with which each of these was 
demonstrated in each target cycle is detailed in Table 3.3.1 below. 
 
High risk denotes a consistent preference for the higher risk alternative in the A 
versus B and A versus C pairs, while low risk denotes a consistent preference for the lower 
risk alternative. Predicted reversal denotes a demonstration of the reversal predicted by the 
original form of prospect theory (i.e. A > B, C > A for gains and B > A, A > C for losses), 
while counter reversal denotes a demonstration of the counter reversal. Dominant denotes 
72 
 
that the dominant alternative was selected for the B versus C pair, while dominated means 
that the dominated alternative with chosen.  
 
 
As one can see, the predicted reversal of preference was, as expected, observed 
more frequently than the counter reversal in all conditions. Consistent preference for the 
lower risk alternative was the most frequently displayed preference pattern. However, 
more participants demonstrated the predicted reversal than demonstrated a consistent 
preference for the higher risk alternative.  
 
Preference Reversal 
 
Table 3.3.2: Frequency with which the predicted and counter preferences reversals 
were observed in each target condition 
 Predicted preference 
reversal 
Counter preference 
reversal 
X
2 
sig 
Low win (N=32) 19 13 1.125 .289 
High win(N=34) 27 7 11.765 .001*** 
Low loss (N=27) 19 8 4.481 .034* 
High loss (N = 29) 19 10 2.793 .095 
*Significant at p ≤ .05  
**Significant at p ≤ .01 
***Significant at p ≤ .001 
 
Table 3.3.1: Number of times each possible pattern of preference was demonstrated 
for each target cycle 
 High risk Low risk Predicted reversal Counter reversal 
 dominant dominated dominant dominated Dominant dominated dominant dominated 
Low-
win 
8 4 13 14 8 11 9 4 
High-
win 
10 1 15 11 15 12 3 4 
Low-
loss 
4 7 25 8 13 6 5 3 
High-
loss 
6 7 24 5 9 10 6 4 
Total 28 19 77 38 45 39 23 15 
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Table 3.3.2 above details the frequency with which the predicted preference 
reversal and the counter reversal was observed in each of the four target conditions and 
whether a chi square test revealed a significant difference in frequency between predicted 
and counter reversal. Note that this table only reports the number of participants who 
demonstrated either the predicted preference reversal or counter reversal. The number of 
participants who demonstrated a consistent (and therefore transitive) higher-risk or lower-
risk preference for each of the repeated measures conditions can be found in Table 3.3.1. 
As one can see, the predicted reversal was observed significantly more frequency than the 
counter reversal for the high win (N = 34, X
2
(1) = 11.765, p ≤ .001) and low loss (N = 27, 
X
2
(1) = 4.481, p ≤ .05) cycles. Despite the fact that the predicted reversal occurred more 
frequently than the counter reversal for the low win and high loss cycles, the difference did 
not reach significance in either instances, though it approached it for the high loss cycle. 
 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 can thus be said to be generally supported by these findings.  
 
 
Figure 3.3.1: Mean rate at which the predicted preference reversal was demonstrated, by 
presentation format and presentation mode. 
 
In order to determine whether presentation mode and/or presentation format had the 
hypothesised effects on preference reversal, the number of times each participant 
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demonstrated the predicted reversal was summed. The mean rate at which those in each 
format-mode condition demonstrated the predicted preference reversal is illustrated in 
Figure 3.3.1. A glance at the graph indicates that there is very little difference in rate of 
predicted preference reversal between each of the four groups, though the rate of 
(predicted) preference reversal was slightly higher for those in the text-simultaneous 
condition than those in the text-sequential condition. A 2 x 2 between groups ANOVA 
revealed no main effect of either format (N = 71, F(1, 67) = .012, p > .05) or mode (N = 
71, F(1, 67) = .938, p > .05). There was no interaction between these factors (N= 71, F(1, 
67) = .29, p > .05). It should be noted that because the data was not normally distributed, a 
follow up set of non-parametric tests were conducted. The datafile was first split by 
presentation format. Following this, two Mann Whitney U tests with Bonferroni 
adjustment (p = .025) were conducted with presentation mode as the independent variable. 
Again, no significant effects were found. Hypotheses 3a and 4a are thus unsupported. 
 
Dominance Violation 
 
As mentioned above, the rate of dominance violation observed for the B versus C 
pairs presented in the present study was surprisingly high. It had been anticipated that a 
higher rate of dominance violation than that observed in Starmer‘s (1999) study would be 
observed amongst those in the text-format condition and sequential-presentation conditions 
(Hypotheses 3b and 4b). However, as Figure 3.3.2 below illustrates, for each of the four B 
versus C target pairs dominance was violated by 23 – 33 participants (i.e. a 34 – 47% rate 
of dominance violation), a very large proportion of the total sample. In addition to this, 
mean rate of dominance violation was actually highest amongst those in matrix-
simultaneous condition (see Table 3.3.3) 
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Figure 3.3.2: Frequency with which dominance was violated for each target pair featuring 
a dominant alternative (N = 71). 
 
Table 3.3.3: Mean rate of dominance violation per participant for the four target pairs 
featuring a dominant alternative by presentation format and presentation mode conditions 
Condition Mean (standard deviation) 
(Stimuli = 4) 
Matrix-simultaneous (N = 18) 1.89 (1.37) 
Matrix-sequential (N =18) 1.39 (1.24) 
Text-simultaneous (N = 18) 1.33 (1.14) 
Text-sequential (N = 17) 1.68 (1.17) 
Overall (N = 71) 1.56 (1.23) 
 
In order to determine whether the mean rate of dominance violation (for the four 
target B versus C pairs) observed in this study significantly exceeded zero for each of the 
four between groups conditions, the sample was split by presentation format and 
presentation mode, and a series of four one-sample t-tests with Bonferroni Adjustment  (p 
= .0125) were performed. Rate of dominance violation was entered as the test-variable and 
0 as the test value. As Table 3.3.4 below details, rate of dominance violation significantly 
exceeded zero for all four conditions  
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Table 3.3.4: Results of one-sample t-tests examining whether rate of dominance violation 
significantly exceeded zero for each stimulus presentation condition  
Condition t p 
Matrix-simultaneous (N = 18) 5.861 ≤ .001 
Matrix-sequential (N =18) 4.740 ≤ .001 
Text-simultaneous (N = 18) 4.973 ≤ .001 
Text-sequential (N = 17) 5.807 ≤ .001 
* Significant at p ≤ .05 
** Significant at p ≤ .01 
*** Significant at p ≤ .001 
 
A 2 x 2 between groups ANOVA revealed no significant effect of format (N = 71, 
F(1, 67) = .258, p > .05) or mode  (N = 71, F(1, 67) = .101, p > .05) on rate of dominance 
violation for the four target pairs featuring a dominant alternative. Nor was any significant 
interaction found between the two variables (N = 71, F(1, 67) = 1.930, p > .05). 
Hypotheses 3b and 4b are thus unsupported. 
 
  As the assumption of normality was violated in this instance a follow up non-
parametric test was conducted. The four format-mode conditions (i.e. matrix-simultaneous, 
matrix-sequential, text-simultaneous, text-sequential) were merged into a single 
‗Condition‘ variable with four levels. A Kruskal Wallis test with condition as the 
independent variable and rate of dominance violation as the dependent was then 
performed. Again, no significant between groups difference was found with regard to rate 
of dominance violation (N = 71, X
2
(3) = 2.005, p > .05). 
 
The possibility that the high rate of dominance violation observed in this study was 
the result of participants responding in a quasi-random fashion (i.e. making selections 
without attending to the choice information) was of course considered. However, two 
findings pointed to this not being the case. 
 
The first of these was the fact that rate of dominance violation for the filler pairs 
depicted in Figure 3.2.7 was lower (11 – 14%) that for any of the target pairs (34 – 47%). 
A  McNemar test comparing the rate of dominance violation for the low loss condition (i.e. 
the target with the lowest rate of dominance violation) and the filler pair with the higher 
rate of dominance violation was performed. The test revealed that the difference in rate of 
dominance violation between the two pairs was significant (N = 71, X
2
(1) = 6.043, p ≤ 
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.05). Had the high rate of dominance violation observed here been the result of quasi-
random responding, one would expect dominance to be violated with similar frequency for 
each pair featuring a dominant alternative. 
 
The second finding that indicated that dominance violation was not the result of 
quasi-random responding, was the fact that there was no significant correlation between 
rate of dominance violation (i.e. number of times each participant violated dominance) and 
response time (N = 66, rho = -.125, p > .05). Had those more prone to dominance violation 
simple been responding without attending to the information presented then one would 
expect them to have faster response times. 
 
Response Time 
 
Mean response time was calculated for all participants. Initial screening then 
revealed two outliers above the mean text-sequential group and three outliers above the 
mean in the text-simultaneous group. These outliers were thus omitted from further 
analysis of response time data.  
 
 
Figure 3.3.3: Mean response time (milliseconds) for all stimuli by Presentation Format and 
Presentation Mode. 
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Hypothesis 5 predicted that response times would be higher for those in the text 
format condition than those in the matrix format condition. Hypothesis 6 meanwhile 
predicted that response times would be higher for those in the sequential mode condition 
than the simultaneous mode condition.  
 
As Figure 3.3.3 above illustrates, mean response time (all stimuli) was indeed 
higher for those in the text condition than those in the matrix condition. However, mean 
response time (all stimuli) was higher for those in the simultaneous condition than the 
sequential condition. Mean response time was highest for those in the text-simultaneous 
presentation condition (N = 15, m = 10695, sd = 2980), followed by those in the text-
sequential presentation condition (N =15, m = 9139, sd = 2600). Response times for those 
in the matrix-simultaneous condition (N = 18, m = 6905, sd = 3273) and matrix-sequential 
condition (N = 18, m = 6530, sd = 2052) were very similar, though the latter was slightly 
lower. 
 
A 2 x 2 between-groups ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of presentation 
format on mean response time (N = 66, F(1, 62) = 21.969, p ≤ .001, partial eta squared = 
.262). However, no main effect of presentation mode on mean response time was found (N 
= 66, F(1, 62) = 2.003, p > .05), nor was there any significant interaction between format 
and mode (N = 66, F(1, 62) = .749, p > .05). Hypothesis 5 is therefore supported, while 
Hypothesis 6 is not. 
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Figure 3.3.4: Mean response time (milliseconds) by number of non-zero outcomes. 
 
While no initial predictions regarding stimulus complexity (i.e. number of potential 
outcomes) and response time were made, further scrutiny of the response time data 
gathered in this experiment indicated that this factor did appear to have an effect on 
response time. As Figure 3.3.4 above illustrates, mean response time for single non-zero 
outcome pairs (N = 66, m = 7536, sd = 3129) tended to be faster than that for asymmetric 
pairs (N = 66, m = 8657, sd = 3752). Similarly, response times for asymmetric pairs were 
faster than response times for two non-zero outcome pairs (N = 66, m = 9585, sd = 4525). 
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect of number of 
outcomes on response time (N = 66, F(2, 130) = 14.674, p ≤ .001, partial eta squared = 
.184). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment indicated that there was 
a significant difference in response time between single non-zero outcome pairs and 
asymmetric pairs (N = 66, F(1, 65) = 12.315, p ≤ .001, partial eta squared = .159) and that 
a near-significant difference existed between asymmetric and two non zero outcome pairs 
(N = 66, F(1, 65) = 5.150, p > .05 (= .08), partial eta squared = .073). 
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Risk Preference 
 
Table 3.3.5 below lists the mean number of times participants in each of the four 
conditions selected a more risky alternative over a less risky alternative, for the 18 lottery 
pairs (target and filler) featuring a more risky and less risky alternatives.  
 
Table 3.3.5: Mean frequency with which the riskier alternative was chosen by those in each 
Format-Mode condition (Stimuli = 18) 
 Matrix Format  Text Format  
Simultaneous Mode 7.94 (2.92) 8.4 (2.00) 
Sequential Mode 6.50 (2.75) 8.53 (2.62) 
Overall 7.22 (2.89) 8.46 (2.29) 
 
Consistent with Hypothesis 7, which predicted that risk seeking would be higher 
amongst those in the text-format condition, rate of risk seeking was higher amongst those 
in the text-sequential and text-simultaneous conditions than the matrix-sequential and the 
matrix-simultaneous conditions. A 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed significant effect of 
presentation format (N = 71, F(1, 67) = 4.023, p ≤ .05) but not of presentation mode (N 
=71, F (1, 67) = 1.118, p > .05). No significant interaction between mode and format was 
found (N = 71, F(1, 67) = 1.652, p > .05). 
 
As the rate of risk seeking was not normally distributed for those in the text format 
condition, a Mann Whitney U test was used to confirm the effect of format on risk seeking. 
A significant effect of format was, once again, found (N = 71, U = 438, z = -2.232, p ≤ 
.05). 
 
Hypothesis 7 is therefore supported by the findings of this investigation. 
 
3.4. Discussion 
 
This study was undertaken in order to fulfil three aims: 1) to test the replicability of 
Starmer‘s (1999) findings; 2) to investigate whether the intransitivity/preference reversal 
observed by Starmer would generalise to losses and gambles higher in outcome value; and 
3) to examine whether manipulations of the format and mode of information presentation 
would influence the rate of preference reversal and dominance violation. It was, in 
accordance with Starmer‘s findings and the predictions of original prospect theory 
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(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), hypothesised that the 
predicted (intransitive) preference reversal would occur more frequently than the counter 
reversal in both the domain of gains and the domain of losses. It was also hypothesised that 
the predicted preference reversal would occur more frequently when choice information 
was presented in text format and/or sequential mode than when said information was 
presented in matrix format and/or simultaneous mode. 
 
The results of this study show that the predicted reversal occurred significantly 
more frequently than the counter reversals in two out of four conditions (the high win and 
the low loss), with a general non-significant trend in this direction in the remaining two 
conditions. As the predicted preference reversal did not occur significantly more frequently 
than the counter reversal in the cycle that constituted a direct adaptation of Starmer‘s 
(1999) stimuli (i.e. the low win condition), a direct replication of Starmer‘s findings has 
not been obtained. However, as the predicted reversal was observed significantly more 
frequently than the counter reversal in two conditions, with the results in the expected 
direction in the other two, it does not seem unreasonable to assert that the results of the 
present study constitute a partial replication, with regard to preference reversal.  
 
Of course, while the predicted preference reversal ( A > B, C > A for gains and B > 
A, A > C for losses) might be in evidence, the results of the present study differ from those 
obtained by Starmer in that violations of dominance occurred with great frequently in all 
four cycles. It had been anticipated that presenting choice information in text format and/or 
sequential mode might diminish the rate at which between-attributes comparisons were 
made and lead to an increase in the rate of dominance violation. However, when the data 
from the four format-conditions was compared, no effect of format or mode on rate of 
dominance violation was in evidence. The fact that the proportion of participants violating 
dominance ranged from 34% to 47% with regard to the target pairs was surprising. It was 
initially thought that this may be the result of a large number of participants making quasi-
random selections (i.e. responding without actually attending to the choice information 
presented). However, if participants were responding in a quasi-random fashion then one 
would expect dominance violation to occur at a similar rate for all pairs with a dominant 
alternative. The fact that rate of dominance violation was significantly lower for the two 
filler pairs with a dominant alternative, would seem to indicate that this was not the case.  
 
82 
 
It was initially hypothesised that presenting information in text format and 
sequential mode would lead to both a higher rate of preference reversal and a higher rate of 
dominance violation. However, no effect of either of these manipulations on preference 
reversal or dominance adherence was found. Consistent with Hypotheses 5 and 7 a 
significant effect of presentation format on response time and risk preference was found, 
with those in the text presentation condition demonstrating – on average – higher response 
times and a higher rate of risk seeking than those in the matrix condition. However, no 
effect of presentation mode was found on response time. 
 
Configural Weighting Models 
 
With regard to the configural weighting TAX (Birnbaum & Chavez, 1997) and 
RAM (Birnbaum & McIntosh, 1996) models, the findings of the present study do not fully 
conform to either. The RAM confirgural weighting model predicts that – in the domain of 
gains – C should be given less weight that A or B. However, a glance back at Table 3.3.1 
indicates that a majority of participants selected C over A in both the Low-Win and High-
Win conditions, by either consistently selecting the lower risk alternative or demonstrating 
the predicted preference reversal. RAM also fails to account for the high rate of dominance 
violation observed here. The TAX model on the other hand does predict both that the (A > 
B, C > A) preference reversal will occur more frequently than the counter reversal, and that 
dominance violation will be frequently violated when B and C are presented together. 
However, it also predicts that the majority of participants will demonstrate a consistent 
preference for the higher risk alternative (A > B, A > C). In this investigation this was not 
found to be the case: consistent preference for the higher risk alternative was demonstrated 
less frequently than either consistent preference for the lower risk alternative or the 
predicted preference reversal. Hence it can be concluded that neither the TAX nor the 
RAM model accurately predicts the patterns of preference observed in the present study. 
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Preference Reversal, Dominance and Prospect theory 
 
As outlined in the introduction, the original form of prospect theory (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1979) predicts that the preference reversal (A > B, C > A) will occur in the 
gains domain and the preference reversal (B > A, A > C) occur in losses domain as a result 
the overweighting of smaller probabilities comparative to large ones. However, dominance 
violation is not predicted to occur when B and C are presented together, as the model holds 
that transparently dominated alternatives will be rejected in the editing phase. On the other 
hand, the cumulative formulation of the weighting function proposed by cumulative 
prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) does not allow for either dominance 
violation or the above mentioned preference reversal.  
 
Consistent with the original form of prospect theory, the intransitivity (A > B, B > 
C, C > A) was demonstrated more frequently than the (transitive) reversal (B > A, B > C, 
A > C) in Starmer‘s (1999) study. It was therefore hypothesised that the findings of the 
present study would be consistent with the application of original prospect theory‘s 
weighting function. The preference reversals predicted by original prospect theory were 
indeed demonstrated significantly more frequently than the counter reversals for two out of 
four cycles (with non-significant trends in the predicted direction occurring for the other 
two). However, contrary to original prospect theory‘s predictions, dominance was violated 
at a rate of 34 - 47% for each B versus C pair.  
 
It was anticipated, based upon the findings of Stone and Schkade (1991) and 
Javenpaa (1990), that presenting information in text presentation format or sequential 
presentation mode may induce participants to make fewer between attributes comparisons. 
This, it was hypothesised, would lead to an increased rate of preference reversal and 
possibly even dominance violation comparative to those presented with choice information 
in a matrix format and simultaneous mode. It was predicted that inducing participants to 
make fewer attribute-based comparisons between alternatives by manipulating format and 
mode would impede dominance detection. However, no such effect was found and the rate 
of dominance violation was surprisingly high amongst all groups, significantly exceeding 
zero for each of the four format/mode conditions. 
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Though the application of original prospect theory‘s weighting function without 
dominance detection could theoretically explain the high rate of dominance observed here, 
it seem unlikely that this would occur in the matrix-simultaneous condition with such high 
frequency. The nature of the graphical display presented in this condition is such that it 
would seem to facilitate between-attributes comparisons, especially with regard to outcome 
probabilities. To make a decision congruent with original prospect theory‘s weighting 
function without prior dominance detection in this condition participants would have to 
consider all outcomes and outcome probabilities for all alternatives and somehow integrate 
them. It seems implausible that this could occur in the matrix-simultaneous condition 
without some recognition that one alternative dominates the other taking place. It would 
also fail to explain why dominance was violated far more frequently in the present study 
than Starmer‘s (1999) investigation.  
 
Nonetheless, intuitive implausibility is not the same thing as impossibility and this 
possibility cannot be wholly discounted on the basis of any of the data gathered in this 
study. Indeed, the fact that dominance was violated significantly more frequently for the 
target B versus C pairs than the two filler pairs depicted in Figure 3.2.7 (in which 
dominance could not be violated as a result of original prospect theory‘s weighting 
function being applied) would seem to support this postulation. The possibility that 
dominance violation was the result of the overweighting of smaller probabilities 
comparative to larger ones cannot be entirely discounted. However, as will shortly be 
discussed in greater detail, it is felt that there are more plausible and compelling potential 
explanations for the phenomenon.  
 
As the findings of the present study are only partially consistent with original 
prospect theory, it cannot be concluded that the model was a wholly accurate predictor of 
preference patterns on the lottery choice task. It is however perhaps worth noting that 
preference patterns were more congruent with the predictions of original prospect theory 
than those of cumulative prospect theory.   
 
Information Presentation 
 
The manipulations of format and mode employed in this study were not found to 
have any significant effect on rate of preference reversal or rate of dominance violation. 
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Thus the hypotheses that preference reversal (in the predicted direction) and dominance 
violation would occur more frequently in the text presentation format and sequential 
presentation mode conditions than the matrix format and simultaneous mode conditions is 
unsupported. Consistent with Hypotheses 5 and 7, there was however found to be a 
significant effect of presentation format on both response time and risk seeking. Both 
response time and risk seeking were significantly higher for those in the text format 
condition than those in the matrix format condition. The former finding is perhaps 
unsurprising. English text is generally read left to right and top to bottom in a sequential 
manner and thus it is probable that many participants in the text format condition read the 
choice information thusly, before making any between alternatives comparison. The matrix 
format condition on the other hand would not, due to its graphical nature, be likely to 
induce such a reading. Nonetheless, this difference in response times does lend some 
support to the prediction that information processing in the text format condition would be 
more alternative-based than in the matrix format condition. As Payne, Bettman and 
Johnson (1993) point out, there is evidence to suggest that alternative-based choice 
processes are more cognitively demanding than attribute-based processes (Russo & 
Dosher,1983) and more cognitively demanding processes are likely to take longer than 
those that are less demanding. However, the fact that no effect of format was found on rate 
of dominance violation or preference reversal indicates that while this manipulation may 
have induced more alternative-based choice processes, said choice processes did not have 
the hypothesised effect. 
 
The finding that risk seeking was significantly higher for those in the text 
presentation condition than those in the matrix presentation condition is rather more 
theoretically interesting. A link between the utilisation of graphical (versus text) displays 
and risk aversion has been found in previous research (e.g. Stone, Yates & Parker, 1997; 
Chua, Yates & Shah, 2006). Stone, Yates and Parker found evidence to suggest that 
graphical representations of risk increase risk aversion by rendering probabilistic 
information more salient than do equivalent numerical representations of risk. Though the 
small monetary outcomes in the present study are perhaps more affectively pallid than the 
vehicular death and injury rates that were presented to Stone, Yates and Parker‘s 
participants, it is easy to imagine that the matrix format used in the present study may well 
serve to render probabilistic information more visually salient.  
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With regard to the sequential presentation mode, no effects were found. This may 
be due to the fact that participants were given control of the time lapse between 
presentation of the first alternative and presentation of the second. It was observed by the 
experimenter than some participants appeared to disregard instructions to study the first 
alternative before pushing a button to reveal the second, opting instead to reveal the second 
alternative as soon as the first appeared (thus rendering the presentation effectively 
identical to that of the simultaneous mode). For reasons previously described in the 
methodology section, the sequential mode condition employed in the present study was not 
fully sequential. This is to say that alternatives were not presented separately (i.e. 
alternative A presented in isolation followed by alternative B in isolation), but rather in a 
partially sequential fashion with alternative A appearing first, before being joined by 
alternative B. Hence, it is also possible that this manipulation failed to induce the 
difference in process that a fully sequential presentation manipulation would have. 
Therefore, it would perhaps be unwise to draw any conclusions about the effect – or lack 
thereof – of mode on preference and processing based on the findings of this study. 
 
Dominance Violation and Information Processing 
 
The high rate of dominance violation observed in this study was, as previously 
noted, very surprising. While it had been anticipated that manipulations of format and 
mode may lead to a higher rate of dominance violation by facilitating alternative-based 
rather than attribute-based processing, these factors were not found to have a significant 
effect on rate of dominance violation. As mentioned above, one possible explanation for 
this is that prospect theory‘s weighting function was being applied without the prior 
dominance detection. However, this is not the only potential explanation for the 
phenomenon. As will now be discussed there would seem to be four other possibilities: 
inattention to choice information, error, an endemic misunderstanding of the task and 
probability neglect. 
 
As previously discussed, the fact that dominance was violated at a higher rate for 
the target B versus C pairs than the two fillers featuring a dominant alternative, indicates 
that participants were not simply responding in a quasi-random manner to stimuli (i.e. 
pressing response buttons without attending to the choice information). It would also seem 
to indicate that accidental error (e.g. participants accidentally pressing the wrong button on 
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the response box or mistaking a gain pair for a loss pair and vice versa) was not the sole 
cause of dominance violation. One would, after all, expect such errors to be distributed in a 
relatively even fashion. The possibility that some participants fundamentally 
misunderstood how outcomes and ticket numbers corresponded in the task would seem to 
be a more likely possibility. However, the fact that the vast majority of participants did not 
violate dominance for all four B versus C target pairs would seem to suggest that such 
misunderstandings tended to be temporary. It would seem plausible that inattention, error 
and task misunderstanding might each all account for some instances of dominance 
violation, but for the reasons outlined it seems rather less likely that they represent the only 
explanations. 
 
Probability neglect was identified as a possible explanation for dominance violation 
when the similarity between the present study‘s results and the findings of Denes-Raj and 
Epstein (1994) was noted. In the now famous ‗jelly beans‘ task Denes-Raj and Epstein 
asked participants to choose between making a blind draw from a bowl containing 1 
(winning) red jelly bean and 9 (zero outcome) white jelly beans and making a blind draw 
from a bowl containing 9 (winning) red jelly beans and 91 (zero outcome) white jelly 
beans. As bowl one offered a 1/10 chance of winning a prize and bowl two a 9/100 chance 
of winning the same prize, bowl one was objectively superior (i.e. dominant) to bowl two. 
However, it was found that a very large proportion of participants chose the objectively 
inferior 9/100 bowl over the objectively superior 1/10 bowl. This occurred despite the fact 
that many participants who selected the inferior alternative stated, when questioned as to 
why they made the choice that they did, that they knew that the 9/100 bowl was objectively 
inferior to the 1/10 bowl but that they still ‗felt‘ better disposed towards the former because 
the numerator was higher. This phenomenon has been dubbed ‗the ratio bias effect‘ or 
‗denominator neglect‘. Denominator neglect per se could not be responsible for any of the 
violations of dominance observed in the present study as denominators remained constant 
throughout (i.e. all outcome probabilities were essentially p out of 20). However, the 
results of the present study do point to a related phenomenon: probability neglect. 
Dominance was frequently violated for asymmetric pairs where the outcome value of the 
two-outcome alternative was lower than that of the single-outcome alternative, but 
significantly less frequently violated when the two-outcome alternative had the higher 
outcome value. This would seem to suggest that, just as the choices of many of Denes-Raj 
and Epstein‘s participants were based on numerators divorced from their denominators, the 
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number of potential outcomes had a greater influence on choices of dominance violators 
than did outcome probability.  
 
In terms of the present study, probability neglect may have taken one of two forms: 
a) a tendency to sum outcome values together (i.e. neglect the mutual exclusivity of 
outcomes); or b) the use of number of outcomes as an attribute in itself. With regard to the 
former, such an ‗adding strategy‘ has previously been observed in the research of Huber 
(1982, though see Huber 1989 for a summary in English).  During a think aloud study, one 
of Huber‘s participants was observed to adopt a strategy of adding together outcome values 
in order derive a valuation for each alternative (a strategy that led to a non-dominant 
alternative receiving the highest valuation). With regard to the latter proposition, that 
number of gain/loss outcomes was being used as an attribute in itself, such a phenomenon 
would seem to correspond closely with Denes-Raj and Epstein‘s (1994) findings.  In either 
case objectively relevant probability information would be rejected in favour of objectively 
irrelevant information (i.e. sum of outcomes or number of non-zero outcomes). 
 
Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994) posit that their findings can be explained in terms of 
a dual-process account of choice, judgement and reasoning. Dual-process models of 
thought hold that humans possess two modes of thought: the intuitive and the deliberative 
(dubbed System 1 and System 2 by Stanovich & West, 2000). System 1 is generally 
characterised as being intuitive, fast, automatic, largely unconscious, cognitively 
undemanding, associative, affect driven and prone to certain biases. System 2 by contrast is 
generally characterised as being slow, deliberative, conscious, cognitively demanding, 
rule-based and more apt to produce normatively correct responses (see Chapter 2 for a 
more in depth discussion of dual-process models of thought, see also Epstein, 1994; Evans, 
2006; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Sloman, 1996 and Stanovich & West, 2000, 2008). 
Denes-Raj and Epstein attributed the denominator neglect observed in their study to 
reliance on an experiential, affect-driven mode of thought (i.e. System 1), in which the 
concrete and salient nature of numerator information induces a greater a positive affective 
response to the alternative with the higher numerator.  
 
In terms of the present study, one might speculate that the visual salience of the 
number of potential gain/losses offered by each alternative may have induced a greater 
positive affective reaction to two-outcome gain alternatives and a more negative affective 
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reaction to two-outcome loss alternatives. Participants relying on System 1 processes might 
then have selected the dominated alternative based upon their choice upon this affective 
reaction. It would certainly explain why dominance violation occurred far less frequently 
for the filler pairs, where the two-outcome alternative did represent the objectively larger 
win or loss. The fact that few participants violated dominance for all four B versus C pairs, 
does not pose a problem for this explanation. It is entirely possible that an affective 
reaction towards the number of non-zero outcomes dictated choice in some instances, but 
was overridden in others. For instance, in their dual-process model Stanovich and West 
(2008) argue that ‗biased‘ automatic, associative, affect-driven responses are overridden if 
1) the individual possesses the ‗mindware‘ (i.e. knowledge) necessary to provide a 
normatively correct ‗deliberative‘ response; 2) the need to override the intuitive response is 
detected; and 3) the cognitive resources to sustain an override long enough to generate a 
deliberative response are available. Thus, while the existence of the appropriate mindware 
should remain constant throughout the task, the need to override the prepotent intuitive 
response may not always be detected and/or the cognitive resources to sustain inhibition 
may not always be uniformly available.  
 
One potential criticism of the probability neglect hypothesis comes from the fact 
that presentation format had no effect on rate of dominance violation. The fact that those in 
the matrix presentation condition tended to be more risk averse than those in the text 
presentation condition would – as previously discussed – seem to suggest that the matrix-
format rendered probabilistic information more salient: a postulation supported by prior 
research (see Chua, Yates & Shah, 2006; Stone, Yates & Parker, 1997). If the high rate of 
dominance violation observed in this study was largely a result of probability neglect, then 
any manipulation that increased the salience of probability should logically reduce the rate 
of dominance violation. One should keep in mind however that the B and C alternatives 
offer exactly the same 6/20 chance of obtaining a non-zero outcome. The difference 
between dominant and dominated alternative lies in the fact that one alternative has a 
single non-zero outcome and the other alternative has two non-zero outcomes (one of 
which is slightly lower than the outcome value offered by the single non-zero outcome 
alternative). Thus it is possible that in these cases the matrix format would simply serve to 
render salient the fact that one alternative has two non-zero outcomes and the other just 
one. 
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Of course, the probability neglect account does not in itself explain why a high rate 
of dominance violation was observed in the present study, but not in Starmer‘s (1999) 
research. One possible reason for this could be that Starmer‘s sample had a higher average 
numeracy level than that of present study. The exact composition of Starmer‘s sample is 
not reported. However, it is known that the present study‘s sample was comprised of 
students who were likely to have a wide range of numeracy levels, with post-graduate 
students from numerate disciplines taking part alongside students from courses with 
minimal mathematics requirements. Peters et al. (2006) propose that when presented with 
probabilistic information (and quantitative information in general) less numerate 
individuals are more likely to rely on affectively salient, but objective irrelevant 
information. Peters et al. (2006) found that those higher in numeracy were less likely to 
select the inferior alternative in the jelly beans task than were those lower in numeracy. 
Based upon this, along with the finding that those higher in numeracy were also less 
susceptible to certain framing effects, Peters et al. postulated that more numerate 
individuals tend to have a greater affective response to precise probabilistic information 
and are thus more likely to utilise it. Less numerate individuals, it is thus posited, derive 
less affective meaning from numerical information (especially less ‗concrete‘ numerical 
information) and thus are more likely to be influenced by irrelevant, yet affectively salient 
attributes.  
 
As the composition of Starmer‘s sample is unknown, the notion that there may have 
been a difference in average level of numeracy between the two samples remains pure 
speculation; however, it is clear that the possible role of numeracy should be considered in 
any further investigation of the violations of dominance observed here. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The results of the present study represent a partial replication of Starmer‘s (1999) 
findings. The predicted reversal of preference was observed to occur significantly more 
frequently than the counter reversal in two out of four target cycles, with a non-significant 
difference in the predicted direction being observed with regard to the other two. However, 
the high rate of dominance violation observed in the present study does not correspond 
with Starmer‘s findings. Hence, while the present study‘s findings regarding preference 
reversal are consistent with original prospect theory‘s weighting function, they are not 
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consistent with original prospect theory‘s prediction that dominance detection occurs prior 
to evaluation in an editing phase. The possibility that prospect theory‘s weighting function 
was being applied without dominance detection cannot be dismissed. However, it seems 
highly unlikely that participants presented with choice information in matrix-simultaneous 
format would violate dominance were they to perform the integration of outcome-value 
and probability necessary for a choice to comply with the predictions of original prospect 
theory. Had violations of dominance predominantly taken place in the text format and 
sequential mode conditions dominance violation could be attributed to a combination of a) 
original prospect theory‘s weighting function; and b) the method of presentation reducing 
the number of between attributes comparisons and rendering the existence of a dominant 
alternative less transparent.  No such effect of format or mode on rate of dominance 
violation was however found. Probability neglect has therefore been identified as the most 
likely cause of dominance violation in the present study. If probability is neglected then an 
alternative offering two potential gains may become more attractive than an alternative 
offering a single, slightly superior gain (with the reverse being true in the domain of 
losses). This hypothesis is routed Denes-Raj and Epstein‘s (1994) findings regarding 
denominator neglect (aka ‗the ratio bias effect‘). It is also speculated, based upon the 
findings of Peters et al. (2006), that level of numeracy may be related to propensity to 
violate dominance in the lottery choice task used in this study. 
 
However, while probability neglect is felt to be the most plausible explanation for 
the high rate of dominance violation observed in the present study, the data gathered in the 
present study does not permit any firm conclusions on this score. In order for this 
hypothesis to be fully tested the possibility that prospect theory‘s weighting function was 
responsible for the high rate of dominance violation observed in this study must be 
controlled for. In addition to this, some rating of participants‘ mathematical ability would 
be required to test the prediction that numeracy level is related to the propensity to violate 
dominance in the task conditions utilised in this study. 
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Chapter 4: Study 2 
 
Of the principles of rational choice set out in subjective expected utility theory, 
dominance is perhaps the most fundamental (see von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944 and 
Savage, 1954 for the axiomisation of SEU). It states that if an alternative is superior to all 
other alternatives in a least one respect and equal in all others then this alternative should 
be chosen. Though the question of what constitutes ‗good decision making‘ is still a matter 
of some contention, it would seem reasonable to suggest that a ‗good decision‘ is one that 
adheres to the principle of dominance when the existence of a dominant alternative is 
transparent. Indeed, it is a notion that is likely to seem intuitively obvious to most people. 
Yet the results of Study 1 show that a large proportion of participants opted to select a 
dominated alternative over a dominant one in a choice scenario where the existence of a 
dominant alternative was thought to be salient. When such a widespread propensity to 
choose an inferior alternative over a superior alternative is found the decision researcher is 
prompted to question why, and so the present study concerns dominance 
adherence/violation and the factors that may have induced it in Study 1. 
 
Several violations of the dominance principle have, of course, been observed in 
previous research. Tversky and Kahneman (1981, 1986), for example, observed violations 
of dominance in both two-stage gambles and gambles with a large number of potential 
outcomes. In the former case the existence of a dominant alternative was obscured and 
rendered non-salient by the multi-stage nature of the task and could only be detected if one 
integrated the two stages of the gamble. In the latter case the existence of a dominant 
alternative was obscured by the presence of a large number of outcomes. Another classic 
violation of dominance was observed and investigated by Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994), 
who observed that, when presented with the jelly beans task (see Chapter 2 for a full 
description of the task), many participants chose a 9/100 chance of winning a prize over a 
1/10 chance of winning a prize. When Denes-Raj and Epstein enquired as to why they did 
this, a number of participants stated that they recognised that the 1/10 bowl was objectively 
superior but that they felt better disposed towards the 9/100 bowl and thus felt compelled 
to select it. Denes-Raj and Epstein thus attributed this phenomenon (named the ‗ratio bias 
effect‘ or ‗denominator neglect‘) to reliance on an intuitive, experiential mode of thought 
that is driven by the decision maker‘s affective response to absolute numerators (1 versus 
9) rather than less concrete denominators (10 versus 100). This ‗experiential‘ mode of 
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thought was proposed by Denes-Raj and Epstein (see also Epstein 1994) to operate 
alongside a ‗rational‘ mode of thought that utilises formal rules rather than affective 
associations. 
 
Of the previously observed violations of dominance mentioned above, the ratio bias 
effect is – as discussed in the previous chapter – the one that would seem to bear the 
closest association to the violations of dominance observed in Study 1. The aim of Study 1 
was to investigate whether a particular pattern of intransitivity, previously observed by 
Starmer (1999), could be replicated in different presentation conditions (i.e. text versus 
matrix and sequential versus simultaneous) and generalised to the domain of losses. The 
intransitivity in question is predicted by the original form of prospect theory (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1979, 1981), which holds that moderate probabilities are underweighted 
comparative to smaller probabilities. Hence, when x is a gain and y a moderate probability, 
the alternative (x;0.5y: x; 0.5y) will be preferred to the alternative (x; y), despite the fact 
that the two alternatives are fundamentally identical. Based upon this, Starmer predicted 
(and found) that if the three lotteries depicted in Figure 4.1.1 below were presented to 
participants in pairs of A versus B, B versus C and C versus A, the intransitivity A > B, B 
> C, C > A (where  > denotes preference) would be observed. 
 
Lottery A 
 
 
Lottery B 
0                          30           31                                                             100 
 
        £8:00 
 
                          0 
 
Lottery C 
0       15                    16 30 31                                                             100 
£8:00 £7:75 
                                  
                            0 
Figure 4.1.1: Illustration of the three lotteries used by Starmer (1999). 
0             20                    21                                                                        100 
 
   £14:00 
 
                                0 
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Though Lottery C is dominated by Lottery B, Starmer (1999) posited that the 
overweighting of the two 15% chances of winning a prize offered by lottery C comparative 
to the single 30% chance of winning a prize offered by Lottery B, would for many 
individuals offset the 25p difference in outcome value between the two. However, as 
original prospect theory holds that the existence of a saliently dominant alternative should 
be recognised (and selected) during the preliminary editing phase of choice (i.e. prior to 
evaluation and the application of decision weights); Lottery C should not be directly 
chosen over Lottery B when the two are presented together. However, when Lottery B and 
Lottery C are presented with Lottery A, the reversal of preference A > B, C > A might be 
expected to occur with some frequency. On presenting the three choice pairs to a large 
sample of participants Starmer found that the preference reversal A > B, C > A occurred 
significantly more frequency than the counter reversal B > A, A > C (which would denote 
simple indifference between alternatives).  
 
As stated above, Study 1 sought to replicate Starmer‘s investigation (1999) and 
extend it by introducing a format manipulation and including cycles of A versus B, B 
versus C and A versus C in the domain of losses (where B > A, A > C was predicted to 
occur more frequently than A > B, C > A). Consistent with this hypothesis, the predicted 
preference reversal occurred significantly more frequently than the counter reversal for two 
out of the four cycles (with a non-significant difference in the predicted direction being 
observed in the other two). However, while the rate of dominance violation for the B 
versus C pairs was extremely low in Starmer‘s study, in Study 1 the rate of dominance 
violation was over 30% for each of the four cycles. This finding is not consistent with the 
predictions of original prospect theory, which holds that salient dominance should be 
detected before the weighting function is applied. Nor were the patterns of response 
observed here consistent with either cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1992) or the TAX (Birnbaum & Chavez, 1997) and RAM (Birnbaum & McIntosh, 1996) 
configural weighting models (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of the findings 
of Study 1 in relation to these models).  
 
On considering why the observed violations of dominance should occur with such 
high frequency a number of possible explanations were suggested: 1) that the findings 
were a result of a large number participants making quasi-random selections (i.e. pressing 
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the response buttons without considering any of the choice information); 2) that those who 
violated dominance didn‘t understand the task; 3) that prospect theory‘s weighting function 
was being applied without any prior form of dominance detection having taken place; and 
4) that some form of probability neglect was taking place, possibly as a result of the 
participants in Study 1 possessing lower numeracy levels than those taking part in 
Starmer‘s (1999) study. 
 
With regard to the first of these possibilities, other data obtained in Study 1 would 
suggest that this was not the case. Had a large number of participants been responding in a 
quasi-random manner, then one would expect a similar rate of dominance violation to 
occur for any pair featuring a dominant and dominated alternative. This however was not 
the case. While the rate of dominance violation for the four target pairs with a dominant 
alternative (see Figure 4.1.2 below for an example of such a pair) was high (34 – 47%), 
rate of dominance violation for the filler pairs featured in Figure 4.1.3 below was 
significantly lower (11 – 14%). 
 
 
Figure 4.1.2: An example of one of the Matrix-Simultaneous stimuli used in Study 1 and 
the present study.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.1.3: Two filler stimuli featuring a dominant and dominated alternative that were 
utilised in Study 1. 
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As one can see there are two differences between the filler stimuli depicted in 
Figure 4.1.3 and the target stimulus in Figure 4.1.2: 1) the difference in outcome value 
between dominant and dominated alternative is far higher for the stimuli in Figure 4.1.3; 
and 2) in Figure 4.1.3 the two-outcome alternatives have the highest potential outcome 
value while in Figure 4.1.2 the single-outcome alternative has the highest potential 
outcome value. However, it seems clear that had the high rate of dominance violation 
observed with regard to the target pairs merely been the result of inattention, a similar rate 
of dominance violation would have been observed with regard to the pairs in Figure 4.1.3. 
In addition to this had those who violated dominance done so as a result of inattention then 
one would expect their response times for the stimuli in question to be far lower than 
dominance adherers. Again, this was not found to be the case. 
 
The possibility that participants did not fully understand the task is perhaps a more 
plausible explanation than inattention and quasi-random responding. However, given that 
the proportion of participants who violated dominance was over 30% for each target pair 
featuring a dominant alternative, it seems unlikely that the level of task misunderstanding 
would be so high. In addition to being given instructions as to how the task would proceed, 
participants were presented with a demonstration and a set of practice games that were 
designed to ensure that they understood how tickets (probabilities) corresponded with 
outcomes. The fact that only a few participants violated dominance for all four target pairs 
would also seem to suggest that these participants did not consistently misunderstand the 
task. Nonetheless, this possibility cannot be wholly discounted on the basis of Study 1‘s 
findings alone and, as will be seen, it is a possibility that the present study‘s design aims to 
mitigate. 
 
The possibility that original prospect theory‘s weighting function may be 
responsible for the observed violations of dominance must also be considered. The fact that 
the predicted reversal of preference occurred significantly more frequently than the counter 
reversal in two out of the four target cycles (i.e. A > B, C > A for gains and B > A, A > C 
for losses) would seem to support the existence of a weighting function that weights two 
lots of 15% higher than one lot of 30%. However, this does not answer the question of why 
such a high rate of dominance violation should be observed in Study 1 but not Starmer‘s 
(1999) study. It also seems strange (not to mention counter intuitive) that a decision maker 
97 
 
would enter into a consideration of outcome values and their corresponding probabilities 
and not notice that one alternative dominates the other. Original prospect theory does 
predict that dominance may be violated when the existence of a dominant alternative is 
obscured by the presence of a large number of potential outcomes, but the alternatives 
featured in Study 1 had two non-zero outcomes at most. Hence, the existence of a 
dominant alternative would seem to be transparent. Of course, the fact that something is 
counterintuitive does not mean that it is impossible; and as none of the data obtained in 
Study 1 could be used to test this possibility directly it cannot be discounted. The 
application of original prospect theory‘s weighting function would, after all, explain why 
dominance was violated with such high frequency for the target pairs, but not the filler 
pairs depicted in Figure 4.1.3. 
 
The last and most theoretically interesting possibility is that the high rate of 
dominance violation observed in Study 1 was the result of probability neglect. This is to 
say that dominance was violated as a result of participants simply ignoring probabilities 
and basing their choices of outcome values alone. As previously discussed, denominator 
neglect has been observed in certain choice scenarios (e.g. Denes-Raj & Epstein‘s, 1994, 
jelly beans task). This effect has been linked to both lower levels of cognitive ability 
(Stanovich & West 2000, 2008) and lower levels numeracy (Peters et al., 2006). Although 
denominator neglect could not explain the findings of Study 1 (where the denominator was 
kept constant), probability neglect could. If one looks at the lottery pair depicted in Figure 
4.1.2 and pays no heed to the probabilities associated with each potential outcome, then 
one sees that one lottery (A) offers one non-zero outcome with a value of £8:00 and the 
other (B) two non-zero outcomes with a value of £8:00 and a value of £7:75 respectively. 
Hence, if the probabilities of the outcomes in question are discounted, then it would seem 
that the two non-zero outcome alternative (B) offers ‗more‘ potential gains than the single 
non-zero outcome alternative (A). When presented with the lottery pairs depicted in Figure 
4.1.3 on the other hand, those prone to probability neglect would not select the dominated 
alternative over the dominant one as the alternative with two non-zero outcomes represents 
the higher win/loss in each case. Such a phenomenon would not be without precedence. In 
a think aloud study conducted by Huber (1982, though see Huber, 1989, for a summary of 
these findings in English) the verbal protocols obtained from one participant indicated that 
he was evaluating alternatives by summing together the value of each potential outcome 
without consideration of their corresponding probabilities of occurring.  
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It is possible that those who violated dominance in Study 1 did so as a result of 
using an ‗adding strategy‘ of the kind observed by Huber (1982, see Huber 1989). It is also 
possible that participants might have recognised the mutual exclusivity of outcomes, but 
felt that two potential gain amounts was better than one potential gain amount (and vice-
versa for losses). Denes-Raj and Epstein found that many of those who engaged in 
denominator neglect in the jelly beans study reported feeling better disposed towards the 
high numerator alternative than the dominant low numerator alternative. Thus it would 
seem possible that certain participants might experience a more favourable affective 
reaction to, say, the presence of two gain amounts than a single gain amount. The fact that 
few participants violated dominance for all four target cycles means that such choice 
strategies/heuristics could not have been applied consistently. However, as each lottery 
pair represents a separate choice then it seems plausible that participants may vary their 
choice processes. 
 
Of course, while the notion that probability neglect may have been largely 
responsible for the violations of dominance observed in Study 1 is a compelling one, it 
does not explain why this was not observed in Starmer‘s (1999) investigation. One possible 
answer is that the two groups differed considerably regard to participants‘ numeracy. The 
composition of Starmer‘s sample with respect to mathematical ability and level of 
education is unknown. However, it seems highly likely that those in Study 1‘s sample 
would represent a wide range of mathematical abilities. The participants – while all 
students – came from a variety of courses and disciplines, some of which do not have a 
high mathematics entry requirement. Therefore this disparity between the two studies may 
be the result of a greater diversity of numeracy levels amongst those in Study 1‘s sample. 
 
In their work on numeracy and decision making Peters et al. (2006) found that less 
numerate participants a) were significantly more prone to selecting the dominated 
alternative in the jelly beans task; and b) reported less precise feelings towards the 
dominated alternative than did more numerate participants. Based upon this and other 
findings from the same series of studies (see Chapter 2 for a more detailed summary of 
Peters et al.‘s findings) Peters et al. concluded that more numerate individuals tend to draw 
more affective meaning from quantitative information while less numerate individuals tend 
to rely more on affectively salient, but normatively irrelevant information (e.g. frame and 
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numerator divorced from denominator). This conclusion was supported by further research 
in which Peters et al. (2009) found that when rating a hypothetical (quantitatively 
presented) health care plan, incidental affective state (i.e. how participants ‗felt‘ at the time 
of the study) influenced the judgement of less numerate participants but not more numerate 
participants. One might therefore hypothesise that less numerate participants in Study 1 
may have derived greater affective meaning from the number of outcomes present than the 
probabilities of said outcomes occurring.  
 
Aims and hypotheses 
 
It is the aim of the present study to a) further investigate the systematic violations 
of dominance observed in Study 1; and b) examine whether the pattern of preference 
reversal observed in Study 1 and Starmer‘s (1999) study can be replicated. As detailed 
above, four possible explanations for dominance violation in the lottery choice task have 
been suggested: inattention, task misunderstanding, the application of original prospect 
theory‘s weighting function and probability neglect. Based upon the data gathered in Study 
1, probability neglect was deemed to be the most plausible explanation, but the present 
study offers an opportunity for all four possible explanations fully examined.  Each of 
these potential explanations makes certain predictions with respect to performance on the 
lottery choice task, and thus these predictions may be tested. 
 
 If inattention and quasi-random responding are responsible then one would expect: 
1) dominance to be violated with similar frequency for pairs featuring alternatives with a 
single non-zero outcome, pairs featuring two non-zero outcomes and pairs featuring an 
asymmetric number of outcomes; and 2) the response times of dominance violators to be 
far smaller than those of dominance adherers. As previously noted, the findings of Study 1 
failed to support this explanation. However, the present investigation will serve to provide 
a further, more systematic, test of this possibility. 
 
With respect to the possibility that task misunderstanding was responsible for the 
high rate of dominance violation observed in Study 1, it is anticipated that further 
elaborating upon the task instructions and presenting participants with a knowledge quiz 
with feedback prior to the start of the experiment will serve to eliminate such 
misunderstanding. Hence, if task misunderstanding was responsible for the high rate of 
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dominance violation observed in Study 1, then one would expect it to be vastly reduced in 
the present study. One would also anticipate that explicitly priming participants to 
recognise the existence of dominant alternatives would reduce the rate of dominance 
violation. The task misunderstanding explanation thus predicts that: 1) fewer instances of 
dominance violation will be observed in this study than Study 1; and 2) those participants 
given a dominance priming task will violate dominance less than participants not presented 
with this task. 
 
If the application of prospect theory‘s weighting function is primarily responsible 
for dominance violation then one would expect to observe: 1) dominance violation to occur 
almost exclusively for asymmetric-outcome pairs in which the difference in outcome value 
between the dominant and dominated alternative is small; 2) a replication of the findings of 
Study 1 and Starmer‘s (1999) study with respect to the relative frequency of the predicted 
and counter preference reversals; and 3) those more prone to dominance violation to 
demonstrate the predicted preference reversal more than those less prone to dominance 
violation. The weighting function cannot account for any instances of dominance violation 
for single or two-outcome pairs, as the probability structure is identical for both 
alternatives in such pairs. Nor would the weighting function be able to account for 
dominance violation for pairs where difference in outcome value between dominant and 
dominated alternative is large. The overweighting of smaller probabilities comparative to 
larger ones may lead to dominance violation when difference in outcome value between 
the dominant and dominated alternative is small, but this phenomenon could not offset 
very large differences in outcome value. 
 
If probability neglect is responsible for dominance violations then one would 
anticipate dominance violation to: 1) occur predominantly for asymmetric-outcome pairs; 
2) persist when the difference in outcome value between dominant and dominated 
alternative is relatively large; and 3) occur with greater frequency amongst those lower in 
numeracy. One would also expect those more prone to dominance violation to demonstrate 
greater risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses than those less prone to 
dominance violation, due to a disregard of probabilistic information. With respect to the 
preference reversal predicted by original prospect theory, the probability neglect 
hypothesis would seem to make the same predictions as the weighting function 
explanation. One would expect a) the predicted reversal to occur more frequently than the 
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counter reversal; and b) those more prone to dominance violation to demonstrate the 
predicted preference reversal more frequently than those less prone to dominance violation.  
 
The prediction that rate of dominance violation will correlate negatively with 
numeracy, is grounded in Peters et al.‘s (2006) finding that less numerate participants were 
more prone to denominator neglect than more numerate participants. If probability neglect 
is responsible for dominance violation then one would expect to observe a similar 
correspondence between lower levels of numeracy and greater dominance violation. The 
numeracy scale used in the present study will be an expansion of that developed by Lipkus, 
Samsa and Rimer (2001). As there are more percentage-based than frequency-based 
questions on Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer‘s scale, the decision has been taken to add eight 
new frequency based items (see method for further details). There are two related reasons 
for this modification. The first, that it has been proposed that humans process probabilistic 
information presented in frequency format differently (and more easily) than probabilistic 
information presented is percentage or decimalised format (e.g. Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; 
Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). The second is that the choices presented in Study 1 (and to 
be presented in this study) represent probability using frequencies. 
 
As previously stated, it is the goal of this study to tests the predictions made by each of 
the possible explanations for dominance violation outline above. Thus the aims of this 
investigation can be formally summarised as follows: 
 
1. To assess whether there is any difference in rate of dominance violation for single-
outcome, two-outcome and asymmetric-outcome pairs. 
 
2. To assess whether dominance priming will reduce the rate of dominance violation. 
 
3. To assess whether response times are lower amongst those more prone to 
dominance violation than those less prone to dominance violation.  
 
4. To examine whether increasing the difference in outcome value between dominant 
and dominated alternative reduces rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-
outcome pairs.  
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5. To ascertain whether there exists a relationship between numeracy and rate of 
dominance violation. 
 
6. To ascertain whether any difference exists with regard to risk seeking between 
those more and less prone to dominance violation. 
 
7. To examine whether the preference reversal predicted by original prospect theory‘s 
weighting function occurs more frequently than the counter reversal, as was 
previously reported by Starmer (1999) and observed in Study 1. 
 
8. To ascertain whether those more prone to dominance violation demonstrate the 
predicted preference reversal more than those less prone to dominance violation 
 
As probability neglect is thought to be the most likely cause of dominance violation, 
this study will proceed with the following hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1: That dominance violation will occur at a higher rate for asymmetric-
outcome pairs than single or two-outcome pairs. 
 
Hypothesis 2: That numeracy will correlate negatively with rate of dominance 
violation. 
 
Hypothesis 3: That those who are more prone to dominance violation will be more 
risk seeking for gains and risk averse for losses than those who less prone to 
dominance violation. 
 
Hypothesis 4: That the predicted preference reversal will occur more frequently 
than the counter reversal. 
 
Hypothesis 5: That dominance violators will demonstrate the predicted preference 
reversal more frequently than dominance adherers. 
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4.2. Method 
 
Participants 
 
63 participants (28 male and 35 female) took part in the study. Participants‘ ages 
ranged from 18 to 74 with a mean of 29.4. Participants were recruited both by direct 
approach by the experimenter and by word of mouth (i.e. existing participants informing 
others of the opportunity to participate). Of the sample, 48 participants were staff and 
students recruited on the University of Bolton campus, while the remaining 15 were 
members of the general population recruited off campus. The experimental data obtained 
from the first two participants was discarded as modifications to the experiment were made 
after this point; however, their numeracy test data was usable and thus retained.  
 
Design 
 
The experiment employed a mixed factorial 2x2x3x3 design, with one between 
groups variable (Dominance Priming) and three repeated measures variables (Outcome 
Domain, Outcome Value Difference and Stimulus Complexity). Dominance Priming had 
two levels (dominance priming present versus no dominance priming) as did Outcome 
Domain (gains versus losses). Outcome Value Difference had three levels (low versus 
moderate versus high) as did Stimulus Complexity (single-outcome versus asymmetric-
outcome versus two-outcome). It should be noted that while these were the experimental 
manipulations used in this study, two other independent variables were utilised during data 
analysis. One of these variables was based on score on the numeracy test (more numerate 
versus less numerate) and the other on propensity to violate dominance (dominance 
adherers versus dominance violators). 
 
Dependent variables were rate of dominance violation/adherence, rate of risk 
seeking, response time and number of times the predicted versus counter preference 
reversal was observed. 
 
The numeracy scale took the form of a 19 item test. Scores on the test represented 
the total number of correct answers given by each participant. 
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Materials, Apparatus and Stimuli 
 
Computerised experiment. 
 
The experiment was constructed in E-Studio 1.1 (Psychology Software Tools, 
Pittsburgh, PA, USA) and run using E-Run 1.1 on PCs and laptop computers running 
Windows XP. In instances where the experiment was run on a PC responses were made 
using a response box with buttons labelled A, 1, 2, 3 & B. In instances where the 
experiment was run on a laptop responses were made using keys 1 – 5 on the top row, 
which were relabelled A, 1, 2, 3 & B for the purpose of this experiment. 
 
 Single-outcome pair 
 
 Two-outcome pair 
 
  Asymmetric-outcome pair 
 
Figure 4.2.1: Examples of single non-zero outcome, two non-zero outcome and 
asymmetric non-zero outcome lottery pairs featuring a dominant and dominated 
alternative.  
 
Target stimuli comprised of 54 lottery pairs: 24 featuring a dominant alternative, 30 
not featuring a dominant alternative. Of those stimuli without a dominant alternative 10 
featured single-outcome pairs,  8 featured two-outcome pairs and 12 featured asymmetric 
105 
 
outcome pairs (note that the phrases ‗single-outcome‘ and ‗two-outcome‘ refer here to 
pairs featuring a single non-zero outcome and two non-zero outcomes respectively). Of 
those stimuli with a dominant alternative 4 featured single-outcome pairs, 4 featured two-
outcome pairs and 16 featured asymmetric-outcome pairs. Figure 4.2.1 above depicts 
examples of single-outcome, two-outcome and asymmetric-outcome pairs featuring a 
dominant alternative. Of the 4 single-outcome pairs with a dominant alternative 2 featured 
a low difference in outcome value between dominant and dominant alternatives while 2 
featured a high difference in outcome value. Of the 16 asymmetric-outcome pairs with a 
dominant alternative 6 featured a low difference in outcome value, 4 a moderate difference 
in outcome value and 6 a high difference in outcome value. 
 
12 of the lottery pairs used in this study were the original target pairs from Study 1.  
 
Numeracy test. 
 
The 19 item numeracy test was comprised of all 11 items from Lipkus, Samsa and 
Rimer‘s (2001) numeracy scale and eight new frequency based items (see Appendix B for 
a copy of the test and Chapter 5 for a full report and discussion of the expanded scale‘s 
internal consistency). 
 
Procedure 
 
After being assigned to either the dominance priming or no dominance priming 
group, participants were seated in front of a computer running the experiment and asked to 
read the onscreen instructions, which informed them that they were about to be presented 
with a series of lottery pairs and that they were required to select from each the pair that 
they would prefer to play. Participants were also informed that once the study had been 
completed, one participant would be selected at random from the sample to receive £30 
plus/minus the amount won/lost on one of their selected lotteries.  
 
A heavily annotated demonstration game was then presented to participants, in 
which they were presented with a single-outcome lottery pair and prompted to select which 
of the two alternatives (‗A‘ or ‗B‘) they would prefer to play by pressing the key labelled 
‗A‘ or ‗B‘ on the response box/keyboard. A ticket number between 1 and 20 was then 
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generated by the program and participants were informed onscreen which ticket had been 
drawn and whether the ticket drawn corresponded with a win (of £15:50 or £5:00 
depending on whether lottery ‗A‘ or lottery ‗B‘ was chosen) or a zero outcome (i.e. the 
status quo). The annotations present in this demonstration served to further explain how 
probabilities (tickets) corresponded with outcomes (win amount, loss amount or status 
quo). 
 
Once the demonstration had been completed, participants were required to answer 
four multiple choice questions: two of which pertained to probabilities and two of which 
pertained to outcome values (see Appendix C). Participants made their responses by 
pressing key ‗1‘, ‗2‘ or ‗3‘ on the response box/keyboard (i.e. the number that 
corresponded with the answer they wished to select). After each response participants were 
informed onscreen whether their answer was correct or incorrect; and an illustrated 
explanation as to why the correct answer was correct displayed. After answering these four 
questions participants in the dominance priming condition were presented with two 
additional questions. In each of these questions a lottery pair featuring a dominant 
alternative was presented onscreen and participants were asked to indicate which 
alternative (‗A‘ or ‗B‘) they thought that most people would select if given the choice. 
After each question participants were again informed as to whether their response was 
correct (dominant alternative selected) or incorrect (dominated alternative selected) and an 
illustrated explanation given as to why most people would be expected to select the 
dominant alternative. The first of these questions featured a single-outcome pair and the 
second featured an asymmetric outcome pair.  
 
To further familiarise participants with the lottery choice task a practice block of 
four lottery pairs (two loss pairs and two gain pairs) were then presented. Participants were 
required to choose from each pair the lottery that they would prefer to play by pressing ‗A‘ 
or ‗B‘ on the response box/keyboard. Once all four selections had been made one ticket 
number and one practice game were selected by the program. Participants were then 
informed onscreen which game and which ticket had been selected and how much they 
would have added to/lost from a £30 stake, based upon the outcome that the ticket number 
corresponded with in their preferred lottery for the game in question. 
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Once the practice had been completed participants were informed onscreen that 
they were about to begin the main body of the experiment and that one of their choices (to 
be selected and played at random) would determine how much they would receive if they 
won the prize draw. After signalling their readiness to begin by pressing ‗2‘ participants 
were then presented with the 54 target pairs and asked to select from each the pair the 
alternative that they would prefer to play. The order in which the pairs were presented was 
randomised by the program. Once participants had made all 54 selections, one game and 
one ticket number were randomly selected by the computer. Participants were then 
informed onscreen which ticket and which game had been selected and what their final 
balance was. As was the case with the practice games this final balance was £30 plus or 
minus the win or loss (or zero amount) that corresponded with the ticket number in their 
chosen lottery for the pair. They were also told that they would receive this final balance if 
their name was drawn in the prize draw at the end of the study. 
 
After completing the experiment, participants were required to complete the 
nineteen item numeracy test.  The test was paper-based and presented in a three page 
booklet. Participants were instructed to try and answer as many of the questions as they 
possibly could, but not to worry if there were some they were unable to answer. Once they 
had completed the numeracy test participants were thanked for their time and paid a £5 fee 
for taking part in the study. 
 
After all participants completed the study one participant was selected at random to 
receive their final balance. 
 
4.3. Results 
 
The experimental data gathered from the first two participants who took part in the 
present study had to be discarded due to alterations to the program made after they 
completed it, while only a partially complete dataset was retained for another participant 
due to technical difficulties that occurred during the experiment. All three however 
provided usable numeracy test data. One participant‘s numeracy test score was discarded. 
This was due to the participant in question skipping the middle page of the test. 
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Numeracy Test Performance 
 
Mean score on the expanded numeracy scale was 15.44 (N = 62, sd = 2.84). The 
value of Cronbach‘s alpha was α = .742, lower than the .8 specified for cognitive tests, but 
above the .7 advised by Kline (1999) for tests of ability (see also Field 2009). As the 
following chapter will focus on the expanded numeracy scale, further discussion regarding 
its reliability will not be placed here. However, it should be stated that the scale was a) 
found to improve the internal consistency of Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer‘s (2001) original 11 
item scale (as one might imagine given the addition of eight new items); and b) was 
determined to be fit for purpose.  
 
In order to divide the sample into less numerate and more numerate participants a 
median split was performed. As the median score on the test was 16, participants with 
scores 17 and above were categorised as More Numerate (N = 27) and those with scores 16 
or under as Less Numerate (N = 35).  
 
Dominance Violation 
 
Comparison with previous study. 
 
Table 4.3.1: Percentage rate of dominance violation in Study 1 and present study 
for pairs with a dominant alternative common to both 
 Study 1 Current study(N = 60) 
Low Win 46.5% (N= 71) 16.7% (N = 60) 
High Win 39.4% (N= 71) 11.5% (N = 61) 
Low Loss 36.6% (N= 71) 26.7% (N = 60) 
High Loss 33.8% (N= 71) 16.4% (N = 61) 
 
 
A glance at Table 4.3.1 reveals that percentage the rate of dominance violation in 
Study 1 was greater than that observed in the present study for each of the four pairs 
featuring a dominant alternative that were common to both studies. For these four pairs, the 
rate of dominance violation observed in Study 1(m = 1.56, sd = 1.23, mdn = 2) was 
compared with that observed in the present study (m = .72, sd = 1.08, mdn = 0) using a 
Mann Whitney U test. A significant difference was found (N = 131, U = 1257, z = -4.223, 
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p < .001, r = .37). However, while the rate of dominance violation for these pairs was 
lower in the present study than in Study 1, it remains surprisingly high.   
 
Rate of dominance violation. 
 
The mean number of dominance violations per participant was 3.52 (N =60, sd = 
4.57). The median was lower at 1.5. As one would expect, rate of dominance violation was 
positively skewed (skewness = 1.433), with exactly one-third of the sample making no 
violations of dominance at all. Table 4.3.2 below details the mean (sd) and median 
percentage of dominance violation for those in the dominance priming and no dominance 
priming conditions for each of the outcome complexity conditions (i.e. single-outcome, 
two-outcome & asymmetric-outcome). 
 
Table 4.3.2: Mean percentage rate of dominance violation for participants in the 
dominance priming and no dominance priming conditions by number of outcomes 
 Dominance priming 
(N=30) 
No dominance priming 
(N=30) 
All participants (N=60) 
No. of 
outcomes 
Mean (sd) Mdn Mean (sd) Mdn Mean (sd) Mdn 
       
Single 5.00 (12.10) 0 10.00 (18.01) 0 7.50 (15.47) 0 
Two 6.67 (15.99) 0 17.50 (23.8) 0 12.08 (20.84) 0 
Asymmetric 13.96 (21.50) 6.25 20.20 (24.22) 12.50 17.08 (22.92) 6.25 
Overall 11.25 (16.85) 4.17 18.06 (20.66) 12.50 14.65 (19) 6.25 
  
The overall rate of dominance violation was higher for those in the no dominance 
priming condition than those in the dominance priming condition. However, a series of 
Mann-Whitney U test indicated that this difference was not significant (N = 60, U = 364, z 
= -1.300, p > .05) 
 
 Hypothesis 1 predicted that dominance would be higher for asymmetric-outcome 
pairs than single or two-outcome pairs. As Table 4.3.2 shows, rate of dominance violation 
was lowest for single-outcome pairs and highest for asymmetric-outcome pairs. The 
median percentage rate of dominance violation for single-outcome and two-outcome pairs 
was 0 as more than half of all participants consistently adhered to dominance in these 
conditions. A Friedman test indicated that a significant difference in rate of dominance 
violation existed between stimulus complexity conditions (N = 60, Χ² (2) = 15.54, p < 
.001). A follow up series of three Wilcoxon Sign Rank tests with Bonferroni adjustment 
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(sig = .017), revealed there to be a significant difference between percentage rate of 
dominance violation for single-outcome and asymmetric-outcome pairs (N = 60, T = 111, z 
= -3.352, p ≤.001, r = -.31), and a near significant difference between percentage rate of 
dominance violation for single-outcome and two-outcome pairs (N = 60, T = 73.5, z = -
1.895, p > .017 (=.058), r = -.17). The difference in rate of dominance violation between 
two-outcome and asymmetric-outcome pairs was not found to be significant (N = 60, T = 
214, z = =-1.652, p > .017, r = -.15), though it was in the expected direction (i.e. a greater 
rate of dominance violation in the asymmetric-outcome condition). Hypothesis 1 is thus 
generally supported by these findings. 
 
 
Figure 4.3.1: Mean percentage rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs 
with low outcome value difference, moderate outcome value difference and high outcome 
value difference. 
 
As stated in the introduction, if prospect theory‘s weighting function is the primary 
cause of dominance violation in the lottery choice task, then dominance violation should 
primarily occur for asymmetric-outcome pairs in which the difference in outcome value 
between dominant and dominated alternative is relatively low. As it was the present 
study‘s goal to ascertain which of the four potential explanations for dominance violation 
111 
 
was the correct one, this prediction was tested. As Figure 4.3.1 shows, there appears to be 
little difference in rate of dominance violations between asymmetric-outcome pairs with a 
low outcome value difference and asymmetric-outcome pairs with moderate and high 
outcome value differences. A Friedman test confirmed that no significant difference 
between conditions existed (N = 60, Χ² (2) = .65, P > .05). Thus the weighting function 
hypothesis is not supported. 
 
Numeracy and dominance. 
 
Consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 2, numeracy was found to correlate 
negatively with rate of dominance violation. This correlation was both strong and 
significant (N = 59, r = -.687, p < .001, r² = .472).  
 
 
Figure 4.3.2: Mean percentage rate of dominance violation in each stimulus complexity 
condition for More Numerate (N=26) and Less Numerate (N=33) participants. 
 
On further scrutinising the patterns of dominance violation of More Numerate and 
Less Numerate participants, it became clear that the rate of dominance violation for More 
Numerate participants appeared to be more or less the same for single, two and 
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asymmetric-outcome pairs. As Figure 4.3.2 above illustrates however, for Less Numerate 
participants there seemed to be a very clear pattern; with mean rate of dominance violation 
for single and two-outcome pairs  being considerably lower than that for asymmetric-
outcome pairs. When the sample was split into More Numerate and Less Numerate 
samples and a Friedman test with Bonferroni adjustment (sig = .025) performed for each 
group separately, it was found that there was no significant difference in rate of dominance 
violation between any of the three stimulus complexity conditions for More Numerate 
participants (N = 27, Χ² (2) = 3.05, p > .05). A significant difference was however found 
for Less Numerate participants (N = 33, Χ² (2) = 13.932, p ≤ .001). 
 
A follow up series of three Wilcoxon tests with Bonferroni adjustment (sig = .017) 
were subsequently performed on the dominance violation data for Less Numerate 
participants only. It was revealed that percentage rate of dominance violation for 
asymmetric-outcome pairs was significantly higher than percentage rate of dominance 
violation for single-outcome pairs (N = 33, T = 50, z = -3.038, p < .01, r = -.37). The 
difference between percentage rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome and 
two-outcome pairs narrowly missed significance (N = 33, T = 60.5, z = -2.368, p > .017 
(=.018), r = -.29). Rate of dominance violation for two-outcome pairs was higher than that 
for single-outcome pairs. However, this difference was neither significant nor approaching 
significance (N = 33, T = 35, z = -1.213, p > .017). Thus, Hypothesis 1‘s prediction that 
dominance violation would occur more frequently for asymmetric-outcome pairs than 
single and two-outcome pairs is supported with respect to less numerate participants,  but 
not more numerate participants. 
 
Risk Seeking and Risk Aversion 
 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that those participants most prone to dominance violation 
would demonstrate greater risk seeking in the domain of gains and risk aversion in the 
domain of losses than those less prone to dominance violation. The rationale for this 
hypothesis being that if probability neglect is responsible for dominance violation, then 
one would expect dominance violators to  be more likely than dominance adherers to 
neglect probabilistic information when presented with pairs without a dominant alternative. 
Hence, one would expect to observe greater risk seeking in the domain of gains and greater 
risk aversion in the domain of loses amongst dominance violators. In order to test this 
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possibility the sample was divided via median split into dominance violators (N = 30) and 
dominance adherers (N = 30). Dominance violators were classified as those who had 
violated dominance more than once while dominance adherers were those who had made 
one dominance violation or less. It should here be emphasised that the fact that exactly half 
the sample were classified as dominance adherers (one dominance violation or less) and 
half as dominance violators (two dominance violations or more) was a serendipitous 
coincidence. As one can see from Figure 4.3.3 below, in the domain of gains the average 
rate of risk seeking for dominance violators (m = 5.93, sd = 3.49) was higher than that for 
dominance adherers (m = 4.97, sd = 2.7). In the domain of losses on the other hand, 
average rate of risk seeking for dominance adherers (m = 7.8, sd = 3.19) was higher than 
that for dominance violators (m = 5.73, sd = 3.46). 
 
 
Figure 4.3.3: Rate of risk seeking for Dominance Adherers and Dominance Violators in 
the domain of gains and domain of losses. 
 
 
A mixed factorial ANOVA was performed with propensity to violate dominance 
(dominance adherers versus dominance violators) as a between groups factor, outcome 
domain (gains versus losses) as a repeated measures factor and frequency with which the 
114 
 
riskier alternative was selected as a dependent variable. As anticipated an interaction 
between propensity to violate dominance and outcome domain was found (N = 60, F(2,58) 
= 5.908, p < .05, partial eta squared = .092). Two post-hoc independent samples t-tests 
with Bonferroni adjustment (sig = .025) were then conducted. It was revealed that, in the 
domain of gains, the difference in rate of risk seeking between Dominance Violators and 
Dominance Adherers was not signficant (N = 60, t(58) = -1.202, p > .025). In the domain 
of losses however, Dominance Adherers were however found to be significantly more risk 
seeking than Dominance Violators (N = 60, t(58) = 2.405, p < .025, r = .3). Hypothesis 3 is 
therefore partially supported.  
 
Response Time 
 
As previously stated, quasi-random responding was identified as one possible 
explanation for dominance violation. It was posited that if this was the case and dominance 
violators were simply not attending to the choice information presented, then their 
response times should be faster than those of dominance adherers. Thus, this prediction 
was tested. 
 
Overall, mean response time was slightly higher for Dominance Adherer‘s (m = 
7044ms, sd = 2873ms) than Dominance Violators (m = 5881ms, sd = 2053ms). However, 
as Figure 4.3.4 below illustrates, when response times for pairs with a dominant alternative 
and pairs without are examined separately a somewhat more complex picture emerged. 
With respect to pairs featuring a dominant alternative, there was virtually no difference in 
mean response time between dominance adherers and dominance violators. On the other 
hand, when it came to pairs without a dominant alternative, mean response time for 
dominance adherers was far higher than that for dominance violators. 
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Figure 4.3.4: Mean response time for pairs with and without a dominant alternative by 
Dominance Adherers and Dominance Violators. 
 
A mixed factorial ANOVA was performed, in which propensity to violate 
dominance (Dominance Adherers versus Dominance Violator) was entered as a between 
groups factor, stimulus type (pairs with a dominant alternative versus pairs without a 
dominant alternative) as a repeated measures variable and mean response time as a 
dependent variable. Propensity to violate dominance was not found to have a significant 
main effect on response time (N = 61, F(2, 59) = 2.867, p > .05). However, a significant 
interaction between propensity to violate dominance and stimulus type was found (N =61, 
F(2, 59) = 8.423, p < .01, partial eta squared = .127). 
 
The quasi-random responding explanation is thus not supported by the response 
time data gathered here. However, as will be further discussed in the discussion, these 
findings do have some interesting implications with respect to choice process. 
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Preference Reversal 
 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that the preference reversal predicted by prospect theory‘s 
weighting function and previously observed in Study 1, would be observed to occur more 
frequently than the counter reversal. Hypothesis 5 predicted that dominance violators 
would demonstrate the predicted preference reversal more frequently than dominance 
adherers. 
 
Table 4.3.2: Number of times the predicted preference reversal and counter reversal 
were demonstrated 
 No. of times predicted 
reversal demonstrated 
No of times counter reversal 
demonstrated 
Χ² sig 
Low Win 13  5 3.556 .059 
Low Loss 16 13   .310 .577 
High Win 14  7 2.333 .127 
High Loss 12  5 2.882 .090 
Total 55 30 7.353** .007** 
*Significant at the ≤ .05 level 
**significant at the ≤ .01 level 
 
Table 4.3.3 above details the number of times the predicted and counter preference 
reversals were observed in each of the four outcome value-domain conditions. As one can 
see, all differences are in the predicted direction, with the predicted reversal being 
demonstrated more frequently than the counter reversal. However, the difference is only 
marginally significant for the Low Win condition (though the difference observed in the 
High Loss condition approaches significance).  
 
When all the four conditions are merged and all instances of the predicted reversal 
compared with all instances of the counter reversal, it was found that the predicted reversal 
occurred significantly more frequently than the counter reversal (Χ²(1) = 7.353, p < .01). 
Thus Hypothesis 4 is supported. 
 
On examining whether dominance violators were more likely to demonstrate the 
predicted reversal than dominance adherers, it was found that the former demonstrated the 
predicted reversal (m = 1.07, sd = .94, mdn = 1) more frequently than the latter (m = .73, 
sd = .91, mdn = .5). This difference was not found to be significant (N = 60, U = 355, z = -
1.493, p > .05). Hypothesis 5 is thus unsupported. However, it is interesting to note that a 
near-significant positive correlation was found between rate of dominance violation for 
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asymmetric-outcome pairs and number of times the predicted preference reversal was 
demonstrated (N = 60, rho = .25, p > .05 (=.054). 
 
Numeracy however was not found to have a significant or near significant effect on 
rate at which the predicted preference reversal was demonstrated (N = 60, U = 384, z = -
.732, p > .05) 
 
Discussion 
 
The present study was undertaken with the intention of further investigating the 
high rate of dominance violation observed in Study 1. As stated at the outset, four possible 
reasons for the high rate of dominance violations observed in the previous study were 
identified: inattention/quasi-random responding, a misunderstanding of the task, the 
application of original prospect theory‘s weighting function (Tversky & Kahneman, 1979) 
in the absence of dominance detection and probability neglect. As outlined in the 
introduction, each of these explanations makes certain prediction with respect to 
performance on the lottery choice task; and it was the goal of the present study to test these 
predictions. What follows will be a discussion of the study‘s findings in relation to these 
predictions and what the theoretical implications of said findings are. 
 
Random Responding 
 
It was noted at the outset that if quasi-random responding (i.e. pushing buttons 
without considering any choice information) was the primary cause of dominance violation 
on the lottery choice task, then one would expect dominance to be violated with more or 
less equal frequency for all pairs featuring a dominant alternative. One would also expect 
the response times of those more prone to dominance violation to be unanimously faster 
than those less prone to dominance violation. 
 
As was the case in Study 1, this explanation was not supported by the findings of 
the present study. For less numerate participants dominance was violated more frequently 
for asymmetric-outcome pairs than for single or two-outcome pairs (though it should be 
note that the difference in rate of dominance violation between asymmetric and two-
outcome pairs was only marginally significant when the Bonferroni adjustment was 
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applied). For more numerate participants no such pattern was observed. However, as a 
group more numerate participants had far lower rate of dominance violation. With respect 
to response times, dominance violators tended to respond faster than dominance adherers 
when presented with lottery pairs without a dominant alternative. For pairs with a 
dominant alternative however, the mean response time of dominance violators was almost 
identical to that of dominance adherers. Hence, it is felt that while a few participants may 
have engaged in quasi-random responding, it can be ruled out as the primary cause of 
dominance violation in the lottery choice task 
 
Task Misunderstanding 
 
Task misunderstanding could not, based solely upon the data gathered in Study 1, 
be dismissed as a possible cause of dominance violation. The present study therefore aimed 
to reduce task misunderstanding by improving the instructions and task demonstration 
presented to participants. A set of four questions with feedback that was designed to allay 
any misapprehensions participants might have regarding the manner in which outcomes 
corresponded with ticket numbers and outcome probabilities corresponded with outcomes 
was also added.  
 
A comparison of the rate of dominance violation for the four pairs common to both 
Study 1 and the present study indicated that rate of dominance violation was significantly 
lower in the present study than it was in Study 1. It might therefore be reasonably deduced 
that the very high rate of dominance violation observed in Study 1 (33.8% - 46.5%) was, in 
part, a result of some participants not fully understanding the task. However, the fact that 
participants in the present study did violate dominance for the four lottery pairs common to 
both studies at a fairly high rate (11.5% - 26.7%) would seem to suggest that task 
misunderstanding is not the sole cause of dominance violation. None of the participants 
classified as Dominance Violators violated dominance all the time. Indeed, the majority of 
Dominance Violators adhered to the dominance principle more often than they violated it. 
Therefore, it seems once again, highly unlikely that a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
task was solely responsible. 
 
The fact that dominance priming had no significant effect on rate of dominance 
violation would also seem to suggest that task misunderstanding is not the sole cause of 
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dominance violation. If task misunderstanding was the primary cause of dominance 
violation in the lottery choice task, one would expect that providing a direct explanation as 
to why dominant alternatives are objectively superior to dominated alternatives would lead 
to a lower rate dominance violation amongst those receiving this explanation (i.e. those in 
the dominance priming condition). This however was not observed. While those in the 
dominance priming condition did on average demonstrate a slightly lower rate of 
dominance violation than those in the no dominance priming condition, the difference was 
not significant. Hence, it is felt that it can be reasonably concluded that while task 
misunderstanding may have been responsible for some of the violations of dominance 
observed in Study 1, it was not the sole cause. 
 
The Weighting Function 
 
 In Study 1 the application of original prospect theory‘s weighting function without 
dominance detection was identified as a possible, though unlikely, cause of dominance 
violation. This possibility could not be accepted or refuted on the basis of the data gathered 
in Study 1 and so the present study aimed to systematically test the predictions implicit in 
this explanation. If the weighting function was the primary cause of dominance violation in 
the lottery choice task, then one would expect dominance violation to predominantly occur 
for asymmetric-outcome pairs in which the difference in outcome value between dominant 
and dominated alternative was very small. One would also expect the preference reversal 
predicted by original prospect theory to occur significantly more frequently than the 
counter reversal, as was previously observed in Study 1 and by Starmer (1999). Indeed, it 
would be anticipated that those more prone to dominance violation would also be more 
prone to preference reversal in the predicted direction. 
 
 The results of this study indicate that dominance was indeed violated more for 
asymmetric outcome pairs than single or two-outcome pairs by those lower in numeracy 
(with those higher in numeracy demonstrating a consistently low rate of dominance 
violation across the three stimulus complexity conditions). The predicted preference 
reversal was also found to occur more frequently than the counter reversal when all four 
cycles of A versus B, A versus C were merged. However, dominance was not violated 
significantly more frequently for pairs with a small difference in outcome value between 
dominant and dominated alternative (i.e. ≤ 3.125%) than for pairs with a very large 
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difference in outcome value (circa 25% - 75%). In addition to this dominance violators 
were not found to be significantly more likely to demonstrate the predicted preference 
reversal than dominance adherers; though rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-
outcome pairs did have a near-significant correlation with rate of preference reversal. It is 
thus felt that the weighting function can be rejected as an explanation for dominance 
violation in the lottery choice task. The overweighting of two 15% probabilities 
comparative to a single 30% probability could not offset high differences in outcome value 
between dominant and dominated alternatives. However, the weighting function does 
remain a plausible explanation for preference reversal amongst dominance adherers. 
 
Probability Neglect 
 
In a think aloud study Huber (1982, see Huber 1989 for summary in English) 
observed the systematic neglect of both probability and the mutual exclusivity of outcomes 
on the part of one participant. Denes-Raj & Epstein (1994) meanwhile observed 
widespread denominator neglect (and thus dominance violation) on the jelly beans task. 
Denes-Raj and Epstein attributed this phenomenon to numerators having greater affective 
salience than their corresponding denominators. In a more recent investigation, Peters et al. 
(2006) found that less numerate individuals were more prone to denominator neglect than 
more numerate individuals. This finding was attributed to those lower in numeracy being 
more susceptible to influence by affectively salient but objectively irrelevant information 
(e.g. numerator divorced from denominator), when presented with quantitative tasks. 
Based upon these prior findings it was posited that dominance violation in the lottery 
choice task may be the result of some participants being influenced more by number of 
potential outcomes (a salient yet irrelevant attribute) than precise probabilistic information.  
 
It was thus hypothesised that dominance violation would occur at a higher rate for 
asymmetric-outcome pairs than single or two-outcome pairs (Hypothesis 1) and that 
numeracy would correlate negatively with rate of dominance violation (Hypothesis 2). It 
was also predicted that dominance violators would, as a result of a greater propensity to 
neglect probabilistic information, demonstrate greater risk seeking for gains and risk 
aversion for losses (Hypothesis 3). In addition to this it was anticipated that probability 
neglect would also lead to the predicted preference reversal, as a result of two-non zero 
outcomes appearing to represent a greater win/loss than an equivalent single non-zero 
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outcome when probability is neglected. Hence it was hypothesised that the predicted 
reversal would occur more frequently than the counter reversal (Hypothesis 4) and that 
dominance violators would be more prone to demonstrating the predicted reversal than 
dominance adherers (Hypothesis 5). 
 
Hypotheses 1 & 2 were supported by the findings of the present study. While rate 
of dominance violation was uniformly low for more numerate participants across all 
stimulus complexity conditions, less numerate participants violated dominance more 
frequently for asymmetric-outcome pairs than single or two-outcome pairs. A strong 
negative correlation was also observed between numeracy and rate of dominance violation. 
Hypothesis 3 was partially supported. Dominance adherers were significantly more risk 
seeking in the domain of losses than dominance violators. However, while the mean rate of 
risks seeking in the gains domain was higher for dominance violators than dominance 
adherers, this difference was not significant. Hypothesis 4 was, as previously mentioned, 
supported when all presentations of A versus B and A versus C were taken together. 
Hypothesis 5 however was not fully supported. No significant difference in rate of 
preference reversal in the predicted direction was found between dominance adherers and 
dominance violators; although rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs 
did have a marginally significant correlation with rate of preference reversal in the 
predicted direction. 
 
Based upon the findings outlined above, it is felt that it can be reasonably 
concluded that probability neglect was the main cause of dominance violation in both the 
present study and Study 1. This explanation is the only one that accounts for both: a) the 
interaction between numeracy and stimulus complexity with respect to dominance 
violation; and b) the fact that the size of the difference in outcome value between dominant 
and dominated alternatives had no effect on rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-
outcome pairs. However, though there is some indication that probability neglect may 
underlie some instances of preference reversal, the fact that propensity to violate 
dominance did not have a significant effect on rate of preference reversal suggests that it is 
not the sole cause of this phenomenon.  
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Probability Neglect, Numeracy and Mode of Thought 
 
Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994, see also Epstein, 1994) posit that humans possess 
two modes of thought, the ‗experiential‘ and the ‗rational‘, and that denominator neglect 
results from reliance on the former.  This dual-process conceptualisation of thought is one 
that has been embraced by many in the field of decision research (see for instance Evans, 
2006; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Sloman, 1996 and Stanovich & West, 2000, 2008). 
As discussed in Chapter 2, while models that posit the existence of an intuitive/deliberative 
split in mode of thought may differ in certain structural respects (see Evans, 2008), all have 
certain commonalities with respect to the conceptualisation of the two modes of thought. 
Intuitive processes (dubbed System 1 by Stanovich, 1999) are generally characterised as 
being fast, automatic, associative, affect-driven, cognitively undemanding and prone to 
certain thought biases. Deliberative processes (dubbed System 2 by Stanovich, 1999) are 
generally characterised as being slow, rule-based, cognitively demanding and less prone to 
certain thought biases. Given the obvious similarities between probability neglect and 
denominator neglect, one is prompted to posit that reliance on intuitive, affect-driven 
System 1 processes may underlie both phenomena. The proposition that dominance 
violators utilise number of outcomes in lieu of stated probabilities is, after all, grounded in 
the idea the former may be more affectively salient than the latter.  
 
Intuitive System 1 processes are characterised as being fast and cognitively 
undemanding, while deliberative System 2 processes are characterised as being slow and 
cognitive demanding. Hence, if dominance violators tended to rely on the former and 
dominance adherers the latter, one would expect to observe a difference in response times 
between the two groups. As previously noted, no main effect of propensity to violate 
dominance on response time was found in the present study. However, an interaction 
between propensity to violate dominance and stimulus type (dominant alternative versus 
no dominant alternative) was. Mean response time for dominance violators remained 
consistently fast for both pairs with and pairs without a dominant alternative. For 
dominance adherers on the other hand, mean response time was far lower for pairs with a 
dominant alternative than pairs without. Hence, the average response times of dominance 
violators would appear to be consistent with reliance on fast, undemanding System 1 
processes. The average response times of dominance adherers on the other hand would 
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seem to suggest that the amount of cognitive effort expended depended on whether a 
dominant alternative could be identified. This would seem to be consistent with the 
utilisation of deliberative System 2 processes. Hence, it is felt that the response time data 
gathered in this study does support the existence of an intuitive/deliberative split between 
dominance violators and adherers. 
 
Peters et al. (2006) propose that more numerate individuals tend to draw precise 
affective meaning from quantitative/probabilistic information, while less numerate 
individuals are more likely to draw meaning form affectively salient yet objectively 
irrelevant information. The present study‘s findings with respect to numeracy, dominance 
violation and probability neglect would seem to be consistent with the postulation. At first 
glance, this notion that more numerate individuals derive affective meaning from precise 
quantitative information may appear to contradict the hypothesis that reliance on affect 
driven System 1 processes leads to dominance violation. However, if one were to assume 
the existence of two modes of processes that operate in a manner consistent with the model 
proposed by Stanovich and West (2008), then the contradiction disappears. Stanovich & 
West propose what Evans (2008) refers to as a default-interventionist model, in which an 
intuitive System 1 response is automatically generated and only overridden by a 
deliberative System 2 response if: 1) the knowledge (or ‗mindware‘) to provide a System 2 
response is available; 2) the need to override is detected; and 3) one has the cognitive 
capacity to inhibit the prepotent System 1 response long enough to derive the appropriate 
System 2 response. Hence, it is possible that the affect-driven System 1 responses of more 
numerate individuals are more likely to be normatively correct and therefore require no 
override.  
 
A Note on Preference Reversal 
 
At the outset of this study it was hypothesised that the preference reversal predicted 
by prospect theory would occur more frequently than the counter reversal. It was also 
hypothesised that dominance violators would be more prone to demonstrating the predicted 
preference reversal than dominance adherers. The former hypothesis was supported. The 
latter hypothesis was not; though a near-significant correlation between rate of preference 
reversal and rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs was found. It 
would therefore seem reasonable to posit that dominance violators and dominance adherers 
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tended to demonstrate the predicted preference reversal for different reasons: the former 
because of probability neglect, the latter because of probability overweighting as per 
original prospect theory‘s predictions. 
 
However, even if this is the case, one may question why the performance of 
dominance adherers was not significantly more normative than that of dominance violators 
when it came to preference reversal. After all, the response time data obtained in this study 
indicates that they tended to expend greater cognitive effort on pairs without a dominant 
alternative. Again, Stanovich and West‘s (2008) model may account for both this finding 
and the finding that numeracy had no correlation with rate of preference reversal. In 
Stanovich and West‘s model, the inhibition of a prepotent response will only occur if the 
need to override is detected. When a lottery pair featuring a dominant alternative is 
presented, cues that one alternative is dominant exist in the stimulus itself. This is not the 
case with preference reversal between the A versus B and A versus C pairs. No cue that 
one‘s preference pattern may be inconsistent exists in either pair. 
 
In Summary 
 
The findings of this study show that of the four possible explanations for 
dominance violation in the lottery choice task suggested at the outset, probability neglect 
appears to be the most plausible. The difference in rate of dominance violation between the 
present study and Study 1 does appear to suggest that task misunderstanding was 
responsible for some of the violations of dominance observed in Study 1. However, as 
most of those classified as Dominance Violators in the present study adhered to the 
dominance principle over 50% of the time, it seems unlikely that dominance violation 
occurred purely because they did not understand how outcomes corresponded with tickets. 
By identifying probability neglect as the most likely cause of dominance violation the 
claim is not being made that that Dominance Violators consistently neglect all probabilistic 
information; rather, it is suggested that they make less use of probabilistic information than 
Dominance Adherers. The finding that Dominance Violators were more risk averse for 
losses than Dominance Adherers, would certainly seem to indicate that the choices of the 
former were more influenced by outcome value and less influenced by probability than the 
those of the latter. The fact that those classified as Less Numerate demonstrated a distinct 
pattern of dominance violation while those classified as More Numerate did not, would 
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also seem to support this postulation. Peters and colleagues (see for instance Peters et al., 
2006; Peters et al., 2009) suggest that when presented with quantitative information, the 
choices and judgements of those lower in numeracy are more likely to be influenced by 
affectively salient but objectively irrelevant information than those higher in numeracy.  In 
this case it is posited that the choices of Less Numerate participants were more likely to be 
influenced by (the objectively irrelevant) ‗number of outcomes‘ information than the 
choices of More Numerate participants. It is impossible to discern from the data gathered 
in this study whether Dominance Violators were employing an outcome value adding 
strategy, such as that observed by Huber (see Huber 1989), or simply using number of 
outcomes information in lieu of actual probability information. Either however, would 
indicate a reliance on objectively irrelevant – but perhaps affectively salient – information. 
 
In terms of information processing, the response time data gathered in this study 
would seem to suggest that Dominance Violators tended to rely upon processes consistent 
with the mode of thought dubbed System 1. This again would be consistent with 
Dominance Violators basing their choices on that information that is most immediately 
affectively salient. The response times of Dominance Adherers on the other hand, indicate 
greater deliberation for pairs where a clearly dominant alternative was not present. This 
would be consistent with greater utilisation of System 2. 
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Chapter 5: Study 3 
 
Over the last few years the relationship between numeracy and decision making has 
come under closer scrutiny in the field of decision research. While a link between general 
cognitive ability, choice and reasoning has been an area of interest for some time (see for 
instance Stanovich & West, 2000), it is only of late that numeracy, as a factor in its own 
right, has become a focus of investigation (see Reyna et al., 2009, for overview). Many 
decisions involve numeric components. In decisions under risk probability is usually 
represented numerically, in either a frequency or percentage format, while choice 
outcomes are often numerically quantifiable (e.g. amount of dollars that could potentially 
be lost, number of lives that could be saved... etc.). It is therefore evident that the manner 
in which humans process and utilise number information will have a strong influence on 
how decisions are made.  
 
The primary aim of the present study is to further test the reliability of the 
expanded numeracy scale developed for use in this programme of research. It is also 
however the goal of this investigation to examine whether participants respond differently 
to simple frequency-based items than simple items featuring other representations of 
probability.  What follows will be a brief summary of key theoretical points pertaining to 
the study of numeracy and choice (see Chapter 2 for a more comprehensive overview), 
followed by a discussion of key issues pertaining to the measurement of numeracy and an 
outline of the aims and hypotheses of the present study. 
 
Probability, Numeracy and Decision Making: Theoretical Background 
  
The manner in which people process probabilistic information has been a topic of 
interest in the field or reasoning and decision making for some time. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, it has been posited that humans are better able to process and utilise 
probabilistic information presented in frequency format than other representations of 
probability. This, it has postulated, is the result of humans possessing some form of 
domain specific function for reasoning with natural frequencies (see for instance Cosmides 
& Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995, 1999, 2007; Hoffrage & Gigerenzer, 1998).  
Evidence cited in favour of this position, comes from several investigations that have 
indicated that presenting Bayesian reasoning problems in frequency rather than percentage 
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format reduces base-rate neglect (e.g. Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 
1995). Indeed, the notion that frequencies and percentage-based probabilities are processed 
in a different manner would seem to be supported by the findings of studies featuring far 
simpler probabilistic problems. Slovic, Monahan and MacGregor (2000) found that a 
sample of forensic psychologists and psychiatrists were more likely to rate an offender 
described as having a 10% chance of reoffending as less dangerous than one described as 
having a 10 in 100 chance of reoffending. Not all however accept the hypothesis that 
humans are innately disposed to reasoning with frequency-based information. Barby and 
Sloman (2007) dispute the existence of a discrete domain-specific function for reasoning 
with frequencies (but not other probabilistic representations), positing instead that 
frequency-based representations of Bayesian problems tend to be easier to solve because 
they render salient the underlying set structure of the problem. 
 
The exact nature of the cognitive processes and structures underlying humans‘ 
ability to utilise probabilistic information has, as one can see, been a subject of interest for 
some time. However, the nature of the relationship between numeracy and the processing 
and utilisation of risk information has only recently begun to receive widespread attention 
in the field of decision research. In terms of cognitive ability more generally, Stanovich 
and West (2000, 2008) have linked cognitive ability to a tendency to avoid biases and 
perform in a normatively correct fashion in certain reasoning and decision making tasks. 
However, there is a body of evidence to suggest that even highly educated participants 
often have limited understanding of probabilistic concepts (see Nelson, Reyna, Fagerlin, 
Lipkus & Peters, 2008; and Reyna et al., 2009, for a detailed summary). In addition to this, 
there is an ever increasing body of evidence to suggest that numeracy has an effect on 
choice, judgement and decision making distinct from that of general cognitive ability. 
When Peters et al. (2006) presented participants with a version of Slovic, Monahan and 
MacGregor‘s (2000) risk assessment task an interaction between numeracy and risk 
representation was found. Less numerate participants presented with information stating 
that a psychiatric patient had a 10% chance of committing a violent offence tended to rate 
the patient as posing a lower risk than those presented with the same information if 
frequency format. For more numerate participants however, no such difference between 
representations was found. This interaction between risk representation numeracy persisted 
when cognitive ability (for which SAT score was used as a proxy) was controlled for. In 
the same series of investigations Peters et al. also observed that less numerate participants 
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were more susceptible to denominator neglect and certain framing effects than more 
numerate participants. In a subsequent study, Peters and Levin (2008) found that while 
more and less numerate participants were susceptible to framing effects when presented 
with the Asian Disease Problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), the choices of those higher 
in numeracy tended to be more consistent with their ratings of the risky and riskless 
alternatives in separate judgement. Chapman and Liu (2009) meanwhile, found that 
presenting Bayesian reasoning problems in frequency format improved the performance of 
more numerate individuals far more than that of less numerate individuals. 
 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, Peters and colleagues (see Peters et al., 2006; Peters et 
al., 2009) posit that more numerate participants tend to draw more precise affective 
meaning from numeric information (especially ratio-based information), while less 
numerate participants tend to be more susceptible to the influence of objectively irrelevant 
but affectively salient details (e.g. frame, salience of risk representation, numerator 
divorced from denominator, incidental affective state). It should be noted that those higher 
in numeracy do not always make more normatively correct judgements when presented 
with quantitative information than those lower in numeracy. Peters et al. (2006), for 
example, observed that adding a small loss to a gamble actually increased its mean 
attractiveness rating amongst those higher in numeracy. However, it does appear that more 
numerate individuals do tend on the whole to be better able to utilise probabilistic and 
other ratio-based information than less numerate individuals. Peters et al. (2008) posit that 
this may be the result of more numerate individuals tending to possess more precise (i.e. 
less steep) intuitive number lines than those lower in numeracy (see Chapter 2 for an 
explanation of the number line); with this enabling them to more easily draw precise 
distinctions between magnitudes. This notion that greater precision of number 
representation leads directly to higher aptitude in numerical reasoning, is questioned by 
Reyna et al. (2009), who argue that ‗gist‘ (i.e. representation of essential meaning) rather 
than precise ‗verbatim‘ representations of risk information facilitate choice and judgement. 
However, as is discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 6, these two perspectives are not 
irreconcilable. It seems, after all, entirely plausible that the ability to easily draw precise 
distinctions between magnitudes would facilitate the formation of accurate gist 
representations. 
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With respect to possible differences in the manner in which frequency-based and 
other representations of probability are processed, the research mentioned above suggests a 
mixed picture. As previously mentioned, Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) along with 
Cosmides and Tooby (1996) have found that presenting Bayesian reasoning problems in 
frequency rather than percentage format reduced based rate neglect. However, in a more 
recent study Chapman and Liu (2009) observed that this effect was more pronounced for 
more numerate than less numerate participants. This finding, as Chapman and Liu point 
out, suggests that not only is numeracy a very important factor in determining performance 
in probabilistic and proportional reasoning task, but that a capacity for reasoning using 
natural frequencies is not as universal and intrinsic to human cognition as Gigerenzer and 
Hoffrage (1995, 1999) and Cosmides and Tooby (1996) have posited that it might be. 
Indeed, the findings of Study 2 would seem to suggest that many less numerate individuals 
are prone to the neglect of frequency-based information. Nonetheless, the findings of 
Peters et al. (2006) would seem to indicate that those lower in numeracy do, on at least 
some occasions, draw different meaning from frequency-based and percentage-based 
representations of the same information.  
 
It is thus felt that further study of the comparative difficulty of simple frequency-
based, simple percentage-based and simple mixed-representation problems is warranted. 
 
Measuring Numeracy 
 
In order to study the relationship between numeracy and decision making it is 
necessary to be able to measure numeracy. This can be done by use of either subjective, 
objective or proxy measures. Proxy measures of numeracy, such as previously obtained 
mathematics qualifications (e.g. GCSE grades) are easily obtained. As such, using 
qualifications as an indicator of numeracy may be useful in situations where other means 
of gauging numeracy would be impractical. However, there are three not insignificant 
problems inherent in this approach: 1) it automatically excludes those who have not 
obtained that particular qualification; 2) a participant‘s mathematical ability may have 
changed since the qualification was obtained; and 3) grading schemes may not remain 
consistent over time. With respect to subjective assessments of numeracy, evidence 
suggests that people do not tend to be accurate judges of their own mathematical ability. 
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Sheridan, Pignone and Lewis (2003), for instance, found that those who rate themselves as 
being good with numbers very frequently fail to respond to numeracy questions correctly 
(see Reyna et al., 2009 for a more comprehensive discussion). Although it should be noted 
that Fagerlin et al. (2007) report a strong correlation between score on their recently 
devised Subjective Numeracy Scale and objective measures of numeracy. Nonetheless, it 
would seem that the most reliable, consistent and accurate way to measure numeracy is to 
present participants with an objective test of numeric reasoning ability. 
 
Various scales have been constructed to measure numeracy in studies of decision 
making: with most designed primarily for investigations of medical decision making and 
information comprehension (see Reyna et al, 2009, for a full discussion). Some measures 
are disease specific, designed to gauge whether an individual has the numerical reasoning 
skills necessary to successful follow a particular treatment regime (e.g. Apter et al., 2006 
for asthma; Estrada, Martin-Hryniewicz, Peek, Collins & Byrd, 2004, for warfarin 
treatment). Other measures aim to provide a more general assessment of numeracy. 
Schwarz, Woloshin, Black & Welch (1997) devised a scale comprised of four risk ratio 
problems. This scale was later expanded upon by Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer (2001), who 
added an additional seven items to the scale. The Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer scale aimed to 
assess aptitude in four areas:  
 
 “... how well people, 1) differentiate and perform simple mathematical operations 
on risk magnitudes using percentages and proportions; 2) covert percentages to 
proportions; 3) convert proportions to percentages; and 4) convert probabilities to 
proportions.” (Lipkus, Samsa & Rimer, 2001, p37). 
 
Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer (2001) tested the scale with three separate groups 
sampled in different breast and colon screening studies (N=463 in total) and found the 
value of alpha for each of the three groups to be 0.7, 0.74 and 0.75 respectively; an 
improvement on the original Schwarz et al. scale, (for which the values of alpha for same 
three groups were 0.44, 0.44 and 0.49 respectively). They found, as might be expected, that 
a greater proportion of participants responded correctly to questions that required them to 
differentiate between or perform simple operations on proportions (i.e. frequencies) and 
percentages, in which no conversion from proportion/frequency to percentage or vice versa 
was required. The proportion of participants giving the correct response to questions 
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requiring a conversion from frequency to  percentage and vice versa was lower, with a 
greater percentage of incorrect responses being given to questions involving a frequency to 
percentage conversion than a percentage to frequency conversion. Of the two questions 
receiving the lowest percentage of correct responses one involved the conversion of the 
frequency 1 in 1000 to the percentage 0.1% (20.9% responded correctly) and the other the 
conversion of the probability 0.0005 to the frequency 5 in 10000 (48.6% responded 
correctly). This could indicate not just a difficulty with conversion, but a difficulty with 
understanding or utilising decimal points. In the case of probability to frequency question 
one might also speculate that the low rate of correct response could be due to information 
rarely being presented in this manner in the ratio-related information people are likely to 
come across during day to day life. 
 
Peters et al. (2007) added four additional questions to Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer‘s 
(2001) scale. These questions were designed to be more complex than the original eleven 
questions and thus enhance the distributional properties of the original scale. Items from 
both Lipkus, Samer and Rimer‘s scale and Peters et al.‘s expansion were incorporated into 
Dieckmann et al.‘s (2009) short numeracy scale, along with two items from Frederick‘s 
(2005) Cognitive Reflection Test (see Chapters 2 and 8 for a discussion of the CRT and its 
relationship to numeracy). Again, this scale was designed to produce a normal distribution 
of responses as opposed to the heavily negatively skewed distribution observed in relation 
to Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer‘s scale.   
 
Of the scales used to gauge numeracy in studies of the relationship between 
numeracy and decision making, Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer‘s (2001) scale has to date been 
one of the most popular. However, of the eleven items on the original scale only three 
questions pertain exclusively to frequency-based information, the rest involve either 
percentages or probabilities in some capacity. If, as certain articles of research cited above 
suggests, people process frequencies differently (i.e. more easily) than percentages and 
standard probability formats then it would seem possible that scores on the scale may not 
fully reflect individuals‘ aptitudes for reasoning with frequency information. The results of 
Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer‘s study alone would seem to suggest that participants were no 
more adept as utilising simple frequency information than they were at utilising simple 
percentage based information. However, as stated earlier Slovic, Monahan and 
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MacGregor‘s findings indicate a disparity between the way frequency and percentage-
based information is perceived and/or processed.  
 
Aims and Hypotheses 
 
As described in the preceding chapter, the expanded numeracy scale developed for 
use in this programme of research incorporated all 11 items from Lipkus, Samsa and 
Rimer‘s (2001) scale, along with eight additional frequency-based items. The additional 
frequency based items were added due to the postulation that frequency-based information 
is processed differently to other probabilistic representations (e.g. Cosmides & Tooby, 
1996; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995, 1999). As the lottery choice task utilises frequency-
based representations of probability, it was felt that this expansion of the original scale was 
justified and appropriate. The results of Study 2 indicated the existence of a strong 
negative correlation between score on the expanded numeracy scale and rate of dominance 
violation. As the findings of Study 2 also indicate that dominance violation is primarily the 
result of probability neglect, it was therefore concluded that less numerate individuals are 
more likely to neglect probability than more numerate individuals. The value of 
Cronbach‘s alpha obtained for the expanded numeracy scale in Study 2 was α = .742, an 
acceptable value for a test of ability (Kline, 1999). However, as the sample was comprised 
of just 63 participants, it is felt that a larger scale evaluation of the reliability expanded 
numeracy scale in warranted. In addition to this, by specifically recruiting a subset of 
participants who are known to be highly numerate (i.e. mathematics undergraduates), it 
will be possible to further test the validity of the numeracy scale. If mathematics students 
perform better on the test than psychology students, then this will be a clear indication that 
the scale is measuring mathematical ability.   
 
Distributing the expanded numeracy scale to a larger sample will also allow for a 
more thorough examination of the items comprising the scale and how they may relate to 
choice, judgement and reasoning. As discussed above Cosmides and Tooby (1996) along 
with Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995, 1999, 2007) take the position that people are innately 
better able to reason with natural frequencies than other representations of probability. If 
this is the case then it might be anticipated that simple frequency-based items will receive 
more correct responses than simple non frequency-based items. It is also the goal of this 
study to submit the nineteen items on the expanded scale to Principal Components 
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Analysis. Should different processes underlie the comprehension and utilisation of 
frequency-based probabilities and the comprehension and utilisation of non frequency-
based probabilities, it might be expected that those items that are wholly frequency-based 
will load onto a distinct underlying construct to those featuring other representations of 
probability. It would also seem plausible that, should two or more underlying components 
be revealed, performance on one subset of items could be a stronger predictor of 
propensity to violate dominance on the lottery choice task than others.  
 
Hence the key aims of this study can be summarised as follows: 
 
1. To further test the internal consistency of the expanded numeracy scale and 
ascertain whether the additional eight items serve to increase reliability. 
 
2. To further examine the validity of the expanded numeracy scale. 
 
3. To examine and compare the rate of correct response for frequency-based items and 
items that incorporate other representations of probability. 
 
4. To ascertain whether items that are solely frequency-based load onto a separate 
component than items that are not solely frequency-based. 
 
5. Should the scale be found to comprised of two or more underlying components, 
then the relationship between each individual component and rate of dominance 
violation in Study 2 will be assessed. 
 
This study will proceed with three hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: That the items added Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer‘s (2001) eleven item 
scale will enhance the scale‘s internal consistency. 
 
Hypothesis 2: That mathematics undergraduates will perform better on the task than 
psychology undergraduates. 
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Hypothesis 3: Frequency items will be answered correctly more frequently that 
equivalent percentage items. 
 
Hypothesis 4: That those items that are solely frequency-based will load onto a 
different underlying construct than other items.  
 
5.2. Method 
 
Participants 
 
151 participants (55 male, 84 female, 12 undisclosed) completed the numeracy test. 
Of the 136 participants who reported their age when asked to do so, ages ranged from 18 to 
74 with a mean of 27.8 (15 participants failed to disclose their age). Of the sample, 63 
participants were those individuals who had taken part in Study 2 and 88 were new 
participants, recruited specifically to provide additional numeracy scale data. Of the 88 
new participants, all were staff and students at the University of Bolton. Of the whole 
sample, 96 participants were recorded as being psychology students/graduates and 22 as 
mathematics students, with the remaining 33 coming from other disciplines or from outside 
academia.  
 
As detailed in the previous chapter, those participants who completed the numeracy 
scale whilst taking part in Study 2 were paid the sum of £5 for their participation and 
entered into a prize draw. Those recruited to complete the numeracy scale in the second 
wave of sampling were not paid a fee for their participation. However, in order to provide 
an incentive for participants to answer as many questions as accurately as they were able 
participants were offered the chance for their names to be entered into a prize draw at the 
end of the study; wherein four winners would be randomly selected from amongst those 
scoring the highest marks on the test and would receive £10 each. 
 
Scale development 
 
As stated in the introduction, the scale incorporated all eleven items from Lipkus, 
Samsa and Rimer‘s original numeracy scale (see Table 5.3.1 for a list of all questions and 
the corresponding proportion of correct answers). The original scale consisted of three 
135 
 
frequency based items, two percentage based items, three conversion from percentage to 
frequency items, two conversion from frequency to percentage items and one conversion 
from (decimalised) probability to frequency item. 
 
It was, as outlined in the introduction, the researcher‘s intention in developing the 
expanded scale to incorporate additional frequency items into the scale. Therefore, eight 
frequency-based questions of varying difficulty were added to the scale. Of these questions  
three required comparisons of magnitude, two required calculations involving the 
frequency of single non-zero event and three that required the merging and understanding 
of subsets (e.g. identifying that a game offering a 3/2000 chance of winning £8000 and a 
3/2000 of winning £3000 offers a 6/2000 chance of winning a prize).  
 
Materials 
 
The 19 questions were presented to participants in booklet format (see Appendix 
B).  Though the scale was presented in the same fashion in all of the booklets, those given 
to participants who did not take part in Study 2 contained a demographic details section 
and slip which participants were invited to fill in should they wish to enter the prize draw. 
 
Procedure 
 
In Study 2 63 participants were presented with the numeracy test after completing 
the experiment outlined in the previous section. They were given the booklets and 
instructed to answer as many questions as they were able, before being asked to fill in a 
demographic details form and paid £5 for their participation. In this instance the test was 
completed under controlled conditions in the university cognition laboratory, with the 
experimenter on hand to respond to any queries participants may have and prevent 
conferring amongst participants. 
 
The remainder of the participants were recruited from various lecture and tutorial 
groups at the University of Bolton and requested to complete the numeracy test at the start 
of a class. The booklets were distributed to each student present in the selected tutorial 
groups and the students requested to complete the test. Prior to distributing the booklets the 
researcher informed the students that they were in the process of developing a numeracy 
136 
 
test for use in decision making research and that they (the students) were requested to 
answer as many of the questions in the booklet as possible. It was stressed that 
participation was voluntary and that once the study was complete four individuals 
randomly selected from amongst the highest scorers would receive £10. This was done in 
order to provide participants with an incentive for completing the test. It is acknowledged 
that the inclusion of an incentive to correctly answer as many questions as possible along 
with the fact that the tests were completed in classrooms and lecture theatres may have led 
to conferring amongst some participants. However, it was felt that, despite this possibility, 
this was still the most appropriate way to collect responses. Getting the number of 
additional participants needed to fully test the reliability of the scale and apply data 
reduction techniques to complete the test under laboratory conditions would not have been 
feasible. Alternative means of distributing the test, such as postal, online or ‗take home‘ 
methods were also dismissed as it they would provide even greater scope for collaboration 
between individuals. Hence, it was felt that having participants complete the numeracy test 
in a classroom or lecture theatre where the researcher could attempt to minimise conferring 
(though probably not eliminate the possibility entirely) seemed the most logical method to 
choose.    
 
Once the participants in each class had completed the numeracy test, the booklets 
were collected by the experimenter. All of those tests that appeared to have only partially 
filled in (i.e. just the first page completed) were discarded. Once the tests from all 151 
participants who had completed the test were scored, four names were drawn at random 
from the pool of those who had answered all 19 questions correctly and indicated that they 
wished to take part in the prize draw and the participants in question informed that they 
had won £10.  
 
5.3. Results 
 
Internal consistency 
 
The value of Cronbach‘s alpha for the expanded numeracy scale was .731, an 
acceptable value for a test of ability (Kline, 1999; see also Field, 2009). The Item-Total 
statistics indicated that the removal of question 10 would increase the value of alpha to 
.732 and the removal of question 18 to .733, however as these potential increases in the 
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value of alpha would be very small it was decided that no items should be removed. The 
value of Cronbach‘s alpha for the eleven items on Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer‘s original 
scale alone was .620. For the eight additional items alone the value of alpha was .591. 
Hypothesis 1 is thus supported; it appears that the additional items do serve to enhance the 
internal consistency of the scale as a whole. Though it should of course be kept in mind 
that adding (appropriate) items to a scale would be expected to increase the value of alpha. 
 
Validity 
 
As anticipated, mathematics students were found to, on average, score more highly 
(N = 22, mean = 17.14, sd = 1.7) on the test than psychology students (N = 96, mean = 
15.44, sd = 2.77). This difference was found to be significant (N = 118, df = 116, t = -
2.754, p ≤ 0.01, r = .25), indicating that performance on the test does correspond with 
mathematical reasoning ability. Hypothesis 2 is therefore supported. 
 
Proportion of Correct Responses per Item  
 
Table 5.3.1 below, details the percentage of participants answering each question 
correctly in both the present investigation and Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer‘s (2001) study. 
Questions are here arranged by type (see Appendix B to view questions as they were 
presented to participants). 
 
For those questions taken from Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer‘s original numeracy 
scale, a greater proportion of correct responses were given by participants in the current 
study that those who took part in the evaluation of Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer‘s scale. As a 
large proportion of the present study‘s participants were university students in the process 
of undertaking a statistics course this is perhaps unsurprising. With respect to item 
difficulty, the percentage calculation type (one item) received the highest proportion of 
correct responses followed – in descending order – by percentage to frequency items, 
comparison items, single-class frequency calculation items, multiple-class frequency 
calculation items, frequency to percentage items and probability to frequency items. 
  
138 
 
Table 5.3.1: Proportion of correct responses per item in the present investigation 
and Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer’s (2001) study 
Question 
type 
Question 
 
Correct responses % 
Present 
Study 
Lipkus, 
Samsa and 
Rimer 
(2001) 
Percentage 
calculation 
9. If Person A‘s risk of getting a disease is 1% in ten years, 
and Person B‘s risk is double that of A, what is B‘s risk? * 
96.0 83.6 
Mean  96.0  
Percentage 
to 
frequency 
1. If the chance of getting a disease is 10% how many people 
would be expected to get the disease out of 100? * 
98.7 80.8 
2. If the chance of getting a disease is 10% how many people 
would be expected to get the disease out of 1000? * 
96.7 77.5 
3. In the Big Bucks Lottery, the chances of winning a £10:00 
prize are 1%. What is your best guess about how many 
people would win a £10:00 prize if 1000 people each buy a 
single ticket from Big Bucks? * 
86.8 59.8 
Mean  94.1  
Comparison 
16. Which of the following numbers represents the biggest 
risk of getting a disease? a) 1 in 100, b) 1 in 1000, c) 1 in 10. 
* 
97.4 78.2 
10. Brand J painkillers cause drowsiness in 2 in 25 people. 
      Brand K painkillers cause drowsiness in 6 in 25 people. 
Which of the two brands is most likely to cause drowsiness? 
a) Brand J, b) Brand K, c) They are both equally likely to 
cause drowsiness. 
94.7 - 
12. Which of the following represents the biggest risk of 
getting a disease? a)1%, b) 5%, c)10% * 
94.7 83.6 
7. Which of the following represents the highest chance of 
winning £30:00? a) 1 in 10, b) 3 in 10, c) 5 in 10 
90.7 - 
18. Which of the following represents the highest overall 
chance of losing £1500? a) A 3 in 10 chance, b) A 5 in 10 
chance, c) A 3 in 5 chance. 
76.2 - 
Mean 90.74  
Single 
class 
frequency 
calculation 
5. If Person A‘s risk of getting a disease is 1 in 100 in ten 
years, and Person B‘s risk is double that of A, what is B‘s 
risk? * 
96.7 86.6 
4. Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided die 1000 times. Out 
of 1000 rolls, how many times do you think the die would 
come up even (even being a 2, a 4 or a 6)? * 
80.8 55.3 
19. 1 in 3 people in the village of Upper Nullton owns a lawn 
mower. The village has 3000 residents. How many of them 
own a lawn mower? 
79.5 - 
6. Each International Lottery ticket provides a 1 in 
20,000,000 chance to win £10,000,000. If John buys 4 tickets 
what are his chances of winning? 
70.9 - 
Mean 81.98  
 
 
Table continued on next page   
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 Table continued from previous page  
Question 
type 
Question 
Correct responses % 
Present 
Study 
Lipkus, 
Samsa and 
Rimer 
(2001) 
Multiple 
class 
frequency 
calculation  
17. There are 2000 glass beads in a jar: 3 are red, 3 are blue 
and the rest are green. Without being able to see the colour of 
the beads inside George draws one bead from the jar. If a red 
bead is drawn then he wins a prize of £8000, if a blue bead is 
drawn he wins a prize £3000, and if green bead is drawn he 
does not win anything. Altogether, how many chances does 
George have of winning a prize? 
78.1 - 
Lottery Y involves one ticket being drawn from a bowl 
containing 10 tickets.    
               3 of these tickets correspond with a win of £40.  
3 of these tickets correspond with a win of £38.  
4 of these tickets correspond with not win. 
 
Lottery Z involves one ticket being drawn from a bowl 
containing 10 tickets.  
6 of these tickets correspond with a win of £40. 
              4 of these tickets correspond with no win. 
 
  
14. Which lottery provides the largest chance of winning a 
cash amount? a) Lottery Y, b)Lottery Z, c) They provide the 
same chance of winning a cash amount. 
70.9 - 
[with regard to the information  for Question 14] 
15. Which lottery has the highest overall potential payoff? a) 
Lottery Y, b) Lottery Z, c) They provide an identical payoff 
70.9 - 
Mean 73.3  
Frequency 
to 
percentage 
13. If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this 
would be the same as have a ______% chance of getting the 
disease.* 
88.7 70.4 
8. In the Acme Publishing Sweepstakes, the chance of 
winning a car is 1 in 1000. What percent of tickets of Acme 
Publishing Sweepstakes win a car? * 
43.0 20.9 
Mean 65.85  
Probability 
to 
frequency 
11. The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005. Out of 
10000 people, about how many of them are expected to get 
infected? * 
55.6 48.6 
Mean 55.6  
* Indicates that the item was featured on Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer‘s (2001) eleven item 
scale. 
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Frequency versus Percentage Items 
 
With regard to those questions that required only a comparison of probabilities (i.e. 
questions 7, 10, 12, 16 and 18), all but question 18 were answered correctly over 90% of 
the time.  
 
Contrary to the prediction that frequency-based questions would be found to be 
easier than structurally very similar percentage-based items, it was found question 12 (a 
simple percentage-based comparison) was answered correctly more frequently than was 
question 7 (a simple frequency-based comparison in which the denominator was kept 
constant). While a Wilcoxon Sign-rank test indicated that this difference was not 
significant (N = 151, Z = -1.342, p > .05), it nonetheless indicated that, in this instance, the 
frequency-based item did not appear to be the ‗easier question‘.  On a similar note, a 
Wilcoxon Sign-rank test revealed no difference in rate of correct response to questions 5 
and 9, which were structurally identical, but phrased in terms of frequency and percentage 
respectively (N = 151, Z = -.378, p > .05).  
 
A Wilcoxon Sign-rank test did however reveal a significant difference between the 
frequency with which question 7 (in which the denominator remained constant) was 
answered correctly and the frequency with which question 18 (in which both numerator 
and denominator varied) was answered correctly (N = 151, Z = -3.395, p ≤ 0.001, r = -.2). 
Question 18 was also correctly answered significantly less frequently than question 3, the 
most difficult of the percentage to frequency items, (N = 151, Z = -2.530, p ≤ 0.001, r = -
.15). 
 
Hypothesis 3 is thus unsupported. Simple frequency items did not receive a higher 
proportion of correct responses than simple percentage items. The fact that question 18 
received a considerably lower percentage of correct responses than other comparison 
questions is however interesting. This was the only question of the four frequency 
comparison items in which both numerator and denominator were varied.  
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Principal Components Analysis 
 
The nineteen items on the expanded numeracy scale were submitted to Principal 
Components Analysis. The purpose of this was, as previously stated, to discover if 
frequency items loaded onto a separate underlying construct to items featuring other 
representations of probability.  It was also done with the intention of finding out whether 
one underlying construct had a stronger relationship with propensity to violate dominance 
than the scale as a whole.  
 
It is acknowledged that some doubts have been raised as to the suitability of 
submitting dichotomous variables to Principal Components Analysis. Kubinger (2003) 
points out that, with regard dichotomous scoring on tests of aptitude/ability (where 
responses are either ‗correct‘ or ‗incorrect‘), the factors/components generated may reflect 
level of item difficulty rather than any other distinct quality. However, it was thought that, 
even if the solution generated did only reflect levels of item difficulty, it would still aid the 
analysis of the data obtained, by possibly making it easier to identify common features of 
more difficult and less difficult items. 
 
A preliminary inspection of the data revealed the existence of various inter-item 
correlations above the R = .3 level, indicating a high enough degree of inter-relation 
between the items to justify the application of Principal Components Analysis. Conversely, 
as none of the inter-item correlations exceeded R =.8 it was evident that multicollinearity 
did not pose a problem. 
 
An inspection of the descriptive statistics generated when all 19 items were initially 
submitted to the analysis revealed Barlet‘s test of sphericity to be significant at the > 0.001 
level and the Kaiser-Myer-Olkin statistic to equal 0.682, indicating suitability for factor 
analysis. However, a glance at the anti-image correlation matrix showed that the KMO for 
one item (question 10) was below .5, indicating that the item should be removed from the 
analysis at this point. The tests were then re-run, with KMO for all items found to have 
increased to .706 with the removal of question 10. 
 
The initial unrotated factor solution indicated the presence of 6 components with 
Eigenvalues over 1, which explained 59.81% of the total variance. However, an 
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examination of the Scree Plot (see Figure 5.3.1 below) revealed a change in gradient after 
2 components and therefore the decision was made to retain 2 components. As the change 
in gradient on the Scree Plot was less well defined than one might hope a 3 component 
solution was also investigated; however, as the 2 factor solution was found to have greater 
theoretical coherence it is this solution that will be reported here. The two component 
solution accounted for 32.42% of variance in total; with Component 1 accounting for 
19.36% and Component 2 accounting for 13.06% 
 
 
Figure 5.3.1: Screen plot generated for the expanded numeracy scale with question 10 
removed. Note the change in gradient after Component 2.  
 
It was initially assumed that, due to the fact that all of the items submitted to the 
analysis came from a test of numeracy the components would correlate and thus 
necessitate oblique rotation. However, when the analysis was run for the 2 component 
solution the component correlation matrix showed an R = .17 correlation between the 
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components, indicating that orthogonal rotation would be more appropriate and it was thus 
decided that Varimax should be used. 
 
The loadings of the rotated two component solution are detailed in Table 5.3.2 
below. On scrutinising the loadings it quickly became clear that the more difficult items 
(i.e. those with a lower rate of correct response) loaded onto Component 1 and the easier 
items onto Component 2. The only non-sequitur in the component loadings was question 5, 
which loaded onto Component 1 despite being answered correctly by 96.7% of 
participants. Hypothesis 4 initially predicted that items that were solely frequency-based 
would load onto a separate component to other items. As one can see however, this 
prediction is not supported by the loadings of the two-factor solution. 
 
Table 5.3.2: Item loadings for Component 1 and Component 2 
 Component 1 Component 2 
Question 19 .696 .012 
Question 14 .558 .027 
Question 5 .553 .086 
Question 17 .548 -.018 
Question 6 .536 .197 
Question 15 .520 -.122 
Question 8 .509 .121 
Question 4 .490 .367 
Question 11 .444 .154 
Question 18 .383 -.101 
Question 3 .383 .252 
Question 1 -.140 .794 
Question 2 -.138 .754 
Question 9 .205 .555 
Question 16 .006 .544 
Question 12 .006 .535 
Question 13 .197 .482 
Question 7 .203 .308 
 
The value of Cronbach‘s alpha for Component 1 was .723 for the 11 items loading 
onto Component 1 and .590 for the 7 items loading onto Component 2. While the value of 
alpha for Component 1 was above .7, it was still lower than the value of alpha for the scale 
as a whole (α = .731). Thus it can be concluded that the scale as a whole has greater 
internal consistency than the separate components.  
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Correlations between scores on the subsets of items comprising Component 1 and 
Component 2 and the rate of dominance violation observed amongst those who took part in 
Study 2 were also examined. Component 1 correlated significantly with rate of dominance 
violation (N = 59, r = .-601, p < .001) as did Component 2 (N = 59, r = -.529, p < .001). 
Neither subset however correlated more highly with rate of dominance violation than did 
the scale as a whole (N = 59, r = -.687, p < .001). 
 
5.4. Discussion 
 
As stated at the outset, this study was undertaken with five key aims in mind: 1) to 
test the reliability of the expanded numeracy scale; 2) to further examine the validity of the 
scale; 3) to determine whether a difference in rate of correct response for simple frequency 
and percentage-based questions exists; 4) to determine whether solely frequency-based 
items load onto a separate underlying construct than other items; and 5) to ascertain, 
should any underlying component structure emerge during Principal Components Analysis, 
whether any single construct has a stronger correlation propensity to violate dominance 
than the scale as a whole. What follows will be a discussion of each of these points, 
followed by summary of the conclusions that can be drawn from the study and their wider 
implications.  
 
Reliability and Validity 
 
The value of Cronbach‘s alpha for the expanded numeracy scale was higher than 
that for the original eleven item scale. One would, of course, expect a scale‘s value of 
alpha to increase as items are added (providing of course that the items measure the same 
underlying construct). However, with respect to the present sample, the fact remains that 
the value of alpha for the expanded numeracy scale exceeded the .7 threshold while the 
value of alpha for the original eleven item scale did not. 
 
It should be noted that in Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer‘s (2001) original evaluation of 
the eleven item scale, samples of 124, 121 and 281 returned alpha values of .74, .70 and 
.75 respectively. One possible explanation for this variation could be that many of those 
who took part in the present study were undergraduates who had recently undergone 
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statistics training. This may have meant that some participants were able to correctly 
answer more complex questions due to recent exposure to relevant statistical concepts, 
whilst still being susceptible to certain biases with respect to some simpler items. Thus, 
inter-item correlation may have been reduced. It is also possible that cultural and cohort 
difference in the way mathematics was taught to samples may underlie this difference. 
Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer‘s sample were aged 40+ and recruited in the USA, while the 
present study‘s sample had mean age of 27 and were recruited in the UK. Nonetheless, as 
stated above, the fact that the value of alpha obtained with regard to the expanded 
numeracy scale was higher than that of the original indicates greater internal consistency 
on the part of the former. 
 
With respect to validity, the fact that scores on the scale were significantly higher 
for mathematics students than for psychology students indicates that the scale does indeed 
serve to measure mathematical ability. It is thus felt that it can be concluded that the 
expanded numeracy scale represents a reliable and valid measure of numeracy. 
 
Frequency, Percentage and Item Difficulty 
 
As previously discussed, it has been posited that humans are innately better suited 
to reasoning with frequencies than other probabilistic representation, owing to the 
existence of a domain specific function that has evolved to process natural frequencies 
(e.g. Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995, 1999; Hoffrage & 
Gigerenzer, 1998). With respect to the expanded numeracy scale, it was posited that if this 
is the case then one would expect: a) simple frequency-based items to receive a higher 
proportion of correct responses than equivalent percentage-based items (Hypothesis 3); and 
b) that those items that are solely frequency-based to load onto a separate construct to 
those items featuring other representations of probability (Hypothesis 4). Neither 
hypothesis was however supported by the findings of this study. 
 
With respect to simple comparison and calculation questions, frequency-based 
items did not receive a greater proportion of correct responses than equivalent percentage-
based items (see statistical comparison of questions 7 versus 12 and questions 5 versus 9). 
This strongly suggests that participants did not find the latter more difficult than the 
former. However, it is interesting to observe that question 18, a frequency-based 
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comparison item in which both numerator and denominator were varied, received 
significantly fewer correct responses than other comparison items. The fact that rate of 
correct response was far higher for items in which numerators alone (questions 7 and 10) 
or denominators alone (question 16) were varied indicates that the vast majority of 
participants understood what numerators and denominators represent. Hence it would seem 
reasonable to surmise that question 18 was answered incorrectly as a result of either: a) 
participants not understanding how to transform 3/5 to 6/10; or b) denominator neglect. It 
would seem plausible that both may have contributed to the surprisingly large proportion 
of incorrect responses this question received. As discussed in Chapter 2, denominator 
neglect is well established phenomenon (see Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994, Peters et al., 
2006; Stanovich & West, 2000 amongst others). In one study Peters et al. (2006) found that 
those lower in numeracy (measured using the scale devised by Lipkus, Samsa & Rimer‘s, 
2001) were more likely than those higher in numeracy to select a 9/100 chance of winning 
a prize over a 1/10 chance of winning the same prize. This was attributed to those lower in 
numeracy being more susceptible to influence by affectively salient yet objectively 
irrelevant information. Question 18, which required participants to make a judgement as to 
which value represented the greatest chance of a loss, is unlikely to have elicited the same 
affective state as the choice task used by Peters et al.. However, it would still seem 
possible that the salience of the numerator may have reduced or even eliminated attention 
to the denominator. 
 
Of course, it should be noted that not all participants who answered this question 
incorrectly did so in a way that that would indicate that denominator neglect had taken 
place (i.e. some participants selected 3/10 rather than 3/5 or 5/10 as representing the 
greatest chance of losing £1500). Hence, it cannot be concluded with certainty that 
denominator neglect was the primary cause of incorrect response with regard to this 
question. However, one thing that it seems can be concluded with some confidence is that 
a large minority of (mostly well educated) adults cannot consistently perform accurate 
comparisons of (relatively simple) frequency-based probabilities. This is not to say that the 
individuals in question lack any understanding of probability. As previously stated, rate of 
correct responding for a comparison item in which denominator-only or numerator-only 
was varied was very high. The data obtained here does however suggest that these 
individuals may struggle to correctly interpret ‗real world‘ information in which 
probabilities and proportions are given in text/verbal form.  
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Returning to the subject of frequency versus other representations of probability, 
the results of this study would seem to indicate that natural frequencies are not always 
accurately comprehended. Indeed, the fact that question 3 (which required one to calculate 
that 1% of 1000 was 10) was answered correctly significantly more frequently than 
question 18, would seem to contradict Cosmides and Tooby (1996) and Gigerenzer and 
Hoffrage‘s (1995, 1999) suggestion that humans are innately better at making inferences 
involving frequency information than other forms of probabilistic information. Of course, 
the fact that the questions differ structurally, with one involving a comparison of 
frequencies and the other a percentage to frequency calculation, means that like is not 
perhaps being compared with like in this instance. A person may, after all, be able to apply 
the formula for converting percentage to frequency without having a full awareness of how 
proportion and ratio ‗works‘. However, when considered alongside Chapman and Liu‘s 
(2009) findings that presenting Bayesian problems in frequency format reduces base-rate 
neglect more amongst those higher in numeracy than those lower in numeracy, it does 
seem to add support to the argument that frequency comprehension is not universal. 
Indeed, a glance at the rate of correct response for multiple class items on the expanded 
numeracy scale (see Figure 5.3.1 above), indicates that a sizable proportion of participants 
did not answer these questions correctly. As these items were entirely frequency-based in 
nature, this again suggests that many individuals struggle to interpret and utilise multiple-
class frequency representations of probability. Of course, it should be noted that when 
participants in Studies 1 and 2 were presented asymmetric-outcome pairs featuring a 
dominant alternative (which are mirrored by questions 14 and 15), very few violated 
dominance all the time. This again suggests that most of those classed as dominance 
violators were not wholly unable to correctly interpret the information presented, but rather 
had difficulty consistently applying normative rules and/or overriding the influence of 
affectively salient but objectively irrelevant attributes (see Chapters 3 and 4, see also 
Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; and Peters et al., 2006).  
 
As stated above, the findings of this study do not support either Hypothesis 3 or 
Hypothesis 4. Simple frequency-based items did not receive more correct responses than 
equivalent percentage-based items. In addition to this, when the scale was submitted to 
principle components analysis, frequency-based items were not found to load onto a 
separate underlying component to items featuring other representations of probability. This 
148 
 
would seem to indicate that a) simple frequency items are not universally better 
comprehended than other equivalent probabilistic representations; and b) the processes 
used to interpret and utilise simple frequency information are not wholly distinct from 
those used to interpret and utilise simple probabilistic information presented in equivalent 
formats. Of course, it should be kept in mind that the problems presented on the expanded 
numeracy scale are far less complex than the Bayesian reasoning problems presented by 
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995, 1999) and Cosmides and Tooby (1996). Hence, it may be 
possible that differences in difficulty with respect to frequency versus other probabilistic 
representations only become apparent at a higher level of complexity. However, it should 
once again be stressed that the high rate of incorrect response for certain frequency-based 
items does seem to suggest that the ability to (consistently) reason with frequency 
information is not universal, even amongst well educated populations.  
 
Underlying Component Structure: Implications 
 
As noted above, Principal Components Analysis indicated that frequency and other 
items did not load onto different underlying components. Instead, what was found was that 
the two component solution generated seemed to reflect a difficulty split: with ‗harder‘ 
questions loading onto one component and ‗easier‘ questions onto another (with, of course, 
the exception of question 5 which was answered correctly by 96% of participants but 
loaded onto component 1). This mirrors the findings of Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer (2001) 
who, on submitting their data to data reduction, found that the underlying factor structure 
revealed reflected item difficulty rather than qualitatively distinct subsets of items. 
 
From the fact that neither component possessed a higher value of alpha in isolation 
than did the scale as a whole, it can be inferred that the scale as a whole forms a better test 
of probabilistic/proportional reasoning than any individual sub-set of questions. This is 
further supported by the fact that neither component proved to have a stronger correlation 
with rate of dominance violation than did the scale as a whole 
 
As previously stated, Component 1 comprised (mostly) more difficult items and 
Component 2 easier items. Further scrutiny of the items loading onto the second ‗easier 
question‘ component indicated that these items tended to be those that do not actually 
require a thorough understanding of basic probability (or ratio concepts in general) in order 
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for the correct answer to be provided. Questions 7, 10, 12 and 16 (comparison items) for 
instance merely require the ordering of numerators-only (7 and 10), denominators-only 
(16) and percentages (12). Thus, one must simply understand that when a denominator is 
held constant an increase in numerator represents an increase in size and that when a 
numerator is held constant an increase in denominator represents a decrease in size. The 
correct answer to question 9, meanwhile, can be obtained by doubling the number given 
without actually understanding what the 1% represents.  Similarly, Questions 1 and 2 can 
be answered correctly by simply dividing the base rates provided (100 and 1000 
respectively) by 10. One does not have to fully comprehend exactly what a percentage or a 
frequency represents. Nor does one have to know that the correct way to derive a 
frequency from a percentage is to divide the base rate by 100 and then multiply by the 
percentage amount; merely to be able to perform a simple division operation on the 
numbers given.  
 
When one looks at the component mostly comprising ‗more difficult‘ items (i.e. 
those which received fewer correct responses) one sees that, with the exception of question 
5 (which loaded onto the construct, but is inconsistent with the other items), they are all 
questions that require a more complete grasp of basic probability/proportionality in order 
for the correct answer to be calculated or inferred. These answers were not ones that could 
be serendipitously obtained by performing a simple mathematical operation without a full 
understanding of why one was doing it. To illustrate: many participants who answered 
question 6 incorrectly gave the answer simply as 5,000,000 (rather than ‗4‘, ‗4 in 
20,000,000‘ or ‗1 in 5,000,000‘ which would have all be acceptable answers), suggesting 
that they had taken two of the numbers (4 and 20,000,000) present in the question and 
divided one by the other. This would appear to indicate awareness that the ‗right‘ answer 
involved these two figures but not a full awareness of exactly what they represented or 
how one should go about using them to derive the correct answer. 
 
With respect to the underlying component structure revealed with respect to the 
expanded numeracy scale, it is felt that it can reasonably be concluded that the scale as a 
whole represents a more coherent measure of numeracy than either component in isolation. 
This is supported by the fact that a) the value of alpha for each component was lower than 
that for the scale as a whole; and b) the correlation between rate of dominance violation in 
Study 2 and score on the test as a whole was stronger than the correlation between 
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dominance violation and score on either component. Nonetheless, the nature of the 
underlying component structure is interesting; and the fact that Component 1 items tended 
to receive a high proportion of incorrect responses serves to further underscore the fact that 
many well educated individuals appear have difficulty interpreting relatively simple 
probabilistic information. 
 
In Conclusion 
 
It can, it is felt, be concluded that the amended numeracy scale is suitable for use as 
a tool to gauge probabilistic reasoning ability in decision research. The scale‘s internal 
consistency is, according to Kline (1999) (see also Field, 2005) acceptable for a test of 
ability/aptitude. In addition to this, the fact that scores were significantly higher for 
mathematics students than psychology students indicates that mathematical ability (or at 
least mathematical ability with regard to probability) is being measured.  
 
The results of both the Principal Components Analysis and comparison of scores 
for frequency items and items featuring other representations of probability do not support 
the proposition put forward by Cosmides and Tooby (1996) and Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 
(1995, 1999, 2007) that frequency items are naturally easier for humans to understand and 
perform mathematical operations on. In this, the findings of this study concur to an extent 
with those of Chapman and Liu (2009), which also point to the absence of an innate 
aptitude for processing frequency information. This does not, of course, disprove the 
notion that humans may find frequency-based information generally easier to process than 
other forms of probabilistic information – though, as previously stated, Barby and Sloman 
(2007) hold frequency-based problems are only ‗easier‘ than other representations when 
they make set structure salient. However, it does strongly suggest that an aptitude for 
reckoning with simple frequency data is not universal, even amongst relatively well 
educated populations. 
 
As discussed above, the proportion of correct responses given to various questions 
indicates that a sizable minority of participants do not appear to have a thorough grasp of 
basic probability. This is not to say that a complete lack of understanding exists: the vast 
majority did, after all, correctly identify that 1/10 > 1/100 >1/1000. However, the 
proportion of correct responses given to certain questions suggests that many participants 
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did not (or could not) consistently apply satisfactory probabilistic reasoning. It is possible 
that certain errors were the consequence of irrelevant but more affectively salient 
information having an undue influence on judgement, rather than a lack of knowledge per 
se. However, as Reyna et al. (2009) point out, so much information presented to 
individuals in day-to-day life involves proportions and probabilities that an inability to 
consistently extrapolate the intended meaning of said information puts one at a pronounced 
disadvantage.  
 
It is clear that the findings of this study support the growing body of evidence (see 
Reyna et al. 2009 for a full review) that a large proportion of people have difficulty in 
consistently utilising probabilistic information in an accurate manner. Lipkus, Samsa and 
Rimer‘s (2001) findings strongly suggested that a large proportion of literate, educated 
adults in the USA are unable to demonstrate a consistent understanding of simple 
probabilistic information. The findings of the present study strongly suggest that the same 
is true of literate, educated adults in the UK. As representations of probability and 
proportion are ubiquitous in information regarding issues of health and personal finance 
(the latter of which can be relatively complex), the question of how much of it is actively 
understood (and it what ways it is misunderstood) is inevitably raised. This is, of course, a 
point that has already been made by various other researchers (see Reyna et al., 2009 for a 
comprehensive discussion) and one that the proceeding studies reported here endeavour to 
further investigate (see Chapters 6, 8 and 9). 
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Chapter 6: Study 4 
 
When dominance is habitually violated in a scenario where the existence of a 
dominant alternative is thought to be transparent, the decision researcher is prompted to 
ask why. Such a phenomenon was observed in Study 1 and further investigated in Study 2. 
The results of Study 2 lent strong support to the hypothesis that probability neglect was 
responsible for many (though not all) of the dominance violations observed. However, 
while the results of Study 2 are certainly compelling, conclusions were drawn 
predominantly from output (i.e. choices made) rather than process data. Process data in the 
form of response times were obtained. However, following a review of the findings of 
Studies 1 and 2, it was decided that additional process data in the form of think aloud 
protocols would serve to supplement the response and response time data previously 
collected.  The present study was therefore entered into with the intention of collecting and 
analysing said think aloud data.  
 
Numeracy, Process and Verbal Data 
 
The use of concurrent verbal protocols as a method of process tracing has an 
established history in decision process research (see Ranyard & Svenson, 2011 for a 
summary). However, the employment of such ‗think aloud‘ methodologies remains 
somewhat controversial. The use of concurrent verbal data in research has traditionally 
been criticised on the grounds of both process inaccessibility and reactivity (see for 
instance Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). This is to say that people are not consciously aware of 
all of their cognitive processes (and thus cannot report them), and that the very act of 
introducing a verbal protocol may change the processes employed. However, in their 
seminal paper on the subject, Ericsson and Simon (1980) contend that verbal data can both 
accurately reflect process and be unreactive, as long as the cognitive processes taking place 
are directly accessible to (verbalisable) working memory and participants are required only 
to voice the contents of working memory. 
 
The findings of Studies 1 and 2 indicate that dominance violation in the lottery 
choice task is the result of probability neglect. The response time data gathered in Study 2 
also suggests the existence of a System 1/System 2 split in the choice processes of 
dominance violations and dominance adherers (see Chapters 3 and 4; see Chapter 2 for a 
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discussion of dual process models of choice; see also Epstein, 1994; Evans, 2006; 
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Sloman, 1996 and Stanovich & West, 2000, 2008). It would 
therefore seem unlikely that any verbal data collected from those previously classified as 
dominance violators would represent a thorough and accurate account of process. As 
mentioned above, Ericsson and Simon (1980) hold that concurrent verbal data can 
accurately (and unreactively) reflect process when said process is directly accessible to 
(verbalisable) working memory. However, the intention of the present study is not to 
acquire full and intact accounts of the whole choice process from participants, but rather to 
ascertain which choice attributes are most salient to more and less numerate participants. 
As Evans (2007) points out, if think aloud data reflect the content of working memory at 
any given time then it should provide an indication of which information is being attended 
to. Thus it may provide indirect evidence for certain heuristic processes. Hence, should less 
numerate participants attend to less probabilistic information one would expect them to 
make fewer references to probability, regardless of the mode of thought being utilised. If 
the amount of information or type of information attended to by more and less numerate 
participants changes when stimulus complexity is increased (i.e. more potential outcomes 
added), then one might also anticipate this to be revealed through think aloud data. There 
is, of course, the possibility that the introduction of a think aloud procedure may serve to 
change the processes utilised by those who may be more apt to rely on intuitive System 1 
processes. However, should this be the case then one might expect dominance violators to 
start demonstrating choice patterns similar to those of dominance adherers (who are 
posited to utilise more deliberative, working memory accessible System 2 processes). It 
seems highly unlikely that the introduction of the think aloud procedure would induce less 
numerate participants to start neglecting probabilistic information that they would have 
otherwise attended to. If anything, the introduction of a think aloud procedure might be 
expected to have the opposite effect and induce greater attention to probabilistic 
information amongst less numerate participants, due to a desire to be seen to be attending 
to all relevant information. 
 
Another type of data that the use of a think aloud protocol will enable collection of, 
is the rate at which qualitative versus quantitative attribute references are made. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, Peters et al. (2008) have linked higher numeracy to greater 
precision in number discrimination. On the other hand, in their fuzzy trace model of 
information encoding, Reyna and colleagues (see Reyna, 2008; Reyna et al., 2009) propose 
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that more numerate individuals are more capable of encoding ‗gist‘ representations of 
numeric information than less numerate individuals. Reyna et al. posit that that both more 
numerate and less numerate people may encode precise ‗verbatim‘ mental representations 
of numeric information, but that those higher in numeracy are more apt to also encode the 
essential meaning of said numeric information in the form of nominal or ordinal ‗gists‘. As 
noted in Chapter 2, the postulation that more numerate individuals a) derive greater 
affective meaning from precise numerical information (Peters et al., 2006; Peters et al., 
2009); and b) have a more precise intuitive number line (Peters et al., 2008), are not 
fundamentally incompatible with Reyna et al.‘s (2009, see also Reyna 2008) hypothesis 
that the more numerate individuals are better at forming accurate ‗gist‘ rather than precise 
‗verbatim‘ mental representations of numeric information. It seems after all entirely 
possible that a greater ability to draw precise affective meaning from precise numerical 
information may facilitate the formation of accurate gist representation. In terms of the 
present think aloud study however, an insight into whether more numerate participants are 
more apt to represent information precisely or in ‗gist form may be gained from examining 
the number of precise ‗quantitative‘ attribute references made and the number of gist-based 
‗qualitative‘ references made. 
 
Should, contrary to expectations, dominance violation primarily be the result of 
simple error (e.g. participants confusing wins with losses), then it would seem likely that 
this would be revealed though verbal data. As there was a distinct pattern to the manner in 
which dominance was violated in Studies 1 and 2, with dominance being violated more 
frequently for asymmetric-outcome pairs than other, this possibility seems highly unlikely. 
However, if simple errors are widespread, then the introduction of the think aloud 
procedure should enable their detection. It is also possible that the think aloud procedure 
will allow for the detection of participants committing an ‗adding error‘ similar to that 
previously observed by Huber (1982, see Huber, 1989). The possibility that dominance 
violations may arise as a result of participants neglecting the mutual exclusivity of 
outcomes and adding outcome values together has been suggested with respect to the 
findings of Studies 1 and 2. As such a procedure would seem to require that basic 
arithmetic calculations be performed in working memory, it is anticipated that evidence of 
such a process will emerge in the verbal data gathered should said process be taking place. 
The aims of the present study are thus fourfold:  
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1. To gain further insight into the processes and/or errors underlying violation of 
dominance in the lottery choice task, through the analysis of think aloud data.  
 
2. To ascertain whether participants lower in numeracy make fewer references to 
probability that those higher in numeracy. 
 
3. To ascertain whether rate of probability referencing is influenced by stimulus 
complexity.  
 
4. To ascertain whether participants higher in numeracy make more quantitative (or 
more qualitative) attribute references than less numerate participants. 
 
With regard to the first of these aims, it is felt that should simple error such as win/loss 
confusion be primarily responsible for dominance violation then this is likely to be 
revealed in participants‘ verbalisations. Similarly, if the violations of dominance observed 
in Studies 1 an 2, are largely the result of a previously unidentified error/process then this 
may be revealed in participants‘ verbalisations.  
 
With regard to the second and third aims, any finding that less numerate participants 
make fewer references to probability attributes would support the postulation that less 
numerate individuals are more prone to probability neglect than more numerate 
participants. In addition to this, think aloud data may provide some insight into whether the 
amount and type of attribute information attended to by more and less numerate 
participants changes as stimulus complexity is varied.  
 
The final aim, to investigate whether the attribute references of more and less numerate 
individuals tend to be qualitative or quantitative in nature, is rooted in the question of how 
numerical information in represented in the minds of more and less numerate individuals. 
As discussed above, Reyna and colleagues (see Reyna, 2008; Reyna et al. 2009) propose 
that while both more and less numerate individuals are able to encode numerical 
information at a verbatim level, more numerate individuals are better able to (correctly) 
encode numerical information at a ‗gist‘ level. This position would seem to be at odds with 
Peters et al.‘s (2008) findings that more numerate individuals tend to have a more precise 
number line (though as discussed above and in more depth in Chapter 2 the two positions 
156 
 
are not necessarily at odds). Hence, if more numerate participants were found to make 
more qualitative references than less numerate participants this would constitute support 
for Reyna‘s (2008) fuzzy-trace model. 
 
This study will proceed with two clear hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 1: That less numerate individuals will make fewer probability references 
than more numerate individuals. 
 
Hypothesis 2: That while simple error (e.g. win/loss confusion) will be found to 
account for some violations of dominance, it will not account for the majority of 
dominance violations. 
 
Comparison of the rate with which quantitative versus qualitative references are made 
by more and less numerate participants will, of course, take place. However, no clear 
hypothesis is made with regard to whether participants higher in numeracy will make more 
qualitative or more quantitative references than participants lower in numeracy. The 
reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, the findings of Peters and colleagues (see Peters et al., 
2006; Peters et al., 2008) would seem to predict the latter, while the findings of Reyna and 
colleagues (see Reyna, 2008; Reyna et al. 2009) would seem to predict the former. Hence, 
there is uncertainty as to whether a ‗precision‘ or ‗gist‘ explanation would be favoured by 
the evidence. Secondly, the question of whether more numerate participants may be more 
apt to encode the choice information presented here in gist form did not emerge until after 
the data collection phase of the present study had been completed. As such, the 
investigation was not initially entered into with this question (and thus any hypothesis 
regarding it) in mind. 
 
6.2. Method 
 
Participants 
 
21 participants (10 male and 11 female), ranging in age from 19 to 75 (mean = 
31.8), took part in the study. Of these participants, 20 had previously taken part in Study 2 
and 1 was a pilot participant. As the pilot provided usable think aloud and numeracy scale 
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data this data was retained and analysed along with the data obtained from other 
participants. With the exception of the pilot, all had previously taken part in Study 2 and 
had indicated at this time that they would be willing to participate in subsequent decision 
making studies.  Of the participants recruited to take part in this study 8 were classified as 
more numerate (score above 15 on the expanded numeracy scale) and 13 as less numerate 
(score of 15 or below on the expanded numeracy scale). Of those participants allocated to 
the Think Aloud condition 5 were classified as more numerate and 6 as less numerate.   
 
It should be noted that of the 20 participants who took part in this study 10 had 
previously been classified as dominance adherers and 10 as dominance violators. Of these, 
5 dominance adherers and 5 dominance violators were assigned to the think aloud 
condition and 5 dominance adherers and 5 dominance violators to the non think aloud 
condition. This was done for two reasons: 1) so that performance of dominance adherers 
and dominance violators could be compared across studies and their consistency of 
responses assessed; and 2) so that the number of comparative (across alternatives) versus 
non-comparative attribute references made by those previously identified as dominance 
violators and dominance adherers could be compared. As the present report primarily 
concerns the impact of level of numeracy on attribute referencing and findings regarding 
comparative versus non-comparative statements were non-significant, the latter will not be 
reported in any detail here. 
 
Design  
 
With regard to the gathering of data, the study employed a 2x2 between groups 
design, with think aloud condition (think aloud versus non think aloud) and propensity to 
violate dominance (dominance adherers versus dominance violators). Dependent variables 
were rate of dominance violation and response time. Rate of dominance violation was 
recorded so reactivity checks could be performed. Response time data was also obtained so 
that an indication of whether the think aloud procedure increased cognitive load. 
 
With regard to the analysis of the think aloud data specifically a 2x3 mixed-
factorial design was utilised, with numeracy as a between groups variable and stimulus 
complexity as a within groups variable. Numeracy had two levels (more numerate versus 
less numerate) and stimulus complexity three levels (single-outcome versus asymmetric-
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outcome versus two-outcome). The dependent variables that emerged from the coded 
verbal data are discussed in the section on coding scheme development below. However, 
one might summarise the dependent variables obtained from the think aloud data as rate of: 
quantitative probability referencing, qualitative probability referencing, quantitative 
outcome value referencing and qualitative outcome value referencing. 
 
Materials and Stimuli 
 
Equipment. 
 
The program employed in this experiment was created and run using the E-Prime 
1.1 suite (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA, USA). Think aloud recordings were 
made using a digital voice recorder. The experiment was run on both desktop and laptop 
computers. Those who completed the experiment using desktop computers made their 
responses on a response box with buttons labelled ‗A‘, ‗B‘ and ‗2‘. Those whom 
completed the experiment on a laptop made their responses using keys ‗1‘, ‗3‘ and ‗5‘ 
which had been relabelled ‗A‘, ‗2‘ and ‗B‘ respectively. 
 
Stimuli. 
 
The stimuli presented comprised of 6 Single, 6 Two and 11 Asymmetric outcome 
pairs, 9 of which featured a dominant alternative and 14 of which did not; their 
composition is detailed in Table 6.2.1 below. 
 
Table 6.2.1: Number of Single, Two and Asymmetric Outcome pairs with and without 
a dominant alternative presented in each block 
 Single-outcome Asymmetric-outcome Two-outcome 
Block Dom alt. No dom alt. Dom alt. No dom alt. Dom alt. No dom alt. 
Practice - 2 - 2 - - 
Main 2 4 5 6 2 4 
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Procedure 
 
Prior to the start of the experiment participants were assigned to either the Think 
Aloud or the None Think Aloud condition. At the outset, those participants in the Think 
Aloud condition were given a set of paper-based instructions informing them that they 
were about to be presented with a series of lottery choices similar in nature to those with 
which they were presented in Study 2; and that, once again, they were required to choose 
from each pair the lottery that they would prefer to play. The instructions also told them 
that they would be required to verbalise their thoughts as they made their choices (see 
Appendix D for a copy of the instructions). It was stressed here that they should only give 
voice to thoughts that naturally occurred to them and should not try to justify their 
responses. Participants were, at this point, also told by the experimenter that should they 
have any query regarding how the experiment worked at any point they should feel free to 
ask, though the experimenter would refuse to provide any advice as to which lottery to 
take.  They were then seated in front of a computer running the experiment and given a 
further set of onscreen instructions and the experimenter switched on the voice recorder. 
The onscreen instructions informed them that they were going to be presented with a series 
of twenty-two lottery choices and that once all of their choices had been made a ticket and 
a lottery pair would be drawn at random by the computer and that their final balance for 
the game would be £30 plus or minus any gain or loss the ticket corresponded with for 
their chosen lottery. It was stated here that once the study was complete one participant 
would be chosen at random to receive their final balance.  
 
After signalling, by pressing the ‗2‘ button that they had read and understood the 
instructions, participants were presented with a screen telling them that to acclimatise them 
to the experiment they were about to play four practice games, which would have no 
bearing on their final balance. They were prompted to press the ‗Z‘ button when they were 
ready to begin. Once participants pressed this key the experimenter directed them to start 
thinking aloud. Throughout both the practice and main body of the experiment participants 
who went for more than 20 seconds without saying anything were prompted to continue 
thinking aloud. In the practice block participants were presented with four lottery pairs 
(two win pairs and two loss pairs) and requested to select, from each, the lottery that they 
would prefer to play by pressing either the ‗A‘ or the ‗B‘ button on the response box or 
keypad (each lottery pair consisted of a ‗Lottery A‘ and ‗Lottery B‘). After each choice had 
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been made a one second pause, in which participants were shown a blank white screen, 
appeared. This ‗pause‘ was, as was the case in Study 2, present to prevent participants from 
making unintended selections due to accidental double clicking. Choice and response time 
data were collected by the program. After participants had made their choice from all four 
pairs the program selected one lottery and one ticket at random. They were then informed 
onscreen whether – had they been playing for real – their £30 balance would have 
increased, decreased or remained constant depending on the outcome that the randomly 
generated ticket corresponded with in their chosen lottery of the pair.  
 
After the practice block was complete participants were informed onscreen that 
they were about to be presented with a series of 23 lottery pairs from each of which they 
had to choose the lottery that they would prefer to play. Participants were prompted to 
press ‗2‘ once they were ready to continue. 
 
Once they had indicated that they were ready to begin the main block of the 
experiment they were presented with the 23 lottery pairs in a preset sequence and required 
to select from each the lottery that they would prefer to play by pressing the appropriate 
button on the response box/keyboard. The order of stimulus presentation was fixed rather 
than randomised in order to ensure that, with regard to analysing the coded verbal 
protocols, participants‘ statements for each stimulus would be taken at the same stage. 
This, it was felt, would enable comparison between the verbal protocol codings for More 
Numerate and Less Numerate individuals to take place for each stimulus without variations 
in presentation order confounding the analysis. After making all 23 choices a single ticket 
and a single lottery pair from the block were drawn at random by the programme and the 
participant informed onscreen as to whether their balance had been increased, decreased or 
would remain unchanged based upon the outcome with which the ticket corresponded in 
their chosen lottery. This end balance was the one that the participant would receive should 
they win the draw. In addition to the verbal recording made by the experimenter, choice 
and response time data were automatically recorded by the program. 
 
Participants assigned to the None Think Aloud condition were told at the outset that 
there were about to complete a tasks similar in nature to the previous experiment that they 
had taken part in. They were also informed that the experimenter would be on hand 
throughout if they had any queries regarding how the experiment worked (but that the 
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experimenter would not provide any advice or direction as to which choices to make). The 
None Think Aloud participants were seated at a computer and presented with the same 
onscreen instructions as those in the Think Aloud condition, with no additional directions. 
The experiment then proceeded in the same manner as described above for the Think 
Aloud participants with, of course, the distinction that they were not given any kind of 
instruction to give voice to their thoughts. There was the practice block followed by the 
target block; with the stimuli being presented in the same order to each participant 
regardless of condition.  
 
After completing the experiment participants were thanked for their time and 
informed that the experimenter would get in touch with them should they be the winner of 
the prize draw. Once the data collection phase of the study was complete a participant 
number was selected using the www.random.org true random number generator and the 
participant in question awarded their final balance. 
 
The verbal recordings made during the experiment were transcribed by the 
experimenter, before being coded and analysed as described in the following section. 
 
Coding Scheme Development 
  
After data collection was complete, two coding schemes were developed for the 
analysis of the verbal data obtained in this study. Both schemes were designed to code on a 
stimulus by stimulus basis. Coding scheme 1 recorded which specific attributes (i.e. 
probabilities and outcome values) were referenced for each lottery pair. The scheme also 
recorded whether these references were qualitative or quantitative in nature (see Figures 
6.2.1 – 6.2.3 below for a reproduction of the Coding Scheme 1 tables for used for single, 
asymmetric and two-outcome pairs). Coding Scheme 2 recorded whether specific 
procedures, processes and errors were indicated by the verbal data (see Figure 6.2.5 below 
for a reproduction of a Coding Scheme 2 table). While it was recognised that the use of 
multiple coding schemes in such a study is unorthodox, it was felt that it was necessary on 
a practical level. As one can see from a glance at Figures 6.2.2 and 6.2.3, the number of 
possible attribute codes for asymmetric and two-outcome pairs on Coding Scheme 1 was 
high. It was thus felt that adding a set of more general codes would make both coding and 
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second coding very difficult, with coders more liable to miss allocating an appropriate 
code. It was also felt that the two schemes were distinct enough to warrant the separation.  
 
Once all eleven transcripts had been coded by the researcher, six were coded by a 
second coder. Measures of inter-coder reliability are reported in the results section. 
 
As the focus of the present report is the relationship between numeracy and 
attribute referencing, only the data obtained from Coding Scheme 1 will be reported in 
detail here. With respect to Coding Scheme 2, only the rate of win/loss confusion and 
adding error will be reported. 
 
Coding Scheme 1. 
 
 
Figure 6.2.1: Example of a Coding Scheme One coding table for a single-outcome pair. 
 
 
Figure 6.2.2: Example of a Coding Scheme One coding table for an asymmetric-outcome 
pair. 
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Figure 6.2.3: Example of a Coding Scheme One coding table for a two-outcome pair. 
 
As mentioned above, Coding Scheme 1 was designed to the code probabilities and 
outcome values referenced by each participant for each individual lottery pair. The scheme 
also coded whether references were qualitative or quantitative in nature.  Initial scrutiny of 
the transcripts indicated that: a) participants made a high number of probability and 
outcome value references; and b) both qualitative and quantitative references were made 
with some frequency. It was also noted that, with regard to alternatives featuring two non-
zero outcome values, participants sometimes referenced outcome values/probabilities on an 
individual outcome basis and sometimes made more general statements regarding the 
alternative‘s outcome values. For example when presented with Figure 6.2.4 below 
Participant 2 referenced a specific outcome value, while Participant 7 made a more general 
statement regarding outcome values.  
 
 
Figure 6.2.4: A two-outcome pair presented in the main body of the experiment. 
 
“Go with B, cos I don’t want to lose a tenner.” Participant 2 
 
“B you lose less on that one.” Participant 7 
 
For this reason it was decided that Coding Scheme 1 should have separate codes for 
references to specific outcome values/probabilities and more general outcome 
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value/probability references for alternatives with more than one non-zero outcome. Three 
examples of coding using Scheme 1 can be found in Appendix E. 
 
Coding Scheme 2. 
 
Figure 6.2.5: An example of a Coding Scheme Two coding table. 
 
As one can see from Figure 6.2.5 above, Coding Scheme 2 was comprised of 
eighteen codes. Of these only two will be reported in depth here: instances of the adding 
error and instances of win/loss confusion. Two examples of coding using Scheme 2 can be 
found in Appendix E. 
 
6.3. Results 
 
In this study three types of data were collected: rates of dominance violation, 
response times and concurrent verbalisations. This section will start with a comparison of 
the performance of those in the think aloud and non think aloud condition with respect to 
rate of dominance violation and response time. These analyses were performed so that one 
might assess a) whether the introduction of the think aloud procedure was reactive; and b) 
whether verbalisation imposed additional cognitive demand on participants. This will be 
followed by an assessment of inter-coder reliability for each of the codes on Coding 
Scheme 1, which will in turn be followed by an analysis of the rate and nature of attribute 
referencing amongst more and less numerate participants. 
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Think Aloud versus Non Think Aloud 
 
Dominance violation and adherence. 
 
In order to assess the possible impact of the think aloud condition on rate of 
dominance violation, a mixed-factorial ANOVA was conducted: with percentage rate of 
dominance violations as a dependent variable, study (Study 2 versus the present study) as a 
repeated measures factor and both propensity to violate dominance (dominance adherers 
versus dominance violators) and think aloud condition (think aloud versus non think aloud) 
as between groups factors. It was reasoned that if the think aloud procedure was reactive 
with respect to rate of dominance violation, one would observe a significant interaction 
between think aloud condition and study: with rate of dominance violation remaining 
consistent across studies amongst those in the non think aloud condition and inconsistent 
amongst those in the think aloud condition. 
 
Unsurprisingly, a main effect of propensity to violate dominance was found (N = 
20, F(1, 16) = 11.310, p ≤ .01, partial eta squared = .414). However, no interaction between 
study and think aloud condition was found (N = 20, F(2, 18) = .964, p > .05). This would 
seem to indicate that the introduction of the think aloud condition did not have an influence 
on rate of dominance violation.  
 
Unexpectedly, an interaction between propensity to violate dominance and study 
was observed (N = 20, F(2, 18) = 8.434, p ≤ .01, partial eta squared = .345). On average, 
those classified as dominance adherers in Study 2 violated dominance a greater proportion 
of the time in the present study than they had previously done in Study 2. Conversely, 
those classified as dominance violators tended to adhere to dominance a greater proportion 
of the time in the present study than they previously had in Study 2. This is illustrated in 
Figure 6.3.1 below. As will be discussed in the next section however, this finding is likely 
to be the result of regression towards the mean. 
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Figure 6.3.1: Percentage rate of dominance violation in Study 2 and the present study for 
those classified as dominance violators and dominance adherers in Study 2. 
 
Response time. 
 
Table 6.3.1: Mean response times (ms) of those in the think aloud and non-think aloud 
conditions by stimulus complexity 
 Think aloud 
(N = 11) 
Non think aloud 
(N = 10) 
Overall 
(N = 21) 
Response time 14160 (4839) 6409 (2586) 10469 (5519) 
 
A glance at Table 6.3.1 above shows that response times for participants in the 
think aloud condition were, on average, substantially higher than those of participants in 
the non think aloud condition. An independent samples t-test (equal variance not assumed) 
revealed this difference to be significant (N = 21, t(15.6) = 4.635, p ≤ .001, r = .76). Hence, 
it would seem that the requirement to think aloud did require additional cognitive effort. 
The implications of this will be discussed in the next section. 
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Inter-coder Reliability 
 
Coding Scheme 1. 
 
Table 6.3.2: Measure of inter-coder agreement (Cohen’s kappa) for each code utilised in 
Coding scheme one 
 Alternative A 
 
Alternative B 
 General Higher 
outcome 
Lower 
outcome 
General Higher 
outcome 
Lower 
outcome 
Outcome value       
Qualitative .95 .79 .79 .92 - .85 
Quantitative .95 .94 .95 .93 1.00 .96 
       
Probability       
Qualitative .90 - - .94 1.00 - 
Quantitative .98 1.00 1.00 .94 1.00 .66 
       
 
 
Table 6.3.2 above details the measure of agreement (Cohen‘s kappa) between the 
first and second coder for each of the possible attribute reference types. As detailed earlier, 
‗general‘ probability/outcome value references are those which pertain either to 
alternatives featuring a single non-zero outcome or – for two-outcome alternatives – to the 
probability/outcome value of the alternative as a whole. ‗Higher outcome‘ and ‗lower 
outcome‘ probability/outcome value references refer to references made to specific 
outcomes (i.e. the lower value outcome or the higher value outcome), for alternatives with 
two non-zero outcomes. 
 
Of the 11 verbal transcripts obtained in this study 6 were second coded. As one can 
see from Table 6.3.2 the value of kappa was above .8 in all but three instances. In two of 
these three instances (Alternative A/Outcome value/Qualitative/Higher and Alternative 
A/Outcome value/Qualitative/Lower) the value of kappa neared the .8 threshold. For 
Alternative B/Probability/Quantitative/Lower however, the value of kappa was quite low 
.66, a result of very few instances of this particular code being recorded by either coder.  
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On scrutinising the Coding Scheme 1 data further, it became clear that relatively 
few references (qualitative or quantitative) were made to specific outcome 
values/probabilities in pairs with more than one non-zero outcome. The decision was 
therefore taken to amalgamate the ‗general‘, ‗higher outcome‘ and ‗lower outcome‘ 
categories. As one can see from Table 6.3.3 below the value of kappa for each of these 
amalgamated categories was high (>.9). 
 
Table 6.3.3: Inter-coder agreement (Cohen’s kappa) when ‘general’, ‘lower outcome’ 
and ‘higher outcome’ categories merged 
 Alternative A Alternative B 
Outcome value       
Qualitative  .99   .94  
Quantitative  1.00   .95  
       
Probability       
Qualitative  .92   .93  
Quantitative  .98   .97  
       
 
After determining that a suitable level of inter-coder agreement existed, the first 
and second coder examined together each instance where there had been a disagreement 
and came to a consensus as to which code (if any) should be applied. 
 
Coding Scheme 2. 
 
The value of Cohen‘s kappa was .718 for win/loss confusion and 1 for the adding 
error (inter-coder agreement for other codes on this scheme will not be discussed here). 
The value of kappa for win/loss confusion is therefore below the recommended .8 
threshold. However, as very few instances of win/loss confusion were recorded by either 
the first or second coder this is perhaps understandable.  
 
After the values of kappa had been obtained for the codes on coding scheme two, 
the first and second coder together examined each instance of disagreement and came to a 
consensus as to which code (if any) should be applied. 
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Numeracy and Attribute Referencing 
 
Numeracy, probability and outcome value. 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that more numerate participants would make more 
probability references than less numerate participants. To test this prediction, the number 
of lottery pairs (out of 27) for which at least one probability reference had been made was 
totalled for each participants. Multiple probability and/or outcome value references for the 
same lottery pair were, for the purpose of the present analysis, counted as 1. The number of 
stimuli for an outcome value reference had been made was also totalled.  
 
As one can see from Figure 6.3.2 below, there does not appear to be much 
difference in the frequency with which outcome values were referenced by more numerate 
(m = 19, sd = 4.16, mdn = 18)  and less numerate (m = 18.17, sd = 2.99, mdn = 18) 
participants. However, the mean frequency with which more numerate participants 
referenced probabilities (m = 19, sd = 5.96, mdn = 18)  does appear to be quite a lot higher 
than the mean frequency with which less numerate participants referenced probability (m = 
12.3, sd = 4.37, mdn = 12.5). 
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Figure 6.3.2: The mean frequency of outcome value and probability references made by 
more and less numerate participants.  
 
An independent samples t-test (two tailed as no directional hypothesis had been 
made with respect to numeracy and outcome value referencing) confirmed that there was 
no significant or near-significant difference between the frequency with which more and 
less numerate participants made outcome value references (N = 11, t(9) = .665, p > .05). 
However, a second independent samples t-test (one-tailed as Hypothesis 1 predicted that 
those higher in numeracy would make more probability references than those lower in 
numeracy) revealed a significant difference between the frequency with which more and 
less numerate participants referenced probabilities (N = 11, t(9) = 2.114, p ≤ .05, r = .58). 
Hypothesis 1 is thus supported. 
 
Task complexity and attribute referencing. 
 
Figure 6.3.3 below depicts the mean percentage of single, asymmetric and two 
outcome pairs for which participants made at least one outcome value reference. Figure 
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6.3.4 below meanwhile depicts the mean percentage of single, asymmetric and two 
outcome pairs for which participants made at least one probability reference. As one can 
see, there was very little variation in the rate at which more and less numerate participants 
referenced outcome values. However, a glance at Figure 6.3.4 indicates that while more 
numerate participants made probability references at a similar rate for all stimulus 
complexity types, less numerate participants demonstrated a much higher mean rate of 
probability referencing for single-outcome pairs than asymmetric and two-outcome pairs. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3.3: Percentage of single, asymmetric and two non-zero outcome pairs for which 
more and less numerate participants made outcome value references. 
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Figure 6.3.4: Percentage of single, asymmetric and two non-zero outcome pairs for which 
more and less numerate participants made probability references. 
 
With respect to outcome value referencing, a 2x3 mixed-factorial ANOVA 
confirmed that there was no interaction between numeracy and stimulus complexity (N = 
11, F(2, 18) = .555, p > .05).  
 
With regard to rate of probability referencing however, a significant effect of 
stimulus complexity was found (N = 11, F(2, 18) = 5.695, p ≤ .05, partial eta squared = 
.388), as was a marginally-significant interaction between numeracy and stimulus 
complexity (N = 11, F(2, 18) = 3.374, p ≤ .1 (= .065), partial eta squared = .273). A series 
of follow-up t-tests with Bonferroni adjustment (p ≤ .017) were then conducted for each 
stimulus complexity type. As a directional hypothesis had previously been made with 
respect to the effect of numeracy on rate of probability referencing, these tests were one-
tailed. No significant (or near significant) effect of numeracy on rate of probability 
referencing for single outcome pairs (N = 11, t(9) = .620, p > .017) was found. However, a 
significant difference between more and less numerate participants was observed for 
probability referencing for asymmetric-outcome pairs (N = 11, t(9) = 2.836, p ≤ .017 r = 
.68).  For two-outcome pairs, a sizable but non-significant effect of numeracy was found 
(N = 11, t(9) = 1.903, p > .017, r = .53). 
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Qualitative versus quantitative attribute references. 
  
As previously discussed, one of the aims of this analysis was to determine whether 
more numerate participants made more quantitative (or qualitative) attribute references 
than less numerate participants. 
 
A 2x2 mixed-factorial ANOVA revealed that numeracy did not interact with 
reference type (i.e. quantitative versus qualitative) when it came to rate of outcome value 
referencing (N = 11, F(1, 9) = .574, p > .05). The test also revealed that there was no 
significant difference between the (percentage) rate of qualitative value referencing (m = 
42.28, sd = 6.01) and the (percentage) rate of quantitative outcome value referencing (m = 
33.09, sd = 5.91) (N = 11, F(1, 9) = .739, p > .05).  
 
A second mixed-factorial ANOVA indicated that numeracy did not significantly 
interact with reference type when it came to probability references (N = 11, F(1, 9) = 
1.958, p > .05). However, a significant difference between the (percentage) rate at which 
quantitative versus qualitative probability references were made was found (N = 11, F(1, 9) 
= 43.438, p ≤ .001, partial eta squared = .828). Substantially more qualitative probability 
references (m = 50.56, sd = 5.34) were made than quantitative probability references (m = 
14.5, sd = 4.97). Possible reasons for this will be outlined in the discussion. 
 
Errors 
 
Win/Loss confusion. 
 
As predicted, win/loss confusion was observed in the verbal data obtained in this 
study. However, out of 297 stimulus presentations (27 lottery pairs x 11 participants) this 
error was only observed on 6 occasions, with just a single violation of dominance being 
clearly attributable to it. It is possible that the error did occur with slightly greater 
frequency but could not be detected in the verbal data. However, as the vast majority 
verbalisations indicated that participants correctly recognised the outcome domain (gain 
versus loss), it seems implausible that it was the primary cause of dominance violation 
amongst those in the think aloud condition. 
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The finding that this error did occur, but was not a frequent cause of dominance 
violation supports Hypothesis 2: that simple error does lead to some dominance violation 
in the lottery choice task, but is not the primary cause.  
 
The adding error. 
 
The adding error was observed on 7 occasions, with 4 violations of dominance 
being directly attributable to it. It is interesting to note that in the present study only one 
participant appeared to persistently make the error. Of the other two participants who were 
observed to make the error both appeared to respect the mutual exclusivity of non-zero 
outcomes most of the time. Hence, it would seem that while the adding error does occur it 
is not always an indication of a fundamental misunderstanding of the task. 
 
It is possible that the adding error occurred more frequently than could be discerned 
from the think aloud transcripts. Participants who violated dominance sometimes referred 
to the dominated alternative as representing a greater win or a lower loss without further 
elaboration. This could indicate instances of adding error specifically, but it may also 
indicate the use of a ‗number of outcomes‘ heuristic 
 
6.4. Discussion 
 
As stated at the outset the data obtained in this study was analysed with four main aims 
in mind: 
 
1. To gain further insight into the processes and/or errors underlying violation of 
dominance in the lottery choice task, through the analysis of think aloud data.  
 
2. To ascertain whether participants lower in numeracy make fewer references to 
probability that those higher in numeracy. 
 
3. To ascertain whether rate of probability referencing is influenced by stimulus 
complexity.  
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4. To ascertain whether participants higher in numeracy make more quantitative (or 
more qualitative) attribute references than less numerate participants. 
 
With regard to Aims 1, 2 and 3 it is felt that this study has been successful. The verbal 
data obtained in this study indicated that, as will be discussed in more detail below, simple 
error (i.e. win/loss confusion) does not appear to be the primary cause of dominance 
violation. This supports Hypothesis 2: That simple error would be observed to lead to 
violations of dominance, but would not emerge as the predominant cause of dominance 
violation. Hypothesis 1: That more numerate participants would make more probability 
references than less numerate participants, was also supported. Rate of probability 
referencing amongst those higher in numeracy was significantly greater than rate of 
probability referencing amongst those lower in numeracy. As will be discussed further 
below, the verbal data obtained in this study would also seem consistent with the notion 
that more numerate participants attend to more probabilistic information than less 
numerate participants when stimulus complexity is increased. Although the interaction 
between numeracy and stimulus complexity was only marginally significant (a result of the 
small sample size), the effect size was substantial. With regard to Aim 4, the results of this 
study proved inconclusive. Numeracy did not significantly interact with reference type (i.e. 
qualitative versus quantitative) when it came to either outcome value or probability 
references. Interestingly however, while no difference in the rate at which participants 
made quantitative versus qualitative outcome value references was found, participants did 
make significantly more qualitative probability references than quantitative probability 
references. Again, this will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
Think Aloud versus Non think aloud 
 
The primary objective of this study was to determine which information was 
attended to by more and less numerate participants. Hence, the fact that many participants 
may have been relying largely on System 1 processes in study 2 (refer to Chapter 2 for a 
discussion of dual-process models, or see Epstein, 1994; Evans, 2006; Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002; Sloman, 1996 and Stanovich & West, 2000, 2008) was not thought to 
pose the same problem as it would had the aim of this study been to obtain verbalisations 
that represented a complete (or mostly complete) account of the choice process. In their 
seminal paper on the subject of the validity of verbal data, Ericsson and Simon (1980) posit 
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that it is possible to obtain valid, unreactive and task-relevant verbalisations if (task-
related) processes are occurring in working memory (referred to as ‗short term memory‘ in 
the paper in question). Hence, if a process is not accessible to working memory it cannot 
be verbalised. However, even if choice processes are largely unconscious and thus not 
accessible to working memory, traces of the information attended to should be present in 
working memory and thus verbalisable. It was therefore postulated that participants 
references to outcome values and probabilities would indicate the extent to which such 
information was salient to (and attended to by) more and less numerate participants. 
 
Of course, the possibility that the introduction of the think aloud procedure may be 
reactive was acknowledged at the outset of this study. It was speculated that introducing 
the think aloud procedure may induce those who would have otherwise neglected 
probability to utilise probabilistic information more. It was also speculated that the 
introduction of the procedure may lead those who had previously relied on intuitive, 
largely unconscious System 1 processes to start utilising conscious, deliberative (and 
verbalisable) System 2 processes. It was postulated that either of these factors could lead to 
a general reduction in dominance violation. However, it was not thought that the 
introduction of the think aloud procedure would lead less numerate participants to start 
neglecting probabilistic information that they would have otherwise attended to. 
Nonetheless, it was determined at the outset that a comparison of task performance of think 
aloud participants and non think aloud participants would be prudent. 
 
No interaction between think aloud condition and study (Study 2 versus present 
study) was found with regard to rate of dominance violation. This suggests that the 
introduction of the think aloud procedure did not impact on propensity to violate 
dominance. It should, of course, be acknowledged that the sample size was small and thus 
any small to moderate effects may have failed to reach significance. However, a glance at 
the results of the mixed factorial ANOVA used to compare rate of dominance violation 
across studies/conditions (see results section) would seem to indicate that this is unlikely. 
The value of F was, in both tests, very low. 
 
A significant interaction between study and propensity to violate dominance was 
found however. Those classified as dominance violators demonstrated, on average, a 
higher rate of dominance adherence in the present study than in Study 2. By contrast, those 
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classified as dominance adherers demonstrated, on average, a higher rate of dominance 
violation in the present study than in Study 2. This finding was unexpected. However, after 
some consideration it was determined that it was likely to be the result of regression 
towards the mean. Participant selection and classification in the present study was based on 
a single observation (i.e. rate of dominance violation in Study 2), thus it is perhaps 
unsurprising that there was some divergence from previous performance here.  
 
Though think aloud condition does not appear to have had any effect on rate of 
dominance violation in the present study, it was found to have a significant and sizable 
effect of response time. Those in the think aloud condition had, on average, far higher 
response time than those in the non think aloud condition. This is likely to be at least 
partially attributable to speech requiring additional time to produce.  It is also possible that, 
in addition to this, there were some condition-induced differences in cognitive process (and 
cognitive effort) between those in the think aloud and non think aloud conditions. This 
does not necessarily mean that choice processes differed between the two groups. It could 
merely mean that the think aloud requirement served as an additional cognitive demand. 
Ericsson and Simon (1980) propose that when the contents of working memory are 
phonological in nature they can be verbalised with little additional cognitive effort. When 
the contents of working memory are visual rather than phonological in nature on the other 
hand, Ericsson and Simon hold that said information must be recoded into verbal form. As 
this requires additional cognitive effort, an increase the time taken to complete a task 
would be expected. In terms of the present study this may mean that participants‘ mental 
representations of choice information were not solely phonological in nature. The fact that 
many participants began their verbalisations for certain stimuli by stating what their choice 
was, would seem to lend some support to this possibility. 
 
Error 
 
As previously stated, 6 instances of win/loss confusion were observed in the verbal 
data obtained in this study. However, as noted in the previous section only one instance of 
dominance violation was clearly attributable to this error. This, along with the fact that no 
other form of ‗simple mistake‘ emerged from the verbal data as a potential cause of 
dominance violation, supports the postulation that dominance violation is not primarily the 
result of ‗simple mistakes‘. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported. 
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At the outset of this study it was suggested that some participants may violate 
dominance as a result of applying an outcome adding strategy and that the use of this 
strategy may be made evident in the verbal data generated by the think aloud participants. 
Such a phenomenon would not be without precedence. The apparent use of an ‗adding 
strategy‘ was observed in think aloud data gathered by Huber (1982, see Huber, 1989). 
This (non normative) strategy/error would, it was posited, correspond with the fact that rate 
of dominance violation was highest for asymmetric-outcome pairs in Study 2.  
 
The verbal data gathered in this study did indeed indicate that the ‗adding error‘ 
does occur. The error was explicitly evident in 7 instances, with 4 violations of dominance 
being directly attributable to it. As noted in the previous section however, the actual rate at 
which the error occurred may have been higher. The fact that the error was observed on the 
part of two participants who clearly recognised the mutual exclusivity of outcomes with 
regard to most other lottery pairs, would seem to strongly indicate that such errors are not 
always the result of participants failing to understand that outcomes are mutually 
exclusive.  
 
Numeracy and Attribute Referencing 
 
Probability referencing. 
 
It was hypothesised at the outset that less numerate participants would make fewer 
references to probabilistic choice information than more numerate participants. This 
hypothesis was based upon the postulation that less numerate participants were more likely 
to neglect probability in the lottery choice task than more numerate participants. This 
postulation emerged from the findings of Studies 1 and 2 in which a) score on the 
expanded numeracy scale was found to have a strong negative correlation with rate of 
dominance violation; and b) probability neglect was identified as a likely cause of 
dominance violation. It was therefore hypothesised that if, in the context of the lottery 
choice task, less numerate participants were attending to less probabilistic information than 
more numerate participants they would make fewer references to probability in their 
verbalisations. 
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The findings of the present study support the hypothesised connection between 
numeracy and probability referencing. A significant effect of numeracy on overall rate of 
probability referencing was found. A marginally significant interaction between numeracy 
and stimulus complexity was also revealed, with difference in rate of probability 
referencing between more and less numerate participants being far more pronounced for 
asymmetric and two-outcome pairs than single-outcome pairs. Indeed, when the rate of 
probability referencing for asymmetric-outcome pairs was analysed in isolation (with the 
critical value of alpha adjusted to control for the possibility of a Type 1 error), numeracy 
was found to have a stronger effect in the predicted direction than was the case when effect 
of numeracy on probability referencing for all stimulus complexity types was evaluated. 
Although the difference failed to reach significance at the adjusted level of alpha, a 
substantial difference in rate of probability referencing for two-outcome pairs was also 
found between more numerate and less numerate participants. By contrast, when the rate of 
probability referencing for single-outcome pairs was analysed in isolation, no significant or 
near-significant difference between more and less numerate participants was observed.  
 
With respect to outcome value referencing, no difference (significant or near-
significant) was found between the two groups, nor was there any interaction between 
numeracy and stimulus complexity with respect to outcome value referencing.  
 
It is acknowledge that the small sample size means that some caution should be 
exercised in the interpretation of these results. However, it is felt that sizable difference in 
rate of probability referencing between more and less numerate participants with respect to 
more complex stimuli is both a) theoretically interesting; and b) consistent with the 
findings of Studies 1 and 2. The fact that no such differences were observed with respect to 
outcome value referencing also provides a strong indication that these findings were not 
merely the result of less numerate participants being more prone to making fewer attribute 
references in general. 
 
The implication that less numerate participants attend to less probabilistic 
information as stimulus complexity is increased, is perhaps unsurprising. If less numerate 
participants find probabilistic information (and ratio based numeric information in general) 
less affectively salient and more cognitively taxing to utilise, then it would seem plausible 
that increasing the complexity of the stimuli (and thus the cognitive load associated with 
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processing all available information) would induce them to attend to it less. One might, of 
course, anticipate that increasing task complexity/number of outcomes would have an 
effect on the proportion of and manner in which task information is attended by decision 
makers. However, it is telling that no significant or near significant interaction between 
stimulus complexity and numeracy was found with regard to outcome value referencing. 
As discussed in previous chapters, Peters and colleagues (Peters et al., 2006; Peters et al., 
2009) posit that less numerate participants draw less affective meaning from numeric 
information. Though outcome value information is technically numeric it is concrete (as 
oppose to proportional); and the fact that it is monetary in nature mean that both more and 
less numerate participants are likely to be able to extrapolate affective meaning from it. 
Hence, it may be the case that increasing task complexity reduces utilisation of information 
that participants find a) cognitively taxing; and b) lacking in affective salience. As cited in 
Chapter 2, there is compelling evidence to suggest that increasing cognitive load induces 
greater reliance on associative, affect-driven intuitive processes (corresponding with the 
System 1 conceptualisation) and thus a greater tendency to display certain biases (see for 
instance DeNeys, 2006; and Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005). Indeed, Kahneman and 
Frederick (2002) have proposed that under heavy cognitive load ‗attribute substitution‘ 
may take place; whereby decision makers may substitute an easier to process (but not 
necessarily objectively relevant) attribute for a more difficult to process attribute. 
 
Qualitative versus quantitative references. 
 
One aim of the present study was to determine whether more numerate participants 
made more qualitative (or more quantitative) attribute references than less numerate 
participants. This question arose from Reyna and colleagues‘ (see Reyna, 2008; Reyna et 
al., 2009) postulation that those higher in numeracy are more likely to form (accurate) 
‗gist‘ representations of numeric information than those lower in numeracy (who may form 
‗verbatim‘ representations without encoding ‗gist‘ meaning). This proposed gist/verbatim 
split would seem – superficially at least – to contradict Peters and colleagues postulation 
(see Peters et al., 2006, Peters et al., 2008) that those higher in numeracy are able to make 
more precise judgements regarding numerical information. As discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 2, an ability to make precise distinctions between numeric values and draw precise 
affective meaning from numeric information does not preclude the gist/verbatim split in 
encoding. However, it was felt that examining the qualitative versus quantitative nature of 
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participants‘ attribute references in the think aloud condition may provide an insight into 
how more and less numerate individuals mentally represent numeric information. 
 
In the present study however, no interaction was found between numeracy and 
reference type (i.e. quantitative versus qualitative) when it came to both outcome value 
referencing and probability referencing. Hence, the results of the present study with regard 
to Aim 4 are inconclusive. It is possible that the sample size employed in the present study 
was too small for any difference to be detected. It is also possible that the fact that 
participants had the choice information onscreen at all times during the choice process 
rendered them more likely to make ‗precise‘ quantitative statements (i.e. read information 
off the screen).  
 
It is though, interesting to note that while no differences existed between the rate at 
which participants made quantitative outcome value references and the rate at which 
participants made qualitative outcome value references, significantly more qualitative 
probability references were made than quantitative probability references. The nature of 
the data collected in this study does not allow for any firm conclusions to be drawn 
regarding this point. However, one might speculate that it could be due to the graphical 
manner in which probability was represented. Though precise probability values were 
given in the form of ‗ticket numbers‘, it would seem plausible that the graphical aspects of 
probability representation (i.e. the space on the diagram taken up by a particular outcome 
block) were more salient than the ticket numbers within. This would certainly seem to be 
consistent with prior research that has indicated that pictorial representations of risk (e.g. 
Stone, Yates & Parker, 1997; Chua, Yates & Shah, 2004) can render probabilistic 
representations more salient. Hence, describing probabilities as ‗more chance‘ or ‗a small 
chance‘ is perhaps indicative of participants attending more to the (visually salient) size of 
outcome blocks than the precise range of tickets contained in said blocks. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
At the outset of this investigation two predictions were made: a) that simple 
mistakes, such as win/loss confusion, would account for some violations of dominance but 
would not emerge as the primary cause of this phenomenon; and b) that more numerate 
participants would make a greater number of references to outcome probabilities than less 
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numerate participants, thus indicating that more numerate participants attend to more 
probabilistic information. 
 
The first of these predictions is, as discussed above, supported by the verbal data 
obtained in this study. The second prediction is also supported. As a group, more numerate 
participants made significantly more references to probabilistic information than did less 
numerate participants. This, it is posited, constitutes further evidence in favour of the 
probability neglect explanation for dominance violation set out in Studies 1 and 2. The 
results of Studies 1 and 2 indicated that probability neglect (leading to either the ‗adding 
error‘ or a ‗number of outcomes heuristic‘) would seem to be the most likely cause of 
dominance violation. In addition to this, a strong negative correlation between score on the 
expanded numeracy scale and rate of dominance violation was found in Study 2. Hence, it 
was postulated that less numerate individuals tend to attend to less probabilistic 
information than more numerate individuals. This postulation is supported by the results of 
the present study. Though only marginally significant, the interaction between stimulus 
complexity and numeracy with regard to the referencing of outcome probabilities would 
also seem to indicate that less numerate individuals tend to attend to more probabilistic 
information when the stimulus is simpler and thus represents a lower cognitive load.  
 
One possible criticism of the present investigation is, of course, the small sample 
size. However, as the study‘s findings regarding numeracy and probability referencing for 
asymmetric-outcome pairs were (in terms of effect size) highly pronounced and as they 
corresponded with the findings of Studies 1 and 2, it is felt that they do add further weight 
to the probability neglect hypothesis. The notion that information may be neglected in 
choice tasks is certainly not a new one. Indeed, there exists a vast wealth of evidence to 
indicate that decision makers do not always consider all choice information (see for 
instance the summary provided in Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1993). It is felt though, that 
the findings of the present study do – along with the findings of prior research (e.g. 
Dieckmann, Slovic & Peters., 2009; Peters et al., 2006; Peters et al., 2009) – indicate that 
the choice information utilised by decision makers is strongly influenced by their level of 
numeracy. Hence, it does not seem unreasonable to posit that models of risky choice that 
are contingent on consideration of some consideration of both outcome value and outcome 
probability information, may only be predictively valid for highly numerate decision 
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makers. This point will be discussed in more depth in the General Discussion (see Chapter 
9). 
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Chapter 7: Study 5 
 
The findings of Studies 1, 2 and 4 (see Chapters 3, 4 and 6) provide strong evidence 
that probability neglect is the primary cause of dominance violation in the lottery choice 
task. The response time data gathered in Study 2 also would also seem to link dominance 
violation, and thus probability neglect, to reliance on fast, cognitively less demanding 
System 1 processes (see Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of dual-process models; 
see also Epstein, 1994; Evans, 2006; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Sloman, 1996 and 
Stanovich & West, 2000, 2008). It is the goal of the present study to investigate the effect 
of affect on performance (and therefore process) on the lottery choice task.  
 
As outlined in Chapter 2, prior research has linked positive affect to reliance on 
top-down, intuitive System 1 processes and sadness to utilisation of deliberative System 2 
processes. Bless et al. (1996), for instance, found that happy participants were more likely 
to make intrusion errors when recalling a story than sad participants. An intrusion error is 
the recollection of an item and or event that is congruent with the type scenario being 
recalled, but that was not actually present. As such these errors indicate the use of 
associative, top-down processes. Hence, Bless et al. postulated that happy individuals tend 
to rely on associative, top-down processes, while sad individuals tend to rely more on 
bottom-up processes that are driven by external information. The findings of de Vries, 
Holland and Witteman (2008a, 2008b) lend further support to this postulation. In one 
study, de Vries, Holland and Witteman (2008a) linked positive affective states (both 
incidental and induced) to better performance in the early stages of the Iowa Gambling 
Task: an activity in which positively and negatively valenced somatic markers are posited 
to provide cues as to which alternatives are advantageous (see Chapter 2 for further 
discussion of the IGT and the Somatic Marker Hypothesis; see also Bechara et al., 1996; 
Bechara et al. 1997; Bechara, Damasio & Damasio, 2000). In another study it was found 
that happy participants tended to accord prizes they had chosen greater subjective valuation 
when instructed to make said choices intuitively. Sad participants, meanwhile, tended to 
accord their chosen prizes greater subjective valuation when they had been instructed to 
make their choice deliberatively (de Vries, Holland & Witteman, 2008b). With respect to 
why this apparent intuitive/deliberative split between happy and sad individuals might 
occur, Bless et al. posit: 
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“... that individuals' affective states inform them about the nature of the current 
situation. Whereas positive affective states signal a benign and unproblematic 
situation, negative affective states indicate that the situation is problematic and is 
characterized by a lack of positive outcomes or a threat of negative outcomes.” 
(Bless et al., 1996, p677). 
 
It is thus suggested that positive states indicate that it is safe to rely on top down, 
associative general knowledge structures, while negative states signal that the situation is 
problematic and thus said top down, associative general knowledge structures cannot be 
relied upon. It should of course be noted that Bless et al. (1996) do not posit that positive 
affective states invariably correspond with reliance on these associative, top down 
processes; holding that processing capacity and motivational factors will in some 
circumstances diminish or obscure this relationship. 
 
As stated above, propensity to violate dominance for asymmetric-outcome pairs on 
the lottery choice task, has been linked to reliance on intuitive, affect-driven System 1 
processes. It is posited that many individuals find reasoning with probabilistic information 
difficult and cognitively taxing, and are thus prone to substituting this hard to utilise 
attribute with affectively salient but objectively irrelevant information (i.e. number of non-
zero outcomes and/or sum of non-zero outcomes) (see Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, for a 
comprehensive discussion of attribute substitution and dual-process models of thought) . 
Hence, it might be anticipated that mood state (incidental and induced) may influence 
participants‘ propensity to engage in probability neglect (and thus dominance violation for 
asymmetric-outcome pairs) on the lottery choice task. If positive affect facilitates greater 
reliance on, fast, intuitive, System 1 processes then one might anticipate participants 
experiencing elevated happiness to a) have a higher rate of dominance violation for 
asymmetric-outcome pairs; and b) demonstrate faster response times than those who are 
less happy. Conversely, if sadness induces greater deliberation then one might anticipate 
sad participants to have a) a lower rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome 
pairs; and b) longer response times. 
 
Of course, it should be noted that these postulations are based upon studies in 
which affective state was either incidental (e.g. de Vries, Holland & Witteman, 2008a) or 
induced by a manipulation exogenous to the task. Bless et al. (1996) induced happiness and 
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sadness by asking participants to report a happy or sad event, while de Vries, Holland and 
Witteman (2008a, 2008b) showed participants funny and sad video clips. As discussed in 
Chapter 2 however, Zeelenberg et al. (2008) assert that exogenous and endogenous 
emotional states can have different effects on behaviour. As evidence for this position, 
Zeelenberg et al. cite the research of de Hooge, Breugelmans and Zeelenberg (2008), who 
found that endogenous shame tended to increase participants propensity to engage in pro-
social behaviour but exogenous shame did not. Of course, as Loewenstein et al. (2001) 
point out, there does exist evidence to suggest that that task-external ‗exogenous‘ and 
‗irrelevant‘ affective states can be misattributed to some facet of the task at hand (e.g. 
Schwarz and Clore, 1983). Indeed, Peters et al.‘s (2009) finding that the judgements of less 
numerate individuals tended to be influenced by their (incidental) affective state when 
asked to rate (quantitatively presented) health care plans, would certainly seem to support 
this. Zeelenberg et al. acknowledge that certain task-exogenous emotional states may have 
the same (or at least similar) effects on choice and behaviour as task-endogenous 
emotional states, and that these effects could be a consequence of either misattribution or 
some kind of carry over effect. However, while acknowledging this, Zeelenberg et al. state 
that as the exact impact of various endogenous and exogenous emotional states on choice 
behaviour is yet to be fully investigated it is a subject worthy of study.  
 
Aims and Hypotheses 
 
As stated above the present investigation seeks to examine the effect of affect on 
performance (and thus process) on the lottery choice task. It is felt that such an 
investigation is warranted for two reasons. The first pertains to the importance of 
understanding probability neglect and the factors that may facilitate and inhibit it. As stated 
in previous chapters, the fact that many (mostly well educated) individuals appear to be 
prone to neglecting probability in scenarios featuring relatively simple representations of 
chance is a source of both theoretical interest and practical concern.  The second reason is 
that, to the knowledge of the present researcher, the comparative effect(s) of task-induced 
and incidental happiness and sadness on risky choice has yet to be fully investigated.  
 
It is the researcher‘s opinion that the lottery choice task provides an excellent 
context in which to investigate the impact of exogenous and endogenous happiness and 
sadness on probability neglect (and risky choice more generally). The nature of the task is 
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such that exogenous (i.e. incidental) affective state could be gauged at the outset, and 
endogenous changes in affective state induced by causing participants to experience either 
a large win or a large loss. Hence the aims of this study can be summarised thusly: 
 
1. To create (and test) a version of the lottery choice task capable of inducing task-
endogenous positive and negative affect and measuring the impact of same on task 
performance. 
 
2. To ascertain whether (and how) happiness and sadness influence performance (i.e. 
dominance violation and response time) on the lottery choice task. 
 
3. To ascertain whether task endogenous affect (i.e. that induced by the task) has a 
different effect on performance than task exogenous affect (i.e. that which is 
incidental to the task). 
 
4. To test the replicability of Study 2‘s findings regarding dominance violation, risk 
preference and response time. 
 
  Consistent with Schwarz & Clore‘s (1983) findings regarding mood 
misattribution, it is anticipated that incidental (exogenous) happiness and sadness will have 
a similar effect on performance to task induced (endogenous) happiness and sadness. 
However, it is also anticipated that the impact of task induced changes in affective state 
will be stronger. Zeelenberg et al. (2008) postulate that emotion serves to motivate goal 
directed behaviour. If this is the case, it might therefore be predicted that the effect of 
happiness and sadness induced by the task towards which behaviour is being directed will 
be more pronounced.  
 
It is to be anticipated that manipulating the choice task so that participants incur a 
comparatively large win before moving on to the ‗target‘ choices will either induce an 
increase in happiness or no change in affective state. However, incurring a large loss may 
induce sadness or anger/annoyance or both. While sadness and anger are both frequently 
perceived as ‗negative‘ emotional states, the effect of anger on thought and behaviour 
would seem to be somewhat different to that of sadness. As noted above, Bless et al. 
(1996) posit that sadness increases bottom up processing of the task information at hand, 
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and decreases reliance on associative general knowledge structures (i.e. utilises a mode of 
thought consistent with the conceptualisation of System 2). This position would seem to be 
consistent with the findings of de Vries Holland and Witteman (2008a, 2008b). However, 
research by Bodenhausen, Sheppard and Kramer (1994) has linked anger to increased 
reliance on stereotypes and heuristic cues (i.e. processes consistent with reliance on System 
1 thought). Hence, it would seem reasonable to predict that when sadness alone is reported, 
task performance will be different than when anger alone or anger and sadness are 
reported.  
 
Based upon both the prior research summarised above and the findings of Studies 1 
and 2, this study will proceed with the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: That the restructured lottery choice task will succeed in inducing 
(task endogenous) affect via the manipulation of wins and losses (i.e. those in the win 
condition will report an increase in happiness and a reduction in sadness and those in the 
loss condition an increase in sadness and a reduction in happiness). 
 
Hypothesis 2: That happiness (both exogenous and endogenous) will lead to greater 
reliance on System 1 processes and, as a result, a higher rate of probability neglect. As 
such the following are expected to be observed: 
 
a) A positive correlation between ratings of happiness and dominance violation for 
asymmetric-outcome pairs. 
 
b) A negative correlation between rating of happiness and response time. 
 
Hypothesis 3: That sadness (both exogenous and endogenous) will, in the absence 
of annoyance, lead to greater reliance on System 2 processes and, as a result, a lower rate 
of probability neglect. As such the following are expected to be observed: 
 
a) A negative correlation between ratings of sadness and dominance violation for 
asymmetric-outcome pairs. 
 
b) A positive correlation between rating of sadness and response time. 
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Hypothesis 4: That where task induced (endogenous) changes in affective state 
occur they will have the same effect on performance as incidental (exogenous) affect, but 
that the effect of the former will be more pronounced. 
 
Hypothesis 5: That the findings of Study 2 with respect to dominance violation, 
response time and risk preference will be replicated in the present study. Hence, the 
following are to be expected. 
 
a)  That rate of dominance violation will be higher for asymmetric-outcome pairs 
than single or two-outcome pairs. 
 
b) That dominance violators will tend to demonstrate consistently fast response 
times (indicating reliance on fast, cognitively undemanding System 1 processes), 
while dominance adherers will tend demonstrate higher response time for pairs 
without a dominant alternative than pairs with a dominant alternative. 
 
c) That dominance violations will be more risk seeking for gains and risk averse for 
losses than dominance adherers, as a result of finding probabilistic information less 
salient than outcome value information. 
 
7.2. Method 
 
Affect Elicitation Procedure: Development 
 
As stated above, one of the aims study was to create a procedure for eliciting task-
endogenous changes in affective state. It was posited that endogenous happiness and 
sadness could be induced by presenting participants with an affect elicitation block of 
lottery choices, in which either a large win or a large loss would be sustained at the end of 
the block. The effects of any change in affective state on task performance could then be 
immediately tested by presenting participants with a target block of lottery choices.  
 
It was decided that in the affect elicitation block a ticket draw should take place 
after each choice had been made, rather than one lottery and one ticket being drawn at the 
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end. It was felt that doing this during the affect elicitation phase would increase 
participants‘ engagement with the task. This could not of course be done in the target block 
(i.e. the block in which performance was to be measured) as repeated ticket draws would 
likely lead to repeated changes in affective state. Hence, the target block proceeded in a 
manner similar to Studies 1 and 2. 
 
In order to measure any changes in affective state (i.e. any increases or decreases in 
happiness and sadness), participants were asked to rate their levels of happiness and 
sadness at three points during the task: at the start, directly after the affect elicitation 
procedure and just before the final draw in the target block. Measures of annoyance, 
elation, relief and disappointment were also taken directly after the affect elicitation 
procedure. Findings regarding these other states are reported here, however of these only 
‗annoyance‘ is focussed upon in detail. Measures of ‗annoyance‘ were taken as opposed to 
‗anger‘ because it was felt that participants may not feel it socially desirable to report that 
they were experiencing anger. 
 
It is of course acknowledged that in asking participants to rate their emotional state 
using the scales employed here one is potentially faced with the problem of participants not 
ratings their levels of happiness, sadness...etc. in a manner consistent with one another. 
However, while this may add a certain amount of ‗noise‘ to data regarding incidental (i.e. 
exogenous) happiness and sadness, it should not impact greatly upon measures of 
endogenous happiness and sadness as these will be contingent on ‗change in rating‘ rather 
than absolute rating. This is to say that while one would anticipate at least some subjective 
variation in participants‘ ratings of emotion, it is possible to extrapolate from ‗change in 
happiness/sadness‘ whether there has been increase, a decrease or no change in emotional 
state. It is also felt that the fact that emotions can be classified in a binary fashion as 
‗experienced‘ (rating above zero) versus ‗not experienced‘ (rating of zero) also serves to 
mitigate this potential problem. However, it is worth noting that in the present study very 
few participants gave a happiness rating of zero. 
 
With respect to potential concerns regarding the induction of negative affect, it was 
felt that the affect elicitation procedure did not pose an ethical problem. The negative 
affect induced amongst those in the loss condition was likely to be very mild and short 
lived. It also seemed highly unlikely that the experience of being in the loss condition 
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would be any different from losing a game that was based on truly random selection. 
Hence, any negative affect experienced by participants in the loss condition would be no 
different from the negative affect they might experience as a result of losing a non-fixed 
game.  
 
Participants 
 
60 participants (32 male and 28 female) took part in the study. Age at time of study 
was recorded for 57 out of 60 participants. Of these 57 participants, ages ranged 18 to 57 
with a mean of 34.8. Half of the sample (N = 30) were randomly allocated to the Win 
condition and half to the Loss condition (N = 30). Both student and non-student 
participants were recruited to take part in the study. Student participants were recruited 
from lecture groups, with the experimenter asking all students who would be interested in 
taking part in the study to provide an email address via which the experimenter could 
contact them. Non-student participants were recruited off-campus through both direct 
approach by the experimenter and word of mouth.  
 
Design 
 
The study employed a mixed 2 x 3 x 2 design, with condition (win versus loss) as a 
between subjects factor and Stimulus Complexity (single, two and asymmetric-outcome) 
and Outcome Type (gain-pair versus loss-pair) as repeated measures. Dependent variables 
were rate of dominance violation, risk preference, response time and ratings of happiness, 
sadness, relief, disappointment, elation and annoyance. 
 
Materials and Stimuli 
 
The program created to deliver the experiment was constructed using Visual Basic 
Express Edition 2008 (Microsoft, Redmond, WA, USA).  
 
Three sets of stimuli were developed for use in the experiment: a practice block, an 
affect elicitation block and a target block. Table 7.2.1 below details the type of stimulus 
composition of each block, while Figure 7.2.1 below provides an example of Single, Two 
and Asymmetric-outcome pairs. In the Target block an equal number of Win-pairs and 
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Loss-pairs were presented, with the Loss-pairs duplicating the outcome values and 
probabilities of the Win-pairs (e.g. if a Win-pair contained a lottery offering a 3/20 chance 
of winning £1 and lottery offering a 6/20 chance of winning £0:50 then a corresponding 
Loss-pair would comprise of a lottery offering a 3/20 chance of losing £1 and a lottery 
offering a 6/20 chance of losing £0:50). 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2.1: Example of Single-outcome, Two-outcome and Asymmetric-outcome lottery 
pairs (without a dominant alternative) utilised in this study. 
 
Table 7.2.1: Number of single, asymmetric and two-outcome pairs, with and without 
a dominant alternative, in each block 
 Stimulus type 
 
 Single-outcome pairs Asymmetric-outcome 
pairs 
Two-outcome pairs 
 Dom alt. No dom alt. Dom alt. No dom alt. Dom alt. No dom alt. 
Practice 
block 
 
- 2 - 1 - 1 
Affect 
elicitation 
block 
 
- 6 2 8 - 4 
Target 
block 
4 8 6 8 4 8 
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Procedure 
 
Stage 1: Instructions. 
 
Prior to the start of the experiment participants were randomly allocated to either 
the Win or Loss condition via a blind ticket draw. They were then seated at a computer and 
presented with a set of onscreen instructions informing them that they were about to be 
presented with two blocks of lottery choice games, in which they would be presented with 
a series of lottery pairs and asked to select from each pair the lottery that they would prefer 
to play. The instructions went on to state that in the first block of games a ticket would be 
drawn by the computer after each choice was made, and their balances credited, debited or 
left unchanged depending on the outcome that the drawn ticket corresponded with. 
However, in the second block no ticket draw would take place until all choices had been 
made, whereupon one ticket and one game would be randomly selected and their £3:00 
balance debited, credited or left unchanged depending on the outcome of that game. 
Participants were also informed that, once the experiment was over, they would receive 
their final balance (£3:00 plus or minus whatever was won or lost) for either the first or 
second block of lottery pairs. 
 
 The instructions were designed to give participants the impression that the ticket 
selection would be random. In actuality however the ticket selection for the first (affect 
elicitation) block was fixed in the manner described above. Therefore, in the interests of 
fairness, all participants received their balance for the target block (the draw for which was 
truly randomised) 
 
 Stage 2: Demonstration. 
 
Once participants had read through the onscreen instructions and indicated that they 
were willing to take part in the study, they were presented with a demonstration game. In 
this demonstration lottery pair was presented onscreen along with their starting balance 
(£3:00) and a set of ‗ticket numbers‘ (see Appendix F for a screenshot of this display). 
Participants were instructed via an onscreen prompt to tick the box next to the lottery they 
wished to play and then click a button to confirm their selection. Annotations further 
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elaborating on the potential outcomes of their selected choice appeared once the box next 
to either Lottery A or Lottery B was ticked. Should the button to confirm selection be 
pressed without an alternative being selected, participants text appeared onscreen telling 
the participant that they needed to choose an alternative before proceeding. Once the 
choice was made a ticket was selected and the participant‘s demonstration balance credited 
in accordance with the outcome the ticket corresponded with in their chosen lottery. The 
ticket selection was fixed in order to ensure all participants incurred a gain here. 
 
 Stage 3: Ensuring task understanding.  
 
In order to ensure that participants understood how the games were to proceed they 
were then asked a series of five questions regarding outcome values and probabilities 
within the context of the lottery choice task (see Appendix G for screenshots of these 
questions). If a question was answered correctly the participant proceeded to the next 
question. If a question was answered incorrectly participants were presented with an 
onscreen display detailing why their response was incorrect. They were then required to 
repeat the question until they provided a correct response. 
 
Stage 4: Initial mood rating. 
 
After all five questions had been answered correctly, participants were asked to rate 
their current level of happiness and sadness on seven point scales. On these scales ‗0‘ 
indicated that they were not experiencing the emotion in question at all and ‗7‘ indicated 
that they were experiencing a very high level of happiness or sadness. 
 
Stage 5: Practice games. 
 
Four practice games were then presented to participants in order to further 
acclimatise them to the task. Participants began the practice block with an imaginary 
balance of £3:00 (they were instructed prior to the practice that their performance here 
would not affect their final balance. The practice pairs were then presented in the same 
manner as the demonstration game (though without the annotation that was present in the 
demonstration). A series of four lottery pairs were shown onscreen and participants were 
required to select from each pair the lottery they would prefer to play. After each choice 
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was made a ticket number was drawn and participant‘s balance credited, debited or left 
unchanged, depending on the outcome with which the ticket corresponded in their chosen 
lottery. The outcomes of these choices were fixed in order to ensure that participants 
experienced a full range of outcomes (i.e. win, loss and status quo). 
 
Stage 6: affect elicitation block. 
 
Once the practice games had been completed, participants were presented with the 
twenty games that made up the affect elicitation block. Each lottery pair was presented in 
the same order for each participant and the ticket draw for the first eighteen games was 
‗fixed‘ to ensure that a) all participants experienced some wins and losses and b) that all 
participants‘ balances were between £3 and £4 on reaching the final game of the block. 
While the aim of the Affect Elicitation block was to induce positive affect in one group by 
having them experience a large win and induce negative affect in the other group by 
having them experience a large loss, it was felt that having those in the Win condition 
experience no losses at all and those in the Loss condition experience no gains would make 
participants suspicious (as would getting the ‗no-change‘ outcome in all games until the 
last). As the aim of the study was to induce positive or negative affect by engineering 
either a large win or large loss at the end of block, it was determined that the participants‘ 
balances should be between £3 and £4 by Game 18. This would ensure that the win or loss 
incurred would either disseminate or double their balance. On reaching Game 19, those in 
the Win condition were presented with a lottery pair in which both lotteries offered a 12/20 
chance of losing an amount ranging from £2:50 - £2:70. The ticket draw for this game was 
fixed to ensure that a non-losing ticket was drawn. Game 20 the featured a lottery pair 
identical in outcome values and outcome probabilities to that presented in Game 19. In this 
instance however all outcomes were in the gains domain (i.e. a win of £2:50 - £2:70). The 
ticket draw was fixed to ensure that participants in the Win condition obtained the highest 
outcome value possible for their selected lottery.  
 
For those in the Loss condition, the affect elicitation block proceeded in the same 
manner as it did for those in the Win condition until Games 19 and 20, where the order of 
game presentation was reversed. Participants were presented in Game 19 with the pair 
featuring the large win (i.e. a 12/20 chance of winning £2:50 - £2:70) and the ticket draw 
was fixed to ensure that they did not win. In Game 20 they were then presented with the 
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pair featuring a large loss. The draw for this game was fixed to ensure that they lost the 
maximum amount possible for their chosen alternative. 
 
Stage 7: Post affect elicitation mood rating. 
 
Once all 20 games in the Affect Elicitation block had been played participants were 
asked, for a second time, to rate their mood on a series of seven point scales. This time 
however, participants were asked to rate their levels of disappointment, relief, annoyance 
and elation in addition to their levels of happiness and sadness (see Appendix H).  
 
Stage 8: target block. 
  
Participants were then informed onscreen that they were about to be presented with 
a block of 38 lottery pairs (the target block) and that once again it was their task to choose 
from each the lottery that they would prefer to play. They were also once again instructed 
that in this block no ticket draw would take place until all 38 choices had been made, 
whereupon one lottery pair and one ticket number would be drawn at random by the 
computer and their £3:00 starting balance credited, debited or left unchanged, depending 
on the outcome that the ticket corresponded with in their chosen lottery from the pair. 
 
 Stage 9: Final rating of mood.  
 
Once participants had made all 38 choices they were again asked to rate their levels 
of happiness and sadness on the seven point scales. After rating their levels of happiness 
and sadness, a game and a ticket were randomly selected by the program and the 
participants‘ balances credited, debited or left unchanged depending on the outcome the 
ticket corresponded with. Participants were then asked to fill out a demographic details 
form (see Appendix M), given their final balance for the target block and fully debriefed 
about the aims of the study and the deception employed (see Appendix I for a copy of the 
debriefing sheet). 
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7.3. Results 
 
 As stated at the outset, the goals of this investigation were to 1) test the efficacy of 
the affect elicitation procedure; 2) examine the effect of affect on task performance; 3) 
ascertain whether endogenous and exogenous happiness and sadness have different 
relationships with task performance; and 4) to further test the replicability of the findings 
of Studies 1 and 2. Hence, this section will start with an analysis of the effect of the two 
affect elicitation conditions on ratings of happiness and sadness. This will be followed by 
an examination of dominance violation, response time and risk seeking in the present 
study. 
 
It should be noted here that a previously unidentified error in the data collection 
function of program meant that response time data for target 38 was not recorded for any 
of the participants. Choice data for target 38 along with response time data for target 37 
was also unrecorded for the first 13 participants due to a similar data error. The latter error 
was fixed upon discovery, but the former was not as it would require more extensive 
alterations to be made. As all other choice and response time data was present and 
accurate, it was felt that the loss of response time data for 1 in 38 stimuli would not distort 
the findings of the data analysis. 
 
Affect Elicitation 
 
Happiness. 
 
Table 7.3.1 and Figure 7.3.1 below details the mean rating of happiness for those in 
each of the two affect manipulation condition at the three mood rating points: 1) at the 
start; 2) directly after the affect elicitation block; and 3) at the end. As predicted, mean 
rating of happiness for those in the Win condition rose between the first and second ratings 
of mood, whilst it fell for those in the Loss condition. However, a glance at mean 
happiness rating at the end of the experiment indicates a full reversal for those in the Win 
condition and a partial reversal for those in the Loss condition. 
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Table 7.3.1: Mean rating of happiness and by affect elicitation condition and timeframe 
 Rating of happiness at 
start 
Rating of happiness after 
Affect Elicitation 
Rating of happiness at end 
    
Win (N=30) 3.60 (1.19) 3.93 (1.11) 3.43 (1.38) 
Loss(N=30) 3.13 (1.50) 2.73 (1.28) 2.87 (1.41) 
All (N=60) 3.37 (1.37) 3.33 (1.33) 3.15 (1.41) 
 
 
Figure 7.3.1: Mean rating of happiness at the start of the experiment, post affect elicitation 
and at the end of the experiment for those in the win condition and those in the loss 
condition 
 
In order to ascertain whether affect elicitation condition had a significant effect on 
rating of happiness an ANCOVA was performed, with affect elicitation condition as the 
independent variable, rating of happiness post affect elicitation as the dependent variable 
and rating of happiness at the start of the experiment as a covariate. As those in the Win 
condition had higher initial ratings of happiness than those in the Loss condition, this 
variable needed to be controlled for. The test revealed that rating of happiness post affect 
elicitation was significantly higher for those in the Win condition than those in the Loss 
condition, when initial rating of happiness was controlled for (N = 30, F(1, 57) = 17.223, p 
≤ .001, partial eta squared = .232).  
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It should be mentioned here that the assumptions of normality and homogeneity of 
variance were violated with respect to the dependent variable. However, due to lack of a 
non-parametric ANCOVA equivalent, the decision was taken to proceed with this test. It is 
however worth noting that when ‗change in happiness‘ was calculated (i.e. rating of 
happiness at start subtracted from rating of happiness post affect elicitation) and a Mann 
Whitney U test used to discern whether a significant difference in change in happiness 
between those in the win condition (m = .33, sd = 1.09) and those in the loss condition (m 
= -.4, sd = .77) exists. The test revealed that this was indeed the case (N = 60, U = 279, z = 
-2.708, p ≤ .01, r = .35). 
 
It should also be noted that a second Mann Whitney U test found no difference 
between those in the win condition and those in the loss condition with respect to ratings of 
happiness at the end of the experiment (N = 60, U = 359, z = -1.400, p > .05).  
 
Based upon these findings it would seem reasonable to conclude that the affect 
elicitation manipulation was successful in inducing a general increase in happiness 
amongst those in the Win condition and a general decrease in happiness amongst those in 
the Loss condition. It also appears that the effect of the affect elicitation procedure on 
happiness diminished over the course of the target block. 
 
Sadness. 
 
Table 7.3.2 and Figure 7.3.2 below detail the mean rating of sadness for those in 
the Win and Loss conditions at the three mood rating points. As one can see, ratings of 
sadness were low at all three points for both groups. There was a small reduction in rating 
sadness for those in the Win condition and an even smaller increase in rating of sadness for 
those in the loss condition 
 
Table 7.3.3: Mean rating of sadness by affect elicitation condition and timeframe 
 Rating of sadness at start Rating of sadness after 
Affect Elicitation 
Rating of sadness at end 
    
Win (N=30) .93 (1.38) .53 (1.04) .40 (.77) 
Loss(N=30) .50 (  .90) .63 (1.13) .50 (.78) 
All (N=60) .72 (1.18) .58 (1.08) .45 (.77) 
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Figure 7.3.2: Mean rating of sadness at the start of the experiment, post affect elicitation 
and at the end of the experiment for those in the win condition and those in the loss 
condition. 
 
An ANCOVA failed to reveal a significant effect of affect elicitation condition on 
rating of sadness post affect elicitation, when initial rating of sadness was controlled for (N 
= 60, F(1, 57) = 2.676, p > .05).  
 
A Mann Whiney U test did reveal that there a significant difference in ‗change in 
sadness‘ between those in the Win condition (m = -.4, sd = .86) and those in the Loss 
condition (m = .13, sd = 1.04) existed (N = 60, U = 313.5, z = -2.388, p ≤ .05, r = .308). 
However, it seems clear that while the affect elicitation manipulation may have induced a 
mean decrease in sadness amongst those in the Win condition it did not induce an 
equivalent increase in sadness amongst those in the Loss condition.  
 
Hypothesis 1, which predicted that the affect elicitation procedure would induce 
increases in ratings of happiness amongst those in the Win condition and increases in 
ratings of sadness amongst those in the Loss condition, is thus partially supported. 
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Other emotional states. 
 
Table 7.3.3: Mean and statistical comparison of ratings of relief, disappointment, 
elation and annoyance by affect elicitation condition 
  Mean     t    sig Effect size 
 Win Loss    
Relief 2.10 (1.71) 1.63 (1.17)  1.133 p = .262 - 
Disappointment   .53 (1.14) 2.43 (1.72) -5.057 p <= .001** r = .55 
Elation 1.90 (1.67)   .63 (  .89)  3.669 p <= .001** r = .43 
Annoyance   .60 (1.25) 1.07 (1.36) -1.383 p = .172 - 
 
 
Table 7.3.3 above details the mean ratings of relief, disappointment, annoyance and 
elation, taken directly after the affect elicitation procedure, for those in the Win and Loss 
conditions. As one might expect, participants in the Loss condition reported – on average – 
higher levels of disappointment and annoyance than those in the Win condition. By 
contrast, mean rating of elation and relief was higher for those in the Win condition than 
the Loss condition. These between groups differences were however only significant for 
disappointment (N = 60, df = 50.34, t = -5.057, p ≤ .001, r = .55) and elation (N = 60, df = 
44.27, t = 3.339, p ≤ .001, r = .43) (tests reported for equal variances not assumed). 
Possible reasons for the absence of a significant effect for annoyance and relief are 
outlined in the discussion. 
 
Dominance Violation (Target Block) 
 
Dominance violation and stimulus complexity. 
 
Table 7.3.4 and Figure 7.3.3 below detail the percentage rate at which those in the 
Win condition and those in the Loss condition violated dominance for single-outcome, 
asymmetric-outcome and two-outcome pairs featuring a dominant alternative. 
 
Table 7.3.4: Mean percentage rate of dominance violation by affect elicitation condition and 
stimulus complexity 
 Single-outcome Asymmetric-outcome Two-outcome 
Win (N = 30) 3.33 (10.85) 15.00 (22.68) 5.00 (13.77) 
Loss (N = 30) 4.17 (14.80) 23.33 (26.84) 7.50 (14.90) 
All (N = 60) 3.75 (12.88) 19.17 (24.90) 6.25 (14.28) 
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Figure 7.3.3: Mean percentage rate at which those in the Win and Loss conditions violated 
dominance in each stimulus complexity condition.   
 
Consistent with the findings of previous studies, rate of dominance violation was 
highest for asymmetric-outcome pairs and lowest for single-outcome pairs for both groups. 
A Friedman test confirmed that there was indeed a significant effect of stimulus 
complexity on rate of dominance violation (N = 60, X
2
(2) = 40.055, p ≤ .001). A set of 
three posts-hoc Wilcoxon sign rank tests with Bonferroni adjustment (p = .017) were 
subsequently conducted. There was found to be no significant difference in rate of 
dominance violation for single-outcome and two-outcome pairs (N = 60, T = 24, z = -
1.222, p > .017). However, as expected, percentage rate of dominance violation for 
asymmetric outcome pairs was higher than that for both single outcome pairs (N = 60, T = 
37, z = -4.404, p ≤ .001, r = .4) and two outcome pairs (N = 60, T = 30, z = -4.335, p ≤ 
.001, r = .4).  
 
Hypothesis 5a is thus supported. As was the case in Study 2, rate of dominance 
violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs was higher than that for single or two-outcome 
pairs. 
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Surprisingly, the mean rate of dominance violation for asymmetric pairs was higher 
for those in the Loss condition than Win condition. This difference was not however found 
to be significant (N = 60, df = 58, t = -1.304, p > .05).  However, for reasons previously 
discussed it had been anticipated that those in Win condition (i.e. those in for whom the 
affect elicitation technique was used to induce positive affect) would violate dominance 
more frequently for asymmetric-outcome pairs than those in the loss condition. 
Nonetheless, this in itself does not directly contradict Hypothesis 4, which predicts that 
task endogenous happiness will correspond with a higher rate of dominance violation for 
asymmetric-outcome pairs. To test Hypotheses 2, 3, 4 and 5, further analysis of the 
emotional response scales in needed. 
 
Dominance violation and affect. 
 
 Happiness. 
 
As outlined in the introduction it was anticipated that happiness would correspond 
with a higher rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs (Hypothesis 2a) 
and that sadness in the absence of annoyance would correspond with a lower rate of 
dominance violation for asymmetric outcome pairs (Hypothesis 3a). It was also anticipated 
that any relationship between happiness, sadness and task performance would be stronger 
for task-endogenous affect than task-exogenous affect (Hypothesis 4). 
 
Table 7.3.5: Correlation between rating of happiness and rate of dominance 
violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs 
Happiness rating Pearson‘s R 
r Sig. r
2 
 
Start 
 
.280* .03 .08 
Post affect elicitation .051 .699 - 
 
Finish 
 
.166 .250 - 
Change in rating 
(post affect elicitation 
rating minus rating at start) 
-.312* .015 .1 
*Significant at .05 (two-tailed) 
**Significant at .01 (two-tailed) 
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Table 7.3.5 above details the correlation between rate of dominance violation for 
asymmetric-outcome pairs and ratings of happiness at each of the three ‗mood rating 
points‘. The correlation between rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs 
and the change in rating of happiness between initial and post affect elicitation ratings is 
also reported in the table. ‗Change in happiness‘ was calculated by subtracting happiness 
rating at the start from post affect elicitation rating of happiness. Hence, a positive ‗change 
in happiness‘ value represents an increase in reported happiness and a negative value a 
decrease in reported happiness. Note that while the assumption of normality was violated 
with respect to ratings of happiness, these correlations were confirmed using non-
parametric tests (Spearman‘s Rho).  
 
Consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 2a, a positive correlation was found 
between initial rating of happiness and rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-
outcome pairs. However, there was not found to be any direct correlation between 
dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs and rating of happiness post affect 
elicitation. Indeed, further analysis revealed that the correlation between rate of dominance 
violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs and ‗change in happiness‘ was both negative and 
significant, indicating that decreases in happiness between initial and post affect elicitation 
ratings tended to correspond with a higher rate of dominance violation and increases in 
happiness with a lower rate of dominance violation. This finding stands in direct 
opposition to the initial prediction that endogenous (i.e. task induced) happiness would 
correspond with a higher rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs. While 
higher levels of exogenous happiness (as measured by initial ratings of happiness) do 
appear to correspond with a higher rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome 
pairs, endogenous increases in happiness (as measured by change in happiness) appear to 
correspond with a lower rate of dominance violation. 
 
Though no effect of affect elicitation condition on rate of dominance violation had 
been found, it was posited that – should the correlations described above be indicative of 
endogenous and exogenous happiness influencing performance in different ways – an 
effect of condition might be found if initial rating of happiness was controlled for. An 
ANCOVA test was therefore conducted, in which dominance violation for asymmetric-
outcome pairs was entered as a dependent variable, affect elicitation condition as an 
independent variable and initial rating of happiness as a covariate. A near significant effect 
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of condition on rate of dominance violation was found (N = 60, F(2, 57) = 3.171, p < .1 
(=.08), partial eta squared = .053). 
 
Taken together, these findings strongly suggest that incidental happiness and task 
induced happiness had different relationships with this measure of performance. Hence, 
Hypothesis 2a is supported with respect to exogenous (incidental) happiness only, while 
Hypothesis 4 is unsupported with respect to endogenous and exogenous happiness. 
 
Sadness. 
 
Table 7.3.6: Correlation between rating of sadness and rate of dominance 
violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs 
Sadness rating Pearson‘s R 
r Sig. r
2 
 
Start 
 
-.120 .362 - 
Post affect 
elicitation 
.061 .646 - 
 
Finish 
 
.103 .103 - 
Change in rating 
(post affect elicitation 
rating minus rating at 
start) 
.210 .107 - 
 
Hypothesis 3a predicted that sadness (in the absence of annoyance) would 
correspond with a lower rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs. As 
Table 7.3.6 above details, no direct correlation between rate of dominance violation and 
rating of sadness at any of the three mood rating points was found. In addition to this, no 
significant correlation was found between rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-
outcome pairs and ‗change in sadness‘ (i.e. post affect elicitation rating of sadness minus 
initial rating of sadness). 
 
It should be noted that the apparent near-significant positive correlation between 
‗change in sadness‘ and rate of dominance violation disappeared when ‗change in 
happiness‘ was partialled out. (N = 60, df = 57, r = .093, p > .05). This suggests that it was 
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the result of ‗change in sadness‘ negatively correlating with ‗change in happiness‘ (which 
did have a significant negative correlation with rate of dominance violation). 
 
Table 7.3.7: Correlation between rating of sadness and rate of dominance violation 
for asymmetric-outcome pairs when ratings of ‘annoyance’ were partialled out. 
Sadness rating r Sig. r
2 
Start -110 .408 - 
Post affect elicitation .084 .529 - 
Finish .119 .369 - 
Change in rating .218 .218 - 
 
 
As sadness and annoyance were found to have a positive correlation (N = 60, r = 
.285, p ≤ .05, r2 = .08) it was posited that annoyance might be obscuring any relationship 
between sadness and performance. As discussed in the introduction, sadness has been 
linked to bottom-up, ‗System 2‘ processing (e.g. de Vries, Holland & Witteman, 2008a, 
2008b), while anger has been linked to reliance on heuristics (see Bodenhausen, Sheppard 
and Kramer, 1994). However, as one can see from Table 7.3.7 above however, no 
correlation between ratings of sadness and rate of dominance violation was found when 
annoyance was partialled out. Hypothesis 3a is thus not supported. 
 
Response Time 
 
Response time, stimulus complexity and affect elicitation condition. 
 
Mean response time was calculated for each stimulus complexity condition. 
Preliminary screening revealed five outliers above the mean in both the single-outcome 
and asymmetric-outcome condition, one outlier was found in the two-outcome condition. 
These outliers were removed from the following analysis. 
 
Figure 7.3.4 below shows the mean response times of those in the win and loss 
condition for single-outcome, asymmetric-outcome and two-outcome pairs. Hypotheses 2b 
predicted that happiness would correlate negatively with response time, while Hypothesis 
3b predicted that happiness would correlate positively with response time. Hence, one 
would anticipate response times to be lower in the win condition than the loss condition, 
which were designed to induce happiness and sadness respectively. However, a glance at 
207 
 
Figure 7.3.4 indicates that – contrary to initial expectations – response times were actually 
lower for those in the loss (negative affect) condition than those in the win (positive affect) 
condition. 
 
 
Figure 7.3.4: Mean response time for each stimulus complexity condition, by affect 
elicitation condition. 
 
A mixed-factorial ANOVA was performed, with stimulus complexity as a repeated 
measures variable, affect elicitation condition as a between groups factor and response 
time as the dependent variable. A main effect of affect elicitation condition was found (N = 
55, F(1, 53) = 7.441, p ≤ .01, partial eta squared = .123), as was a main effect of stimulus 
complexity (N = 55, F(2, 106) = 87.625, p ≤ .001, partial eta squared = .623). No 
significant interaction between the two variables was found (N = 55, F(2, 106) = 1.535, p > 
.05). Post hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment were performed for the 
stimulus complexity variable. Mean response time for asymmetric-outcome pairs was, as 
expected, significantly higher than response time for single-outcome pairs (N = 55, F(1, 
53) = 62.808, p ≤ .001, partial eta squared = .542). Similarly, mean response time for two-
outcome pairs was found to be significantly higher than that for asymmetric-outcome pairs 
(N = 55, F(1, 35) = 54.183, p ≤ .001, partial eta squared = .506). 
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These results do not support Hypotheses 2b and 3b. However, as will be detailed in 
greater length in the discussion, they are consistent with the finding that ‗change in 
happiness‘ negatively correlates with rate of dominance violation. Indeed, as Table 7.3.8 
below details, the correlation between change in happiness and response time for 
asymmetric-outcome pairs was both positive and significant. By contrast a negative 
correlation between change in sadness and response time for asymmetric-outcome pairs 
was observed (See Table 7.3.9 below). As previously stated, change in happiness was 
calculated by subtracting rating of happiness at the start of the experiment from post affect 
elicitation rating of happiness. Hence, a positive ‗change in happiness‘ value denotes an 
increase in happiness and a negative ‗change in happiness‘ value denotes a decrease in 
happiness. Change in sadness was calculated in the same fashion, by subtracting rating of 
sadness at start from post affect elicitation rating of sadness. The present study‘s findings 
regarding response time and endogenous happiness/sadness (as measured by change in 
happiness/sadness) are quite the opposite of what was initially predicted. Those reporting 
increases in happiness tended to demonstrate higher average response times than those 
reporting decreases in happiness. Those reporting increases in sadness meanwhile tended 
to demonstrate lower average response times than those reporting decreases in sadness. 
 
Table 7.3.8: Correlation between mean response time and change in happiness for 
each stimulus complexity condition 
                       Pearson‘s R 
 r  Sig.  r
2 
 
Single-outcome 
 
.193 .158 - 
Asymmetric-outcome .290* .032 .084 
 
Two-outcome 
 
.105 .427 - 
Overall .231 .089 - 
*Significant at .05 (two-tailed) 
**Significant at .01 (two-tailed) 
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Table 7.3.9: Correlation between mean response time and change in sadness for each 
stimulus complexity condition 
                       Pearson‘s R 
  r Sig.  r
2 
 
Single-outcome 
 
-.232 .089 - 
Asymmetric-outcome -.354** .008 .125 
 
Two-outcome 
 
-.108 .416 - 
Overall -.313* .02 .098 
*Significant at .05 (two-tailed) 
**Significant at .01 (two-tailed) 
 
It should also be mentioned here that initial ratings of happiness (N = 55, r = -.185, 
p > .05) and sadness (N = 55, r = .164, p > .05) did not significantly correlate with overall 
response time (or response time in any of the three stimulus complexity conditions). 
However, it is interesting to note that, consistent with initial predictions, the (non-
significant) correlation between rating of happiness at the start and response time was 
negative, and the correlation between rating of sadness at the start and response time 
positive. 
 
Response time and propensity to violate dominance. 
 
 Hypothesis 5b predicted that Study 2‘s findings regarding response time would be 
replicated, with interaction between propensity to violate dominance and response time for 
pairs with and without a dominant alternative being observed. In Study 2 mean response 
time for pairs with a dominant alternative was almost identical for dominance adherers and 
dominance violators. For pairs without a dominant alternative however, mean response 
time for dominance adherers was far higher than that for dominance violators. Hence, a 
similar pattern of response times was expected to be replicated here. 
 
On screening the response time data for stimuli with a dominant alternative five 
outliers above the mean were found: four amongst dominance adherers and one amongst 
dominance violators. For stimuli without a dominant alternative two outliers above the 
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mean were identified: one amongst dominance adherers and one amongst dominance 
violators. All outliers were removed from the analysis. 
 
Figure 7.3.5 below illustrates the mean response time for pairs with and without a 
dominant alternative for dominance adherers and dominance violators. As one can see, 
there is a small difference in response time between the two groups when it comes to pairs 
with a dominant alternative. However, for pairs without a dominant alternative, mean 
response time for dominance adherers is substantially higher than mean response time for 
dominance violators. 
 
 
Figure 7.3.5: Mean response times (milliseconds) for pairs with and without a dominant 
alternative for dominance violators (N = 16) and dominance adherers (N = 38). 
 
A mixed factorial 2x2 ANOVA was performed, with ‗stimulus type‘ (dominant 
alternative versus no dominant alternative) as a repeated measured variable, propensity to 
violate dominance (dominance violators versus dominance adherers) as a between groups 
factor and mean response time as a dependent variable. A significant interaction between 
stimulus type and propensity to violate dominance was found (N = 55, F(1, 52) = 5.592,  p 
≤ .05, partial eta squared = .097). A pair of follow up independent samples t-tests with 
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Bonferroni adjustment (p = .025) were subsequently performed for pairs with and without 
a dominant alternative. The difference in response time between dominance violators and 
dominance adherers for pairs with a dominant alternative approached significance at the 
adjusted p = .025 level (N = 53, df = 53, t = 2.078, p ≤ .025, r = .075). However, the 
difference in response time between dominance violators and dominance adherers for pairs 
without a dominant alternative was found to be both significant and sizable (N = 55, df = 
48.21, t = 4.233, p ≤ .001, r = .271). 
 
Differences in response times for pairs with and without a dominant alternative 
were also examined separately for dominance violators and dominance adherers. The 
sample was split into dominance adherers and dominance violators and two paired-samples 
t-tests with Bonferroni adjustment (p = .025) were performed. As no difference in response 
time for pairs with and without a dominant alternative was predicted on the part of 
dominance violators, two-tailed tests were used. For dominance violators the difference in 
response time neared significance at the adjusted p = .025 level (N = 16, df = 15, t = -
2.130, p ≤ .025 (p = .05), r = .23), with mean response time being slightly lower for pairs 
with a dominant alternative than pairs without. For dominance adherers this difference was 
both large and significant (N = 38, df = 37, t = -6.648, p ≤ .025, r = .54), with mean 
response time being substantially lower for pairs with a dominant alternative than pairs 
without. 
 
Hypothesis 5b is generally supported by these findings. While a near-significant 
difference in response time for pairs with and without a dominant alternative was found on 
the part of dominance violators, the interaction between stimulus type and propensity to 
violate dominance demonstrates that this difference was significantly smaller than that for 
dominance adherers. It can thus be concluded that the response times of dominance 
violators varied far less across stimulus type than the response times of dominance 
adherers.  
 
Risk Preference and Propensity to Violate Dominance 
 
Hypothesis 5c predicted that the risk preferences of dominance adherers and 
dominance violators in the present study would correspond with those of dominance 
adherers and dominance violators in Study 2. This is to say that dominance violators would 
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demonstrate greater risk aversion for losses than dominance adherers. As Figure 7.3.6 
below illustrate however, there appears to be little difference in the rate at which 
dominance adherers and dominance violators selected the riskier alternative in either the 
gains or losses domain. 
 
 
Figure 7.3.6: Mean percentage rate with which dominance adherers and dominance 
violators selected the riskier alternative in the domain of gains and the domain of losses. 
 
A 2x2 mixed factorial ANOVA with percentage rate of risk seeking as a dependent 
variable, outcome domain (i.e. gains versus losses) as a repeated measures variable and 
propensity to violate dominance as a between groups factor was performed. A near-
significant main of outcome domain was found (N = 60, F(1, 58) = 3.108, p ≤ .1, partial eta 
squared = .051). However, no interaction between outcome domain and propensity to 
violate dominance was revealed (N = 60, F(1, 58) = .076, p > .05). Hypothesis 5c is thus 
unsupported. Possible reasons for this finding will be discussed in the following section. 
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7.4. Discussion 
 
This investigation was undertaken in order to fulfil both methodological and 
theoretical objectives. With respect to methodology the aim of this study to test the 
efficacy of the affect elicitation procedure. With regard to theory, several hypotheses 
regarding affective state and choice were tested. This discussion will therefore be divided 
into two main sub-sections. The first of these will discuss findings regarding the efficacy 
of the affect elicitation procedure. The second will focus on the study‘s findings regarding 
affect and choice. 
 
Efficacy of the Affect Elicitation Procedure 
 
As stated at the outset, it was anticipated that causing participants to experience a 
win that would double their balance would induce a) an increase in happiness; and b) a 
decrease in sadness. Conversely, it was predicted that causing participants to experience 
loss that decimated their balance would a) induce sadness and/or annoyance; and b) cause a 
decrease in happiness. The self-reported ratings of emotional state taken at the start of the 
task and directly after the affect elicitation block clearly indicate that the effect elicitation 
procedure was successful in inducing changes in happiness. This is evidenced by the fact 
that post affect elicitation ratings of happiness were found to be higher for those in the win 
condition than those in the loss condition, when initial ratings of happiness were controlled 
for. Similarly, a significant difference in ‗change in happiness‘ was found to exist between 
conditions, with those in the win condition reporting a mean increase in happiness and 
those in the loss condition reporting a mean decrease in happiness. This suggests that the 
procedure was effective in inducing increases in happiness amongst those in the win 
condition and decreases in happiness amongst those in the loss condition (though of course 
not all participants demonstrated a change in rating of happiness or a change in the 
expected direction). It is acknowledged that in any situation in which participants are 
required to directly rate their levels of happiness and sadness demand characteristics may 
influence response (e.g. report a higher level of happiness because they have just obtained 
a large win as thus feel that a higher rating of happiness is ‗expected‘). However, the fact 
that ‗change in happiness‘ corresponded with certain measures of performance (e.g. 
response time and rate of dominance violation) suggests that the affect elicitation 
procedure did induce changes in affective state.  
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It should be noted that the ratings of happiness obtained at the end of the 
experiment indicated a general reversion to initial state by the end of the target block. 
Hence, it would seem that the changes in happiness induced by the procedure were 
relatively short-lived. 
 
No significant difference in ratings of post affect elicitation sadness was found 
between those in the win condition and those in the loss condition, even when initial rating 
of sadness was controlled for. A significant difference in ‗change in sadness‘ was found 
between the two groups; with those in the win condition demonstrated a mean reduction in 
sadness.  However, while those in the loss condition demonstrated a mean increase in 
sadness, it was very small. This would seem to indicate that the affect elicitation procedure 
utilised in the win condition succeeded in effecting a reduction in sadness, but that the 
affect elicitation procedure utilised in the loss condition did not succeed in inducing a 
widespread increase in sadness. With regard to the reason(s) why the affect elicitation 
procedure may have failed to induce an increase in sadness amongst those in the loss 
condition, one possibility is that losses of the kind incurred do not tend to induce sadness. 
There was a significant difference between those in the win and loss condition with regard 
to disappointment, indicating that experiencing a large loss tended to induce some 
‗negative‘ feeling. However, while both sadness and disappointment might be classed as 
‗negative‘ emotions they are distinct states; and so the presence of the latter does not 
necessarily imply the presence of the former. Only 17 participants did, after all, report a 
sadness rating above zero following the affect elicitation procedure. It is also possible that 
the affect elicitation procedure, as it stands, is more suited to inducing happiness than other 
affective states. This postulation would seem to be supported by the fact that, with regard 
to self-reported ratings of relief, there was no significant difference between those in the 
win condition and those in the loss condition. While those in the loss condition had their 
balances drastically reduced in the affect elicitation procedure, they were always left with 
balance above zero. Hence, it is possible that the fact that their balance – while reduced – 
was greater than the amount with which they started the experiment led to feelings of relief 
in addition to disappointment amongst those in the loss condition. This ambivalence may, 
in part, be the reason why ‗change in sadness‘ correlates with few measures of 
performance. 
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Taking into account all of the findings of this study with regard to the impact of the 
affect elicitation procedure on affective state, it would seems reasonable to conclude that 
the procedure is effective in inducing changes in happiness. However, it is at present rather 
less effective at inducing sadness (and negative affective states more generally). As noted 
above, the fact that participants in the loss condition finished the affect elicitation block 
with a balance above zero may have tended to induce ambivalence (i.e. both ‗relief‘ and 
‗disappointment‘) rather than a negative affective state per se. Hence, it would perhaps be 
prudent for future versions of the affect elicitation procedure to feature a loss condition 
where participants‘ balances go below zero.  
 
Consistency With Study 2 
 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that the present study would replicate the findings of Study 
2 with respect to: a) pattern of dominance violation; b) response time; and c) risk 
preference. With respect to pattern of dominance violation and response time, this was 
indeed the case. Consistent with the probability neglect hypothesis, dominance was 
violated significantly more frequently for asymmetric-outcome pairs than single or two-
outcome pairs. Consistent with the postulation that there tends to exist an 
intuitive/deliberative split in process between dominance violators and dominance 
adherers, an interaction between propensity to violate dominance and stimulus type (pairs 
with a dominant alternative versus pairs without a dominant alternative) was found with 
respect to response time. As was the case in Study 2, dominance adherers tended to 
demonstrate considerably higher response times for pairs without a dominant alternative 
than pairs with a dominant alternative. The response times of dominance violators on the 
other hand tended to remain consistently fast, with difference in response time for pairs 
with and without a dominant alternative only reaching near-significance for this group. 
Hence, the response times of dominance violators would appear to be indicative of reliance 
on fast, cognitively undemanding, affect-driven System 1 processes. Conversely, the 
varying response times of dominance adherers would appear to be indicative of the 
utilisation of more effortful, deliberative System 2 processes. 
 
With regard to risk seeking, it had been anticipated that dominance violators would 
be more risk seeking for gains and risk averse for losses than dominance adherers: a 
consequence of attending more to outcome value information than probabilistic 
216 
 
information. In Study 2, dominance violators had been significantly less risk seeking in the 
domain of losses than dominance violators. In the domain of gains dominance violators 
had been more risk seeking than dominance adherers (though the difference was not 
significant). However, in the present study no interaction between propensity to violate 
dominance and outcome domain was found with respect to risk seeking. It is possible that 
this disparity between the findings of Study 2 and the findings of the present study is the 
result of the outcome values utilised in the present study being smaller (by a factor of 10) 
than those employed in Study 2. Dominance adherers may have been less inclined to take 
risks to avoid losses in the present study, due to the losses being far smaller. 
 
Despite the fact that the findings of Study 2 with respect to risk preference were not 
replicated here, it is felt that the results of this study with regard to pattern of dominance 
violation and response time lend further weight to a) the probability neglect hypothesis; 
and b) the postulation that there exists a System 1/System 2 split between dominance 
violations and dominance adherers. 
 
Dominance, Response Time and Affect 
 
At the outset of this study it was hypothesised that both exogenous and endogenous 
happiness would positively correlate with a higher rate of dominance violation for 
asymmetric-outcome pairs (Hypothesis 2a), but that the relationship between endogenous 
happiness and dominance violation would be stronger (Hypothesis 4). It was also predicted 
that both endogenous and exogenous sadness would correlate negatively with rate of 
dominance violation (Hypotheses 3a), but that the relationship between endogenous 
sadness and dominance violation would be stronger (Hypothesis 4). These predictions 
were, as discussed in the introduction, based upon a) prior research that suggest a link 
between happiness and reliance on top down, associative System 1 processes and sadness 
and utilisation of bottom up System 2 processes (e.g. Bless et al. 1996; Bless & Schwarz, 
1999; Holland, de Vries and Witteman, 2008a, 2008b); and b) findings obtained in the 
present series of studies that link dominance violation to reliance on System 1. 
 
The results of the present Study support Hypothesis 2a only with regard to 
exogenous happiness (i.e. participants‘ initial ratings of happiness). Initial ratings of 
happiness were found to positively correlate with rate of dominance violation for 
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asymmetric-outcome pairs. Endogenous happiness – as measured by change in happiness 
between initial and post affect elicitation rating of mood – on the other hand was found to 
have a negative correlation with rate of dominance violation. Indeed, when initial rating of 
happiness was controlled a near-significant difference in rate of dominance violation for 
those in the win condition and those in the loss condition was found in the opposite direct 
to that initially predicted. Though only near-significant this result does lend support to 
other findings indicating a) that the affect elicitation procedure succeeded in inducing task-
endogenous changes in happiness; and b) that endogenous happiness does not have the 
same relationship with task performance that exogenous happiness does. 
 
Unlike happiness, neither initial rating of sadness nor ‗change in sadness‘ was 
found to have any correlation with rate of dominance violation, even when annoyance was 
controlled for. Hypothesis 3a is therefore unsupported. As discussed above, this may be the 
result of a) only one-third of participants entering the experiment rating themselves as 
having a sadness level above zero; and/or b) the affect elicitation procedure failing to 
induce an increase in sadness amongst those in the loss condition. Hence, this finding is 
perhaps unsurprising. 
 
Hypothesis 4, which predicted that while the effects of exogenous and endogenous 
affective on performance would be the same the effect of endogenous affective state would 
be stronger, is not supported by the findings of this study.   
 
As previously discussed, Bless et al. (1996) and de Vries, Holland and Witteman 
(2008a, 2008b) examined the relationship between exogenous affective state and mode of 
thought. Hence, the present study‘s finding that incidental happiness positively correlated 
with a higher rate of dominance violation, is essentially consistent with the link between 
positive affect and reliance on top-down, associative, intuitive processes established in 
these studies. However, the fact that endogenous happiness appears to have quite the 
opposite relationship with rate of dominance violation is surprising. It was also 
hypothesised that happiness would correspond with faster response times (Hypothesis 2b) 
and sadness with slower response times (Hypothesis 3b). Again however the results were 
not as expected. No significant correlation was found between initial ratings of happiness 
and sadness and response time. It was however found that a) those in the win condition had 
significantly higher response times than those in the loss condition; and b) ‗change in 
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happiness‘ had a significant positive correlation with response time for asymmetric-
outcome pairs. This indicates that those experiencing a task-induced increase in happiness 
tended to expend greater cognitive effort on the task. Thus, contrary to initial predictions, 
endogenous happiness appears to have corresponded with the utilisation of deliberative 
System 2 processes.  
 
There are, to the researcher‘s knowledge, no prior studies that have investigated the 
comparative effect of endogenous and exogenous happiness on choice. However, as 
discussed both in Chapter 2 and the introduction to the present study, Zeelenberg et al. 
(2008) posit that exogenous and endogenous emotional states sometimes influence 
behaviour in a different manner. Citing de Hooge, Breugelmans and Zeelenberg‘s (2008) 
finding that exogenous and endogenous shame appear to have different effects on 
performance, Zeelenberg et al. propose that endogenous emotional states have motivational 
functions that exogenous emotional states do not. This proposition is grounded in 
Zeelenberg and colleagues‘ (Zeelenberg et al., 2008) ‗feeling is for doing‘ framework, in 
which it is argued that emotions serve to facilitate goal directed behaviour. Zeelenberg et 
al. acknowledge that mood/emotional misattribution, as reported by Schwarz and Clore 
(1983), can occur. However, within this framework situation-induced and incidental states 
are not held to have the same impact on choice, or indeed behaviour in general.  
 
Of course, the exogenous shame induced in de Hooge, Breugelmans and 
Zeelenberg‘s (2008) research did not appear to have any influence on subsequent choice 
behaviour. In the present study exogenous happiness did correlate negatively with one 
measure of performance (i.e. rate of dominance violation). The relationship in question 
was however the opposite of that observed between rate of dominance violation and 
endogenous happiness. In order to discern why incidental and task-induce happiness may 
have had difference relationships with performance it is necessary to consider what role 
affective state may have in choice processes. Bless et al. (1996) suggest that happiness 
serves as a cue that one‘s present situation/environment is acceptable and thus it is safe to 
rely on associative, top-down ‗general knowledge structures‘. While Bless et al.‘s (1996) 
study centred on the use of situational schemas rather than choice, subsequent research by 
de Vries, Holland and Witteman(2008a, 2008b) does support a link between happiness and 
greater reliance on associative, intuitive System1 processes in choice scenarios. This 
postulation would seem to be consistent with the relationship between dominance violation 
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and exogenous happiness observed in the present study. With regard to endogenous 
happiness however the picture is somewhat different. The positive correlation between 
change in happiness and response time for asymmetric-outcome pairs, along with the 
negative correlation between change in happiness and rate of dominance violation for 
asymmetric-outcome pairs, would seem to be consistent with the use of deliberative, more 
time consuming and cognitively demanding System 2 processes. It is thus posited that 
endogenous happiness may have a motivational effect on task performance; with 
participants experiencing a task-induced increase in happiness being motivated to expend 
more cognitive resources on the task in question. Thus it might be suggested that 
exogenous happiness serves to signal that it is safe to rely upon intuitive, associative, top-
down processes, while endogenous happiness motivates engagement with/enjoyment of the 
choice task and prompts the utilisation of cognitively demanding deliberative processes. In 
addition to explaining the findings of the present study, this would seem to be consistent 
with Bless et al.‘s postulation that motivational factors may offset the relationship between 
positive affect and reliance on top down, general knowledge structures. A position that is 
consistent with Bodenhausen, Kramer and Süsser‘s (1994) finding that individuals in 
whom (exogenous) happiness had been induced tended to be more prone to making 
stereotypic judgements (i.e. a behaviour consistent with reliance on associative, System 1 
processes), except in instances where they were told beforehand that they would be held 
accountable for their judgements. In this instance however the motivational factor appears 
to be endogenous happiness itself. 
 
One could, of course, argue that the negative correlation between ‗change in 
happiness‘ and dominance violation and the positive correlation between ‗change in 
happiness‘ and response time does not necessarily indicate any kind of causal relationship. 
A relationship between endogenous happiness and mode of thought is certainly suggested. 
However one might posit that –  rather than a task-induced increase in happiness leading to 
greater utilisation of System 2 processes – those most likely to utilise deliberative, System 
2 processes while taking part in the lottery choice task are also those most likely to enjoy 
playing games with a strong numeric component. The results of Studies 2, 3 and 4 strongly 
suggest a link between probability neglect, dominance violation and numeracy; with less 
numerate participants tending to have a much higher rate of dominance violation than more 
numerate participants. It would therefore seem conceivable that many less numerate 
participants, who are more likely to violate dominance, might have simply disliked taking 
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part in a task that requires the consideration of numeric information. By contrast, more 
numerate participants might have been more apt to enjoy the task. As no measure of 
numeracy or general cognitive ability was taken during the present study, the possibility 
that these two factors might mediate the relationship between task-induced happiness and 
performance cannot be entirely discounted.  However, the fact that a near-significant effect 
of affect elicitation condition on rate of dominance violation was found when initial ratings 
of happiness were controlled for suggests that this is not the case. If ‗change in happiness‘ 
negatively correlated with rate of dominance violation simply because more numerate 
participants tend to get more enjoyment from playing the lottery choice games, then one 
would not expect to find an effect of condition. Similarly, the fact that response times for 
those in the win condition were significantly higher than response times for those in the 
loss conditions suggests that endogenous happiness had an effect on the choice processes 
utilised. Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that acquiring a measure of participants‘ 
numeracy would enable one to examine the relative effects of numeracy and affect on task 
performance. 
 
A second potential criticism of the link between endogenous happiness, motivation 
and greater utilisation of System 2 proposed here pertains to the measures of exogenous 
and endogenous happiness obtained in this study. One might argue that rather than 
representing measures of exogenous and endogenous affective state, initial happiness and 
change in happiness may in fact reflect a trait versus state distinction in affect; with initial 
happiness essentially constituting a measure of trait happiness (i.e. an individual‘s intrinsic 
disposition towards happiness) and change in happiness a measure of state happiness (i.e. 
happiness induced by situational factors). Differences between trait positive affect and 
state positive affect have been reported with respect to their relationship with certain 
measures of stress and anxiety (see Papousek, Nauschnegg, Paechter, Lackner, Goswami 
& Schulter, 2010; Polk, Cohen, Doyle, Skoner & Kirschbaum, 2005), suggesting that the 
two can and do have distinct psychological and physiological correlates and effects. It 
would therefore seem possible that trait happiness and state happiness might have different 
relationships with mode of thought (and thus performance on the lottery choice task). If 
this was the case then the task performance data obtained in the present study would seem 
to point to higher levels of trait happiness corresponding with a greater propensity to rely 
upon intuitive System 1 processes, and increases in state happiness (whether endogenous 
or exogenous to any given task) corresponding with greater utilisation of deliberative 
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System 2. However, while it is acknowledged that participants‘ initial ratings of mood may 
in part reflect dispositional traits, the findings of prior research would seem to indicate that 
a trait/state distinction is unlikely to underlie the differing relationships between task 
performance and incidental happiness and task performance and (endogenously) induced 
happiness observed in the present study. As previously discussed, de Vries, Holland and 
Witteman (2008a) found that both incidental and (exogenously) induced happiness had the 
same relationship with performance on the IGT, while Bless et al. (1996) manipulated 
mood state by asking participants to recall happy or sad memories. The findings of both of 
these studies suggest a link between exogenous positive affect (whether incidental or 
induced) and reliance on top-down, intuitive System 1 processes. If measures of incidental 
happiness tend to reflect trait and measures of deliberately induced happiness tend to 
reflect state (and state and trait happiness have different influences on mode of thought), 
one would expect incidental and exogenously induced happiness to have different 
relationships with performance on the IGT. As stated above however, de Vries, Holland 
and Witteman found that incidental and exogenously induced happiness had the same 
relationship with IGT performance. Hence, it would seem highly unlikely that a trait/state 
distinction underlies the present study‘s findings with respect to the influence of incidental 
and endogenously induced happiness on task performance. A difference in the relationship 
between mode of thought and endogenous and exogenous happiness is therefore felt to be 
the most plausible explanation for the present study‘s findings with respect to affective 
state and task performance (i.e. rate of dominance adherence/violation and response time). 
 
The motivational effect of endogenous happiness on decision process (and thus 
performance) suggested here would, in certain respects, seem to be consistent with Isen 
and colleagues mood maintenance hypothesis (see for instance Isen, Nygren & Ashby 
1988). As discussed in Chapter 2, the mood maintenance hypothesis holds that those in a 
positive affective state will seek to maintain said affective state. It would therefore 
conceivable that participants, in whom happiness has been induced as a result of playing a 
game, will seek to avoid selecting alternatives that are less advantageous/more 
disadvantageous than others. Of course, the method of affect induction used by Isen, 
Nygren and Ashby (i.e. giving participants a bag of candy) was exogenous rather than 
endogenous. In the present study however exogenous happiness was found to have a 
different relationship with performance than endogenous happiness. However, it is worth 
noting the potential outcomes utilised in Isen, Nygren and Ashby‘s study took the form of 
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course credits rather than a small cash balance. It would seem likely that the former 
incentive would be considered more important that the latter. Loss of extra course credit 
would, after all, seem likely to loom larger and pose a greater threat to one‘s positive mood 
state than the loss of a small monetary balance funded by someone other than oneself. 
Therefore, it may be the case that the effect of exogenous versus endogenous happiness on 
risky choice depends on incentive and the importance of gains and losses.  
 
Summary of Conclusions 
 
This study was undertaken with three overarching objectives in mind: 1) to test the 
efficacy of a procedure designed to induce task-endogenous affect in participants taking 
part in the lottery choice task; 2) to ascertain whether ratings of happiness and sadness 
have any relationship with performance on the lottery choice task; and 3) to ascertain 
whether exogenous and endogenous affect impact differently upon performance on the 
lottery choice task. It was also this study‘s intention to examine whether the findings of 
Studies 1 and 2 could, in terms response time, risk seeking and rate of dominance 
violation, be replicated 
 
With regard to the first of these aims, the data obtained in this study strongly 
suggests that the affect induction procedure is effective in inducing small increases and 
decreases in happiness amongst those in the Win and Loss conditions respectively. 
Although it should of course be noted that not all participants reported a change in 
happiness. The procedure also seems to have been successful in reducing ratings of sadness 
amongst those in the Win condition, but not in increasing ratings of sadness amongst those 
in the Loss condition. Hence, it is felt that it can be concluded that the affect elicitation 
procedure is – in its present state – a useful method of inducing endogenous happiness. 
However, it does not seem to have been effective at inducing endogenous sadness. Higher 
ratings of disappointment were reported by those in the Loss condition; but while 
disappointment and sadness could both be classed as negative emotions, they are distinct 
affective states. 
 
In terms of the second and third aim, task exogenous happiness and task 
endogenous happiness were found to have very different relationships with task 
performance. Incidental happiness was, as predicted, found to positively correlate with rate 
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of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs. This is consistent with Bless and 
colleagues proposition that positive affective states tend to correspond with greater reliance 
on associative, top-down, general knowledge structures (see  Bless et al. 1996; Bless & 
Schwarz, 1999) and the findings of de Vries, Holland and Witteman (2008a, 2008b). 
However, the relationship between endogenous happiness and performance was quite 
different, with change in happiness correlating negatively with rate of dominance violation 
for asymmetric-outcome pairs and positively with response time for asymmetric-outcome 
pairs. This would seem to suggest that task-endogenous increases in happiness tended to 
correspond with greater deliberation and cognitive effort. It is therefore proposed that 
while incidental (i.e. exogenous) happiness may correspond with greater reliance on 
System 1 processes, task-induced (i.e. endogenous) happiness serves to motivate greater 
engagement with the task. As noted above however, the possibility that numeracy mediates 
the relationship between happiness and performance on the lottery choice task cannot be 
entirely ruled out and so further investigation of this potential confound is needed (see 
Chapter 8). 
 
The fact that the findings of Study 2 were replicated with regard to dominance 
violation, response time and stimulus complexity serves to lend further support to the 
probability neglect hypothesis and the postulation that there exist a System 1/System 2 
between dominance violators and dominance adherers. However, findings regarding risk 
and propensity to violate dominance were not replicated here. It is though suggested that 
the fact that the outcome values utilised in the present study‘s lottery pairs were lower by a 
factor of ten than those used in Study 2‘s stimuli may have impacted upon the risk 
preference of participants, especially dominance adherers. 
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Chapter 8: Study 6 
 
The data obtained in Study 5 suggests that incidental and task-induced happiness 
have a very different relationship with task performance. However, the possibility that 
numeracy mediated the relationship between task-induced happiness and dominance 
violation/adherence, could not be discarded based on the findings of Study 5 alone. It is 
therefore intended that this study will further explore the relationship between numeracy, 
affect and choice. In addition to this, the study will also investigate the possible influences 
of cognitive reflection and reward on performance on the lottery choice task. 
 
Numeracy, Dominance and Probability Neglect 
 
As previously detailed in Chapters 3 – 7, the findings of Studies 1, 2, 4 and 5 
provide clear evidence that probability neglect is the primary cause of dominance violation 
on the lottery choice task. In addition to this, the response time data gathered in Studies 2 
and 5 strongly suggests that dominance violators tend to rely on consistently fast, 
cognitively undemanding choice processes. The response times of dominance adherers on 
the other hands suggest that they tend to vary the amount of cognitive effort expended on 
the choice task, depending on whether an objectively dominant alternative could be 
identified. It was concluded that this was evidence of a System 1/System 2 split between 
dominance violators and dominance adherers (see Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion 
of dual-process models; for primary sources see Epstein, 1994; Evans, 2006; Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002; Sloman, 1996 and Stanovich & West, 2000, 2008). Dominance violators, 
it seemed, were more apt to rely on consistently fast, cognitively undemanding intuitive 
processes (consistent with the conceptualisation of System 1). Dominance adherers, on the 
other hand, appeared to exercise greater deliberation in instances where no clearly 
dominant alternative existed (consistent with the conceptualisation of System 2). These 
conclusions were in line with prior research conducted by Denes-Raj & Epstein (1994), 
who linked denominator neglect in the jelly beans task to reliance on an intuitive, 
experiential mode of thought in which choice was driven by affective feeling towards the 
alternatives presented. Subsequent research conducted by Peters et al. (2006) revealed that 
less numerate participants were more likely to engage in denominator neglect and – as a 
group – report less precise affective feelings towards the available alternatives than more 
numerate participants. Hence, it was concluded that a similar phenomenon (i.e. probability 
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neglect) induced by the same factors (i.e. a reliance on an intuitive ‗System 1‘ mode of 
thought which, when the choice information presented is probabilistic in nature, tends to 
correspond with lower levels of numeracy) was responsible for the violation of dominance 
observed in Study 2. The link between probability neglect and numeracy receiving further 
support from the verbal data gathered in Study 4. 
 
Exogenous versus endogenous affect 
 
As previously discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 7, Bless and colleagues (e.g. 
Bless et al. 1996; Bless & Schwarz, 1999) proposed a link between  affective state and 
mode of thought. Positive affective states, it was claimed, were apt to induce reliance on 
associative, top-down processes analogous with System 1. Depressed negative affective 
states on the other hand were linked to bottom-up processes (i.e. consistent with the 
utilisation of deliberative System 2). This proposition has been supported by the work of 
de Vries, Holland and Witteman (2008a), who obtained evidence to suggest that positive 
mood states lead to greater reliance on intuitive, affect driven System 1 processes. In 
another study, de Vries, Holland and Witteman (2008b) observed that ‗happy‘ participants 
rated their choices more favourably when instructed to base their decisions on intuition 
rather than deliberation, with the reverse being true for those in ‗sad‘ mood states. 
 
The results of Study 5 indicated the existence of a positive correlation between 
ratings of incidental (i.e. exogenous) happiness and dominance violation for asymmetric-
outcome pairs. Dominance violations for asymmetric-outcome pairs of the type presented 
in Studies 2, 4 and 5 has, as previously discussed, been linked to probability neglect and 
(non-normative) reliance on intuitive, affect-driven System 1 processes. This would seem 
to be in keeping with the link between positive affect and System 1 processes suggested by 
the findings of Bless et al. (1996) and de Vries, Holland and Witteman (2008a, 2008b). 
However, contrary to expectations, task-induced (i.e. endogenous) ‗change in happiness‘ 
was found to have a) a negative correlation with rate of dominance violation for 
asymmetric outcome pairs; and b) a positive correlation with response time for 
asymmetric-outcome pairs. Thus, while exogenous happiness appeared to be consistent 
with reliance on System 1 processes, endogenous happiness appeared to be consistent with 
utilisation of cognitively effortful System 2 processes. On considering on why this might 
be the case, it was hypothesised that those who had experienced an increase in happiness as 
226 
 
a result of taking part in the task might have been subsequently more motivated to expend 
cognitive effort on the task. This suggestion is consistent with Bless et al.‘s (1996) 
assertion that motivational factors may diminish the relationship between positive affect 
and reliance on associative, top down processes. It would also seem to be in keeping with 
Zeelenberg et al‘s (2008) postulation that certain exogenous and endogenous emotional 
states influence choice (and behaviour in general) in a different manner (see Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 7). 
 
Of course, the conclusions drawn in the preceding chapter regarding the 
relationship between exogenous and endogenous happiness and performance on the lottery 
choice task are based upon the findings of just a single study. A replication is therefore 
necessary to further substantiate these conclusions. 
 
Numeracy and Affect 
 
In evaluating the relationship between affect and choice obtained in Study 5, one 
potential confound that was identified and could not be entirely mitigated was the 
possibility that numeracy may act as a mediating factor. This is to say that the correlation 
between ‗change in happiness‘ and rate of dominance violation observed in the study could 
conceivably be a result of more numerate participants being more prone to enjoying the 
lottery choice games than less numerate participants. In Study 2 numeracy was found to 
have a strong correlation with rate of dominance violation and it would seem plausible that 
those who are more numerate would enjoy taking part in a task involving the presentation 
of probabilistic information than those who are less numerate. The fact that the affect 
elicitation procedure appears to have been the primary cause of ‗change in happiness‘ – 
with those in the win condition reporting higher levels of happiness post affect elicitation 
than those in the loss condition – suggests that this was not in fact the case. Indeed, when 
initial rating of happiness was controlled for, a near-significant effect of affect elicitation 
condition was found on rate of dominance violation. 
 
The possibility that numeracy may exercise some influence on affective state 
cannot however be discounted. Therefore, it was felt that any extension of the investigation 
conducted in Study 5 should include the expanded numeracy scale. This would a) provide 
an opportunity to check that the strong negative correlation between numeracy and rate of 
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dominance violation observed in Study 2 is replicable; and b) allow numeracy level to be 
controlled for when examining the relationship between affective state and rate of 
dominance violation. 
 
Cognitive Reflection and Mode of Thought 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Frederick (2005) holds that many erroneous responses 
on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) can be attributed to a failure to inhibit and reflect 
upon prepotent, associatively cued responses. As one might imagine, Frederick links these 
associatively cued errors to the output of intuitive, automatic System 1, and normatively 
correct responses to the utilisation of deliberative, rule-based System 2. Frederick also 
reports a) a strong correlation between score on the CRT and several measures of 
intelligence; and b) a tendency for those scoring higher on the CRT to demonstrate a lower 
level of temporal discounting than those scoring lower. Though items on the CRT have 
been included in the numeracy scale used by Peters et al.‘s (2007), Frederick posits that 
while CRT score is related to mathematical ability, cognitive reflection represents a 
distinct component of cognitive ability. 
 
In terms of the present programme of research, it would seem plausible that – 
should previous conclusions regarding dominance violation and System 1 be correct – 
those scoring higher on the CRT will be less prone to dominance violation than those 
scoring lower on the CRT. If performance on the CRT is not solely a measure of numeracy 
then one would anticipate that CRT score would negatively correlate with rate of 
dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs when score on the expanded numeracy 
scale is controlled for. 
 
Hedonic versus Utilitarian Rewards 
 
So far in this series of studies, those investigations in which the lottery choice task 
has been used (Studies 1, 2, 4 and 5) have featured purely monetary outcomes. However, 
the findings of a series of investigations carried out by Dhar & Wertenbroch (2000) 
suggests that the type of outcome/incentive utilised can have a strong influence on the 
choice process. 
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Dhar & Wertenbroch (2000) presented participants with choices between hedonic 
and utilitarian rewards: a hedonic good being one that is perceived as being enjoyable, 
pleasant and appealing to the senses, while a utilitarian good is classified as one that is 
useful and practical. It was subsequently found that in acquisition choices more 
participants selected the utilitarian item, but that in forfeiture choices more participants 
elected to keep the hedonic item. Dhar & Wertenbroch posit that this is the result of 
forfeiture scenarios evoking affective feelings towards the potential loss of the respective 
items. As hedonic items are by definition more affectively salient than utilitarian items, 
this leads to the potential loss of a hedonic item having greater negative affective impact 
than the potential loss of a utilitarian item. 
 
To the researcher‘s knowledge, the possible relationship between ‗incentive type‘ 
(i.e. hedonic versus utilitarian) and propensity to demonstrate thought biases has not, to 
date, been investigated. However, it would seem possible that affectively salient hedonic 
rewards may tend to induce greater reliance on affect driven choice processes, while 
affectively pallid utilitarian rewards do not. As previously noted, de Vries, Holland and 
Witteman‘s (2008b) found that participants tended to rate their chosen rewards more 
highly when their (task exogenous) mood state (happy versus sad) ‗matched‘ the choice 
processes (intuitive versus deliberative) they were asked to utilise to select said prize. 
Hence, one might speculate that type of incentive (affectively salient hedonic items versus 
affectively pallid utilitarian items) may have a similar relationship with process. 
 
With respect to the lottery selection task it might therefore be anticipated that 
participants playing for affectively salient hedonic items may be more likely to rely upon 
affect-driven, System 1 processes than those playing for utilitarian items. 
 
Modifications to the Affect Elicitation Procedure 
 
As noted in the discussion of Study 5‘s findings (see Chapter 7), the affect 
elicitation procedure developed for use in that investigation would appears to have been 
successful in inducing increases and decreases in happiness. However, the procedure does 
not appear to have been successful in inducing increases in sadness amongst those assigned 
to the loss condition. While it is acknowledged that this may simply be the result of the 
lottery choice not being apt to induce sadness or – barring disappointment – negative 
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affective states in general, it is also possible that at least one change could be made to the 
task in order to induce (mild) negative affect.  
 
In Study 5 the affect elicitation block of lottery choices was structured so that the 
running balances of those in the loss condition remained above zero. As the balances were 
not funded by the participants themselves it is possible that final balances – while reduced 
– were ultimately viewed by at least some of those in the loss condition as an acquisition. 
Hence, it is possible that negative affective states would be more likely to be induced if 
balances were ‗fixed‘ to go below zero. 
 
Aims and Hypotheses 
 
The present study‘s overarching aim is to expand upon the investigation conducted in 
Study 5. As such six specific objectives can be identified. 
 
1. To ascertain whether the findings of Study 5 regarding affect, dominance violation, 
response time and risk seeking are replicable. 
 
2. To further test the replicability of Study 2‘s findings regarding the relationship 
between numeracy and rate of dominance violation. 
 
3. To ascertain whether the relationship between change in happiness and task 
performance observed in Study 5 will persist when numeracy is controlled for. 
 
4. To ascertain whether ensuring that the balances of participants in the loss condition 
go below zero in the affect elicitation stage of the experiment will succeed in 
inducing mild levels of sadness. 
 
5. To ascertain whether cognitive reflection has a relationship with dominance 
violation/adherence separable from that of numeracy. 
 
6. To investigate whether type of reward (i.e. hedonic versus utilitarian) has an effect 
on task performance. 
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Drawing upon the results of Studies 1- 5 and the findings of prior published research, 
the following hypotheses are proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Numeracy will negatively correlate with rate of dominance violation. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Score on the CRT will correlate negatively with rate of dominance 
violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs and this will persist when numeracy is controlled 
for. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Initial ratings of happiness will positively correlate with rate of 
dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: ‗Change in happiness‘ will negatively correlate with rate of dominance 
violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs. 
 
Hypothesis 3c: The correlation between ‗change in happiness‘ and rate of dominance 
violation will persist when numeracy and score on the CRT controlled for. 
 
Hypothesis 4: ‗Change in happiness‘ will positively correlate with response time for 
asymmetric-outcome pairs. 
 
Hypothesis 5: That the amended affect elicitation procedure will succeed in inducing a 
mean increase in sadness and other negative affective states amongst those in the loss 
condition.  
 
Hypothesis 6: That participants playing for hedonic items will be more prone to 
dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs than participants playing for utilitarian 
items. 
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8.2. Methodology 
 
Participants 
 
59 participants (31 female and 28 male) took part in the experiment. Age at time of 
study was recorded for 56 out of 59 participants. Of these 56 participants, ages ranged 18 
to 55 with a mean of 27. All participants were staff and students at the University of 
Bolton. Participants were recruited both directly from lecture groups and via an email sent 
to a pool of students who had previously expressed a wish to receive information about 
research participation opportunities. Due to the deceptive element employed in this and the 
preceding study it was stipulated that no participant who had taken part in Study 5 would 
be permitted take part in the present study. 
 
Design 
 
The study employed a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 3 design with outcome (win versus loss), 
reward (hedonic versus utilitarian), numeracy (high versus low) and CRT score (score of 
zero versus score above zero) as between group‘s factors; and stimulus complexity (single 
versus asymmetric versus two) as repeated measures variables. The dependent variables 
measured were rate of dominance violation, response time and mood state (i.e. self-
reported levels of Happiness, Sadness, Relief, Disappointment, Elation, Irritation, Anxiety 
and Excitement).  
 
Materials and Stimuli 
 
Lottery choice task. 
 
The experiment was a modified version of that utilised in the previous study and 
was created and amended using Visual Basic Express Edition 2008 (Microsoft, Redmond, 
WA, USA). The stimuli (i.e. lottery pairs) employed in the present study were thus 
identical to those employed in Study 5 (though the presentation order of the target stimuli 
was, as described in the procedure section below, changed). Half of the pairs in this section 
featured potential wins and half potential losses. The outcome values of the win pairs were 
mirrored in the loss pairs. 
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Table 8.2.1 below details the number of each stimulus type utilised in the practice, 
affect elicitation and target blocks. As one can see, the target block featured 14 pairs with a 
dominance alternative (6 of which were asymmetric-outcome pairs) and 24 pairs without a 
dominant alternative. 
 
Table 8.2.1: Number of Single, Two and Asymmetric Outcome pairs presented in 
each block 
 Single-outcome Asymmetric-outcome Two-outcome 
 Dom alt. No dom 
alt 
Dom alt. No dom 
alt 
Dom alt. No dom 
alt 
Practice 
block 
 
- 2 - 1 - 1 
Affect 
elicitation 
block 
- 6 - 4 2 8 
 
Target 
block 
4 8 6 8 4 8 
 
 
While the results of the previous study demonstrated a clear increase in happiness 
amongst those in the Win and decrease in happiness amongst those in the loss condition 
following the affect elicitation procedure, it was – as detailed in the previous chapter – also 
found that participants‘ self-reported levels of happiness and sadness tended to regress 
back towards what they had been at the outset by the end of the experiment. This suggests 
that the change in emotional state induced by the procedure begins to ‗wear off‘ at some 
point during the target block. Thus, the decision was made in the present experiment to 
structure the order of stimulus presentation so that the first half and second half of the 
target block featured an identical number of the different types of stimuli (e.g. 2 Single-
outcome lottery pairs featuring a dominant alternative in the first half of the block and 2 
Single-outcome lottery pairs featuring a dominant alternative in the second half of the 
block.  
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Mood rating. 
 
The mood rating scales utilised in the present study were amended, so that 
participants were required to rate their levels of happiness, sadness, relief, disappointment, 
elation, irritation, excitement and anxiety at all three mood rating points. This was done so 
that ‗change in state‘ could be calculated for all emotions listed. Though most of the 
findings reported in this study concern happiness and sadness only, it was felt that it would 
be prudent to also a) measure change in all emotional states; and b) gauge levels of anxiety 
and excitement.  
 
Numeracy test and CRT. 
 
As stated in the introduction both the Expanded Numeracy Scale detailed in 
Chapter 5 and the three items that comprise Frederick‘s (2005) Cognitive Reflection Task 
were presented to participants as a single test (see Appendix J for a full sample). 
 
Procedure 
 
Prior to the start of the experiment participants were randomly assigned to one of 
four conditions Hedonic-Win, Hedonic-Loss, Utilitarian-Win or Utilitarian-Loss. This was 
done by asking participants to make a blind draw from a bag of numbered tickets. 
Participants were then seated in front of a computer running the version of the experiment 
to which they had been allocated and asked to choose, via an onscreen prompt one of three 
prizes to play for. For those in the hedonic conditions these prizes were tokens for DVDs, 
music CDs or confectionary. For those in the Utilitarian conditions they were tokens for 
stationery, blank writable CDs and home cleaning products.  
 
It should be noted that the type of tokens offered as prizes in the hedonic and 
utilitarian conditions was determined by the findings of a preliminary investigation, in 
which a group of participants had been asked to rate the usefulness and enjoyableness of a 
series of goods. Hedonic items were selected on the basis that they had received high 
enjoyableness ratings and comparatively low usefulness ratings. Utilitarian items were 
selected on the basis that they had received high usefulness ratings and comparatively low 
enjoyableness ratings. This investigation is fully detailed in Appendix K. 
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After selecting the prize vouchers that they wished to play for, participants were 
presented with onscreen instructions. The instructions informed them that they were about 
to play two sets of lottery choice games in which they would be presented with a series of 
lottery pairs from which they had to choose the alternative they would prefer to play. They 
were told that in the first set of games a ticket would be drawn by the computer after every 
selection and that their balance credited, debited or left unaltered accordingly. With regard 
to the second set they were told that they would make all choices consecutively without 
any ticket draw. Once they had made all of their selections a ticket number along with a 
game would be randomly selected by the computer and that their balance would be 
debited, credited or left unaltered accordingly. Participants were also informed that they 
would receive their final voucher balance for one of the two blocks once they had 
completed the experiment providing that the balance for the selected block was above zero. 
 
  After reading the instructions participants were required to tick an onscreen box in 
order to confirm that they wished to take part in the study. 
 
Once participants had signalled that they wished to proceed with the study, they 
were asked to rate their levels of happiness, sadness, relief, disappointment, elation, 
irritation, excitement and anxiety on seven point scales. On these scales points were 
labelled 0 to 6, with 0 indicating that they were not presently experiencing the emotion at 
all and 6 indicating that they were experiencing a high level of the emotion.  
 
Participants were then presented with a demonstration game. This demonstration 
was identical to that used in Study 5, with the exception that the hypothetical onscreen 
balance represented the monetary worth of the participant‘s chosen vouchers as oppose to 
money in and of itself. Throughout the experiment a picture representing the item the 
participant was playing for vouchers of was placed next to the running balance in order to 
render the nature of the goods played for more salient (i.e. to induce participants to think of 
the balance as representing tokens for particular hedonic or utilitarian goods as oppose to 
money). In the demonstration participants were prompted by onscreen annotations to make 
a choice by clicking the radio box next to their preferred lottery and then clicking a button 
to confirm their selection. Once they had made their choice a ticket (pre-selected to 
correspond with a win) was drawn and their onscreen balance adjusted accordingly.  
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Following the demonstration, participants were presented with five questions about 
how probability and outcome value operated within the context of the game. All questions, 
which were the same as those utilised in the previous study, had a multiple choice format 
(see Appendix G). If a correct response was given to a question then participants were 
informed onscreen that they had made the correct choice and were allowed to proceed to 
the next question. If an incorrect response was given a screen appeared informing them 
that their answer was incorrect and detailing how the correct response could be derived. 
They were then required to answer the question again. This procedure was repeated until 
the correct answer had been given. 
 
After completing all five questions, participants were presented with four practice 
games. These games proceeded in much the same fashion as the demonstration (though 
without the onscreen prompts and annotations that appeared in the demonstration). 
Participants chose their preferred lottery from the pairs with which they were presented 
and a ticket was drawn after each selection. Participants‘ balances (hypothetical in this 
section) were then credited, debited or left unchanged accordingly. The ticket selection was 
fixed in this section to ensure that participants incurred one loss and one win. 
 
Participants were then informed onscreen that they were about to begin the first 
block of games that might have a real outcome. After indicating that they were ready to 
begin by clicking on a ‗start‘ button, participants were presented with a series of 20 lottery 
pairs and required to choose from each the lottery that they would prefer to play. After 
each selection a ticket was drawn and displayed onscreen by the program. The participant‘s 
onscreen balance was then adjusted accordingly. The ticket draws for games 1 - 18 in this 
block were fixed in order to a) keep participants‘ balances within a certain range until the 
final pair and b) expose them to both small wins and small losses in an attempt to induce 
emotional involvement in the game. While the games were ‗fixed‘ so that all participants 
would experience some wins and some losses in games 1 - 18, the program ensured that 
those in the win condition experienced more wins than losses and those in the loss 
condition more losses than wins. On the 19
th
 game those in the win condition were 
presented with the lottery pair depicted in Figure 8.2.1 below and the program with preset 
to select ticket 13. In the 20
th
 game these participants were presented with the lottery pair 
depicted in Figure 8.2.2 and the program was preset to select a winning ticket. Those in the 
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loss condition were presented with the pairs depicted in Figure 8.2.1 and Figure 8.2.2 in 
the reverse order, narrowly missing the 19
th
 gain and incurring a loss in the 20
th
 game. For 
those in the loss condition the outcomes of previous lotteries presented in the block were 
such that the loss incurred here took their balance below zero. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2.1: Lottery pair presented to those in the win condition in game 19 and those in 
the loss condition in game 20 
 
 
Figure 8.2.2: Lottery pair presented to those in the win condition in game 20 and those in 
the loss condition in game 19. 
 
After completing the affect elicitation block, participants were asked to rate their 
mood state on a series of scales identical to that presented at the outset. They were then 
informed via an onscreen prompt that they would be presented with another series of 
lottery pairs from each of which they would have to choose that which they would prefer to 
play. It was also reiterated that this time there would be no ticket draw after each choice, 
but that a single game and a single ticket number would be drawn by the program once all 
38 choice had been made and that their final balance for this block would be £3:00 plus or 
minus any gains or losses incurred in their chosen lottery for that particular game. When all 
38 selections had been made, participants were required to complete the mood rating scale 
for a final time. This final rating of mood was included in order to gauge whether any 
changes in mood state induced by the affect elicitation procedure had endured or 
diminished during the target block.  
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Once the final rating of mood was complete one of the two lottery pairs depicted in 
Figure 8.2.3 was selected at random by the computer as was a ticket number between 1 and 
20. The participant‘s balance was then increased or decreased if the ticket drawn 
corresponded with a win or loss in their chosen lottery of the pair. Participants were then 
informed onscreen that they would receive their balance for the second block of games. 
 
Responses and response times were recorded by the program for both the affect elicitation 
and Target blocks of the experiment. 
 
After completing the experiment participants were then asked to fill out a 
demographic details form and given a booklet containing the Expanded Numeracy Scale 
and CRT questions. The experimenter requested that they answer as many of the questions 
as they were able to. Once the test had been completed participants were paid £2 in cash 
along with their final balance for the Target block. The first 40 participants received their 
balance for the Target block as tokens, which could be used at a number of different retail 
outlets, while the remaining participants received their balance in cash (this was the result 
of the tokens purchased for the experiment expiring). Participants were then given a 
debriefing sheet (see Appendix L) and thanked for taking part. 
 
8.3. Results 
 
Of the 59 participants who took part in the study 58 provided usable numeracy 
scale and CRT data, while 57 provided usable data for the lottery choice task. All provided 
usable mood rating data. 
 
Numeracy and CRT 
 
Descriptive statistics. 
 
Table 8.3.1: Average score on the expanded numeracy scale and CRT (N = 58) 
 Mean (sd) Median 
Expanded numeracy scale 15.21 (2.96) 16 
Cognitive reflection task (CRT)     .57 (  .88)   0 
Combined numeracy and CRT 15.78 (3.46) 16 
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Table 8.3.1 above details, the mean number of questions answered correctly on the 
expanded numeracy scale and the cognitive reflection task. As one can see, median score 
for the CRT was 0, indicating that the majority of participants did not answer any of the 
CRT questions correctly.  
 
The total number of participants who answered each of the CRT questions correctly 
is reported in Table 8.3.2 below. As one see, for each individual question the number of 
participants who responded correctly is relatively low. Of the 58 participants who 
completed the expanded numeracy scale and CRT only 21 answered one or more CRT 
questions correctly. 
 
Table 8.3.2: Frequency with which each CRT question was answered correctly 
Question Total correct (N = 58) 
A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat costs £1.00 more 
than the ball. How much does the ball cost? 
 
8 
If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long 
would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?  
12 
 
In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch 
doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the 
entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half 
of the lake?  
13 
 
Correlation between numeracy and CRT. 
 
A preliminary inspection of scores on the expanded numeracy scale revealed two 
outliers far below the mean. These two cases were removed from the following analysis. 
  
As one might anticipate, a reasonably strong correlation was found between score 
on the expanded numeracy scale and score on the CRT (N = 56, r = .516, r
2
 =.266, p ≤ 
.001). The strength of this correlation indicates that while the two scales share variance 
they are not collinear.  
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Scale reliability. 
 
The value of Cronbach‘s alpha for the 19 items on the expanded numeracy scale 
was .746, indicating a very similar level of internal consistency to that observed in Study 3. 
This would seem to constitute further evidence of the scales reliability. 
 
When the 3 items on the CRT were added to the expanded numeracy scale, the 
value of alpha rose slightly to .783. Nonetheless, further analysis of the data gathered in the 
present study will evaluate the relationship between score on the CRT and performance 
and score on the expanded numeracy scale and performance separately.  
 
Affect Elicitation 
 
 
Figure 8.3.1: Mean self-reported ratings of happiness for those in the win condition and 
those in the loss condition at each of the three mood rating points (i.e. start, post affect 
elicitation and finish) 
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Figure 8.3.2: Mean self-reported ratings of sadness for those in the win condition and those 
in the loss condition at each of the three mood rating points (i.e. start, post affect elicitation 
and finish) 
  
Figures 8.3.1 and 8.3.2 above depict the mean ratings of happiness and sadness for 
those in the win condition and those in the loss condition at each of the three mood rating 
points. As expected, the average rating of happiness for those in the win condition was 
higher post affect elicitation than at the start; while the average rating of sadness was lower 
post affect elicitation than it was at the start. For those in the loss condition the reverse is 
observed, with an increase in mean rating of sadness and decrease in mean rating of 
happiness occurring between the start and post affect elicitation ratings. However, as was 
the case in Study 5, mean ratings of happiness and sadness at the finish suggest a reversion 
or partial reversion of happiness and sadness to their initial level.  
 
Table 8.3.3 below details the mean rating of each emotional state listed on the post 
affect elicitation mood rating scale for those in the win condition and those in the loss 
condition. The table also details the significance and magnitude of the difference in post 
affect elicitation mood ratings between the two groups when initial ratings were controlled 
for. The analysis used for this purpose was a 2x2 ANCOVA, in which affect elicitation 
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condition (win versus loss) and reward condition (hedonic versus utilitarian) were entered 
as between groups factors, rating of mood post affect elicitation as a dependent variable 
and initial rating of mood as a covariate.  
 
Table 8.3.3: Difference in post affect elicitation rating of mood between those in the win 
condition and those in the loss condition when initial rating of mood is controlled for (N = 59) 
 Mean rating of mood post affect 
elicitation 
ANCOVA 
 Win condition 
(N = 30) 
Loss condition 
(N = 29) 
F Sig. Partial eta 
squared 
Happiness 4.57 (1.17) 1.93 (1.60) 80.314 ≤ .001 .598 
Sadness   .37 (  .81) 1.41 (1.72) 12.830  ≤ .001 .192 
Relief 3.03 (1.60) 1.28 (1.65) 23.657 ≤ .001 .305 
Disappointment   .50 (  .73) 2.28 (2.00) 21.471 ≤ .001 .284 
Elation 3.17 (1.49) 1.07 (1.51) 33.950  ≤ .001 .386 
Irritation   .43 (  .93) 1.86 (1.75) 25.568 ≤ .001 .321 
Excitement 3.47 (1.53) 1.38 (1.66) 34.599 ≤ .001 .391 
Anxiety   .77 (1.14) 1.41 (1.77)   5.584    .020 .094 
 
As one can see, ratings of post affect elicitation happiness, relief, elation and 
excitement were significantly higher for those in the win condition than those in the loss 
condition. By contrast ratings of sadness, disappointment, irritation and anxiety were 
significantly higher for those in the loss condition than those in the win condition. This 
would seem to indicate that, as anticipated, those in the win condition tended to experience 
more happiness (and other positive affective states) than those in the loss condition, with 
the reverse being true for sadness (and other negative affective states). 
 
While reward condition was entered as a variable in the analysis detailed above it 
was not found to interact with affect elicitation condition with regard to any of the eight 
ratings of mood. A main effect of reward condition was found for post affect elicitation 
ratings of anxiety (N = 59, F(4, 54) = 4.008, p ≤ .05, partial eta squared = .069), with those 
in utilitarian condition reporting a slightly higher mean level of anxiety (m = 1.41, sd = 
1.76) than those in the hedonic condition (m = .77, sd = 1.16). However, no main effect of 
reward was found for any other mood state. 
 
In order to fully test whether – as Hypothesis 5 predicts – the amended affect 
elicitation procedure was successful in inducing sadness in those in the loss condition the, 
datafile was split by affect elicitation condition (win versus loss). Two paired samples t-
tests with Bonferroni correction (p = .025) were then performed, comparing level of 
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sadness reported in the initial mood rating with level of sadness reported post affect 
elicitation for those in the win condition and those in the loss condition. As anticipated, the 
difference between initial and post affect elicitation ratings of sadness was significant for 
those in the loss condition (N = 29, df = 28, t = -3.073, p ≤ .01, r = .502), with mean post 
affect elicitation rating of sadness (m = 1.42, sd = 1.72) being higher than mean initial 
rating of sadness (m = .41, sd = .78). For those in the win condition mean sadness was 
higher in the initial mood rating (m = .63, sd = .93) than the post affect elicitation mood 
rating (m = .37, sd = .81). This difference was again significant (N = 30, df = 29, t = 3.247, 
p ≤ .01, r = .56). Hypothesis 5 is therefore supported. 
 
It is also worth noting that the reverse pattern was, as one might guess, observed for 
initial and post affect elicitation ratings of happiness. For those in the win condition mean 
initial rating of happiness (m = 3.4, sd = 1.4) was less than mean post affect elicitation 
rating (m = 4.57, sd = 1.17), a difference that was significant (N = 30, df =29, t = -4.958, p 
≤ .001, r = .68). For those in the loss condition meanwhile, mean initial rating of happiness 
(m = 3.38, sd = 1.4) was higher than mean post affect elicitation rating of happiness (m = 
1.93, sd = 1.6). Once again, this difference was significant (N =29, df = 28, t = 6.432, p ≤ 
.001, r = .78). This finding further supports the efficacy of the affect elicitation procedure. 
 
In order to determine whether task-induced changes in happiness persisted until the 
experiment‘s finish an ANCOVA was performed, with rating of happiness at finish entered 
as dependent variable, affect elicitation condition as a between groups factor and rating of 
happiness at start as a covariate. A significant effect of affect elicitation condition on 
happiness rating at finish was found (N = 59, F(1, 56) = 8.753, p ≤ .01, partial eta squared 
= .135), indicating that change in happiness induced by the affect elicitation procedure did, 
at least to an extent, endure to the end of the target block. However, it should be noted that 
the size of this effect is far smaller than that between those in the win condition and those 
in the loss condition immediately post affect elicitation (see Table 8.3.3), suggesting that a 
reversion to initial state was taking place. 
 
To examine whether task-induced changes in sadness persisted until the finish, a 
second ANCOVA was performed. Sadness rating at finish was entered as a dependent 
variable, affect elicitation condition as a between groups factor and rating of sadness at the 
start as a covariate. No significant difference was found between the final sadness ratings 
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of those in the win condition and those in the loss condition (N = 59, F(1, 56) = 1.075, p > 
.05). This indicates that changes in sadness induced by the affect elicitation procedure did 
not endure to the end of the experiment.  
 
Numeracy, Cognitive Reflection and Dominance  
 
Numeracy. 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that numeracy would negatively correlate with rate of 
dominance violation. A Pearson‘s Product Moment test (one-tailed) revealed that this was 
indeed the case, both for dominance violation in general (N = 54, r = -.472, r
2
 = .223, p ≤ 
.001) and dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs specifically (N = 54, r = -
.434, r
2 
= .188, p ≤ .001).  
 
Score on the expanded numeracy test was transformed into a binary variable (more 
numerate versus less numerate). As was the case in Study 2, those with a score of 16 or 
less (N = 32) were categorised as less numerate and those with a score of 17 or more (N = 
24) as more numerate. Figure 8.3.3 below illustrates the mean rate of dominance violation 
for more and less numerate participants. 
 
Figure 8.3.3: Mean rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs (stimuli = 
6) for more and less numerate participants. 
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An independent samples t-test revealed that less numerate participants has a 
significantly higher rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs than more 
numerate participants (N = 54, df = 51.1, t = -2.664, p ≤ .01, r = .35)  
 
Cognitive reflection. 
 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that score on the CRT would negatively correlate with rate 
of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs and that this relationship would 
persist when score on the numeracy test was controlled for; thus indicating that CRT score 
is not solely a measure of numeracy.  
 
A Spearman‘s Rho test (one-tailed) revealed a significant negative correlation 
between score on the CRT and rate of dominance violation (N = 56, rho = -.497, p ≤ .001). 
Score on the CRT was then transformed into a binary categorical variable with those 
scoring zero (N = 37) comprising one category and those scoring above (N = 21) 
comprising another. Figure 8.3.4 below illustrates the difference in mean rate of 
dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs between the two groups. 
 
 
Figure 8.3.4: Mean rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs (stimuli = 
6) for those with a CRT score of zero and those with a CRT score above zero. 
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An ANCOVA was performed with CRT performance as a between-groups factor, 
rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs as a dependent variable and 
score on the expanded numeracy scale as a covariate. A significant difference in rate of 
dominance violation was found between the two groups (N = 54, F(2, 51) = 4.947, p ≤ .05, 
partial eta squared = .088). 
 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are thus supported by the data gathered in this investigation. 
 
Affect and Dominance 
 
Correlation between affect and dominance violation. 
 
Hypothesis 3a predicted that initial rating of happiness would positively correlate 
with rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs. Hypothesis 3b on the 
other hand predicted that change in happiness (post affect elicitation rating minus initial 
rating) would negatively correlate with rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-
outcome pairs. 
 
As no relationship between ratings of sadness and rate of dominance violation were 
found in Study 5, no predictions were made on this account in the present study. However, 
it was decided to examine whether – in light of the modifications made to the affect 
elicitation procedure – any such relationship was in evidence in the data gathered here. As 
can be seen from Table 8.3.4 below however no relationship between sadness and rate of 
dominance violation was evident in the present study. 
 
Table 8.3.4: Correlation between mood state ratings and rate of dominance violation for 
asymmetric-outcome pairs (N = 57) 
 r
 
Sig 
Initial rating of happiness (one-tailed) .129 .169 
Change in happiness (one-tailed) -.196
# 
.072 
Initial rating of sadness (two-tailed) .067 .618 
Change in sadness (two-tailed) -.040 .768 
*Significant at ≤ .05 
**Significant at ≤ .01 
#
Approaches significance at ≤ .1 
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Table 8.3.4 above details the correlation between rate of dominance violation for 
asymmetric-outcome pairs and initial happiness rating, initial sadness rating, ‗change in 
happiness‘ and ‗change in sadness‘. As one can see, initial rating of happiness and change 
in happiness both correlated in the expected direction with rate of dominance violation. For 
initial rating of happiness the positive correlation (one-tailed) with rate of dominance 
violation was non-significant. For change in happiness however the negative correlation 
(one-tailed) with rate of dominance violation was marginally significant (N = 57, r = -.196, 
r
2 
= .038, p ≤ .1). 
 
Hypothesis 3a is therefore not supported by the findings of this study. It should be 
noted though that the fact that the correlation – though clearly non-significant – is in the 
expected direction does not contradict it. As the correlation between change in happiness 
and rate of dominance violation does approach significance, Hypothesis 3b could be said to 
be partially supported. 
 
Affect, reward, numeracy, CRT and dominance. 
 
Hypothesis 3c predicted that the correlation between change in happiness and 
dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs would persist when scores on the CRT 
and the expanded numeracy scale were controlled for. As the correlation between ‗change 
in happiness‘ and rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs approached 
significance the decision was taken to proceed with the statistical testing of this hypothesis. 
 
A partial correlation (one-tailed) analysis was conducted, in which rate of 
dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs and change in happiness were entered 
as correlational variables and scores on the CRT and expanded numeracy scale were 
controlled for. This partial correlation was significant (N = 54, df = 50, r = -.324, r
2 
= .105, 
p ≤ .01). Hypothesis 3c is therefore supported. It does not appear that the relationship 
between dominance violation and change in happiness is mediated by numeracy or 
cognitive reflection. 
 
It should also be noted that change in happiness was not found to correlate with 
either CRT score (N = 58, rho = -.018, p > .05) or score on the expanded numeracy scale 
(N = 56, r = -.152, p > .05).  
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As the data gathered in this study strongly suggests that the affect elicitation procedure 
was successful in inducing changes in happiness, it seemed logical to examine whether a 
significant difference in rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs exists 
between those in the win condition and those in the loss condition. Meanwhile, Hypothesis 
6 predicted that participants playing for hedonic rewards would be more prone to 
dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs than participants playing for utilitarian 
rewards. 
 
 Figure 8.3.5 below illustrates the mean rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-
outcome pairs for those in the hedonic-win, hedonic-loss, utilitarian-win and utilitarian-
loss conditions. As one can see mean rate of dominance violation was higher for those in 
the loss condition than the win condition. Contrary to prediction of Hypothesis 6, mean 
rate of dominance violation was also slightly higher for those in utilitarian condition than 
the hedonic condition, but this difference was slight. 
 
 
Figure 8.3.5: Mean rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs by affect 
elicitation condition and reward condition. 
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A 2x2 between groups ANCOVA was subsequently conducted, with rate of 
dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs as a dependent variable, affect 
elicitation condition and reward condition as independent variables and score on CRT and 
score on expanded numeracy scale as covariates. A significant main effect of affect 
elicitation condition was found (N = 54, F(1, 48) = 4.5, p ≤ .05, partial eta squared = .086). 
However, no significant main effect of reward condition was found (N = 54, F(1, 48), = 
2.007, p > .05), nor was there any interaction between affect elicitation condition and 
reward condition (N = 54, F(1, 48) = .012, p > .05). Hypothesis 6 is therefore unsupported 
by these findings, while Hypothesis 3c is further supported. 
 
A second ANCOVA in which affect elicitation condition and binary CRT score 
(score of zero versus score above zero) were entered as independent variables and score on 
numeracy test as a covariate was performed. A marginally significant interaction between 
affect elicitation condition and CRT was found (N = 54, F(1, 49) = 3.722, p ≤ .1 (= .06), 
partial eta squared = .071). As is illustrated in Figure 8.3.6 below, there is little difference 
between rate of dominance violation for those in the win condition and those in the loss 
condition amongst those with a CRT score above 0. However, amongst those with a CRT 
score of zero, rate of dominance violation was higher for those in the loss condition than 
those in the win condition. 
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Figure 8.3.6: Mean rate of dominance violation (asymmetric-outcome pairs only) by affect 
elicitation condition and CRT score. 
 
It is hence felt that it might reasonably be concluded that a) task-induced increases 
in happiness corresponded with a lower rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-
outcome pairs; and b) this correlation was unrelated to numeracy and cognitive reflection, 
which have a quite separate effect on task performance. 
 
Response Time 
 
Affect and response time. 
 
Figure 8.3.7 below illustrates mean response time for single, asymmetric and two-
outcome pairs for those in the win and loss conditions. As was the case in all previous 
studies employing the lottery choice, task response times were (on average) lowest for 
single-outcome pairs and highest for two-outcome pairs. It is also evident that average 
response time was slightly higher for those in the win condition than those in the loss 
condition. 
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Figure 8.3.7: Mean response time for single, asymmetric and two-outcome pairs by affect 
elicitation condition. 
 
A 2x2x3 mixed-factorial ANOVA was conducted with response time as a 
dependent variable, stimulus complexity as a repeated measures variable and affect 
elicitation condition and reward condition as between groups variables. It should be noted 
that the response data from two participants was excluded from analysis due to the 
presence of outliers. A main effect of stimulus complexity was found (N = 55, F(2, 102) = 
94.312, p ≤ .001, partial eta squared = .649). A main effect of affect elicitation condition 
was also found (N = 55, F(1, 51) = 4.619, p ≤ .05, partial eta squared = .083). There was no 
interaction between the two variables (N = 51, F(2, 102) = 1.497, p > .05). 
 
No main effect of reward condition was found with regard to response time (N = 
55, F(1, 51) = 1.404, p > .05), nor was there any interaction between reward condition and 
stimulus complexity (N = 55, F(1, 51) = .176, p > .05). 
 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that– as was the case in Study 5 – response times would (for 
asymmetric-outcome pairs at least) be higher for those reporting a task induced increase in 
happiness than those reporting a task induced decrease in happiness. The finding that those 
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in the win condition had significantly higher response times than those in the loss condition 
lends support to this hypothesis.  
 
Table 8.3.5: Correlation (one-tailed) between change in happiness and response time 
for single, asymmetric and two-outcome pairs 
 r r
2 
Sig. 
Single-outcome  
(N = 55) 
.353** .125 .004 
Asymmetric-
outcome 
(N = 56) 
.394** .155 .001 
Two-outcome 
(N = 56) 
.407*** .166 .001 
Overall  
(N = 56) 
.399*** .159 .001 
*Significant at ≤ .05 (one-tailed) 
**Significant at ≤ .01 (one-tailed) 
***Significant at ≤ .001 (one-tailed) 
 
Further support for Hypothesis 4 comes from the direct positive correlation 
between change in happiness and response time. As detailed in Table 8.3.5 above, change 
in happiness positively correlated with response time for all three stimulus complexity 
conditions. 
 
Numeracy, cognitive reflection and response time. 
 
Table 8.3.6: Correlation (two-tailed) between numeracy and response time for single, 
asymmetric and two-outcome pairs  
 r Sig. 
Single-outcome  
(N = 52) 
.026 .855 
Asymmetric-
outcome 
(N = 53) 
.086 .539 
Two-outcome 
(N = 53) 
.094 .504 
Overall  
(N = 53) 
 .077 .581 
*Significant at ≤ .05 (two-tailed) 
**Significant at ≤ .01 (two-tailed) 
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As one can see from Table 8.3.6 above, numeracy did not significantly correlate 
with response time for any of the stimulus complexity conditions.  Similarly, score on the 
CRT test correlated positively with response time in all stimulus complexity conditions, 
but none of these correlations were significant (see Table 8.3.7 below). 
 
 
Table 8.3.7: Correlation (two-tailed) between score on CRT and response time for 
single, asymmetric and two-outcome pairs  
 Rho Sig. 
Single-outcome  
(N = 54) 
.120 .388 
Asymmetric-
outcome 
(N = 55) 
.212 .120 
Two-outcome 
(N = 55) 
.196 .152 
Overall  
(N = 55) 
.213 .118 
*Significant at ≤ .05 (two-tailed) 
**Significant at ≤ .01 (two-tailed) 
 
8.4. Discussion 
 
This study was, as detailed in the introduction, undertaken in order to fulfil several 
aims. What follows will be a systematic review and discussion of what the findings 
obtained in this investigation suggest with regard to each of the predictions made at the 
outset.  
 
Numeracy, Cognitive Reflection and Dominance 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that, as was the case in Study 2, score on the expanded 
numeracy scale would correlate negatively with rate of dominance violation. The data 
obtained in this study firmly supports this prediction. The strength of the correlation 
between numeracy and rate of dominance violation in the present study was not quite as 
strong as it was in Study 2. However, it seems likely that this is result of the present 
study‘s target block featuring fewer lottery pairs with a dominant alternative (14 pairs, 6 of 
which were asymmetric) than the target set used in Study 2 (24 pairs, 16 of which were 
asymmetric).  
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This finding is in keeping with the postulation that those lower in numeracy are 
more prone to engaging in probability neglect than those who are more numerate. 
 
Hypothesis 2, which predicted that CRT score would correlate with a lower rate of 
dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs and that this correlation would persist 
even when score on the expanded numeracy scale was controlled for, is also supported by 
the findings of this study. Those scoring above zero on the CRT were found to display a 
significantly lower rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs than those 
with a CRT score of zero when numeracy was entered as a covariate. It was also observed 
that while CRT scores and scores on the expanded numeracy scale were strongly correlated 
they were not collinear. 
 
From an individual differences perspective, these results would seem to be in line 
with Frederick‘s (2005) proposition that performance on the CRT, while strongly linked to 
numeracy, does not solely constitute a measure of mathematical ability. On examining the 
relation between CRT score and mark on the mathematical component of the SAT, 
Frederick found a moderately strong – but far from absolute – correlation between the two. 
Though Frederick‘s sample (N = 434) was far larger that employed in present study, this is 
similar to the correlation of between CRT and numeracy score observed here.  
 
The fact that CRT performance had a significant effect on dominance violation that 
persisted when numeracy was controlled for, lends further support to the suggestion that 
dominance violation (for asymmetric-outcome pairs) often results from reliance on 
associative, affect-driven System 1 processes. As mentioned in the introduction, Frederick 
posits that cognitive reflection is a distinct component of cognitive ability that is required 
for the suppression of erroneous ‗intuitive‘ responses.  
 
In terms of performance on the lottery choice task, one might therefore speculate 
that numeracy and cognitive reflection influence performance in a different fashion. It 
would seem possible that those higher in numeracy are less likely to violate dominance 
because they are more likely to have an intuitive preference for the dominant alternative. 
As previously discussed, the findings of Peters and colleagues (Peters et al., 2006) suggest 
that more numerate participants are more likely to draw precise affective meaning from 
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probabilistic information; hence, it would seem possible that they are less likely to 
‗intuitively‘ neglect probability. Cognitive reflection on the other hand is defined as the 
ability to reflect on one‘s responses before responding; with those possessing a higher 
capacity for cognitive reflection being more apt to suppress and override erroneous 
‗intuitive‘ responses. CRT score is of course certainly related to numeracy. Indeed, to 
answer any of the three CRT questions correctly one must be conversant with arithmetic 
and have some knowledge of ratio and proportion. However, in addition to having the 
mathematical ability to provide correct responses to the questions, it seems that many 
respondents must also have the ability suppress erroneous intuitive responses. As 
mentioned above, Frederick proposes this represents a distinct cognitive ability. It might 
therefore be suggested that the relationship between cognitive reflection and dominance 
violation/adherence (that persists when numeracy score is controlled for), is the result of 
those with a greater capacity for cognitive reflection suppressing an intuitive preference for 
the dominated alternative. 
 
One potential problem with this theory however, is that no significant correlation 
was found between CRT and response time for asymmetric-outcome pairs. If erroneous 
intuitive responses were being inhibited and overridden by those higher in CRT score then 
one would anticipate the response times of those scoring above zero on the CRT to be 
higher than response times of those scoring 0. A small non-significant positive correlation 
between CRT score and response time was found (see Table 8.3.6), possibly indicating that 
such a relationship does in fact exist, but that the sample was not large enough for it to be 
detected. However, given that no significant relationship was found in this particular study, 
no firm conclusions can be drawn regarding this possibility.  
 
It is however felt that it can be concluded from the data obtained in this study that 
both numeracy and cognitive reflection are related to propensity to violate dominance. The 
results of this investigation also support the postulation that the CRT is not purely a 
measure of mathematical ability. 
 
Affect and Dominance 
 
In keeping with the findings of Study 5, it was predicted that initial rating of 
happiness would correlate positively with rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-
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outcome pairs (Hypothesis 3a) and that change in happiness would correlate negatively 
with the same (Hypothesis 3b). The first of these hypotheses was not fully supported by the 
evidence obtained in this study. The correlation between rate of dominance violation and 
initial rating of happiness was not significant, though it was in the expected direction. The 
second of these hypotheses did however receive some support. A near-significant negative 
correlation was found between rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs 
and change in happiness. Hence, the findings of Study 5 can be said to have been partially 
replicated by the present investigation.  
 
As previously noted, one of the aims of this study was to examine whether the 
relationship between change in happiness (i.e. task induced happiness) and dominance 
violation would persist when numeracy and CRT score were controlled for. In the 
discussion of Study 5‘s finding (see Chapter 7), the possibility that numeracy may mediate 
the apparent relationship between change in happiness and rate of dominance violation was 
acknowledged. It would not, after all, seem unreasonable to posit that more numerate 
participants might enjoy playing the lottery choice task more than less numerate 
participants due to the task‘s numeric content. As affect elicitation condition had a 
significant and strong effect on rating of post affect elicitation happiness it seemed unlikely 
that numeracy was mediating any changes in ratings of happiness. However, the possibility 
that it may have such an influence could not be wholly discounted based on the findings of 
Study 5 alone.  
 
Hypothesis 3c predicted that change in happiness would continue to correlate 
negatively with rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs when scores on 
the expanded numeracy scale and CRT were controlled for. The results of the present study 
support this hypothesis. When score on the CRT and expanded numeracy scale were 
controlled for, change in happiness was found to have a significant negative correlation 
with rate of dominance violation. In addition to this, change in happiness was also found to 
have no significant or near-significant correlation with score on either of the tests. Thus 
indicating that while change in happiness, CRT score and score on the expanded numeracy 
scale correlate negatively with rate of dominance violation the first of these is unrelated to 
the latter two.   
 
256 
 
Rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs for those in the win 
condition and those in the loss condition was also statistically compared (with score on the 
CRT and expanded numeracy scale controlled for). A significant difference between the 
two groups was found, with those in the win condition having a lower mean rate of 
dominance violation than those in the loss condition. Subsequent analysis indicated that 
this effect only existed for those scoring zero on the CRT. If the postulation that 
dominance violation results from erroneous reliance on intuitive System 1 processes is 
correct, then it would seem reasonable to surmise that task-induced happiness corresponds 
with greater deliberation (i.e. utilisation of System 2 processes). This postulation is further 
supported fact that there was a) a significant effect of affect elicitation condition on 
response time; and b) a positive correlation between change in happiness and response 
time in all three stimulus complexity conditions. It would appear that participants whose 
happiness increased as a result of playing the lottery choice games in the affect elicitation 
condition expended greater cognitive effort on the task.  
 
From a theoretical standpoint, the present study‘s findings regarding affective state 
and choice are not consistent (or at least wholly consistent) with the postulation that 
happiness predisposes individuals to greater reliance on associative top-down processes 
and sadness to reliance on bottom up deliberation of task information (e.g. Bless et al., 
1996; Bless & Schwarz, 1999; deVries, Holland & Witteman, 2008a, 2008b). Rating of 
sadness was not found to have any relationship rate of dominance violation or response 
time; and while initial rating of happiness did have a small positive correlation with rate of 
dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs it was not significant. Instead, task 
induced increases in happiness were found to correspond with a lower rate of dominance 
violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs and higher response times. As stated above, this 
strongly suggests that those experiencing (endogenous) increases happiness tended to 
expend more cognitive effort on the task than those experiencing no change or 
(endogenous) decreases in happiness. In terms of dual-process models of thought, these 
findings would seem to indicate greater utilisation of deliberative, time-consuming System 
2 processes amongst those experiencing task-induced increases in happiness. 
 
With regard to the underlying reason for this apparent relationship between 
utilisation of deliberative processes and endogenous happiness, it is posited that those who 
are made happier during the affect elicitation procedure are more motivated to expend 
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cognitive effort during the target phase. This does not appear to be the case for incidental 
happiness. As was the case in Study 5, initial ratings of happiness had a positive 
correlation with rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs (though this 
correlation did not reach significance in the present study). The fact that the method by 
which happiness was rated was open to some degree of subjectivity (i.e. some participants 
may be more conservative in their ratings of happiness than others despite experiencing a 
similar affective state) is likely to add ‗noise‘ to the ratings. However, even if this is the 
case, one would still not expect initial rating of happiness to correlate with measures of 
performance in the opposite direction to change in happiness if endogenous and exogenous 
happiness had a similar relationship with process. As noted with regard to the findings of 
Study 5, the findings of the present study would seem to be consistent with Zeelenberg et 
al.‘s (2008) postulation that some emotional states can have different effects on behaviour 
when endogenous (task induced) and exogenous (external to the task). In both Study 5 and 
the present study it seems that endogenous increases in happiness motivated the 
expenditure of greater cognitive effort on the task while incidental happiness did not. If, as 
Zeelenberg et al. (2008) suggest, emotions are to be viewed as mechanisms for driving 
goal directed behaviour it would seem reasonable to posit that endogenous happiness may 
act to induce the decision maker to expend more cognitive effort on the task that has 
elicited the happiness. Incidental happiness by contrast may not have such an effect. 
 
Of course, it should be kept in mind that the lottery choice task differs 
fundamentally from Bless et al.‘s (1996) restaurant story recall task and the Iowa 
Gambling Task (used by de Vries, Holland and Witteman, 2008a). When an asymmetric-
outcome pair with a dominant alternative is presented in the lottery choice task, 
participants are visually presented with all the cues they need to discern that one alternative 
is ‗better‘ than the other. In the IGT however there are no explicit cues available as to 
which decks are ‗good‘ and which are ‗bad‘; participants must learn through repeated 
sampling. Similarly, in the restaurant story recall task participants are not provided with 
any explicit visual cues as to whether a certain recollection represents an intrusion error or 
a ‗true recollection‘. Based upon this, one might suggest that happiness may only facilitate 
the utilisation of deliberative, System 2 processes when a cue that one‘s intuitive, System 1 
response ought to be overridden exists. However, this alone would not account for the fact 
that – in both Study 5 and the present study – initial rating of happiness did not have the 
same relationship with performance as change in happiness.  
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While it is clear that questions do remain regarding the differing relationships 
between endogenous versus exogenous happiness and choice process, it is felt that is felt 
that two conclusions can be drawn. The first: that task induced increases in happiness 
corresponded with an average increase in cognitive effort expended on the task. The 
second: that this relationship was not mediated or influenced by numeracy or cognitive 
reflection. 
 
Reward and Dominance 
 
 Contrary to the prediction of Hypothesis 6, reward condition (i.e. hedonic versus 
utilitarian incentive) was not found to have any significant effect on rate of dominance 
violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs. Nor was any effect of this variable was found with 
respect to response time. Hence, it can be surmised that affectively salient hedonic rewards 
did not, in this instance, induce greater reliance on affect-drive System 1 processes than 
affectively pallid utilitarian rewards. 
 
The Affect Elicitation Task: Methodological Changes 
 
As discussed in both the introduction and methodology sections of this chapter, one 
of the aims of this study was to assess whether a particular modification to the affect 
elicitation procedure would serve to induce an increase in sadness (and other negative 
affect states) amongst those in the losses condition. The findings of Study 5 indicated that 
while those in the win condition reported an average decrease in sadness, an equivalent 
increase in sadness was not evident amongst those in the loss condition. It was 
subsequently postulated that the fact that participants in the loss condition still retained a 
balance above zero when they finished the affect elicitation block may have led to the 
procedure being ineffective at inducing (mild) negative affect. The £3:00 balance was not 
funded by the participants themselves and so the final balance (though diminished), may 
have been viewed by at least some participants as a net gain.  
 
A modification to the affect elicitation condition was thus implemented in the 
present study. The balances of those in the loss condition were pre-set to go below zero 
after sustaining the final loss. Though participants were instructed from the outset that 
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could not literally go into debit (i.e. that a balance if zero or less than zero merely meant 
that they would not receive anything in addition to the £2:00 participation fee), it was 
thought that making the balance below zero may induce an increase in sadness (and 
negative affect in a more general sense). Hypothesis 5 therefore predicted that, in the 
present study, a significant increase in sadness between the initial and post affect elicitation 
ratings of mood would be observed amongst amongst those in the loss condition. This 
hypothesis was fully supported by the findings of the study. Post affect elicitation ratings 
of sadness amongst those in the loss condition were found to be significantly higher than 
initial ratings of sadness. As noted above however, endogenous sadness did not appear to 
have any significant relationship with either rate of dominance violation or response time. 
 
In Conclusion 
 
Several interesting findings have been obtained in this study. Of these the ones 
most central to this thesis are those pertaining to numeracy, cognitive reflection and task 
induced changes in happiness. As previously noted, the findings of this study lend further 
support to both the postulation that there exists a strong relationship between probability 
neglect and numeracy and the suggestion that probability neglect (and thus dominance 
violation) results from reliance on fast, intuitive, System 1 processes. In addition to this, 
the data gathered in this investigation indicate a relationship between endogenous 
happiness and choice process that is not mediated by numeracy (or cognitive reflection). In 
the present study change in happiness was found to positively correlate with response time 
and negatively correlate with rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs; 
strongly suggesting that those made happier by participating in the task were more likely to 
expend cognitive effort on it. No such relationship was found regarding incidental 
happiness and dominance violation. Indeed, there was a non-significant positive correlation 
between initial rating of happiness and rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-
outcome pairs. Hence, it seems reasonable to posit that task-induced happiness motivated 
engagement with the task while incidental happiness did not. Further discussion of the 
theoretical and practical implications of this finding will take place in the General 
Discussion in Chapter 9. 
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Chapter 9: General Discussion 
 
The main objective of this programme of research has been to investigate the 
relationship between numeracy, affective state and violations of (transparent) dominance in 
decisions under risk. In Study 1 an unexpectedly high rate of dominance violation occurred 
for pairs in which the existence of a dominant alternative was thought to be transparent. 
The results of this investigation along with those of Study 2 indicated that probability 
neglect was the primary cause of this phenomenon. As decisions under risk are by 
definition choices featuring potential outcomes with a specified probability (< 1) of 
occurring, the finding that a large number of (mostly well educated) participants appear to 
frequently neglect probabilistic information has both theoretical and practical implications. 
For this reason, the decision was taken to investigate the relationship between numeracy, 
affective state, mode of thought and probability neglect. 
 
What follows will be a discussion of: a) the main theoretical implications of the 
investigations that comprise this programme of research and their contribution to 
knowledge; b) the contribution to methodology represented by the expanded numeracy 
scale and affect elicitation procedure; c) the practical implications of the findings obtained 
in this series of studies; and d) possible directions for future research.  
 
Theoretical Implications 
 
Dominance violation and probability neglect. 
 
The most striking finding of Study 1 was the unexpectedly high rate of dominance 
violation observed for asymmetric pairs featuring a higher value single-outcome alternative 
and a lower value two-outcome alternative. Violations of dominance have of course been 
observed in prior research (see for example Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). However, the 
fact that the existence of a dominant alternative had been assumed to be transparent 
prompted further enquiry. Subsequent investigation in Study 2 indicated: a) that less 
numerate individuals were more prone to dominance violation than those higher in 
numeracy; and b) that probability neglect was the cause of these systematic violations of 
dominance. Had participants been violating dominance as a result of quasi-random 
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responding, then dominance should have been violated with similar frequency for all pair 
types. Had the application of prospect theory‘s weighting function been responsible for 
dominance violation, then dominance violation should not have persisted when the 
difference in outcome value between dominant and dominated alternatives was high (see 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1979, for a full outline of original prospect theory). The findings of 
Studies 4, 5 and 6 lend further support to the probability neglect hypothesis (see Chapters 
6, 7 and 8), with the verbal data gathered in Study 4 establishing a further link between 
numeracy and probability neglect. 
 
The fact that dominance violation was found to occur so frequently for asymmetric-
outcome pairs strongly suggests that probability neglect is a widespread phenomenon. 
Insensitivity to probabilistic information has been previously observed with respect to 
events that are highly visceral (e.g. Rottenstreich & Hsee‘s, 1999, study of willingness to 
pay to avoid electric shocks) and potentially catastrophic (e.g. Sunstein‘s, 2003, study of 
the disproportion fear evoked by low probability events). Huber and Huber (2003, as cited 
by Ranyard & Charlton, 2006) meanwhile, found that, when faced with scenarios in which 
choice information must be sought, participants requested less probabilistic information 
when presented with quasi-realistic risky tasks than when presented with a lottery task. 
However, the findings of this programme of research indicate that probability neglect 
frequently occurs even when a) choices concern non-visceral outcomes (e.g. small 
monetary gains and losses); b) the choices in question are between simple lotteries; c) all 
choice information is presented simultaneously and in full; and d) choice information is 
presented in a format that would seem to render probabilistic information salient. Indeed 
given the clearly defined, comprehensively presented and relatively simple nature of the 
lottery choice task, one would anticipate probability neglect to be lower in the lottery 
choice task than less well defined real world choice scenarios. The implications for both 
cognitive and behaviourist models of choice are clear. Any model that requires the 
consideration or weighting of probabilities is unlikely to consistently predict or account for 
the choices of those prone to probability neglect. Hence, given the clear association 
between lower levels of numeracy and probability neglect drawn in the present series of 
investigations, it does not seem unreasonable to posit that while models such as prospect 
theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1979), cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1992) and the TAX (Birnbaum & Chavez, 1997) and RAM (Birnbaum & McIntosh, 1996) 
configural weighting models may be successful at predicting the choice behaviour of more 
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numerate individuals they will be less successful at predicting the choice behaviour of 
those lower in numeracy. 
 
Cognition, probability neglect and dual-process models of thought. 
 
 On observing that dominance was predominantly violated for asymmetric-outcome 
pairs (in which the two-outcome alternative was lower in outcome value), comparisons 
were drawn with the violations of dominance observed by Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994) 
with respect to the jelly beans task. Of course, in Denes-Raj and Epstein‘s study 
denominator neglect rather than probability neglect per se was identified as the cause of 
participants selecting objectively inferior alternatives (e.g. a 9/100 chance of winning over 
a 1/10 chance of winning the same prize). However, there does appear to be a striking 
similarity between the two phenomena. Denes-Raj and Epstein posited that selection of the 
inferior high numerator/high denominator alternative was the result of numerators having 
greater affective salience than denominators. Postulating that humans have two modes of 
thought: the experiential and the rational, Denes-Raj and Epstein suggested that those 
relying on the experiential mode of thought make choices on the basis of affective response 
(see also Epstein, 1994). As discussed in Chapter 2, while opinion varies as to the exact 
manner in which the two modes operate, there is a good deal of evidence to support the 
dual-process conceptualisation of thought (see for instance Evans, 2006; De Neys, 2006; 
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Sloman, 1996 and Stanovich & West, 2000, 2008). It is thus 
posited that reliance on fast, intuitive, affect driven, cognitively undemanding System 1 
processes underlies the high rate of probability neglect and dominance violation observed 
in this programme of research. It is proposed that, just as many of Denes-Raj and Epstein‘s 
participants seemed to divorce numerators from their corresponding denominators, many 
participants presented with the lottery choice task divorced outcomes from their 
corresponding probabilities. This is to suggest that, for a sizable proportion of participants, 
number of potential non-zero outcomes had greater affective salience than outcome 
probabilities. Indeed, the verbal data obtained in Study 4 indicates that in, at least some 
instances, mutual exclusivity was neglected along with probability. Thus, when these 
participants rely upon intuitive, affect driven, System 1 processes, dominance violation for 
asymmetric-outcome pairs is likely to occur.  
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The suggestion that a ‗number of outcomes‘ attribute is being used in lieu of actual 
probabilistic information would seem to be consistent with the notion of attribute 
substitution (see Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). As the name suggests, attribute 
substitution occurs when a relatively inaccessible attribute is substituted in the choice and 
judgement process by a different but associatively related attribute. According to 
Kahneman and Frederick attribute substitution will occur when: 
 
“...(1) the target attribute is relatively inaccessible; (2) a semantically and 
associatively related candidate attribute is highly accessible; and (3) the 
substitution of the heuristic attribute in the judgment is not rejected by the critical 
operations of System 2.” (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, p 54) 
 
With respect to probability neglect, it might be posited that the effort required to accurately 
interpret probabilistic information renders it less accessible than the associatively related 
and more affectively salient (yet objectively irrelevant) ‗number of outcomes‘ attribute. If 
the operation of System 2 does not reject this substitution then probability neglect and 
dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs will occur. 
  
 The existence of a System 1/System 2 split between those more and less prone to 
dominance violation is directly supported by two key pieces of evidence. The first of these 
is the response time data obtained in Studies 2 and 5. The mean response time of 
dominance violators was found to be almost identical for pairs with and pairs without a 
dominant alternative. By contrast, the mean response time of dominance adherers was far 
higher for pairs without a dominant alternative than pairs with. This suggests that 
dominance violators tended to utilise consistently fast, cognitively undemanding processes 
while the amount of cognitive effort expended by dominance adherers varied. Hence, the 
response times of dominance violators are consistent with the application of fast, 
associative, System 1 processes. The response times of dominance adherers meanwhile 
suggest that the load placed on working memory was contingent on the stimulus type, a 
finding that would seem to suggest that this group were not relying on associative, 
cognitively undemanding System 1.  The second finding that supports a System1/System 2 
split between dominance violators and adherers is the negative correlation between score 
of the cognitive reflection test (CRT) and rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-
outcome pairs observed in Study 6. Devised by Frederick (2005) the CRT is proposed to 
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constitute a measure of participants‘ propensity to reflect upon prepotent intuitive 
responses. As might be expected, Frederick has linked cognitive reflection to the inhibition 
of erroneous System 1 responses. The fact that CRT score and dominance violation 
negatively correlated, and that this correlation persisted even when numeracy was 
controlled for, thus further supports the link between System 1 and probability neglect. 
 
 Interestingly, while propensity to violate/adhere to the dominance principle appears 
to have a clear relationship with mode of thought, propensity to reverse preference does 
not. A near-significant correlation between rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-
outcome pairs and rate of preference reversal was found in Study 2. However, this 
correlation was not as high as one would expect to observe should the same processes 
consistently underlie both phenomena. In addition to this no correlation between numeracy 
and preference reversal was found. It was thus concluded that while reliance on 
(erroneous) System 1 responses was largely responsible the high rate of dominance 
violation observed with respect to the lottery choice task, the same could not be said for 
preference reversal. While it is to be supposed that those who are more prone to probability 
neglect are also more prone to both dominance violation and preference reversal, it also 
seems that those less prone to probability neglect demonstrate preference reversal in the 
manner predicted by original prospect theory (see Chapters 2, 3 and 4; see also Starmer, 
1999). One might therefore surmise that both probability neglect and probability 
overweighting led to preference reversal, but only probability neglect led to dominance 
violation. Of course, one might question why those who have a greater tendency to inhibit 
erroneous intuitive System 1 responses do not appear to be better able at avoiding the 
violation of rationality that preference reversal represents. It is thought that the answer to 
this may lie in Stanovich and West‘s (2008) model of response inhibition in the dual-
process framework. As outlined in Chapter 2, this model holds that an erroneous prepotent 
System 1 response will be overridden only if 1) an individual has the mindware to provide 
a normative response; 2) the need to override the prepotent response is detected; and 3) the 
individual possesses the cognitive resources to sustain inhibition until a normative 
response can be generated.  Therefore, if no cue exists as to the need to override one‘s 
prepotent response, then detection of the need to override is unlikely to occur. 
Simultaneously presented lottery pairs featuring a dominant and dominated alternative 
inherently contain cues that one alternative is objectively better. When it comes to 
preference reversal between separately presented lottery pairs however no such cue is 
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present. Hence, it seems reasonable to conclude that failure to detect the need to override 
one‘s prepotent response rather than failure to sustain inhibition resulted in preference 
reversal.  
 
 In summary, it is here postulated that dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome 
pairs tends to result from probability neglect, which is largely the result of reliance on 
intuitive System 1 processes that lead to attribute substitution. Drawing upon Stanovich 
and West‘s (2008) model of the operation of System 1 and System 2 with respect to the 
inhibition of erroneous System 1 responses, it is posited that failure to sustain inhibition is 
primarily responsible for this phenomenon. This is supported by the negative correlation 
between score on the CRT and rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs 
observed in Study 6 and the relationship between numeracy and dominance 
violation/adherence observed in Studies 2 and 6. With respect to preference reversal 
however, it seems likely that both probability neglect and probability overweighting 
prompted this violation of rationality. As the latter does not result from attribute 
substitution (prompted by the high amount of cognitive effort required to interpret and 
utilise probabilistic information), detection of the fact that one‘s response is non-normative 
does not occur. This is evidenced by the lack of a correlation between numeracy and 
preference reversal observed in Study 2. 
 
Numeracy. 
 
As stated above, score on the expanded numeracy scale was found to have a strong 
correlation with rate of dominance violation in Studies 2 and 6. In addition to this, the 
verbal data collected in Study 4 indicated that more numerate individuals made more 
probability references than less numerate participants when the complexity of the lottery 
pairs was increased (i.e. from single-outcome to asymmetric-outcome). No such pattern 
was observed with respect to the referencing of outcome value information. Thus, it was 
felt that it could be reasonably surmised that those lower in numeracy are more prone to 
probability neglect than those higher in numeracy. This does not, of course, mean that less 
numerate individuals always neglected probability for such choice scenarios. As previous 
noted, very few participants violated dominance for all asymmetric-outcome pairs and – as 
will be discussed in more detail in the following sub-section – affective state appears to 
have an influence on propensity to engage in probability neglect separate from that of 
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numeracy or cognitive reflection. However, the evidence gathered in the investigations 
reported here clearly points to a link between lower numeracy and probability neglect. This 
conclusion is consistent with prior research pertaining to numeracy and its relationship 
with choice, reasoning and judgement. On finding that less numerate individuals appeared 
to be more susceptible to denominator neglect and certain framing effects, Peters et al. 
(2006) proposed that more numerate participants derive greater affective meaning from 
precise numeric information while less numerate participants are more likely to be 
influenced by affectively salient, but objectively irrelevant attributes. Further support for 
this hypothesis comes from Peters et al.‘s (2009) finding that less numerate participants‘ 
ratings of the quality of a hypothetical hospital were influenced by their incidental 
affective state, while the ratings of more numerate participants were not.   
 
The notion that irrelevant but affectively salient information is often utilised in lieu 
of numeric information by those lower in numeracy is in keeping with the conclusion 
drawn with respect to the findings of the current programme of research. As previously 
detailed, it is posited that probabilistic information is frequently substituted with a (salient 
but objectively irrelevant) ‗number of outcomes‘ attribute. If an individual is less 
numerate, and thus has greater difficulty utilising probabilistic information, then it would 
seem plausible that they would be more likely to substitute it with a more affectively 
salient and easier to process attribute. If on the other hand an individual is more numerate, 
and thus more able to derive affective meaning from probabilistic information, then they 
would not be expected to engage in attribute substitution with respect to probabilities. 
Hence, one would expect less numerate participants to demonstrate a far higher rate of 
dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs (where the single-outcome alternative 
has the higher outcome value) than more numerate participants.  
 
In addition to establishing a direct link between numeracy, probability neglect and 
dominance violation, the findings of the present programme of research also have 
implications for the debate regarding information processing and representations of 
probability. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 5, it has been argued that humans are innately 
better able to utilise frequency-based probabilistic information than other representations 
(e.g. Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995, 1999; Hoffrage & Gigerenzer, 1996; Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1996). Evidence cited in favour of this postulation includes the finding that 
presenting Bayesian reasoning problems in frequency rather than percentage-based format 
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reduces base rate neglect (see for example Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). Although it 
should be noted that Barby and Sloman (2007) have suggested that this is a result of such 
frequency-based representations rendering the underlying set structure salient rather than 
an innate capacity to utilise frequency-based information. The evidence obtained in Studies 
1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 of this programme of research indicates that widespread probability neglect 
led to dominance violation and that propensity to neglect probability is strongly linked to 
numeracy. This occurred despite the fact that the lottery pairs were presented in a 
frequency-based manner. These findings do not therefore support the notion that 
frequency-based reasoning is an innate capability. This is consistent with the results of a 
recent study conducted by Chapman and Liu (2009), in which it was found that presenting 
information in frequency format induced a greater reduction in base-rate neglect amongst 
more numerate participants than less numerate participants.  
 
The notion that frequency-based representations are always easier to interpret and 
utilise than equivalent forms of probabilistic information is also unsupported by the 
findings of Study 3, in which it was found that with respect to the expanded numeracy 
scale: a) simple frequency-based items did not receive more correct responses than simple 
percentage-based items; and b) frequency and percentage-based items did not load onto 
separate components. These findings do not of course constitute proof that humans aren’t 
generally better at interpreting and utilising frequency-based representations of probability 
than other forms. However, they do strongly imply that the ability to interpret and utilise 
probabilistic information is contingent on the same form of numeracy regardless of the 
manner in which said probabilistic information is presented. 
 
It is felt that the link between numeracy and probability neglect established in this 
programme of research both builds upon the findings of prior research and represents a 
significant contribution to knowledge in itself. Prior research has indicated that those lower 
in numeracy are a) less likely to draw consistent affective meaning from numeric 
information (Peters et al., 2006); b) more likely to utilise affectively salient but objectively 
irrelevant information (Peters et al., 2006; Peters et al., 2009); and c) less likely to base 
perceptions of risk on quantitative risk information (Dieckmann, Peters & Slovic, 2009). 
The findings of this programme of research would seem to support all three of these 
postulations. In addition to this, they also indicate that those lower in numeracy frequently 
fail to utilise probabilistic information. This does not, for the most part, appear to be the 
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result of less numerate participants simply not understanding that outcomes have 
corresponding probabilities. In Studies 2, 5 an 6, few participants violated dominance for 
all (or even most) asymmetric-outcome pairs, while the verbal data obtained in Study 4 
indicates that difference in rate of probability referencing between more and less numerate 
participants was only different for more complex (i.e. asymmetric-outcome pairs). Hence, 
it seems reasonable to conclude that a failure to consistently attend to probabilistic 
information when doing so requires high cognitive effort largely underlies probability 
neglect, and thus dominance violation, amongst less numerate participants. As will be 
further discussed below, this finding has practical as well as theoretical implications. 
 
The effect of affect. 
 
At the outset of Study 5 it was hypothesised that probability neglect and dominance 
violation would occur more frequently amongst those participants in whom positive affect 
had been induced. This postulation was grounded in prior research conducted by Bless et 
al. (1996) and de Vries, Holland and Witteman (2008a, 2008b), in which a clear link was 
drawn between positive affect and reliance on/preference for intuitive, top-down processes 
(i.e. those that would be classified as belonging to System 1). A clear link between reliance 
on (erroneous) intuitive responses and propensity to violate dominance has been identified 
with respect to the lottery choice task. Hence, it was hypothesised that both incidental and 
task-induced happiness would correspond with an increased rate of dominance violation 
for asymmetric-outcome pairs. 
 
The results of Study 5 however painted a rather more complex picture. It was found 
that while initial ratings of happiness (exogenous happiness) correlated positively with rate 
of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs, post affect elicitation ratings of 
happiness did not. Indeed, it was actually found that change in happiness (endogenous 
happiness) had a significant negative correlation with rate of dominance violation for 
asymmetric-outcome pairs. In addition to this, change in happiness was found to have a 
significant positive correlation with response time for asymmetric-outcome pairs, 
suggesting that those whose happiness increased as a result of the affect elicitation 
procedure were expending more cognitive effort on the task. Thus contrary to initial 
predictions, it seemed that endogenous happiness corresponded with greater deliberation 
and a reduction in thought bias. Most of these findings were replicated in Study 6. Initial 
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ratings of happiness did not in this instance significantly correlate with rate of dominance 
violation (though a non-significant positive correlation was observed). However, change in 
happiness was found to a) negatively correlate with rate of dominance violation when 
numeracy and CRT score were controlled for; and b) positively correlate with overall 
response time. 
 
It was thus concluded that endogenous happiness and exogenous happiness have 
different relationships with mode of thought. Incidental, exogenous happiness appears to 
correspond with reliance on intuitive, System 1 processes. However, the fact that no 
significant relationship between initial rating of happiness and dominance violation was 
observed in Study 6 means that this finding cannot be said to be conclusive. The link 
between endogenous happiness and performance on the other hand is much clearer. Task 
induced happiness appears to have led to the expenditure of greater cognitive effort on the 
task. This is evidenced by the positive correlation between change in happiness and 
response time. The negative correlation between change in happiness and dominance 
violation would appear to suggest that those who experienced a task induced increase in 
happiness were more likely to inhibit (erroneous) prepotent responses than those who did 
not. Hence, it seems reasonable to surmise that endogenous happiness facilitated greater 
utilisation of deliberative, System 2 processes. As this relationship between change in 
happiness and performance persisted when numeracy and CRT score were controlled for, it 
seems clear that this wasn‘t simply the result of more numerate and more cognitively able 
participants enjoying the task more. It would also seem to strongly imply that those who 
may otherwise be prone to probability neglect (and thus dominance violation) may be 
induced to expend additional cognitive resources on a probabilistic task if said task induces 
positive affect. 
 
It should be mentioned at this point that there is clear and strong evidence to 
indicate that the link between change in happiness and performance on the lottery choice 
task was causal, as opposed to merely correlation. Affect elicitation condition (i.e. win 
versus loss) was found to have a significant and strong effect on post affect-elicitation 
rating of happiness in both Studies 5 and 6. In Study 5 affect elicitation condition was 
found to have a near-significant effect on rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-
outcome pairs when initial rating of happiness was controlled for. In Study 6, meanwhile, a 
significant effect of affect elicitation condition on rate of dominance violation for 
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asymmetric-outcome pairs was found when numeracy and CRT score were controlled for. 
In addition to this, the findings of both studies indicate that those in the win condition 
tended to have higher response times than those in the loss condition. It would therefore 
seem reasonable to conclude that a) change in happiness was predominantly the result of 
affect elicitation condition; and b) this manipulation tended to induce (or at least facilitate) 
different types of processing amongst those in the win (positive affect) condition and those 
in the loss (negative affect) condition.  
 
With respect to the reason why task-induced happiness corresponded with greater 
deliberation and cognitive effort, it is proposed that task induced happiness motivated 
greater expenditure of cognitive effort on the task. As discussed in Chapters 2, 7 and 8 
Zeelenberg et al. (2008) propose that emotional states serve to drive goal directed 
behaviour. Hence endogenous and exogenous emotional states may, in some instances, 
influence behaviour in a different manner. This would certainly appear to be the case with 
respect to happiness and performance on the lottery choice task. The data gathered in 
Studies 5 and 6 strongly suggests that endogenous happiness led to greater deliberation and 
greater inhibition of erroneous prepotent responses. Exogenous happiness on the other 
hand, did not. As noted above, while the findings regarding this matter were inconclusive, 
exogenous happiness did appear to correspond with greater reliance on (erroneous) 
intuitive responses and attribute substitution. Exogenous happiness may, as the findings of 
Bless et al. (1996) and de Vries, Holland and Witteman (2008a, 2008b) would certainly 
seem to suggest, induce greater propensity to rely upon top-down, associative, affect-
driven System 1 processes. However, task-induced happiness seems to have had the 
opposite effect with respect to the lottery choice task. It is thus postulated that those 
participants in whom an increase in happiness was induced by the task were willing to 
expend more cognitive resources on the task in order to maintain this positive affective 
state.  
 
It is thus posited that while exogenous happiness may facilitate reliance on 
intuitive, associative System 1 processes, endogenous happiness promotes engagement in 
the task and willingness utilise deliberative, cognitively demanding System 2 processes. 
Further investigation is, of course, needed to confirm that this is a generalisable 
phenomenon. However, it is felt that the results of Studies 5 and 6 demonstrate a clear 
difference in the effect of endogenous and exogenous happiness on task performance. 
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Methodological Contributions 
 
It is felt that the expanded numeracy scale and affect elicitation procedure, created 
for use in this programme of research, represent methodological contributions to 
knowledge. Though both were developed specifically for use in this programme of 
research, it is the opinion of the researcher that they may have wider application.  
 
The expanded numeracy scale. 
 
 As detailed in Chapter 5, the nineteen item expanded numeracy scale was found to 
have greater internal consistency than the original eleven item scale developed by Lipkus, 
Samsa and Rimer (2001). It is, of course, to be expected that adding items to scale will 
enhance the scale‘s internal consistency, as long as the items in question measure the same 
underlying construct. However, in this instance it was found that while the value of 
Cronbach‘s alpha for the expanded scale exceeded the .7 threshold recommended for tests 
of ability (see Kline, 1999, as cited in Field, 2005) the value of alpha for the original 
eleven item scale did not. Possible reasons as to why the original eleven item scale may 
have exceeded the .7 threshold in Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer‘s tests but not in those 
reported in Study 3 are discussed in Chapter 5. However, it is felt that the data obtained in 
Studies 2, 3 and 6 indicate that the additional items do serve to enhance the scale. The fact 
that value of alpha was similar in both Study 3 and Study 6 suggests that the scale 
represents a stable and consistent measure. The fact that mathematics undergraduates 
performed significantly better on the task than psychology undergraduates, meanwhile, 
provides a clear indication that the test measures mathematical ability (or at the very least 
mathematical ability pertaining to ratio conceptions). Another indicator of the scale‘s 
validity is the strong negative correlation between score on the scale and rate of dominance 
violation: a relationship that was observed in both Studies 2 and 5. If the scale did not 
measure numeracy then one would not expect to observe such a relationship with 
performance on the lottery choice task. Hence, it is felt that the expanded numeracy scale 
can be said to represent a reliable and valid measure of numeracy.  
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The affect elicitation task. 
 
 As previously discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, the data gathered in Studies 5 and 6 
indicates that the affect elicitation procedure was successful in inducing endogenous 
changes in happiness. The findings of these studies also indicate that these task induced 
changes in happiness corresponded with measures of performance on the lottery choice 
task (i.e. rate of dominance violation for asymmetric-outcome pairs and response time). 
Thus it is felt that the procedure constitutes a useful tool for studying the effect of 
endogenous affect on simple choice tasks.  
 
 It is of course recognised that the procedure may be criticised on ethical grounds, 
due to the fact that that it involves the manipulation of outcomes to induce negative affect 
and minor deception. With respect to the former, it is argued that purposefully inducing 
mild negative affect in this manner is – ethically speaking – no different than running an 
experiment where some participants are likely to experience incidental negative affect as a 
result of losing a ‗real‘ non-fixed gamble. The mood rating data obtained in this study also 
indicated that changes in affect induced by the procedure tended to be transient, with 
ratings of happiness approaching initial levels by the end of the target block (see Chapter 
7). With respect to the issue of deception, it is felt that any potential ethical issues are 
mitigated by the fact that a) the task itself is relatively benign (i.e. does not touch upon 
emotive issues or require that participants divulge sensitive information); b) participants‘ 
final balances were determined by a truly random ticket draw; and c) participants were 
fully debriefed following the experiment.  
 
Practical Implications 
 
In addition to the theoretical and methodological contributions to knowledge made 
by this programme of research, the findings of this series of investigations would also seem 
to have certain practical implications. Of the findings obtained in the six studies reported 
here the most striking are perhaps those pertaining to numeracy and probability neglect.  
Prior research in the field of numeracy and choice has revealed a strong link between 
numeracy and violations of normativity in choice, reasoning and judgement tasks featuring 
probabilistic components (see for example Chapman & Liu, 2009; Garcia-Retamero & 
Galesic, 2009; Peters et al., 2006; Peters & Levin, 2008). However, the results of Studies 2, 
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3, 4 and 6 would seem to show that individuals lower in numeracy frequently neglect 
probabilistic information altogether. On a theoretical level this means that predictive and 
descriptive models of choice that mandate the inclusion of some function of probability are 
likely to only be applicable (or at least consistently applicable) to those higher in 
numeracy. It also perhaps highlights the danger of using samples likely to be high in 
numeracy when developing models of decision making under risk. If participants are 
highly numerate then the results of this study suggest that they will attend to probabilities, 
while those lower in numeracy are likely to be far less consistent in their use of 
probabilistic information. With respect to what one might term real world decision making, 
it would seem highly likely that probability neglect commonly occurs amongst those lower 
in numeracy in day-to-day judgement and decision making scenarios. The lottery choice 
task represents a well defined, relatively simple task with clear outcomes, in which 
information is presented simultaneously and under conditions in which distraction is 
minimised. Hence, it would not seem unreasonable to anticipate that probability neglect 
may occur with even greater frequency in many real world scenarios. A great deal of the 
information people are presented with in day-to-day life is probabilistic (or otherwise ratio 
based) in nature. Thus, failure to consistently attend to probabilistic and other ratio 
information is likely to lead to sub-optimal choice. In the lottery choice task the 
consequences of sub-optimal choice are, of course, relatively minor. In domains such as 
health and personal finance however, neglect of probabilistic information and the selection 
of dominated alternatives may have much more serious consequences. 
 
Future Directions 
 
As noted above the consequences of neglecting probability in various real world 
choice scenarios are likely to be rather more serious than the consequences of neglecting 
probability in small monetary gambles, such as those presented in the lottery choice task. 
One is therefore prompted to consider how probabilistic information might be presented in 
such a way that those lower in numeracy might be more likely to accurately interpret it and 
less likely to engage in processes such as attribute substitution (see Kahneman & 
Fredericks, 2002). It is, of course, likely that a proportion of the general population may at 
present not have the mathematical skills required to understand even very basic 
probabilistic information. However, the results of the investigations reported in this thesis 
would seem to indicate that while many less numerate individuals are prone to probability 
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neglect they do not always neglect probability. Thus, it would seem possible that there are 
ways to present probabilistic information that reduce the likelihood of probability neglect 
occurring. The findings of Study 1 indicated that there existed no difference in rate of 
dominance violation between those presented with text-format and those presented matrix-
format stimuli. Thus, it seems that further work is needed to establish what kind of 
presentation format best reduces probability neglect. The prerequisites of such a format 
would seem to be that it a) enhances the salience of probabilistic information; b) enhances 
the salience of the mutual exclusivity of outcomes; and c) does not lend itself to attribute 
substitution. 
 
In recent years strides have been made in the field of medical and health decision 
making towards the creation of methods of presenting quantitative information that can be 
correctly interpreted by both those higher and lower in numeracy. Peters and colleagues 
(e.g. Peters et al., 2007; Peters et al., 2009) have presented compelling evidence to suggest 
that imposing evaluative categories on quantitative information can increase the utilisation 
of quantitative information. On a similar note, Garcia-Retamero and Galesic (2009) found 
that use of certain pictorial representations appear to reduce denominator neglect. Reyna 
and colleagues meanwhile stress the importance of gist formation and its relationship with 
numeracy (see for example Reyna, 2008; Reyna & Brainerd, 2007; and Reyna et al., 2009). 
To date however it seems that the relationship between numeracy, information presented 
and decisions pertaining to personal finance have received comparatively little focus. 
Huhmann and McQuitty (2009) have proposed a model of consumer financial numeracy. 
This model makes several testable predictions regarding the factors likely to contribute to 
and interact with financial numeracy. However, it does not in itself cover the question of 
how probabilistic and other forms of ratio based financial information might be presented 
in a manner that facilitates comprehension and utilisation amongst those lower in 
numeracy. It is of course likely that much of the research pertaining to the presentation of 
health/medical information will also apply to the presentation of financial information. 
However, it would not seem unreasonable to posit that financial choices may be perceived 
as more affectively pallid than choices pertaining to health; with potential outcomes being 
less well understood. Thus, it would seem that investigation of the relationship between 
numeracy, information format and financial judgement and decision making is warranted. 
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In addition to further exploring the relationship between numeracy and probability 
neglect (and how the latter might be reduced), it is also felt that the relationship between 
cognitive reflection, numeracy, affect and mode of thought warrants further investigation. 
The results of Study 6 along with Frederick‘s (2005) findings suggest that, while score on 
the CRT does strongly correlate with numeracy, it is not merely a short numeracy test but a 
measurement of a distinct cognitive ability (i.e. cognitive reflection). The results of Study 6 
also indicated that while the affect elicitation condition had a significant effect on rate of 
dominance violation amongst those scoring zero on the CRT (with those in the win 
condition violating dominance less for asymmetric-outcome pairs than those in the loss 
condition), no such effect existed amongst those scoring above one. Hence, it would seem 
worthwhile to investigate whether this was the result of those higher in cognitive reflection 
being less susceptible to the effect of affect with respect to thought processes, or whether 
this simply represents a floor effect and the effect of affect would be the same if these 
participants were to be presented with a more complex task (e.g. a choice or judgement 
task that involves Bayesian reasoning). 
 
With respect to furthering the investigation of the effect of exogenous and 
endogenous affective states on mode of thought, it is felt that the affect elicitation 
procedure could be applied to a wider range of choice and judgement phenomena. This 
would allow one to a) investigate whether the link drawn between endogenous happiness 
and the utilisation of deliberative System 2 processes is further supported (i.e. observe 
whether those experiencing task induced happiness tend to be more likely to avoid biases 
other than probability neglect); and b) confirm whether or not incidental (exogenous) 
happiness corresponds with a higher rate of intuitive, System 1 thought biases. It would 
also seem wise to examine whether the difference observed between the apparent effects of 
endogenous and exogenous affect are replicable with respect to less contrived and more 
naturalistic choice tasks. The findings of Studies 5 and 6 strongly suggest that probability 
neglect was lower amongst those in whom endogenous happiness had been induced and 
that this relationship was not mediated by numeracy. The response time data gathered in 
both studies also indicated that those experiencing a task-induced increase in happiness 
expended more cognitive effort on the task than those who did not. Hence, it would seem 
that further investigating the ways in which affective state might facilitate greater 
utilisation of probabilistic and other ratio information amongst those who might otherwise 
be prone to neglecting it would be a worthwhile endeavour.  
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Appendix A: Predictions of the TAX and RAM Configural Weighting Models 
 
Table a(i): Weightings assigned to the lotteries comprising the low win and high win cycles by 
the RAM and TAX configural weighting models  
 RAM TAX Expected Value 
Low Win Cycle    
Lottery A (.2, £14; .8, 0) 2.58 2.56 2.80 
Lottery B (.3, £8; .7, 0) 1.98 1.89 2.40 
Lottery C (.15, £8; .15, £7.75; .7, 0) 1.93 2.37 2.36 
High Win Cycle    
Lottery A (.2, £28; .8, 0) 5.17 5.13 5.60 
Lottery B (.3, £16; .7, 0) 3.97 3.80 4.80 
Lottery C (.15, £16; .15, £15.50; .7, 0) 3.86 4.76 4.73 
  
Table a(i) above details the weightings assigned by the TAX and RAM configural 
weighting models to each of the lotteries in the low win and high win cycles. Expected 
values are also displayed. The weightings were obtained from the RAM and TAX 
calculators made available online by Birnbaum & Bailey (1998), using the default 
parameters. Detailed below are the preference predictions for the low win and high win 
cycles made by each of the models. 
 
Preference predictions   
 
Low win cycle 
 
RAM:  (A > B), (B > C), (A > C) 
TAX:  (A > B), (C > B), (A > C) 
EV:  (A > B), (B > C), (A > C) 
 
High win cycle 
 
RAM:  (A > B), (B > C), (A > C) 
TAX: (A > B), (C > B), (A > C) 
EV: (A > B), (B > C), (A > C) 
 
Note that while TAX predicts violations of dominance for Lottery B versus Lottery C in 
both the low win and high win cycles, neither TAX nor RAM predicts the preference 
reversal (A > B), (C > A) when default parameters are used. It is also worth noting 
however that the fact that the TAX model assigns C a higher weighting than B would seem 
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to predict that the reversal (A > B) (C > A) will occur more frequently than the counter 
reversal (B > A) (A > C). 
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Appendix B: The Expanded Numeracy Scale 
 
1)  If the chance of getting a disease is 10% how many people would be expected to 
get the disease out of 100?  
 
  ____ out of 100. 
 
2) If the chance of getting a disease is 10% how many people would be expected to 
get the disease out of 1000? 
 
  ____ out of 1000. 
 
3) In the Big Bucks Lottery, the chances of winning a £10:00 prize are 1%. What is 
your best guess about how many people would win a £10:00 prize if 1000 people 
each buy a single ticket from Big Bucks? 
 
  ____ people. 
 
4) Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided dice 1000 times. Out of 1000 rolls, how many 
times do you think the die would come up even (even being a 2, a 4 or a 6)? 
 
  The die would come up even ____ times. 
 
5) If Person A‘s risk of getting a disease is 1 in 100 in ten years, and Person B‘s risk is 
double that of A, what is B‘s risk? 
  
  ____ out of 100 in ten years. 
 
6) Each International Lottery ticket provides a 1 in 20,000,000 chance to win 
£10,000,000. If John buys 4 tickets what are his chances of winning? 
 
  _______________________ chances of winning. 
 
7) Question 1. Which of the following represents the highest chance of winning 
£30:00? 
a) 1 in 10 
b) 3 in 10 
c) 5 in 10 
 
8) In the Acme Publishing Sweepstakes, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 1000. 
What percent of tickets of Acme Publishing Sweepstakes win a car? 
 
  ____% 
        Continued on next page  
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9) If Person A‘s risk of getting a disease is 1% in ten years, and Person B‘s risk is 
double that of A, what is B‘s risk? 
 
  ____% in ten years. 
 
10) 
 Brand J painkillers cause drowsiness in 2 in 25 people. 
 Brand K painkillers cause drowsiness in 6 in 25 people. 
 
Which of the two brands is most likely to cause drowsiness? 
a) Brand J 
b) Brand K 
c) They are both equally likely to cause drowsiness. 
 
11) The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005. Out of 10000 people, about how 
many of them are expected to get infected? 
 
  ____ people infected. 
 
12) Which of the following represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? 
a) 1% 
b) 5% 
c) 10% 
 
13) If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the same as have a 
______% chance of getting the disease. 
 
14)  Lottery Y involves one ticket being drawn from a bowl containing 10 tickets.   
3 of these tickets correspond with a win of £40.  
3 of these tickets correspond with a win of £38.  
4 of these tickets correspond with not win. 
Lottery Z involves one ticket being drawn from a bowl containing 10 tickets.  
6 of these tickets correspond with a win of £40. 
4 of these tickets correspond with no win. 
 
a. Which lottery provides the largest chance of winning a cash amount? 
a) Lottery Y 
b) Lottery Z 
c) They provide the same chance of winning a cash amount. 
 
b. Which lottery has the highest overall potential payoff? 
  a) Lottery Y 
  b) Lottery Z 
  c) They provide an identical payoff  
Continued on next page 
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15)  Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? 
a) 1 in 100 
b) 1 in 1000 
c) 1 in 10 
 
16) There are 2000 glass beads in a jar: 3 are red, 3 are blue and the rest are green. 
Without being able to see the colour of the beads inside George draws one bead 
from the jar. If a red bead is drawn then he wins a prize of £8000, if a blue bead is 
drawn he wins a prize £3000, and if green bead is drawn he does not win anything. 
Altogether, how many chances does George have of winning a prize? 
 
  ____ chances of winning a prize. 
 
17) Which of the following represents the highest overall chance of losing £1500? 
  a) A 3 in 10 chance 
  b) A 5 in 10 chance 
  c) A 3 in 5 chance 
 
18) 1 in 3 people in the village of Upper Nullton owns a lawn mower. The village has 
3000 residents. How many of them own a lawn mower? 
 
  ____ people in Upper Nullton own a lawn mower 
 
 
  
295 
 
Appendix C: Knowledge Quiz (Study 2) 
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Additional questions for those in the dominance priming condition 
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Appendix D: Think Aloud Instructions (Study 4) 
 
Think Aloud Instructions 
 
You are about to be presented with an experiment on the computer very similar to that in 
which you previously participated. First you will be given a set of onscreen instructions to 
refresh your mind as to how the games are to be played. This will be followed by 4 
practice lottery pairs, from which you‘ll be asked to choose the lottery that you would 
prefer to play; which in turn will be followed by the ‗main part‘ of the experiment that 
consists of 23 lottery pairs, from which, again, you will be asked to choose the one you 
would prefer to play.  
 
Unlike the previous study however, in this experiment a ‗think aloud‘ method will be used: 
whereby I ask that you verbalize (i.e. tell me out-loud) all the thoughts about the choices 
that occur to you as you decide between each lottery pairs. I am not asking you to give a 
justification for your choices, merely to give voice to your thoughts as they occur to you. 
Should you at any time fall silent for more than twenty seconds then I will prompt you to 
continue talking. 
 
If there is something about the task that you do not understand, you should feel free to ask 
me to explain. However, I may not answer certain questions if I believe that they will bias 
your choices. 
 
As previously stated the experiment will begin with a set of onscreen instructions followed 
by four practice games. The practice games will be used not only to refresh your memory 
as to how the games are played, but to give you a chance to get used to ‗thinking aloud‘. 
 
Remember, there are no ‗right‘ or ‗wrong‘ things to say we are only interested in hearing 
what people think as they play the games. 
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Appendix E: Coding Examples (Study 4) 
 
Coding Scheme 1 
 
In order to illustrate further how coding was conducted a series of five examples are 
provided below.  
 
Example 1: Coding Scheme 1. 
 
 
 
“Okay, let’s see. Um, I’d rather take the smaller chance of losing nine fifty.” Participant 1. 
 
 
 Value  A   Value  B   
Qualitative   
Quantitative X  
 Probability 
A  
Probability 
B 
Qualitative X  
Quantitative   
 
Example 2: Coding Scheme 1. 
 
 
 
“Erm… um… that’s a hard one. Probably choose B, because I would have a chance of 
losing fifteen pounds or I could lose twenty-five pounds. I’d go for B.” Participant 9 
 
 Value  A   Value  B  
Gen 
Value  B  
Higher 
Value  B  
Lower 
Qualitative     
Quantitative   X X 
 Probability 
A  
Probability 
B Gen 
Probability  
B  
Higher 
Probability  
B  Lower 
Qualitative     
Quantitative     
300 
 
 
 
Example 3: Coding Scheme 1. 
 
 
 
“Win one pound sixty... um, same odds. I’ll go for more [laughs]. Oh no, it’s not much 
more.” Participant 20 
 
 Value  A  
Gen 
Value  A  
Higher 
Value  A  
Lower 
Value  B  
Gen 
Value  B  
Higher 
Value  B 
Lower 
Qualitative      X 
Quantitative   X    
 Probability 
A Gen 
Probability 
A  
Higher 
Probability  
A Lower 
Probability 
B Gen 
Probability  
B  
Higher 
Probability  
B  Lower 
Qualitative X   X   
Quantitative       
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Coding Scheme 2 
 
Example 4: Win/Loss Confusion (Coding Scheme 2). 
 
 
 
“Quarter chance of winning A um… I’d go with B cos there’s more chance of winning, and 
it’s only half.” Participant 2 
 
 
Compare OV Compare 
Prob 
Numeric 
difference calc 
OV 
Numeric 
difference  
calc  Prob 
Starts with 
choice 
States choice 
difficult 
Tradeoff 
X X X 
  
 
 
X 
Equivocal Rounds 
values 
Adding Error Win/Loss 
Confusion 
Risk seeking Risk averse Zero outcome 
win 
 
 
  
X 
   
Zero outcome 
loss 
Carry over ‗Obvious‘ No reason    
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Example 5: Adding Error (Coding Scheme 2). 
 
 
 
“Hm. Okay. Lottery A you can lose two pounds eighty or eleven pounds. Lottery B you 
can lose eighteen or five pounds. But with a greater chance of losing nothing. Hm. But the 
overall potential loss of Lottery B is over twenty pounds. But in Lottery A it‘s twelve 
pounds eighty. So Lottery A you‘d lose less if you did lose, so I‘ll choose Lottery A.‖ 
Participant 3 
 
Compare OV Compare 
Prob 
Numeric 
difference calc 
OV 
Numeric 
difference  
calc  Prob 
Starts with 
choice 
States choice 
difficult 
Tradeoff 
X X    
 
 
X 
Equivocal Rounds 
values 
Adding Error Win/Loss 
Confusion 
Risk seeking Risk averse Zero outcome 
win 
 
 
X X 
    
Zero outcome 
loss 
Carry over ‗Obvious‘ No reason    
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Appendix F: Screenshot of demonstration game (Study 5) 
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Appendix G: Task Understanding Questions (Study 5) 
 
 
 
 
 
305 
 
 
 
 
306 
 
 
  
307 
 
Appendix H: Screenshot of Post-Affect Elicitation Mood Rating (Study 5) 
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Appendix I: Debriefing Sheet (Study 5) 
 
Gambling Experiment: Debriefing Sheet 
 
 
This study has two main aims: 
 
1. To examine whether small wins or losses can induce mild feelings of 
disappointment, relief, happiness, annoyance or elation. 
 
2. To examine whether mood has an effect on risk preference. 
 
In order to achieve the first of these aims the first experiment you participated in was 
rigged so that the last lottery you played would either increase your balance considerably 
or reduce your balance considerably. Whether you received the increase or the decrease for 
this lottery was determined by the ticket you picked at the start of the experiment. 
 
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to determine whether any change in people‘s moods at 
the end of Experiment 1 would have an effect on their subsequent lottery preferences. 
 
Both the lottery pair and the ticket drawn at the end of Experiment 2 were genuinely 
random and not rigged in any way. The final balance for Experiment 2 is therefore, in the 
interest of fairness, the one that all participants receive.  
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Appendix J: Expanded Numeracy Scale with CRT 
 
1)  If the chance of getting a disease is 10% how many people would be expected to 
get the disease out of 100?  
 
  ____ out of 100. 
 
2) If the chance of getting a disease is 10% how many people would be expected to 
get the disease out of 1000? 
 
  ____ out of 1000. 
 
3) In the Big Bucks Lottery, the chances of winning a £10:00 prize are 1%. What is 
your best guess about how many people would win a £10:00 prize if 1000 people 
each buy a single ticket from Big Bucks? 
 
  ____ people. 
 
4) Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided dice 1000 times. Out of 1000 rolls, how many 
times do you think the die would come up even (even being a 2, a 4 or a 6)? 
 
  The die would come up even ____ times. 
 
5) If Person A‘s risk of getting a disease is 1 in 100 in ten years, and Person B‘s risk is 
double that of A, what is B‘s risk? 
  
  ____ out of 100 in ten years. 
 
6) Each International Lottery ticket provides a 1 in 20,000,000 chance to win 
£10,000,000. If John buys 4 tickets what are his chances of winning? 
 
  _______________________ chances of winning. 
 
7) Question 1. Which of the following represents the highest chance of winning 
£30:00? 
a) 1 in 10 
b) 3 in 10 
c) 5 in 10 
 
8) In the Acme Publishing Sweepstakes, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 1000. 
What percent of tickets of Acme Publishing Sweepstakes win a car? 
 
  ____ 
        Continued on next page  
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9) If Person A‘s risk of getting a disease is 1% in ten years, and Person B‘s risk is 
double that of A, what is B‘s risk? 
 
  ____% in ten years. 
 
10) 
 Brand J painkillers cause drowsiness in 2 in 25 people. 
 Brand K painkillers cause drowsiness in 6 in 25 people. 
 
Which of the two brands is most likely to cause drowsiness? 
d) Brand J 
e) Brand K 
f) They are both equally likely to cause drowsiness. 
 
11) The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005. Out of 10000 people, about how 
many of them are expected to get infected? 
 
  ____ people infected. 
 
12) Which of the following represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? 
d) 1% 
e) 5% 
f) 10% 
 
13) If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the same as have a 
______% chance of getting the disease. 
 
14)  Lottery Y involves one ticket being drawn from a bowl containing 10 tickets.  
  3 of these tickets correspond with a win of £40.  
3 of these tickets correspond with a win of £38.  
4 of these tickets correspond with not win. 
Lottery Z involves one ticket being drawn from a bowl containing 10 tickets.  
6 of these tickets correspond with a win of £40. 
4 of these tickets correspond with no win. 
 
a. Which lottery provides the largest chance of winning a cash amount? 
d) Lottery Y 
e) Lottery Z 
f) They provide the same chance of winning a cash amount. 
 
b. Which lottery has the highest overall potential payoff? 
  a) Lottery Y 
  b) Lottery Z 
  c) They provide an identical payoff 
        Continued on next page 
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15)  Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? 
 
d) 1 in 100 
e) 1 in 1000 
f) 1 in 10 
 
16) There are 2000 glass beads in a jar: 3 are red, 3 are blue and the rest are green. 
Without being able to see the colour of the beads inside George draws one bead 
from the jar. If a red bead is drawn then he wins a prize of £8000, if a blue bead is 
drawn he wins a prize £3000, and if green bead is drawn he does not win anything. 
Altogether, how many chances does George have of winning a prize? 
 
  ____ chances of winning a prize. 
 
17) Which of the following represents the highest overall chance of losing £1500? 
  a) A 3 in 10 chance 
  b) A 5 in 10 chance 
  c) A 3 in 5 chance 
 
18) 1 in 3 people in the village of Upper Nullton owns a lawn mower. The village has 
3000 residents. How many of them own a lawn mower? 
 
  ____ people in Upper Nullton own a lawn mower 
 
 
19) A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat costs £1.00 more than the ball.  
How much does the ball cost? 
 
 _____ pence. 
 
20) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take  
100 machines to make 100 widgets?  
 
_____ minutes 
 
21) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size.  
If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it  
take for the patch to cover half of the lake?  
 
_____ days 
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Appendix K  
 
Hedonic versus Utilitarian Items: A Supplementary Investigation 
 
Aims 
 
The objective of this study was to identify goods that are perceived to primarily hedonic or 
primarily utilitarian in nature. Hedonic items are those that are perceived primarily 
enjoyable in nature. Utilitarian items by contrast are those that are perceived to be 
primarily useful in nature. Hedonic items tend to be affectively salient while utilitarian 
items tend to be more affectively pallid (see Dhar & Wertenbroch, 2000 for a more 
detailed definition). As it was one of Study 5‘s aims to investigate whether participants 
would be more risk seeking when playing for hedonic incentives than utilitarian incentives 
(see Chapter 8), it was necessary to identified a selection of items that could be classed as 
predominantly hedonic and which could be class as predominantly utilitarian. 
 
Method 
 
54 participants were presented with a copy of the questionnaire on the preceding pages and 
asked to rate how useful and how enjoyable they would find receiving tokens for the items 
listed on a series of seven point scales (0 being ‗not useful/enjoyable at all‘ and 6 being 
‗very useful/enjoyable‘). It should be noted that the questionnaires given to the first 18 
participants did not include fashion accessories, car cleaning products or home cleaning 
products and thus the average scores for these items are based upon the ratings of 36 
participants. 
 
Results and discussion 
 
The table below details the mean usefulness and mean enjoyableness ratings given to the 
items listed on the questionnaire. Items were classified as primarily hedonic if 
enjoyableness ratings were higher than usefulness ratings and primarily utilitarian if 
usefulness ratings were higher. Ratings of enjoyableness and usefulness were statistically 
compared using a series of paired samples t-test. Values of t along with effect size (r) are 
also detailed in table below. 
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Mean ratings of usefulness and enjoyableness for hedonic versus utilitarian items 
 Usefulness Enjoyableness t r Classification 
Music CDs# 4.87 (1.67) 5.89 (1.53) -4.798 .550 Hedonic 
Reference books 5.94 (1.62) 4.72 (1.5) 4.995 .566 Utilitarian 
Stationary# 5.24 (1.62) 3.8 (1.29) 6.5 .666 Utilitarian 
Confectionary# 3.65 (1.91) 5.5 (1.73) -7.327 .709 Hedonic 
Kitchenware 5.45 (1.5) 3.57 (1.45) 8.217 .751 Utilitarian 
Books (fiction) 4.31 (1.72) 5.38 (1.64) -5.201 .589 Hedonic 
Blank CDs# 4.56 (1.94) 2.92 (1.58) 7.439 .721 Utilitarian 
DVDs# 4.77 (1.34) 6.12 (1.02) -6.443 .67 Hedonic 
Fashion accessories 4.44 (1.75) 5.33 (1.55) -3.228 .479 Hedonic 
Cleaning products 
(home)# 
5.61 (1.66) 2.31 (1.55) 7.99 .804 Utilitarian 
Cleaning products (car) 4.08 (2.26) 2.33 (1.53) 4.672 .62 Utilitarian 
#Items that were selected for use as incentives in Study 5 
 
An examination the mean ratings of enjoyableness and usefulness for each item and 
statistical differences between them, indicated that each item on the list could be classified 
as primarily hedonic or primarily utilitarian. With the exception of confectionary, all items 
receiving a higher enjoyableness rating (i.e. those class as primarily hedonic good) also 
received relatively high (above 4) usefulness ratings. However, for all primarily hedonic 
goods, ratings of enjoyableness were significantly greater than ratings of usefulness. 
Hence, the decision was taken to select the three hedonic goods with the greatest mean 
enjoyableness ratings for use as incentives in Study 6. The items in question were: music 
CDs, confectionary and DVDs.  
 
With respect to those items that had higher mean usefulness ratings (i.e. primarily 
utilitarian items), it was found that ratings of usefulness significantly higher than ratings of 
enjoyableness. Though the mean usefulness rating for reference books was higher than the 
mean enjoyableness rating, it was felt that the fact that the mean enjoyableness rating was 
relatively high (above 4) may make it too affectively appealing for use as a utilitarian 
incentive in Study 6. The fact that some of hedonic incentives selected had high usefulness 
ratings posed less of a problem, as this perceived usefulness would not diminish the 
affectively appealing nature of the items in question. However, a requirement of the 
utilitarian incentives was that they be comparatively affectively pallid. Therefore, reference 
book tokens were rejected as possible incentives. From the remaining 5 utilitarian items: 
stationary, home cleaning products and blank CDs were selected as incentives. Though 
kitchenware had a higher usefulness rating and lower enjoyableness rating than stationary, 
it was felt that only one domestic item should be included (i.e. home cleaning products). 
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This was because a large proportion of the sample was likely to be composed of younger 
undergraduates who may live with parents and thus not be responsible for the purchase of 
domestic products. 
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Appendix L: Debriefing Sheet (Study 6) 
 
Gambling Experiment: Debriefing Sheet 
 
 
This study has three main aims: 
 
1. To examine whether small wins or losses can induce mild feelings of 
disappointment, relief, happiness, annoyance or elation. 
 
2. To examine whether mood has an effect on risk preference. 
 
3. To examine whether the type of reward used in the gambling game 
influences mood change and/or risk preference. 
 
In order to achieve the first of these aims the first experiment you participated in was 
rigged so that the last lottery you played would either increase your balance considerably 
or reduce your balance considerably. Whether you received the increase or the decrease for 
this lottery was determined by the ticket you picked at the start of the experiment. 
 
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to determine whether any change in people‘s moods at 
the end of Experiment 1 would have an effect on their subsequent lottery preferences. 
 
Both the lottery pair and the ticket drawn at the end of Experiment 2 were randomly 
selected. The final balance for Experiment 2 is therefore, in the interest of fairness, the one 
that all participants receive.  
 
While you chose to play for tokens for a particular item at the start of the experiment the 
tokens you received can be used to make any kind of purchase at any of the shops listed on 
the tokens themselves or the Love2shop website. 
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Appendix M: Demographic Details Form (all studies) 
 
Demographic Details 
 
 
Participant No. ____ 
 
 
Name: ____________________   Age: ____ 
 
 
Occupation: ______________________ 
 
 
 
Are there any comments about the study that you would like to make? 
 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________. 
 
 
 
 
 
